# tines — Addressed Delivery (store-and-forward) Date: 2026-10-18 Status: draft Extends: `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-10-16-tines-design.md` ## Intent Robots are mostly offline. Today tines gossips observations to every node it meets — every fact spreads to everyone, and every node is a sink for its own world-picture. That covers shared *facts* but not *directives*: there is no way for one robot to address a message to a specific recipient, or to have an intermediary carry it there. The motivating scenario: a survey drone (A) detects an object of interest that needs the instrument robot C to investigate. A and C may never meet directly. When A meets B, A hands B the tasking addressed to C; B carries it until it meets C (or another node that can keep it moving); C eventually receives it and recognizes it as already seen. A keeps its own copy and, if it ever meets C, delivers the details directly. A second scenario: a robot that needs retrieval or repair can emit a message *about itself* — either broadcast (`to = none`) or addressed to a known entity (its "control"/home base). ## Goals 1. A node can address a message to a specific recipient (`to = NodeId`). 2. Multi-hop, epidemic store-and-forward: any node that isn't the recipient can carry the message and forward it to any peer, until it reaches the recipient or expires. 3. Best-effort: no delivery acknowledgment; the originator keeps its own copy. 4. Lifetime-bounded: every addressed message carries a lifetime; carriers drop it once expired. 5. Dedup by content ID: the recipient (and every carrier) recognizes an already-seen message and ignores duplicates. 6. Local-drop cancellation: a node that is done with a message simply stops relaying it; nothing propagates. ## Non-goals / anti-goals - No delivery receipts or custody-transfer acknowledgments. A never learns whether C got it. - No hop-count limit. Lifetime is the only bound for now; a TTL/hop bound can be added later. - No routing intelligence. Forwarding is pure epidemic — no notion of "closer to the destination." - No first-class "about" field. The subject stays the `topic` (a naming convention the application owns). - No change to the existing broadcast gossip path. - The simulation GUI (mark a node ready/not, visually interact with memory) is a separate milestone (M3), out of scope here. ## Constraints - `tines-core` remains `#![no_std]`; `alloc` is feature-gated (default on) and only `MemStore` may require it. Must build for `thumbv7em-none-eabihf` with `--no-default-features`. - No async, threads, I/O, or panics on untrusted wire input. - The content-ID hash changes: `to` becomes part of identity (a breaking change to the pinned vector from the M1 spec). - Addressed messages never appear in a bloom summary (which would leak their existence and cause them to be gossiped). - `lifetime_ms` is excluded from the content ID, like `age_ms`/`observed_at`. ## Data model `Observation` gains two fields: - `to: Option` — recipient. `None` = broadcast (today's gossip); `Some(C)` = addressed to C. - `lifetime_ms: Option` — validity window for addressed messages; invariant `lifetime_ms.is_some() == to.is_some()`. Set at creation, carried unchanged, excluded from identity. `observer` remains "from whom" (the originator). "about whom/what" remains the `topic`. The content ID becomes `first-16-bytes(Blake2s-256(observer || seq_le || topic_len_le || topic || payload_len_le || payload || to))`, where `to = None` hashes as a distinct fixed marker. Consequence: the same payload addressed to two different recipients is two messages (distinct IDs), and a relay can hold both. ## Delivery model Two disjoint paths. **Broadcast (`to = None`)** — unchanged. Bloom-summary/diff gossip; every node absorbs what it hears. **Addressed (`to = Some(C)`)** — a separate, targeted path: - A carrier holds the message in a bounded custody buffer (not the main store, not the bloom). - On contact with a peer P: if P is C, deliver it (C absorbs into its store, deduped by ID); otherwise forward it — P becomes another carrier (multi-hop epidemic). - Loop prevention: content-ID dedup makes re-delivery a no-op; a node does not re-forward a message to the peer it just received it from (immediate-bounce suppression). **Invariant (non-negotiable):** only broadcast observations (`to = None`) are summarized in a bloom. Addressed messages — to me or to others — are never summarized, so their existence never leaks to unrelated nodes via gossip. ## Lifetime and expiry An addressed message is valid for `lifetime_ms` from creation. A carrier computes its current age with the existing machinery (`current_age = age_ms + (now - stored_at)`) and drops it once `current_age > lifetime_ms`. Expiry is local and silent. Age already accumulates per hop (each relay re-encodes the age-adjusted observation), so a lifetime measured from observation is consistent across every carrier. ## Cancellation A node that is done with a message — the recipient, or a carrier that no longer cares — simply stops relaying it. No cancellation signal propagates through the network. ## Decisions vs. my calls **Kyle decided:** `to` is part of identity (content ID); multi-hop epidemic forwarding; lifetime (per-message, time-based) rather than hop-count; best-effort with no ack; local-drop cancellation; "about" stays the topic; `observer` is "from whom." **My calls** (the builder-check surfaced five open questions; all resolved below without needing further input — none changed a Kyle decision): - **Custody is a filtered view over the store, not a separate core buffer.** A `MAX_CUSTODY`-sized heapless buffer of full messages would need ~64 × 1 KB ≈ 72 KB of core static RAM, breaking the no-alloc MCU constraint. Instead, addressed messages live in the (backend-owned, alloc-gated) store alongside broadcast facts; the "custody set" is just "stored observations with `to = Some(other)` not yet expired." Storage cost is the backend's, exactly as `Store`/`MemStore` already work. - **Originator is a carrier.** The originator's own addressed message lives in that same view and is forwarded like any carrier's copy; it never enters the broadcast set and never feeds the bloom. - **Delivery rides the custody path.** A carrier forwards on contact; when the peer is the recipient, the message is absorbed into its store (deduped by ID, excluded from the bloom). No separate "direct send" path. - **Expired-never-stored is a correctness rule.** No node — carrier or recipient — ever stores an addressed message whose lifetime has expired; expiry is checked before insertion. - **The app-facing view is broadcast + to-me.** `for_each_topic`/belief see only `to = None` and `to = Some(me)` observations; `to = Some(other)` messages are invisible to queries and exist only to be forwarded. - **Convergence is broadcast-scoped.** The simulator's `converged`/ `connected_components_converge` properties apply to broadcast observations only; addressed delivery gets its own properties (recipient receives a live message along a connected path; non-recipients dedup; expired never stored). - **Bounce suppression is per-contact:** a node does not re-forward a message to the peer it just received it from within the same contact (content-ID dedup covers correctness otherwise). - **Scheduling:** under the ≤1-frame-per-poll budget, the exchange interleaves broadcast (summary/diff) and custody (addressed forward); custody must not starve broadcast. Exact priority is left to the plan. - **"control"/"home base"** are application-level names resolved to a `NodeId` before the message is created; the core sees only `NodeId`s. - **`lifetime_ms` semantics:** measured from observation, excluded from identity, `Option` with the `Some`-iff-addressed invariant. ## What's left to the builder - Exact wire-format changes (`to`, `lifetime_ms`) and the new content-ID hash layout + an updated known-vector test. - The store/custody-buffer layout and the summary filter that excludes addressed messages. - The exchange changes: targeted + epidemic forwarding on contact, bounce suppression, expiry. - The `Node` facade API for addressing a message with a recipient and lifetime. - A simulator scenario reproducing the relay chain (A → B → C, C dedups), plus property tests for expiry and epidemic spread.