# tines — threat model and security assessment

- **Assessed:** `master` at `3b1a644` (tines-core / tines-store / tines-bt /
  tines-ros2 / tines 0.3.0, fleet-deployment milestone mostly landed)
- **Date:** 2026-10-19
- **Status:** first version. This is a living document, not a spec: update
  it when the code or the trust assumptions change.
- **Related:** the 1.0 spec (`docs/superpowers/specs/2026-10-18-tines-1-0-design.md`),
  especially §2a (signature slot) and §2b (age and the 1.1 threat model).

Every finding below was checked against the source; `file:line` references
are to `3b1a644`.

## 1. Summary

tines v1 has **no trust layer by design**. The core spec lists security as a
non-goal for v1, and the fleet spec repeats "v1 has no trust layer". So most
of what an attacker can do today is expected:

- Anyone in radio range can read everything.
- Anyone in radio range can inject observations under any identity.
- Anyone in radio range can take custody of addressed messages.

That's acceptable while the fleet operates in a trusted RF environment, and
not otherwise. Signing arrives in 1.1 (spec §2a), and link authentication is
the likely 1.1 mechanism for everything that changes per hop (spec §2b).

Separate from the by-design gaps, the assessment found defects that matter
**now**, even with no attacker present. Several are correctness bugs that
the fleet milestone needs fixed regardless of security:

| # | Severity | Finding |
|---|---|---|
| F1 | **High** | A receiver whose store is full still acks, so the sender releases custody of a message nobody kept. |
| F2 | **High** | The standalone `tines` service never polls its `Node`, so it never exchanges anything over BLE. |
| F3 | **High** | `tines-bt` doesn't bind a connection to the advertised NodeId, has no inbound listener, and loses frame boundaries on a stream socket. |
| F4 | **High** | No host calls `LogStore::flush`, and both seed `Node` from the config `first_seq`. Released flags and `next_seq` are never persisted, so seqs repeat after every restart. |
| F5 | Medium | `LogStore` recovery truncates every record after a single corrupt one, and the writer can produce records the reader rejects. |
| F6 | Medium | A peer's NodeId is taken from each frame's `from`, unchecked and changeable per frame, so a peer can claim any identity and be handed that identity's addressed mail. |
| F7–F17 | Medium/Low | Resource exhaustion, amplification, local-IPC and ROS2 exposure, and smaller defects (§6). |

Recommended order: fix F1–F5 in the fleet milestone (they're bugs), harden
the hosts (F10–F12) before any robot leaves the lab, and settle the 1.1
threat questions (§8) before designing signing.

## 2. System and trust boundaries

```mermaid
flowchart LR
  subgraph Robot["Robot (one tines instance per device)"]
    direction TB
    App["Robot software<br/>(ROS2 nodes or IPC clients)"]
    Host["Host: tines-ros2 or tines service"]
    Core["tines-core<br/>Node + Exchange"]
    Store[("tines-store<br/>append-only log")]
    BT["tines-bt<br/>BlueZ L2CAP"]
    App -- "B2: DDS domain / Unix socket" --> Host
    Host --> Core
    Core --> Store
    Core --> BT
  end
  Air(("B1: radio<br/>BLE advertising + L2CAP"))
  BT <--> Air
  Air <--> Other["Other robots<br/>(and anyone in range)"]
  Disk["B3: filesystem"] -.- Store
```

| Boundary | What crosses it | Who can be on the other side today |
|---|---|---|
| **B1 radio** | Advertisements (NodeId in clear), L2CAP frames: Summary, Obs, Frag, Ack | Any BLE device in range. There's no pairing, encryption or allowlist. |
| **B2 local IPC / ROS2** | Observations in, beliefs/payloads and events out | Any local user who can reach the socket (permissions come from umask); any participant on the ROS2 DDS domain (no SROS2). |
| **B3 storage** | The observation log, released set, `next_seq` | Anyone with write access to the log file (mode from umask). |
| Core ↔ transport | `Addr`, raw frames | Trusted code. Core relies on the transport to bind `Addr` to a NodeId (AGENTS.md: "core never maps Addr to NodeId"). |

## 3. Assets

1. **World state integrity:** the facts robots plan and navigate on. Forged
   or stale facts can make a robot act wrongly.
2. **Directive integrity and delivery:** addressed messages (tasks,
   telemetry home), including that they arrive, arrive once, and don't
   outlive their lifetime.
3. **Custody:** "every unexpired addressed message has at least one holder".
4. **Availability of exchange:** contacts are rare and short; wasting one is
   costly.
5. **Robot resources:** RAM (MCU-class targets), disk, battery, airtime.
6. **Identity:** which robot said what (`observer`), which robot is on the
   other end of a link.
7. **Confidentiality:** world state and directives (not a v1 goal) and
   robot location/movement privacy (stable advertised NodeId).
8. **Durability:** the log, the released set and `next_seq` across reboots.

## 4. Adversaries

| Adversary | Capabilities | In scope for |
|---|---|---|
| **A1 radio outsider** | No fleet key. In BLE range: listens, advertises any NodeId, connects, injects arbitrary frames, replays, floods. Can't easily alter frames in flight on an established link, but can impersonate a peer. | v1 assessment; 1.1 design |
| **A2 compromised robot (insider)** | Valid fleet member (and, from 1.1, a valid key). Can already drop, delay or withhold anything it carries; custody accepts carrier failure. | 1.1 design (what signatures do and don't buy) |
| **A3 local user / process** | Unprivileged account or process on the robot's computer. | Host hardening (now) |
| **A4 ROS2 domain participant** | Any process on the same DDS domain, local or on the network the ROS graph is exposed to. | Host hardening (now) |
| **A5 physical / storage access** | Can read or edit the log, swap the SD card, or power-cycle the robot at will. | Partially (integrity and crash safety); full physical attack is out of scope |
| **A0 no adversary** | Faults only: power loss, full disk, full store, radio loss, clock jumps. | Always. Several findings below are A0 bugs. |

Out of scope: side channels, RF jamming (physical-layer DoS can't be fixed
in software), compromise of BlueZ/the kernel, and supply chain.

## 5. Security properties: claimed vs actual

| Property | Claimed (specs/AGENTS.md) | Actual at `3b1a644` |
|---|---|---|
| No panic on untrusted input (core) | Hard constraint | **Holds** as far as reviewed: saturating age arithmetic, guarded shifts and indexing, `expect`s unreachable from wire input (exchange.rs:437, 1092; frag.rs:147). The sim's `garbage_frames_never_panic` covers random bytes only (§9). |
| Malformed frames dropped | Hard constraint | **Holds** in core (wire.rs:64-69). The 1.0 spec adds reporting. |
| Bounded memory in core | Fixed-capacity buffers | **Holds** for the exchange (§6 table). **Doesn't hold for the system**: MemStore and LogStore are unbounded without `trim`, and no host calls `trim` (F10). |
| Custody: ≥ 1 holder (no carrier failure) | Fleet spec, sim property | **Breaks without an attacker** when a store is full (F1). Breaks trivially under A1 (F7). |
| Frames bound to the advertised NodeId | Fleet spec ("frames whose `from` differs … are dropped at the transport") | **Doesn't hold** (F3, F6). |
| Released messages not re-forwarded after reboot | Fleet spec | **Doesn't hold**: release flags are never flushed (F4). Safe direction (duplicate custodian), but wasteful. |
| `next_seq` persisted across reboots | Core contract | **Doesn't hold** in either host (F4). |
| Age continues across reboot | Fleet spec | Partly. Hosts open the store at tick 0, and the service's tick is wall-clock *seconds* (F17). |

## 6. Findings

Severity reflects impact on the fleet as it's meant to be deployed (trusted
RF, single-user robot computers) unless stated. "By design (v1)" marks
attacker capabilities that follow from having no trust layer; they're
listed so the 1.1 work can check them off.

### F1 — Full store acks what it didn't keep (High, A0/A1)

`Exchange::accept` enqueues an ack for every receive except a released
duplicate, including when `insert` fails (exchange.rs ~805-813, comment:
"even an un-stored id"). `Err(Full)` counts as a duplicate and
`released` is false, so the ack goes out. The sender then releases custody
of a message the receiver didn't keep.

- **Effect:** an addressed message is lost with no carrier failure. This
  violates the custody invariant the fleet spec and sim property rely on.
  An attacker doesn't need to do anything clever: filling a robot's store
  (F10) turns it into a custody sink.
- **Why it's not caught:** `MemStore` never returns `Full`, and the sim uses
  `MemStore`.
- **Fix:** never ack an addressed observation unless `insert` returned
  `Ok(_)` (and, for duplicates, the copy isn't released). Add a sim/unit
  test with a store that returns `Full`. This was the fleet spec's own rule
  ("B never acks a … store-full receive").

### F2 — The standalone service never runs the exchange (High, A0)

`tines/src` never calls `Node::poll` or `Node::trim` (grep; the plan calls
for a poll loop, `docs/superpowers/plans/2026-10-18-tines-fleet-deployment.md:209`).
`serve()` only answers IPC requests.

- **Effect:** a non-ROS2 robot never sends or receives anything. Inbound BLE
  data accumulates in an unbounded channel (F10).
- **Security relevance:** availability, plus unbounded memory growth while
  connected. Mostly a functional bug.
- **Fix:** a poll loop (with `trim` on a schedule and `flush` after
  releases), off the IPC thread or interleaved with it.

### F3 — tines-bt: no identity binding, no listener, no framing (High, A0/A1)

- `read_loop` stamps every inbound chunk with `from: peer`, where `peer`
  comes from config (tines-bt/src/transport.rs:340-363). The drop check
  `if from != self.peer` (transport.rs:113-115) therefore never fires,
  whichever device connected.
- The scanner connects to the first device advertising the tines service
  UUID and never decodes or compares the advertised NodeId
  (transport.rs:290-308). There's no allowlist.
- There's no `L2capListener`, so nothing accepts inbound connections, and
  `is_central` is never consulted. Every instance dials out. Two robots
  can only connect if something else accepts.
- The L2CAP socket is in **stream** mode and each `read()` result is
  treated as one frame (transport.rs:345-356). Frame boundaries aren't
  preserved, so frames can be split or merged. Without an attacker, that
  produces sporadic malformed drops. With the 1.0 drop reporting, it would
  also produce false "malformed" alarms.
- `Contact`/`Lost` events are never emitted, so core's per-contact state
  (bounce records, ack validation "this contact", peer removal) never
  resets (see F8).
- No BLE security level (pairing, encryption, LE Secure Connections) is
  requested.

**Fix (fleet milestone):**
- Use SeqPacket L2CAP, or add explicit length-prefix framing.
- Add a listener plus the smaller-NodeId-initiates rule.
- Decode the advertised NodeId and bind the connection to it.
- Drop frames whose `from` differs from the bound NodeId.
- Emit `Contact`/`Lost`.

**Later (1.1):** authenticate the link (spec §2b). Advertised NodeIds are
unauthenticated, so the binding only becomes meaningful once there's a
handshake.

### F4 — Durability promises aren't kept by the hosts (High, A0)

- No host calls `LogStore::flush` (grep of `tines-ros2/src`, `tines/src`).
  `Meta { next_seq, released }` is only written by `flush`. So the
  released set never reaches disk, and after a restart every released
  message is forwarded again. That's the safe direction (a duplicate
  custodian) but contradicts the fleet spec.
- Both hosts build `Node` with the config `first_seq`
  (`tines/src/main.rs:44-48`, `tines-ros2/src/node.rs:147-149`) instead of
  a persisted value. Core requires `next_seq` to be persisted
  (`boot_count << 32 | counter`). After a restart, seqs repeat. A new
  observation with the same topic, payload and recipient as an earlier one
  then has the same id and **dedupes silently**: the robot reports
  something and it vanishes.
- `LogStore::next_seq` counts *all* inserts, including received ones
  (log.rs:352), so it isn't the node's seq either.

**Fix:**
- Persist the node's `next_seq` (boot counter plus counter), and seed
  `Node` from it.
- Flush on release and on a timer.
- Add a host-level restart test.

### F5 — Log recovery can destroy good data (Medium, A0/A5)

- `LogStore::new` stops replay at the first record that fails to parse and
  truncates the file there (log.rs:180-206). A single corrupt record in the
  *middle* (a bad sector, a bit flip, a hand edit) deletes every record
  after it. The code comment says "only the partial tail of a crashed
  append is lost, never a complete record", which is true only for tail
  damage.
- `write_record` doesn't enforce `MAX_RECORD_BYTES` (log.rs:274-281), but
  the reader rejects longer records. A `Meta` record grows by 16 bytes per
  released id, so above roughly 500 released ids the store writes a record
  that makes it truncate itself on the next open.
- There's no checksum, so silent corruption that still decodes is accepted.
  The stored `id` is trusted without recomputing `obs.id()` (log.rs:154).
- There's no file locking. Two processes on one log interleave appends, and
  one's recovery `set_len` can cut the other's records.
- The log is read whole into memory (log.rs:127). The file is created with
  umask permissions, and the truncation isn't fsynced.

**Fix:**
- Add a per-record CRC (or a keyed MAC later).
- On a bad record in the middle, skip to the next valid one (a sync marker)
  instead of truncating; truncate only a torn *tail*.
- Enforce the size cap on write, and keep `Meta` small (store release
  flags per record, or compact).
- Take an exclusive `flock` on open.
- Create the file with mode `0600`.
- Recompute ids on load.

### F6 — Peer identity is whatever the last frame said (Medium; High combined with F3)

`on_frame` sets `peer.id = Some(frame.sender())` on every frame, unchecked
(exchange.rs:723). The `from` field inside Obs/Frag is ignored, and
`observer` is never compared to anything.

- **Effect (A1):** send one frame with `from = X`, and `forward_addressed`
  hands you every message addressed to X (exchange.rs:584-593), as
  "delivery". Combined with F7 you can then ack them, and the honest
  carrier releases them.
- **Design note:** core deliberately leaves the `Addr` ↔ NodeId binding to
  the transport, so this is F3's consequence. Still, core could cheaply
  refuse a NodeId *change* for an existing peer within a contact, and
  should, once the transport binds identities.

### F7 — Custody can be taken by anyone the carrier sends to (Medium; by design v1)

An ack is accepted if it comes from the address the message was sent to
(bounce `Sent` record, exchange.rs:756-784). Under the custody chain, a
carrier hands an addressed message to *any* peer with a known id
(exchange.rs:594-595), then releases on that peer's ack. A1 can collect
custody of every addressed message in range and drop it.

- That matches "carrier failure" (accepted for v1) but needs no key and no
  compromise. 1.1's link authentication limits it to fleet members (A2),
  where it really is carrier failure.
- Also: repeated Acks produce duplicate confidence events (`bcast_sent`
  isn't consumed).

### F8 — Peer-table lockout (Medium, A1)

`MAX_PEERS = 8`. Peers are added on `Contact` or on the first decodable
frame, and removed only on `Lost` (exchange.rs:674-708). A full table drops
all frames from new addresses. There's no idle eviction. With BLE never
emitting `Lost` (F3), entries effectively never leave on real hardware.
Eight spoofed addresses lock a robot out of exchange until restart.

**Fix:** idle-timeout eviction in core (a local constant), and real
`Lost` events from tines-bt.

### F9 — Summary amplification (Medium, A1)

A Summary of about 20 bytes with an all-zero filter makes the receiver
rebuild that peer's send queue with up to 256 of its youngest broadcasts
(exchange.rs:1065-1125). Each one can be up to 64 fragments, so the worst
case is about 16,000 frames of airtime per crafted summary. That's
throttled to one frame per `poll`, but sustained. Re-sending the summary
re-queues what was already sent.

- Each rebuild also scans every broadcast and clones payloads, which costs
  CPU and allocation per summary, with no rate limit.
- **Fix:** rate-limit summary processing per peer (honour at most one per
  `SUMMARY_INTERVAL_MS`), and remember what was already sent this contact
  (`bcast_sent` already exists) so a repeated summary doesn't re-queue it.

### F10 — Unbounded growth (Medium, A0/A1/A4)

- `MemStore` and `LogStore` are bounded only by `Node::trim`. Neither host
  calls it. The log also never compacts (log.rs: append-only, and every
  flush appends the full released list).
- Unbounded channels: tines-bt's inbound and outbound `mpsc`
  (transport.rs:207-208), and tines-ros2's inbound `mpsc` (node.rs:152).
- The IPC server allocates up to 1 MiB per request frame.
- **Effect:** A1 can fill memory and disk by gossiping junk. A4 can do it by
  publishing on a bridged topic. Either drives F1 (store full) once a
  bounded store exists.
- **Fix:**
  - Hosts trim on a schedule with a documented default policy.
  - Use bounded channels (drop or backpressure).
  - Add log compaction.
  - Add per-peer and per-observer insert quotas (for example, a per-peer
    token bucket on new inserts).

### F11 — Local IPC is open to any local user (Medium, A3)

- The socket gets umask permissions, and there's no `SO_PEERCRED` check
  (tines/src/ipc.rs:194-200; grep finds no `set_permissions` or peer-cred
  code).
- Any local process that can reach it can:
  - publish observations **as this robot** (`Observe`), which are then
    gossiped fleet-wide under its identity;
  - read any belief;
  - drain the shared event queue, destructively.
- The configured socket path is unlinked unconditionally before binding,
  whatever file is there (ipc.rs:197).
- **Availability:** clients are served one at a time with no timeouts, so
  an idle client blocks everyone. An `accept` error ends the daemon. An
  oversized frame (> 1 MiB) gets an error reply without consuming its body,
  which desynchronizes the stream (contrary to the module docs).
- **Fix:**
  - Create the socket in a `0700` runtime directory with mode `0600` (or a
    group-restricted mode).
  - Check `SO_PEERCRED` against an allowed uid/gid.
  - Only unlink a path that is a socket.
  - Set per-connection read timeouts, or serve clients concurrently.
  - Close the connection on an oversized frame.
  - Survive `accept` errors.

### F12 — ROS2 bridge trusts the whole DDS domain (Medium, A4)

- **Read:** any participant on the domain can read the latest payload of
  every bridged topic and every receipt.
- **Write:** any participant can inject observations on a managed topic.
  They're stored and gossiped as this robot's own (`observe(..., None, now)`,
  tines-ros2/src/node.rs:197), with no rate limit.
- SROS2/DDS security isn't mentioned or configured anywhere.
- **Likely self-echo loop:** the node subscribes to the topics it
  publishes, with no filter for its own messages (node.rs:207-238). If DDS
  delivers its own publications back, which the default settings allow
  (not verified on hardware), each republish is re-observed with a new seq.
  That's a feedback loop that grows the log and floods the fleet.
- **Fix:**
  - Ignore local publications (`ignore_local_publications` or a
    publisher-GID filter).
  - Document running with SROS2 enclaves and a dedicated domain id.
  - Rate-limit inbound.
  - Bound the channel.

### F13 — Smaller core defects (Low)

- **Event queue drops newest, not oldest** (`let _ = self.events.push`,
  exchange.rs:777), contrary to its docs and the fleet spec.
- **Pending acks for a lost peer aren't purged** on `remove_peer`. On
  send errors they're re-queued, and since acks go ahead of data, retries
  to a dead peer can starve data frames.
- **Reassembler displacement:** one fragment with a different id or count
  resets a peer's in-progress stream (frag.rs:121-133). Same-address only,
  so it's limited by F3/F6 binding.
- **Trailing bytes:** `postcard::from_bytes` accepts trailing bytes after a
  valid frame. That's harmless now, but the 1.0 vectors should pin
  rejection so the wire format is canonical.

### F14 — Belief policies trust attacker-controlled fields (Medium; by design v1)

- `LatestWins` picks the smallest `age_ms` (belief.rs:36-39). An attacker
  sets age 0 to win any topic (see spec §2b).
- `SelfFirst` trusts `obs.observer == me` (belief.rs:75-77). A forged
  observation claiming to be from *this* robot beats everything. Signing in
  1.1 fixes the observer claim. Until then, a host could refuse inbound
  observations whose `observer` is its own NodeId (a robot never needs to
  receive its own observations from a peer if it still holds them).
- First-copy-wins dedupe fixes `age_ms`, `observed_at` and `lifetime_ms`
  forever at a receiver (mem_store.rs:72-75). A huge `lifetime_ms` makes an
  addressed message effectively immortal.

### F15 — No confidentiality, trackable robots (Low for v1; by design)

The BLE link is unencrypted, so world state and directives are readable by
anyone in range. Each robot advertises a stable NodeId in cleartext and is
discoverable (transport.rs:276-282), so it can be tracked across BLE address
rotation. That's the design (the NodeId *is* the rendezvous). If tracking
matters, 1.1+ needs rotating, keyed rendezvous identifiers.

### F16 — The 16-byte id is unkeyed and truncated (Low, A1)

Ids are the first 128 bits of Blake2s-256 (64-bit collision resistance).
Producing a collision with a *specific* existing id needs a second
preimage, which is infeasible, so an attacker can't squat a particular
id. Generic 64-bit collisions are within reach of a determined attacker,
but only between two observations they produced themselves, which gains
nothing. This is acceptable for dedupe. It's the reason spec §2a signs the
full preimage, not the id.

### F17 — Service clock is wall-clock seconds (Medium, A0)

`tines/src/ipc.rs` `now_ms()` returns `as_secs()` from `SystemTime`
(ipc.rs:276-281). Core's `Tick` is monotonic milliseconds.

- Ages advance 1000× too slowly, so addressed lifetimes last 1000× too
  long.
- An NTP step backwards freezes ages, because they saturate.
- The store is opened at tick 0 while requests use epoch values, so the
  first read can add the whole epoch to every age.

**Fix:** use a monotonic millisecond clock (`Instant` since process start)
everywhere in the host, and open the store with the same clock.

## 7. Threats by STRIDE, mapped to findings

| | Threat | Status today | Findings | Planned mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **S**poofing | Impersonate a robot on the link | Trivial (A1) | F3, F6 | Transport binding now; link auth (1.1) |
| | Forge an observation's `observer` | Trivial (A1, A3, A4) | F11, F12, F14 | Host hardening now; signatures (1.1) |
| **T**ampering | Alter content in transit | No integrity (A1) | — | Signatures cover content (1.1) |
| | Alter age / lifetime | Unprotected | F14, §2b | 1.1 threat-model decision |
| | Alter the log on disk | No integrity (A5) | F5 | CRC now; MAC optional |
| **R**epudiation | Deny having said something | Unattributable | — | Signatures (1.1) |
| **I**nformation disclosure | Read world state / directives | Cleartext (A1, A4) | F12, F15 | Out of scope v1; link encryption candidate |
| | Track robots | Stable NodeId adverts | F15 | Rotating identifiers (post-1.1) |
| **D**enial of service | Lose custody traffic | Easy (A0!, A1) | F1, F7 | Fix F1 now; link auth (1.1) |
| | Lock out peers / waste airtime | Easy (A1) | F8, F9 | Eviction and rate limits now |
| | Exhaust memory / disk | Easy (A1, A4) | F10 | Trim, bounded channels, quotas now |
| | Block local clients | Easy (A3) | F11 | Timeouts, concurrency now |
| **E**levation of privilege | Act as the robot from a local account | Any local user (A3) | F11 | Socket permissions + peer creds now |
| | Act as the robot from the ROS graph | Any domain participant (A4) | F12 | SROS2, domain isolation |

## 8. The age question (for 1.1)

Spec §2b asks whether `age_ms` must be authenticated. This assessment
supports its framing, and adds evidence:

- Today the question is moot. Everything is forgeable, and fixing F14
  needs signatures first.
- After 1.1 signs content, age is the main remaining *freshness* lever:
  stale facts winning `LatestWins`, expired directives coming back to life,
  and fresh facts suppressed. For A1 it's fully exploitable without link
  authentication. For A2 it adds freshness attacks to what a bad carrier
  can already do by dropping.
- **Recommendation for 1.1:** link authentication (handshake plus per-frame
  tag), which removes A1 from age, acks, summaries and identity in one
  mechanism. Accept A2 age forgery as equivalent to carrier misbehaviour,
  and document it. Cross-check against signed `observed_at` where robots
  have clocks.

## 9. Test gaps

The sim covers honest-node custody properties and random garbage frames
(`tests/props.rs:281`, `tests/relay.rs`). It doesn't cover:

- well-formed malicious frames: forged acks, spoofed `from`/`observer`,
  NodeId changes mid-contact;
- a store returning `Full` (F1);
- summary floods and peer-table exhaustion (F8, F9);
- reassembly abuse;
- `LogStore` corruption in the middle, an oversized `Meta`, concurrent
  openers, a full disk, and restart and seq continuity (F4, F5);
- anything in the hosts: IPC abuse, ROS2 injection and self-echo
  (F11, F12).

The 1.0 fuzz harness (spec §7) should take an *adversarial peer* mode, not
just random bytes: structured frames with chosen ids and identities.

## 10. Where each finding is being fixed

| Findings | Where | Spec |
|---|---|---|
| F1–F5, F17 | Fleet milestone (M3), now | `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-10-19-tines-fleet-fixes.md` |
| F10–F12 | Host hardening, before a robot leaves the lab | `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-10-19-tines-host-hardening.md` |
| F6, F8, F9, F13 | tines-core 1.0 | `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-10-18-tines-1-0-design.md` §10 |
| F7, F14, §8 | 1.1 (threat model, link authentication, signing) | 1.0 spec §2a, §2b |
| F15, F16 | Accepted for now | — |

Mark each finding fixed here, with its commit, when it lands.

## 11. Recommendations, in order

1. **Fleet milestone bugs:**
   - F1 (ack only what was stored).
   - F2 (poll loop).
   - F3 (framing, listener, NodeId binding, Contact/Lost).
   - F4 (persist seq, flush).
   - F5 (CRC, recovery that skips rather than truncates, write cap,
     locking).
   - F17 (monotonic ms clock).
   - Each with a regression test.
2. **Host hardening before any robot leaves the lab:**
   - F10 (trim, bounded channels, compaction).
   - F11 (socket permissions, peer creds, timeouts).
   - F12 (ignore own publications, SROS2 guidance, rate limits).
3. **Core hardening (can ride with 1.0):**
   - F8 (idle eviction).
   - F9 (summary rate limit, no re-queue).
   - F13 (event drop-oldest, purge acks on peer loss, reject trailing
     bytes).
   - F6 (refuse NodeId change within a contact).
4. **1.1:**
   - Write the full threat model from §4/§8.
   - Choose link authentication.
   - Add signing per spec §2a (F14, F7).
   - Add "replace if better signed" dedupe.
5. **Later:** confidentiality and rotating rendezvous identifiers (F15),
   only if the deployment needs them.