# MCIAS Progress

Source of truth for current development state.

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## Current Status: Phase 5 Complete — Full Implementation

All phases are complete. The system is ready for deployment.

### Completed Phases

- [x] Phase 0: Repository bootstrap (go.mod, .gitignore, docs)
- [x] Phase 1: Foundational packages (model, config, crypto, db)
- [x] Phase 2: Auth core (auth, token, middleware)
- [x] Phase 3: HTTP server (server, mciassrv binary)
- [x] Phase 4: Admin CLI (mciasctl binary)
- [x] Phase 5: E2E tests, security hardening, commit

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## Implementation Log

### 2026-03-11 — Initial Full Implementation

#### Phase 0: Bootstrap

- Wrote ARCHITECTURE.md (security model, crypto choices, DB schema, API design)
- Wrote PROJECT_PLAN.md (5 phases, 12 steps with acceptance criteria)
- Created go.mod with dependencies (golang-jwt/jwt/v5, uuid, go-toml/v2,
  golang.org/x/crypto, modernc.org/sqlite)
- Created .gitignore

#### Phase 1: Foundational Packages

**internal/model**
- Account (human/system), Role, TokenRecord, SystemToken, PGCredential,
  AuditEvent structs
- All credential fields tagged `json:"-"` — never serialised to responses
- Audit event type constants

**internal/config**
- TOML config parsing with validation
- Enforces OWASP 2023 Argon2id minimums (time≥2, memory≥64MiB)
- Requires exactly one of passphrase_env or keyfile for master key
- NewTestConfig() for test use

**internal/crypto**
- Ed25519 key generation, PEM marshal/parse
- AES-256-GCM seal/open with random nonces
- Argon2id KDF (DeriveKey) with OWASP-exceeding parameters
- NewSalt(), RandomBytes()

**internal/db**
- SQLite with WAL mode, FK enforcement, busy timeout
- Idempotent migrations (schema_version table)
- Migration 1: full schema (server_config, accounts, account_roles,
  token_revocation, system_tokens, pg_credentials, audit_log)
- Migration 2: master_key_salt column in server_config
- Full CRUD: accounts, roles, tokens, PG credentials, audit log

#### Phase 2: Auth Core

**internal/auth**
- Argon2id password hashing in PHC format
- Constant-time password verification (crypto/subtle)
- TOTP generation and validation (RFC 6238 ±1 window, constant-time)
- HOTP per RFC 4226

**internal/token**
- Ed25519/EdDSA JWT issuance with UUID JTI
- alg header validated BEFORE signature verification (alg confusion defence)
- alg:none explicitly rejected
- ErrWrongAlgorithm, ErrExpiredToken, ErrInvalidSignature, ErrMissingClaim

**internal/middleware**
- RequestLogger — never logs Authorization header
- RequireAuth — validates JWT, checks revocation table
- RequireRole — checks claims for required role
- RateLimit — per-IP token bucket

#### Phase 3: HTTP Server

**internal/server**
- Full REST API wired to middleware
- Handlers: health, public-key, login (dummy Argon2 on unknown user for
  timing uniformity), logout, renew, token validate/issue/revoke,
  account CRUD, roles, TOTP enrol/confirm/remove, PG credentials
- Strict JSON decoding (DisallowUnknownFields)
- Credential fields never appear in any response

**cmd/mciassrv**
- Config loading, master key derivation (passphrase via Argon2id KDF or
  key file), signing key load/generate (AES-256-GCM encrypted in DB),
  HTTPS listener with graceful shutdown
- TLS 1.2+ minimum, X25519+P256 curves
- 30s read/write timeouts, 5s header timeout

#### Phase 4: Admin CLI

**cmd/mciasctl**
- Subcommands: account (list/create/get/update/delete), role (list/set),
  token (issue/revoke), pgcreds (get/set)
- Auth via -token flag or MCIAS_TOKEN env var
- Custom CA cert support for self-signed TLS

#### Phase 5: Tests and Hardening

**Test coverage:**
- internal/model: 5 tests
- internal/config: 8 tests
- internal/crypto: 12 tests
- internal/db: 13 tests
- internal/auth: 13 tests
- internal/token: 9 tests (including alg confusion and alg:none attacks)
- internal/middleware: 12 tests
- internal/server: 14 tests
- test/e2e: 11 tests

Total: 97 tests — all pass, zero race conditions (go test -race ./...)

**Security tests (adversarial):**
- JWT alg:HS256 confusion attack → 401
- JWT alg:none attack → 401
- Revoked token reuse → 401
- Non-admin calling admin endpoint → 403
- Wrong password → 401 (same response as unknown user)
- Credential material absent from all API responses

**Security hardening:**
- go vet ./... — zero issues
- gofmt applied to all files
- golangci-lint v2 config updated (note: v2.6.2 built with go1.25.3
  cannot analyse go1.26 source; go vet used as primary linter for now)

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## Architecture Decisions

- **SQLite driver**: `modernc.org/sqlite` (pure Go, no CGo)
- **JWT**: `github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5`; alg validated manually before
  library dispatch to defeat algorithm confusion
- **No ORM**: `database/sql` with parameterized statements only
- **Master key salt**: stored in server_config table for stable KDF across
  restarts; generated on first run
- **Signing key**: stored AES-256-GCM encrypted in server_config; generated
  on first run, decrypted each startup using master key
- **Timing uniformity**: unknown user login runs dummy Argon2 to match
  timing of wrong-password path; all credential comparisons use
  `crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare`