memoryd: [honcho] and its keys checked at start, and brokerd's state socket

Co-Authored-By: ornith-1.5-35b-a3b <agent@wntrmute.dev>

crates/memoryd/Cargo.toml

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ publish.workspace = true
 workspace = true
 
 [dependencies]
-bxcore.workspace = true
+bxcore = { workspace = true, features = ["secrets"] }
 roncho.workspace = true
 rusqlite.workspace = true
 serde.workspace = true

crates/memoryd/src/config.rs

@@ -1,13 +1,18 @@
-//! `memoryd` configuration: read `memoryd.toml` into a typed `Config` (M5a spec, section 11).
+//! `memoryd` configuration: read `memoryd.toml` into a typed `Config` (M5a spec, section 11), and
+//! check its `[honcho]` section at start (M5c spec, section 10).
 //!
 //! Unknown keys are errors in every table, as in the other roles: a misspelt key that silently
 //! fell back to its default would be a setting the owner believes is set and is not.
 
+use std::collections::BTreeMap;
 use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 
 use bxcore::DataClass;
+use bxcore::secrets::SecretSpec;
 use serde::Deserialize;
 
+use crate::honcho::config::{self as honcho, HonchoConfig, HonchoSection};
+
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(deny_unknown_fields, default)]
 pub struct Paths {
@@ -65,6 +70,9 @@ pub struct Sockets {
     pub loopd: PathBuf,
     pub broker: PathBuf,
     pub admin: PathBuf,
+    /// `brokerd`'s `state.sock`, which `memoryd` connects to, to ask for a session's state (M5c
+    /// spec, section 7). `brokerd.toml` names the same path as its `[sockets] state`.
+    pub state: PathBuf,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Deserialize, Default)]
@@ -74,12 +82,18 @@ pub struct Config {
     pub memory: Memory,
     pub index: Index,
     pub sockets: Sockets,
+    /// `[honcho]` as written; `honcho_config` checks it. Without it, Honcho is off.
+    pub honcho: Option<HonchoSection>,
+    /// `[secrets.<name>]`: the Honcho keys, checked by `honcho_config`, never read here.
+    pub secrets: BTreeMap<String, SecretSpec>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug)]
 pub enum ConfigError {
     Read(PathBuf, std::io::Error),
     Parse(PathBuf, toml::de::Error),
+    /// `[honcho]` or a key for it is not allowed: the path, and `honcho_config`'s reason.
+    Honcho(PathBuf, String),
 }
 
 impl std::fmt::Display for ConfigError {
@@ -87,6 +101,7 @@ impl std::fmt::Display for ConfigError {
         match self {
             ConfigError::Read(path, err) => write!(f, "{}: {err}", path.display()),
             ConfigError::Parse(path, err) => write!(f, "{}: {err}", path.display()),
+            ConfigError::Honcho(path, why) => write!(f, "{}: {why}", path.display()),
         }
     }
 }
@@ -98,12 +113,15 @@ impl Config {
         toml::from_str(text)
     }
 
-    /// Read and parse `path`; a relative `soul_starter` is taken to be next to it.
+    /// Read, parse and check `path`; a relative `soul_starter` is taken to be next to it.
     pub fn load(path: &Path) -> Result<Config, ConfigError> {
         let text =
             std::fs::read_to_string(path).map_err(|e| ConfigError::Read(path.to_path_buf(), e))?;
         let mut config =
             Config::parse(&text).map_err(|e| ConfigError::Parse(path.to_path_buf(), e))?;
+        if let Err(why) = config.honcho_config() {
+            return Err(ConfigError::Honcho(path.to_path_buf(), why));
+        }
         if config.memory.soul_starter.is_relative() {
             let base = path.parent().unwrap_or_else(|| Path::new("."));
             config.memory.soul_starter = base.join(&config.memory.soul_starter);
@@ -111,6 +129,11 @@ impl Config {
         Ok(config)
     }
 
+    /// `[honcho]` and its keys, checked: `Ok(None)` when there is no `[honcho]` and no key.
+    pub fn honcho_config(&self) -> Result<Option<HonchoConfig>, String> {
+        honcho::check(self.honcho.as_ref(), &self.secrets)
+    }
+
     fn socket(&self, set: &Path, default: &str) -> PathBuf {
         if set.as_os_str().is_empty() {
             self.paths.home.join(default)
@@ -128,6 +151,9 @@ impl Config {
     pub fn admin_socket(&self) -> PathBuf {
         self.socket(&self.sockets.admin, "run/owner-memory/admin.sock")
     }
+    pub fn state_socket(&self) -> PathBuf {
+        self.socket(&self.sockets.state, "run/memory-broker/state.sock")
+    }
     pub fn memory_dir(&self) -> PathBuf {
         self.paths.home.join("memory")
     }

crates/memoryd/src/honcho/config.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+//! `[honcho]` in `memoryd.toml` and its keys in `[secrets.<name>]`, checked at start into a
+//! `HonchoConfig` (M5c spec, sections 3, 6 and 10). Nothing here reaches Honcho or reads a key: a
+//! key's source is checked here and read only when a client is made.
+
+use std::collections::BTreeMap;
+
+use bxcore::DataClass;
+use bxcore::secrets::{SecretSource, SecretSpec};
+use serde::Deserialize;
+
+/// The runbook entry for every reason `check` gives.
+pub const RUNBOOK: &str = "see docs/runbook.md#honcho-config-invalid";
+
+/// The longest name Honcho accepts for a workspace, a peer or a session (M5c spec, section 6).
+pub const MAX_NAME: usize = 512;
+
+/// The names of the keys in `[secrets.<name>]`, one per workspace. A read workspace's key is
+/// `READ_KEY` and its agent's name (`read_key`).
+pub const TRUSTED_KEY: &str = "honcho_trusted";
+pub const UNTRUSTED_KEY: &str = "honcho_untrusted";
+pub const FLEET_KEY: &str = "honcho_fleet";
+pub const READ_KEY: &str = "honcho_read_";
+
+/// `[honcho]` as written. Our own format: unknown keys are errors.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
+pub struct HonchoSection {
+    pub url: String,
+    pub agent: String,
+    pub owner: String,
+    pub trusted: String,
+    pub untrusted: String,
+    pub fleet: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub read: Vec<ReadSection>,
+}
+
+/// One `[[honcho.read]]` as written. `trust` and `class` stay text until `check`, so that a wrong
+/// value is one of its reasons.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
+pub struct ReadSection {
+    pub agent: String,
+    pub workspace: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub trust: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub class: Option<String>,
+}
+
+/// `[honcho]` and its keys, checked: every name is a Honcho name, and the names fit together.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct HonchoConfig {
+    /// `http://` or `https://`, a host and an optional port.
+    pub url: String,
+    /// This agent's peer.
+    pub agent: String,
+    /// The owner's peer, the same in every workspace of the fleet.
+    pub owner: String,
+    /// This agent's three workspaces.
+    pub trusted: String,
+    pub untrusted: String,
+    pub fleet: String,
+    /// Other agents' workspaces this agent reads, in the order written.
+    pub read: Vec<ReadWorkspace>,
+    /// Every `[secrets.<name>]`, by its name: a source that is checked, never read here.
+    pub keys: BTreeMap<String, SecretSource>,
+}
+
+/// One `[[honcho.read]]`, checked.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct ReadWorkspace {
+    pub agent: String,
+    pub workspace: String,
+    pub trust: Trust,
+    pub class: DataClass,
+}
+
+/// How the owner labelled another agent's workspace. `Untrusted` unless written out.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum Trust {
+    Trusted,
+    Untrusted,
+}
+
+/// The name of the key for the workspace of the read agent `agent`.
+pub fn read_key(agent: &str) -> String {
+    format!("{READ_KEY}{agent}")
+}
+
+/// True when `name` is a Honcho name: 1 to `MAX_NAME` characters, each an ASCII letter, a digit,
+/// `_` or `-`.
+pub fn is_name(name: &str) -> bool {
+    !name.is_empty()
+        && name.len() <= MAX_NAME
+        && name
+            .bytes()
+            .all(|b| b.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || b == b'_' || b == b'-')
+}
+
+/// Check `[honcho]` and the keys in `[secrets]`. No section and no key is `Ok(None)`: Honcho is
+/// off. `Err` is the first reason found, one line that names the table and never a key's value.
+pub fn check(
+    section: Option<&HonchoSection>,
+    secrets: &BTreeMap<String, SecretSpec>,
+) -> Result<Option<HonchoConfig>, String> {
+    let Some(section) = section else {
+        if let Some(name) = secrets.keys().next() {
+            return Err(format!(
+                "[secrets.{name}] is set, but there is no [honcho] section"
+            ));
+        }
+        return Ok(None);
+    };
+    check_url(&section.url)?;
+    for (key, name) in [
+        ("agent", &section.agent),
+        ("owner", &section.owner),
+        ("trusted", &section.trusted),
+        ("untrusted", &section.untrusted),
+        ("fleet", &section.fleet),
+    ] {
+        check_name("[honcho]", key, name)?;
+    }
+    if section.agent == section.owner {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "[honcho] agent and owner are both {:?}: the agent's peer must not be the owner's",
+            section.agent
+        ));
+    }
+    check_own_workspaces(section)?;
+    let mut read: Vec<ReadWorkspace> = Vec::new();
+    for entry in &section.read {
+        let checked = read_workspace(section, entry, &read)?;
+        read.push(checked);
+    }
+    let keys = check_keys(secrets, &read)?;
+    Ok(Some(HonchoConfig {
+        url: section.url.clone(),
+        agent: section.agent.clone(),
+        owner: section.owner.clone(),
+        trusted: section.trusted.clone(),
+        untrusted: section.untrusted.clone(),
+        fleet: section.fleet.clone(),
+        read,
+        keys,
+    }))
+}
+
+/// `Err` with the reason when `name`, the value of `key` in `table`, is not a Honcho name.
+fn check_name(table: &str, key: &str, name: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
+    if is_name(name) {
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+    Err(format!(
+        "{table} {key} {name:?} is not a Honcho name: 1 to {MAX_NAME} of a-z, A-Z, 0-9, _ and -"
+    ))
+}
+
+/// `http://` or `https://`, then a host, then optionally `:` and a port; nothing else.
+fn check_url(url: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
+    let rest = if let Some(rest) = url.strip_prefix("https://") {
+        rest
+    } else if let Some(rest) = url.strip_prefix("http://") {
+        rest
+    } else {
+        return Err(URL_REASON.to_string());
+    };
+    let (host, port) = match rest.split_once(':') {
+        Some(pair) => pair,
+        None => {
+            return if host_ok(rest) {
+                Ok(())
+            } else {
+                Err(URL_REASON.to_string())
+            };
+        }
+    };
+    if !host_ok(host) {
+        return Err(URL_REASON.to_string());
+    }
+    let port_ok = !port.is_empty()
+        && port.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit())
+        && port.parse::<u16>().ok().is_some_and(|n| n > 0);
+    if port_ok {
+        Ok(())
+    } else {
+        Err(URL_REASON.to_string())
+    }
+}
+
+/// The host of a URL: not empty, every byte an ASCII letter, digit, `.` or `-`.
+fn host_ok(host: &str) -> bool {
+    !host.is_empty()
+        && host
+            .bytes()
+            .all(|b| b.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || b == b'.' || b == b'-')
+}
+
+/// The reason for any `url` that `check_url` refuses. It never quotes the URL, which could hold a
+/// password (`http://user:password@host`).
+const URL_REASON: &str =
+    "[honcho] url must be http:// or https://, a host and an optional port, and nothing else";
+
+/// `Err` when two of this agent's three workspaces have the same name.
+fn check_own_workspaces(section: &HonchoSection) -> Result<(), String> {
+    let pairs = [
+        (&section.trusted, &section.untrusted),
+        (&section.trusted, &section.fleet),
+        (&section.untrusted, &section.fleet),
+    ];
+    for (a, b) in pairs {
+        if a == b {
+            return Err(format!(
+                "[honcho] workspace {a:?} is named twice: trusted, untrusted and fleet must be three different workspaces"
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// One `[[honcho.read]]`, checked against `[honcho]` and the entries before it, `earlier`.
+fn read_workspace(
+    section: &HonchoSection,
+    entry: &ReadSection,
+    earlier: &[ReadWorkspace],
+) -> Result<ReadWorkspace, String> {
+    check_name("[[honcho.read]]", "agent", &entry.agent)?;
+    check_name("[[honcho.read]]", "workspace", &entry.workspace)?;
+    if entry.agent == section.agent {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "[[honcho.read]] agent {:?} is this agent ([honcho] agent)",
+            entry.agent
+        ));
+    }
+    if earlier.iter().any(|r| r.agent == entry.agent) {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "[[honcho.read]] agent {:?} is listed twice",
+            entry.agent
+        ));
+    }
+    if entry.workspace == section.trusted
+        || entry.workspace == section.untrusted
+        || entry.workspace == section.fleet
+    {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "[[honcho.read]] workspace {:?} is one of this agent's own",
+            entry.workspace
+        ));
+    }
+    Ok(ReadWorkspace {
+        agent: entry.agent.clone(),
+        workspace: entry.workspace.clone(),
+        trust: trust_of(entry)?,
+        class: class_of(entry)?,
+    })
+}
+
+/// The entry's `trust`: `Untrusted` when it is not written.
+fn trust_of(entry: &ReadSection) -> Result<Trust, String> {
+    match entry.trust.as_deref() {
+        None | Some("untrusted") => Ok(Trust::Untrusted),
+        Some("trusted") => Ok(Trust::Trusted),
+        Some(other) => Err(format!(
+            "[[honcho.read]] trust {other:?} of agent {:?} is not \"trusted\" or \"untrusted\"",
+            entry.agent
+        )),
+    }
+}
+
+/// The entry's `class`: `Private` when it is not written.
+fn class_of(entry: &ReadSection) -> Result<DataClass, String> {
+    match entry.class.as_deref() {
+        None | Some("private") => Ok(DataClass::Private),
+        Some("public") => Ok(DataClass::Public),
+        Some("secret") => Ok(DataClass::Secret),
+        Some(other) => Err(format!(
+            "[[honcho.read]] class {other:?} of agent {:?} is not \"public\", \"private\" or \"secret\"",
+            entry.agent
+        )),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Every `[secrets.<name>]`: a Honcho key's name, and a source that `SecretSpec::source` accepts.
+fn check_keys(
+    secrets: &BTreeMap<String, SecretSpec>,
+    read: &[ReadWorkspace],
+) -> Result<BTreeMap<String, SecretSource>, String> {
+    let mut keys: BTreeMap<String, SecretSource> = BTreeMap::new();
+    for (name, spec) in secrets {
+        let is_read_key = matches!(name.strip_prefix(READ_KEY), Some(agent) if read.iter().any(|r| r.agent == agent));
+        if !is_read_key && name != TRUSTED_KEY && name != UNTRUSTED_KEY && name != FLEET_KEY {
+            if let Some(agent) = name.strip_prefix(READ_KEY) {
+                return Err(format!(
+                    "[secrets.{name}] is the key of agent {agent:?}, which is not in [[honcho.read]]"
+                ));
+            }
+            return Err(format!(
+                "[secrets.{name}] is not a Honcho key: memoryd has only honcho_trusted, honcho_untrusted, honcho_fleet and honcho_read_<agent>"
+            ));
+        }
+        let source = spec
+            .source()
+            .map_err(|why| format!("[secrets.{name}] {why}"))?;
+        keys.insert(name.clone(), source);
+    }
+    Ok(keys)
+}

crates/memoryd/src/honcho/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+//! Honcho, the memory this agent shares with the fleet, reached through `roncho` (M5c spec).
+
+pub mod config;

crates/memoryd/src/lib.rs

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ pub mod config;
 pub mod edit;
 pub mod entries;
 pub mod files;
+pub mod honcho;
 pub mod index;
 pub mod journal;
 pub mod notes;

crates/memoryd/src/main.rs

@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@ use std::process::ExitCode;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 
 use bxcore::instance;
-use memoryd::config::Config;
+use memoryd::config::{Config, ConfigError};
+use memoryd::honcho::config::RUNBOOK as HONCHO_INVALID;
 use memoryd::serve;
 
 const USAGE: &str = "usage: memoryd serve --config <path>";
@@ -21,7 +22,11 @@ fn main() -> ExitCode {
     let config = match Config::load(&path) {
         Ok(config) => config,
         Err(e) => {
-            eprintln!("memoryd: {e}\n{START_FAILED}");
+            let pointer = match &e {
+                ConfigError::Read(..) | ConfigError::Parse(..) => START_FAILED,
+                ConfigError::Honcho(..) => HONCHO_INVALID,
+            };
+            eprintln!("memoryd: {e}\n{pointer}");
             return ExitCode::from(1);
         }
     };

crates/memoryd/tests/honcho_config.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+//! `[honcho]` in `memoryd.toml`, its `[[honcho.read]]` list and its keys, checked at start (M5c
+//! spec, section 10), and `[sockets] state`, `brokerd`'s session-state socket: what a valid
+//! section gives, and how `load` refuses an invalid one. The reasons are in `honcho_reasons.rs`.
+//! Do not edit.
+
+#[path = "support/tmp.rs"]
+mod tmp;
+
+use std::collections::BTreeMap;
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+
+use bxcore::DataClass;
+use bxcore::secrets::SecretSource;
+use memoryd::config::{Config, ConfigError};
+use memoryd::honcho::config::{
+    FLEET_KEY, HonchoConfig, MAX_NAME, READ_KEY, RUNBOOK, ReadWorkspace, TRUSTED_KEY, Trust,
+    UNTRUSTED_KEY, read_key,
+};
+use tmp::TempDir;
+
+/// The smallest valid section: the six keys, no read workspace, no key.
+const SECTION: &str = "[honcho]
+url = \"http://rift.scylla-hammerhead.ts.net:8000\"
+agent = \"boxmaker0\"
+owner = \"kyle\"
+trusted = \"boxmaker0-trusted\"
+untrusted = \"boxmaker0-untrusted\"
+fleet = \"fleet\"
+";
+
+/// Two read workspaces: the first with the defaults, the second with both written out.
+const READS: &str = "[[honcho.read]]
+agent = \"boxmaker1\"
+workspace = \"boxmaker1-trusted\"
+[[honcho.read]]
+agent = \"boxmaker2\"
+workspace = \"boxmaker2-trusted\"
+trust = \"trusted\"
+class = \"secret\"
+";
+
+/// `SECTION` with `from` (found exactly once) replaced by `to`, then `extra`.
+fn with(from: &str, to: &str, extra: &str) -> String {
+    assert_eq!(SECTION.matches(from).count(), 1, "{from}");
+    format!("{}{extra}", SECTION.replace(from, to))
+}
+
+/// The checked section of `text`, which must parse.
+fn checked(text: &str) -> Result<Option<HonchoConfig>, String> {
+    let config = Config::parse(text).unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("{text}\n{e}"));
+    config.honcho_config()
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn without_a_honcho_section_it_is_none() {
+    for text in [
+        "",
+        "[paths]\nhome = \"/srv/bx\"\n",
+        "[memory]\nreview = true\n[sockets]\nloop = \"/r/l.sock\"\n",
+    ] {
+        assert_eq!(checked(text), Ok(None), "{text}");
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn the_smallest_section_is_checked_as_written() {
+    let honcho = checked(SECTION).unwrap().unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        honcho,
+        HonchoConfig {
+            url: "http://rift.scylla-hammerhead.ts.net:8000".to_string(),
+            agent: "boxmaker0".to_string(),
+            owner: "kyle".to_string(),
+            trusted: "boxmaker0-trusted".to_string(),
+            untrusted: "boxmaker0-untrusted".to_string(),
+            fleet: "fleet".to_string(),
+            read: Vec::new(),
+            keys: BTreeMap::new(),
+        }
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn read_workspaces_default_to_untrusted_and_private_and_keep_their_order() {
+    let honcho = checked(&format!("{SECTION}{READS}")).unwrap().unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        honcho.read,
+        vec![
+            ReadWorkspace {
+                agent: "boxmaker1".to_string(),
+                workspace: "boxmaker1-trusted".to_string(),
+                trust: Trust::Untrusted,
+                class: DataClass::Private,
+            },
+            ReadWorkspace {
+                agent: "boxmaker2".to_string(),
+                workspace: "boxmaker2-trusted".to_string(),
+                trust: Trust::Trusted,
+                class: DataClass::Secret,
+            },
+        ]
+    );
+    let written = "[[honcho.read]]\nagent = \"b1\"\nworkspace = \"w1\"\ntrust = \"untrusted\"\nclass = \"public\"\n[[honcho.read]]\nagent = \"b2\"\nworkspace = \"w2\"\nclass = \"private\"\n";
+    let honcho = checked(&format!("{SECTION}{written}")).unwrap().unwrap();
+    let labels: Vec<(Trust, DataClass)> = honcho.read.iter().map(|r| (r.trust, r.class)).collect();
+    assert_eq!(
+        labels,
+        vec![
+            (Trust::Untrusted, DataClass::Public),
+            (Trust::Untrusted, DataClass::Private)
+        ]
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn every_key_is_checked_by_its_name_and_never_read() {
+    // None of these exists: a key is checked here, and read only when a client is made.
+    let keys = "[secrets.honcho_trusted]\nenv = \"BOXMAKER_TEST_NO_SUCH_VARIABLE\"\n\
+                [secrets.honcho_untrusted]\nfile = \"/nonexistent/boxmaker/untrusted.key\"\n\
+                [secrets.honcho_fleet]\ncredential = \"honcho-fleet\"\n\
+                [secrets.honcho_read_boxmaker2]\nenv = \"HONCHO_READ_2\"\n";
+    let honcho = checked(&format!("{SECTION}{READS}{keys}"))
+        .unwrap()
+        .unwrap();
+    let expected: BTreeMap<String, SecretSource> = [
+        (
+            "honcho_trusted",
+            SecretSource::Env("BOXMAKER_TEST_NO_SUCH_VARIABLE".to_string()),
+        ),
+        (
+            "honcho_untrusted",
+            SecretSource::File(PathBuf::from("/nonexistent/boxmaker/untrusted.key")),
+        ),
+        (
+            "honcho_fleet",
+            SecretSource::Credential("honcho-fleet".to_string()),
+        ),
+        (
+            "honcho_read_boxmaker2",
+            SecretSource::Env("HONCHO_READ_2".to_string()),
+        ),
+    ]
+    .into_iter()
+    .map(|(name, source)| (name.to_string(), source))
+    .collect();
+    assert_eq!(honcho.keys, expected);
+    assert_eq!(honcho.read.len(), 2, "the keys change nothing else");
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn the_key_names_and_the_pointer() {
+    assert_eq!(TRUSTED_KEY, "honcho_trusted");
+    assert_eq!(UNTRUSTED_KEY, "honcho_untrusted");
+    assert_eq!(FLEET_KEY, "honcho_fleet");
+    assert_eq!(READ_KEY, "honcho_read_");
+    assert_eq!(read_key("boxmaker1"), "honcho_read_boxmaker1");
+    assert_eq!(RUNBOOK, "see docs/runbook.md#honcho-config-invalid");
+    assert_eq!(MAX_NAME, 512);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn unknown_keys_and_wrong_types_are_parse_errors() {
+    for text in [
+        with("fleet = \"fleet\"", "fleet = \"fleet\"\nfleat = \"x\"", ""),
+        format!("{SECTION}[[honcho.read]]\nagent = \"b1\"\nworkspace = \"w1\"\nlabel = \"x\"\n"),
+        format!("{SECTION}[secrets.honcho_trusted]\nenv = \"K\"\nvalue = \"x\"\n"),
+        format!("{SECTION}[honcho.read]\nagent = \"b1\"\nworkspace = \"w1\"\n"),
+        format!("{SECTION}[[honcho.read]]\nagent = \"b1\"\nworkspace = \"w1\"\ntrust = true\n"),
+        format!("{SECTION}[[honcho.read]]\nagent = \"b1\"\n"),
+        format!("{SECTION}[sockets]\nstates = \"/x\"\n"),
+        with("owner = \"kyle\"\n", "", ""),
+        with("agent = \"boxmaker0\"", "agent = 0", ""),
+        "[secrets]\nhoncho_trusted = \"HONCHO_KEY\"\n".to_string(),
+    ] {
+        assert!(Config::parse(&text).is_err(), "{text}");
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn the_state_socket_is_under_home_unless_set() {
+    let config = Config::parse("[paths]\nhome = \"/srv/bx\"\n").unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        config.state_socket(),
+        PathBuf::from("/srv/bx/run/memory-broker/state.sock")
+    );
+    let config =
+        Config::parse("[paths]\nhome = \"/h\"\n[sockets]\nstate = \"/r/s.sock\"\n").unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(config.state_socket(), PathBuf::from("/r/s.sock"));
+    let config = Config::parse("[paths]\nhome = \"/h\"\n[sockets]\nstate = \"\"\n").unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        config.state_socket(),
+        PathBuf::from("/h/run/memory-broker/state.sock")
+    );
+    // The other three do not move.
+    assert_eq!(
+        config.loop_socket(),
+        PathBuf::from("/h/run/loop-memory/memory.sock")
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn load_refuses_an_invalid_section_and_keeps_a_valid_one() {
+    let dir = TempDir::new("honcho-load");
+    let good = dir.write("good.toml", &format!("{SECTION}{READS}"));
+    let config = Config::load(&good).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(config.honcho_config().unwrap().unwrap().read.len(), 2);
+
+    let bad = dir.write(
+        "bad.toml",
+        &with("owner = \"kyle\"", "owner = \"boxmaker0\"", ""),
+    );
+    let err = Config::load(&bad).unwrap_err();
+    let why =
+        "[honcho] agent and owner are both \"boxmaker0\": the agent's peer must not be the owner's";
+    assert!(
+        matches!(&err, ConfigError::Honcho(path, reason) if path == &bad && reason == why),
+        "{err:?}"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(err.to_string(), format!("{}: {why}", bad.display()));
+
+    let unknown = dir.write(
+        "unknown.toml",
+        &with("fleet = \"fleet\"", "fleet = \"fleet\"\nfleat = \"x\"", ""),
+    );
+    assert!(
+        matches!(Config::load(&unknown), Err(ConfigError::Parse(..))),
+        "an unknown key stays a parse error"
+    );
+}

crates/memoryd/tests/honcho_reasons.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
+//! Every reason an invalid `[honcho]` section, `[[honcho.read]]` or Honcho key is refused with at
+//! start (M5c spec, sections 6 and 10): each invalid section has one problem and one exact reason.
+//! Do not edit.
+
+use memoryd::config::Config;
+use memoryd::honcho::config::{HonchoConfig, is_name};
+
+/// The smallest valid section: the six keys, no read workspace, no key.
+const SECTION: &str = "[honcho]
+url = \"http://rift.scylla-hammerhead.ts.net:8000\"
+agent = \"boxmaker0\"
+owner = \"kyle\"
+trusted = \"boxmaker0-trusted\"
+untrusted = \"boxmaker0-untrusted\"
+fleet = \"fleet\"
+";
+
+const URL_REASON: &str =
+    "[honcho] url must be http:// or https://, a host and an optional port, and nothing else";
+
+/// `SECTION` with `from` (found exactly once) replaced by `to`, then `extra`.
+fn with(from: &str, to: &str, extra: &str) -> String {
+    assert_eq!(SECTION.matches(from).count(), 1, "{from}");
+    format!("{}{extra}", SECTION.replace(from, to))
+}
+
+/// The checked section of `text`, which must parse.
+fn checked(text: &str) -> Result<Option<HonchoConfig>, String> {
+    let config = Config::parse(text).unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("{text}\n{e}"));
+    config.honcho_config()
+}
+
+fn reason(text: &str) -> String {
+    match checked(text) {
+        Ok(ok) => panic!("accepted:\n{text}\n{ok:?}"),
+        Err(why) => why,
+    }
+}
+
+fn name_reason(table: &str, key: &str, name: &str) -> String {
+    format!("{table} {key} {name:?} is not a Honcho name: 1 to 512 of a-z, A-Z, 0-9, _ and -")
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn honcho_names_at_the_edges() {
+    let longest = "a".repeat(512);
+    for name in [
+        "a",
+        "Z",
+        "0",
+        "_",
+        "-",
+        "boxmaker0-trusted",
+        "A_b-9",
+        longest.as_str(),
+    ] {
+        assert!(is_name(name), "{name}");
+    }
+    let too_long = "a".repeat(513);
+    for name in [
+        "",
+        too_long.as_str(),
+        "boxmaker.0",
+        "box maker",
+        "a/b",
+        "a:b",
+        "kyle@home",
+        "caf\u{e9}",
+        "tab\t",
+        "new\nline",
+        "\u{0660}",
+    ] {
+        assert!(!is_name(name), "{name:?}");
+    }
+    // The longest name is accepted in every place a name goes.
+    let text = with("fleet = \"fleet\"", &format!("fleet = \"{longest}\""), "");
+    assert_eq!(checked(&text).unwrap().unwrap().fleet, longest);
+    let text = with("owner = \"kyle\"", &format!("owner = \"{too_long}\""), "");
+    assert_eq!(reason(&text), name_reason("[honcho]", "owner", &too_long));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn urls_that_are_accepted() {
+    for url in [
+        "http://rift.scylla-hammerhead.ts.net:8000",
+        "https://rift.scylla-hammerhead.ts.net",
+        "http://127.0.0.1:1",
+        "http://honcho:65535",
+        "https://Rift-2.Example.org:443",
+        "http://h",
+    ] {
+        let text = with(
+            "url = \"http://rift.scylla-hammerhead.ts.net:8000\"",
+            &format!("url = \"{url}\""),
+            "",
+        );
+        assert_eq!(checked(&text).unwrap().unwrap().url, url);
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn urls_that_are_refused_and_the_reason_never_quotes_them() {
+    for url in [
+        "",
+        "rift:8000",
+        "ftp://rift:8000",
+        "HTTP://rift:8000",
+        "http:/rift",
+        "http://",
+        "https://",
+        "http://:8000",
+        "http://rift:",
+        "http://rift:0",
+        "http://rift:65536",
+        "http://rift:+80",
+        "http://rift:80:90",
+        "http://rift:8000/",
+        "http://rift:8000/v3",
+        "http://rift/",
+        "http://kyle:hunter2@rift:8000",
+        "http://kyle@rift:8000",
+        "http://kyle@rift",
+        "http://rift?x=1",
+        "http://rift#top",
+        "http://ri ft",
+        " http://rift",
+        "http://rift_1",
+        "http://[::1]:8000",
+    ] {
+        let text = with(
+            "url = \"http://rift.scylla-hammerhead.ts.net:8000\"",
+            &format!("url = \"{url}\""),
+            "",
+        );
+        assert_eq!(reason(&text), URL_REASON, "{url}");
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn each_invalid_section_gives_its_reason() {
+    let read = |agent: &str, workspace: &str| {
+        format!("[[honcho.read]]\nagent = \"{agent}\"\nworkspace = \"{workspace}\"\n")
+    };
+    let cases: Vec<(String, String)> = vec![
+        (
+            with("agent = \"boxmaker0\"", "agent = \"boxmaker.0\"", ""),
+            name_reason("[honcho]", "agent", "boxmaker.0"),
+        ),
+        (
+            with("owner = \"kyle\"", "owner = \"\"", ""),
+            name_reason("[honcho]", "owner", ""),
+        ),
+        (
+            with(
+                "trusted = \"boxmaker0-trusted\"",
+                "trusted = \"boxmaker0 trusted\"",
+                "",
+            ),
+            name_reason("[honcho]", "trusted", "boxmaker0 trusted"),
+        ),
+        (
+            with(
+                "untrusted = \"boxmaker0-untrusted\"",
+                "untrusted = \"boxmaker0/untrusted\"",
+                "",
+            ),
+            name_reason("[honcho]", "untrusted", "boxmaker0/untrusted"),
+        ),
+        (
+            with("fleet = \"fleet\"", "fleet = \"fleet:all\"", ""),
+            name_reason("[honcho]", "fleet", "fleet:all"),
+        ),
+        (
+            format!("{SECTION}{}", read("boxmaker.1", "boxmaker1-trusted")),
+            name_reason("[[honcho.read]]", "agent", "boxmaker.1"),
+        ),
+        (
+            format!("{SECTION}{}", read("boxmaker1", "boxmaker1.trusted")),
+            name_reason("[[honcho.read]]", "workspace", "boxmaker1.trusted"),
+        ),
+        (
+            with("owner = \"kyle\"", "owner = \"boxmaker0\"", ""),
+            "[honcho] agent and owner are both \"boxmaker0\": the agent's peer must not be the owner's"
+                .to_string(),
+        ),
+        (
+            with(
+                "untrusted = \"boxmaker0-untrusted\"",
+                "untrusted = \"boxmaker0-trusted\"",
+                "",
+            ),
+            "[honcho] workspace \"boxmaker0-trusted\" is named twice: trusted, untrusted and fleet must be three different workspaces"
+                .to_string(),
+        ),
+        (
+            with("fleet = \"fleet\"", "fleet = \"boxmaker0-trusted\"", ""),
+            "[honcho] workspace \"boxmaker0-trusted\" is named twice: trusted, untrusted and fleet must be three different workspaces"
+                .to_string(),
+        ),
+        (
+            with("fleet = \"fleet\"", "fleet = \"boxmaker0-untrusted\"", ""),
+            "[honcho] workspace \"boxmaker0-untrusted\" is named twice: trusted, untrusted and fleet must be three different workspaces"
+                .to_string(),
+        ),
+        (
+            format!("{SECTION}{}", read("boxmaker0", "boxmaker1-trusted")),
+            "[[honcho.read]] agent \"boxmaker0\" is this agent ([honcho] agent)".to_string(),
+        ),
+        (
+            format!(
+                "{SECTION}{}{}",
+                read("boxmaker1", "boxmaker1-trusted"),
+                read("boxmaker1", "boxmaker1-other")
+            ),
+            "[[honcho.read]] agent \"boxmaker1\" is listed twice".to_string(),
+        ),
+        (
+            format!("{SECTION}{}", read("boxmaker1", "boxmaker0-trusted")),
+            "[[honcho.read]] workspace \"boxmaker0-trusted\" is one of this agent's own"
+                .to_string(),
+        ),
+        (
+            format!("{SECTION}{}", read("boxmaker1", "boxmaker0-untrusted")),
+            "[[honcho.read]] workspace \"boxmaker0-untrusted\" is one of this agent's own"
+                .to_string(),
+        ),
+        (
+            format!("{SECTION}{}", read("boxmaker1", "fleet")),
+            "[[honcho.read]] workspace \"fleet\" is one of this agent's own".to_string(),
+        ),
+        (
+            format!(
+                "{SECTION}{}trust = \"Trusted\"\n",
+                read("boxmaker1", "boxmaker1-trusted")
+            ),
+            "[[honcho.read]] trust \"Trusted\" of agent \"boxmaker1\" is not \"trusted\" or \"untrusted\""
+                .to_string(),
+        ),
+        (
+            format!(
+                "{SECTION}{}trust = \"\"\n",
+                read("boxmaker1", "boxmaker1-trusted")
+            ),
+            "[[honcho.read]] trust \"\" of agent \"boxmaker1\" is not \"trusted\" or \"untrusted\""
+                .to_string(),
+        ),
+        (
+            format!(
+                "{SECTION}{}class = \"top-secret\"\n",
+                read("boxmaker1", "boxmaker1-trusted")
+            ),
+            "[[honcho.read]] class \"top-secret\" of agent \"boxmaker1\" is not \"public\", \"private\" or \"secret\""
+                .to_string(),
+        ),
+        (
+            format!(
+                "{SECTION}{}class = \"Private\"\n",
+                read("boxmaker1", "boxmaker1-trusted")
+            ),
+            "[[honcho.read]] class \"Private\" of agent \"boxmaker1\" is not \"public\", \"private\" or \"secret\""
+                .to_string(),
+        ),
+        (
+            format!("{SECTION}[secrets.honcho_trust]\nenv = \"HONCHO_KEY\"\n"),
+            "[secrets.honcho_trust] is not a Honcho key: memoryd has only honcho_trusted, honcho_untrusted, honcho_fleet and honcho_read_<agent>"
+                .to_string(),
+        ),
+        (
+            format!("{SECTION}[secrets.mattermost_token]\nenv = \"MM_TOKEN\"\n"),
+            "[secrets.mattermost_token] is not a Honcho key: memoryd has only honcho_trusted, honcho_untrusted, honcho_fleet and honcho_read_<agent>"
+                .to_string(),
+        ),
+        (
+            format!(
+                "{SECTION}{}[secrets.honcho_read_boxmaker2]\nenv = \"HONCHO_KEY\"\n",
+                read("boxmaker1", "boxmaker1-trusted")
+            ),
+            "[secrets.honcho_read_boxmaker2] is the key of agent \"boxmaker2\", which is not in [[honcho.read]]"
+                .to_string(),
+        ),
+        (
+            format!("{SECTION}[secrets.honcho_read_boxmaker0]\nenv = \"HONCHO_KEY\"\n"),
+            "[secrets.honcho_read_boxmaker0] is the key of agent \"boxmaker0\", which is not in [[honcho.read]]"
+                .to_string(),
+        ),
+        (
+            format!("{SECTION}[secrets.honcho_trusted]\n"),
+            "[secrets.honcho_trusted] needs exactly one of credential, env and file".to_string(),
+        ),
+        (
+            format!(
+                "{SECTION}[secrets.honcho_fleet]\nenv = \"HONCHO_KEY\"\nfile = \"/etc/honcho.key\"\n"
+            ),
+            "[secrets.honcho_fleet] needs exactly one of credential, env and file".to_string(),
+        ),
+        (
+            format!("{SECTION}[secrets.honcho_untrusted]\nenv = \"honcho_key\"\n"),
+            "[secrets.honcho_untrusted] env \"honcho_key\" is not a variable name (A-Z, 0-9, _)"
+                .to_string(),
+        ),
+        (
+            format!(
+                "{SECTION}{}[secrets.honcho_read_boxmaker1]\nfile = \"keys/boxmaker1\"\n",
+                read("boxmaker1", "boxmaker1-trusted")
+            ),
+            "[secrets.honcho_read_boxmaker1] file \"keys/boxmaker1\" must be an absolute path"
+                .to_string(),
+        ),
+        (
+            "[secrets.honcho_trusted]\nenv = \"HONCHO_KEY\"\n".to_string(),
+            "[secrets.honcho_trusted] is set, but there is no [honcho] section".to_string(),
+        ),
+    ];
+    for (text, want) in &cases {
+        assert_eq!(&reason(text), want, "\n{text}");
+    }
+    assert_eq!(cases.len(), 29);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn the_first_problem_is_the_one_reported() {
+    // A bad url and an owner that is the agent: the url is checked first.
+    let text = with(
+        "url = \"http://rift.scylla-hammerhead.ts.net:8000\"",
+        "url = \"rift\"",
+        "",
+    )
+    .replace("owner = \"kyle\"", "owner = \"boxmaker0\"");
+    assert_eq!(reason(&text), URL_REASON);
+    // A read agent that is this agent, with a bad trust: the agent is checked first.
+    let text = format!(
+        "{SECTION}[[honcho.read]]\nagent = \"boxmaker0\"\nworkspace = \"w\"\ntrust = \"no\"\n"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        reason(&text),
+        "[[honcho.read]] agent \"boxmaker0\" is this agent ([honcho] agent)"
+    );
+}

crates/memoryd/tests/honcho_start.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+//! `memoryd serve` with a `[honcho]` section (M5c spec, section 10): an invalid one stops it at
+//! start with the reason and the `honcho-config-invalid` pointer, before it takes its lock or
+//! touches its home; a valid one starts it as before. A key is never printed. Every wait has a
+//! deadline, and every process is killed and every path removed by a guard (tip T44). Do not
+//! edit.
+
+#[path = "support/tmp.rs"]
+mod tmp;
+
+use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+use std::os::unix::net::UnixStream;
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+use std::process::{Child, Command, Stdio};
+use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
+
+use bxcore::{Empty, Envelope, Message, PROTOCOL_VERSION, read_frame, write_frame};
+use tmp::TempDir;
+
+const POINTER: &str = "see docs/runbook.md#honcho-config-invalid";
+const START_FAILED: &str = "see docs/runbook.md#memoryd-start-failed";
+
+/// The values of the two keys the configs name. Built from pieces, so that no file holds one
+/// whole; neither may appear in anything `memoryd` prints.
+fn env_key() -> String {
+    ["hk", "env", "7f3a9c"].join("-")
+}
+fn file_key() -> String {
+    ["hk", "file", "b81d2e"].join("-")
+}
+
+const SECTION: &str = "[honcho]
+url = \"http://127.0.0.1:9\"
+agent = \"boxmaker0\"
+owner = \"kyle\"
+trusted = \"boxmaker0-trusted\"
+untrusted = \"boxmaker0-untrusted\"
+fleet = \"fleet\"
+[[honcho.read]]
+agent = \"boxmaker1\"
+workspace = \"boxmaker1-trusted\"
+";
+
+struct Home {
+    dir: TempDir,
+    config: PathBuf,
+}
+
+impl Home {
+    /// A home whose `memoryd.toml` is the usual one and `extra`, with a key file holding
+    /// `file_key()` (mode 0600) at `<home>/keys/honcho.key`.
+    fn new(tag: &str, extra: &str) -> Home {
+        let dir = TempDir::new(tag);
+        let soul = dir.write("etc/soul.md", "You are Boxmaker.\n");
+        let key = dir.write("keys/honcho.key", &format!("{}\n", file_key()));
+        std::fs::set_permissions(&key, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)).unwrap();
+        let text = format!(
+            "[paths]\nhome = \"{}\"\n[memory]\nsoul_starter = \"{}\"\n{extra}",
+            dir.path().display(),
+            soul.display()
+        );
+        let text = text.replace("KEY_FILE", &key.display().to_string());
+        let config = dir.write("memoryd.toml", &text);
+        Home { dir, config }
+    }
+
+    fn path(&self, relative: &str) -> PathBuf {
+        self.dir.path().join(relative)
+    }
+
+    fn command(&self) -> Command {
+        let mut command = Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_memoryd"));
+        command
+            .args(["serve", "--config"])
+            .arg(&self.config)
+            .env("HONCHO_TEST_KEY", env_key())
+            .stdin(Stdio::null())
+            .stdout(Stdio::null());
+        command
+    }
+
+    /// Runs `memoryd serve` to its end, at most 10 s (then it is killed), and gives its exit code
+    /// (`None` if it had to be killed) and its stderr.
+    fn run_to_end(&self) -> (Option<i32>, String) {
+        let mut child = Daemon(self.command().stderr(Stdio::piped()).spawn().unwrap());
+        let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(10);
+        let mut code = None;
+        while Instant::now() < deadline {
+            if let Ok(Some(status)) = child.0.try_wait() {
+                code = status.code();
+                break;
+            }
+            std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20));
+        }
+        let _ = child.0.kill();
+        let _ = child.0.wait();
+        let mut stderr = String::new();
+        if let Some(mut pipe) = child.0.stderr.take() {
+            let _ = std::io::Read::read_to_string(&mut pipe, &mut stderr);
+        }
+        (code, stderr)
+    }
+
+    /// `memoryd serve` with its stderr in `<home>/memoryd.err`.
+    fn start(&self) -> Daemon {
+        let err = std::fs::File::create(self.path("memoryd.err")).unwrap();
+        Daemon(self.command().stderr(Stdio::from(err)).spawn().unwrap())
+    }
+
+    fn stderr(&self) -> String {
+        std::fs::read_to_string(self.path("memoryd.err")).unwrap_or_default()
+    }
+}
+
+/// A running `memoryd serve`, killed and waited for when dropped. Each test declares it after its
+/// `Home`, so it drops first.
+struct Daemon(Child);
+
+impl Drop for Daemon {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        let _ = self.0.kill();
+        let _ = self.0.wait();
+    }
+}
+
+/// True once `memoryd` answers `memory_block` on `loopd`'s socket, within 10 s.
+fn answers(home: &Home) -> bool {
+    let socket = home.path("run/loop-memory/memory.sock");
+    let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(10);
+    while Instant::now() < deadline {
+        if let Ok(mut stream) = UnixStream::connect(&socket) {
+            let limit = Some(Duration::from_secs(5));
+            let ask = Envelope {
+                v: PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+                id: 1,
+                r#final: true,
+                msg: Message::MemoryBlock(Empty {}),
+            };
+            if stream.set_read_timeout(limit).is_ok()
+                && write_frame(&mut stream, &ask).is_ok()
+                && matches!(
+                    read_frame(&mut stream),
+                    Ok(Envelope {
+                        msg: Message::MemoryBlockReply(_),
+                        ..
+                    })
+                )
+            {
+                return true;
+            }
+        }
+        std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20));
+    }
+    false
+}
+
+fn assert_no_key(text: &str) {
+    assert!(
+        !text.contains(&env_key()),
+        "the env key was printed: {text}"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        !text.contains(&file_key()),
+        "the file key was printed: {text}"
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn an_invalid_section_stops_memoryd_with_its_reason_and_the_pointer() {
+    let extra = format!(
+        "{}[secrets.honcho_trusted]\nenv = \"HONCHO_TEST_KEY\"\n[secrets.honcho_fleet]\nfile = \"KEY_FILE\"\n",
+        SECTION.replace("owner = \"kyle\"", "owner = \"boxmaker0\"")
+    );
+    let home = Home::new("honcho-bad", &extra);
+    let (code, stderr) = home.run_to_end();
+    assert_eq!(code, Some(1), "{stderr}");
+    assert_eq!(
+        stderr,
+        format!(
+            "memoryd: {}: [honcho] agent and owner are both \"boxmaker0\": the agent's peer must not be the owner's\n{POINTER}\n",
+            home.config.display()
+        )
+    );
+    assert_no_key(&stderr);
+    assert!(
+        !home.path("run").exists(),
+        "memoryd stopped before its lock and sockets"
+    );
+    assert!(!home.path("memory").exists(), "and before its memory");
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn a_key_for_an_agent_not_read_stops_memoryd() {
+    let extra = format!("{SECTION}[secrets.honcho_read_boxmaker2]\nenv = \"HONCHO_TEST_KEY\"\n");
+    let home = Home::new("honcho-key", &extra);
+    let (code, stderr) = home.run_to_end();
+    assert_eq!(code, Some(1), "{stderr}");
+    assert_eq!(
+        stderr,
+        format!(
+            "memoryd: {}: [secrets.honcho_read_boxmaker2] is the key of agent \"boxmaker2\", which is not in [[honcho.read]]\n{POINTER}\n",
+            home.config.display()
+        )
+    );
+    assert_no_key(&stderr);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn an_unknown_key_in_the_section_is_still_a_start_failure() {
+    let extra = SECTION.replace("fleet = \"fleet\"", "fleet = \"fleet\"\nfleat = \"x\"");
+    let home = Home::new("honcho-unknown", &extra);
+    let (code, stderr) = home.run_to_end();
+    assert_eq!(code, Some(1), "{stderr}");
+    assert!(
+        stderr.starts_with(&format!("memoryd: {}: ", home.config.display())),
+        "{stderr}"
+    );
+    assert!(stderr.contains("fleat"), "{stderr}");
+    assert!(stderr.ends_with(&format!("\n{START_FAILED}\n")), "{stderr}");
+    assert!(!stderr.contains(POINTER), "{stderr}");
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn a_valid_section_with_keys_starts_memoryd_as_before() {
+    let extra = format!(
+        "{SECTION}[secrets.honcho_trusted]\nenv = \"HONCHO_TEST_KEY\"\n[secrets.honcho_fleet]\nfile = \"KEY_FILE\"\n[secrets.honcho_read_boxmaker1]\nenv = \"HONCHO_TEST_KEY\"\n"
+    );
+    let home = Home::new("honcho-good", &extra);
+    let _daemon = home.start();
+    assert!(
+        answers(&home),
+        "memoryd never answered; stderr: {}",
+        home.stderr()
+    );
+    let stderr = home.stderr();
+    assert!(stderr.contains("memoryd: serving\n"), "{stderr}");
+    assert_no_key(&stderr);
+    assert!(!stderr.contains(POINTER), "{stderr}");
+}

docs/dependencies.md

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Every external crate has a row here. `scripts/check-dep-docs.sh` enforces it.
 | `emsha` | 1.0.4 | `bxcore` | SHA-256. Written by the owner; no dependencies, no `unsafe`. Checked against `sha256sum` on 3,204 inputs. |
 | `rustls` | 0.23.45 | `gatewayd` | TLS to Mattermost over the tailnet (M4a, owner's decision). `default-features = false` with `ring`, `std`, `tls12`. With its dependencies on Linux: `ring` (Apache-2.0 AND ISC; builds C and assembly), `rustls-webpki` and `untrusted` (ISC), `rustls-pki-types`, `subtle` (BSD-3-Clause), `zeroize`, `once_cell`, `getrandom`, `libc`, `cfg-if`. Apache-2.0 OR ISC OR MIT. |
 | `rustls-native-certs` | 0.8.4 | `gatewayd` | The host's trusted certificates, so a CA installed on the host is trusted too; adds `openssl-probe`. Apache-2.0 OR ISC OR MIT. |
-| `zeroize` | 1.9.0 | `bxcore`, feature `secrets` (enabled by `gatewayd`; never by `loopd`) | Wipes a secret's memory when it is dropped (`Secret`). Already a dependency of `rustls`. Apache-2.0 OR MIT. |
+| `zeroize` | 1.9.0 | `bxcore`, feature `secrets` (enabled by `gatewayd` and `memoryd`; never by `loopd`) | Wipes a secret's memory when it is dropped (`Secret`). Already a dependency of `rustls`. Apache-2.0 OR MIT. |
 | `rusqlite` | 0.40.2 | `memoryd` from M5a | The full-text index (`index/memory.sqlite3`, FTS5), disposable and rebuilt from files. Feature `bundled`: `libsqlite3-sys` compiles SQLite from source with FTS5 on, so no system SQLite is needed. With its dependencies: `libsqlite3-sys` (MIT; build: `cc`, `pkg-config`, `vcpkg`), `hashlink`, `hashbrown`, `foldhash` (Zlib, added to `deny.toml` for it), `fallible-iterator`, `fallible-streaming-iterator`, `smallvec`, `bitflags`. MIT. |
 | `roncho` | 1.0.0 | `memoryd` from M5c | The owner's Honcho client (`docs/specs/2026-09-25-roncho-requirements.md`). `default-features = false`, feature `tls` (which implies `blocking`): a blocking client over `std::net`, no async runtime; TLS through `rustls`, already a dependency of `gatewayd`. It adds only itself to the lock file: `serde`, `serde_json`, `thiserror`, `toml`, `zeroize` and the TLS crates are already there. Checked against its requirements on 2026-09-27 (every client built with `.without_config_file()`, spec M5c section 6). Apache-2.0. |
 

docs/implementer-log.md

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ reviewer adds findings under "Reviews" once per milestone.
 
 | Task | Date | Status | Gate runs | First gate | Deviations | Notes | Model |
 |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| M5c1/06-memoryd-honcho-config | 2026-09-28 | done | 1 | pass | none | Copied the three given tests from `docs/plans/M5c1/files/crates/memoryd/tests/`: `honcho_config.rs`, `honcho_reasons.rs`, `honcho_start.rs`. Step 2 showed exactly the named failures: `honcho_config` with eight (E0433 cannot find `honcho` in `memoryd`, E0432 unresolved import `bxcore::secrets`, two E0599 for `honcho_config`, three for `state_socket`, one for the `Honcho` variant) and `honcho_reasons` with two (the same E0433 and E0432); `honcho_start` compiled. Made K1 (`bxcore` gains `features = ["secrets"]`) and L1 (`pub mod honcho;` after `pub mod files;`), created `crates/memoryd/src/honcho/mod.rs` with the given one-line module, and copied the skeleton `crates/memoryd/src/honcho/config.rs`. Filled its seven bodies in the given order, each from its comment and `cargo check` after: `is_name` (not empty, byte length `<= MAX_NAME`, every byte `is_ascii_alphanumeric()` or `_` or `-`, bytes not chars so `é` and U+0660 fail); `check_url` (strip `https://` then `http://`, `split_once(':')` into host and port, a `host_ok` helper for the non-empty ASCII-alnum/`.`/`-` host, a port that is non-empty, all digits and parses to `u16` `> 0` via `ok().is_some_and`, the `URL_REASON` which never quotes the URL); `check_own_workspaces` (the three pairs in order, first equal pair is R5 with its name); `trust_of` (match on `as_deref`, `None`/`Some("untrusted")` is `Untrusted`, `Some("trusted")` is `Trusted`, else R9 with the written text); `class_of` (same shape, `Private`/`Public`/`Secret`, else R10); `read_workspace` (check agent then workspace names, R6 the agent is this agent, R7 the agent is listed in `earlier`, R8 the workspace is one of the three, then the `ReadWorkspace` with `trust_of`/`class_of`); `check_keys` (a name other than the three is a read key only when `strip_prefix(READ_KEY)` names an agent in `read`, else R11 with the suffix or R12 without the prefix, then `spec.source()` with R13). Made C1-C8 in `config.rs` (module comment, imports with `BTreeMap`/`SecretSpec`/`honcho`, `Sockets.state`, `Config.honcho` and `.secrets`, `ConfigError::Honcho` and its Display arm, `load` calls `honcho_config` before returning, `honcho_config` and `state_socket`), and M1-M2 in `main.rs` (imports and the pointer matched by error kind on the `Config::load` arm); the pointer edit first landed on the `instance::lock` arm and I moved it to the `Config::load` arm, the diff being exactly M1-M2. Appended `runbook-honcho-config-invalid.md` to `docs/runbook.md` (`grep -c '^## honcho-config-invalid$'` printed 1) and made D1 in `docs/dependencies.md`. Step 7: `cargo build -p memoryd` builds, the runbook grep prints one line, the `secrets::load`/`read_checked` grep prints nothing, the other-crates diff is empty. `cargo test -p memoryd` every suite passes (config 4, honcho_config 8, honcho_reasons 5, honcho_start 4). `make gate` printed `gate: ok` with 1188 tests (1187 in `cargo test --workspace` plus the ignored `end_to_end` the gate runs separately with `BOXMAKER_BROKERD`; 1171 before this task plus the 17 new). No new dependency, so `Cargo.lock` is unchanged. | ornith-1.5-35b-a3b |
 | M5c1/05-brokerd-state-socket | 2026-09-28 | done | 2 | pass | none | Copied five files from `docs/plans/M5c1/files/`: `state_socket.rs` and `serve_state.rs` (new) and new versions of `config.rs`, `serve.rs` and `tests/fixtures/config/full.toml` (all now set and check `state`). Step 2 showed exactly the named failures: `config` with four E0599 (`no method named state_socket`) and `state_socket` with one E0432 (`unresolved import brokerd::state_socket`); the new `serve.rs` compiled. `cargo build --tests` reported those two targets only. Made the edits exactly as the task gives: C1 `Sockets` gains `state: PathBuf` with the doc comment, C2 `Config::state_socket` after `admin_socket` returning the default `run/memory-broker/state.sock` when empty; L1 `pub mod state_socket;` after `pub mod state;`. Created `crates/brokerd/src/state_socket.rs` with the given body: `read_request`, match `Message::SessionState(question)` (no `SessionState` import), `StateStore::new(&broker.cfg().state_dir())`, `Ok` -> `SessionStateReply { class: state.taint, untrusted: state.untrusted }`, `Err` -> log `brokerd: {e}` and send `internal` with `e.to_string()`, `forbid` for any other kind; `send` the final frame. V1-V11 in `serve.rs`: doc comment, `use crate::state_socket`, `Started` gains `state: UnixListener`, `state.sock` bound first then tool and admin, `Which::State`, the `run` destructure, the second `accept_loop` with `tx` moved, the `accept-state` name, and `state_socket::handle` in `serve_one`; M1-M3 in `main.rs`: doc comment, `state_path = cfg.state_socket()`, the `serving session state on <path>` notice. R1-R3 in `docs/runbook.md`: `accept-broker (or accept-admin, accept-state)`, the `state.sock` line in `socket-forbidden`, and `pgrep -a 'loopd|bxctl|memoryd'`. After the edits `cargo check -p brokerd` is clean with no warning; `config` 7, `state_socket` 8, `serve_state` 5, `instance` 2, `serve` 8, `serve_pointers` 10 pass. Step 7: `grep -n 'listen(&cfg'` prints three lines with `state_socket` first, `grep -n '^use' state_socket.rs` prints four and the `bxcore` import carries `ErrorCode`, `Message`, `SessionStateReply`, `WireError` with no `SessionState`, `git diff --stat -- crates/brokerd/src` lists exactly config.rs/lib.rs/main.rs/serve.rs, the other-crates diff is empty. `make gate` printed `gate: ok` with 1171 tests (1158 before this task plus the 13 new: eight in `state_socket.rs`, five in `serve_state.rs`; the new `config.rs` and `serve.rs` kept their counts, 7 and 8). No new dependency, so `Cargo.lock` is unchanged. | ornith-1.5-35b-a3b |
 | M5c1/04-bxctl-speaker | 2026-09-28 | done | 1 | pass | none | Copied four files from `docs/plans/M5c1/files/`: `chat_speaker.rs` (new) and new versions of `chat.rs`, `chat_approvals.rs` and `cli.rs` (did not copy `chat.rs-task01`). Step 2 showed exactly the named failures: four non-compiling test targets (`chat`, `chat_approvals`, `chat_speaker`, `cli`) with E0061 for `run_turn` (5 args) and `stream_turn` (6 args), E0282 on the closure in `chat.rs`, and E0560/E0609 for the missing `speaker` field. Made the edits exactly as the task gives: C1 the `--speaker NAME` flag added to the chat line of `USAGE` with one explaining line (six-space indent); C2 `ChatOptions` gains `speaker: Option<String>`; C3 `default` sets `speaker: None`; C4 the `--speaker` arm in `parse_chat` refuses a second one and falls through to `i += 2`; C5 `parse_speaker` (empty, or any whitespace/control char -> `UsageError`, else the value as typed). R1 `run_turn` gains `speaker: Option<&str>` after `resume` with the doc comment, R2 `speaker.map(str::to_string)` on the `Turn`, R3 `stream_turn` gains the parameter and passes it. M1-M3 all three `stream_turn` calls in `main.rs` pass `opts.speaker.as_deref()`. `main` unchanged (a `UsageError` already prints the usage text and exits 2). After the edits `cargo check -p bxctl` is clean with no warning; `cli` 15 passed, `chat_speaker` 7 passed, every bxctl suite passes. Step 7: `grep -rn 'speaker: None' crates/bxctl/src` prints one line (the default), `git diff --stat -- crates/bxctl/src` lists exactly chat.rs/cli.rs/main.rs, the other-crates diff is empty. `make gate` printed `gate: ok` with 1158 tests (1148 before plus the 10 new: three in `cli.rs`, seven in `chat_speaker.rs`; `chat.rs` and `chat_approvals.rs` kept their counts). No new dependency, so `Cargo.lock` is unchanged. | ornith-1.5-35b-a3b |
 | M5c1/03-gatewayd-speaker | 2026-09-28 | done | 2 | pass | none | Copied the seven given files from `docs/plans/M5c1/files/`: `deliver_speaker.rs` and `serve_speaker.rs` (new) and new versions of `sessions.rs`, `deliver.rs`, `deliver_links.rs`, `deliver_notice.rs` and `support/fake_mm.rs` (it gains `refuse_users`). Step 2 showed exactly the named failures: `deliver`, `deliver_links`, `deliver_notice`, `deliver_speaker` and `sessions` did not compile (E0560 for `Batch.senders` / `Message.user`, E0061 for `deliver` taking 5 args, E0282 on the closure), and `serve_speaker` compiled with its four tests failing (three found `None` where a speaker was expected, the fourth had no `"no username for"` log line). Made the edits exactly as the task gives: S1 `Message` gains `user` (the post's `user_id`); S2/S3 set `user` on both `Route::Queue` paths; S4 `Batch` gains `senders` plus `Batch::sender` (`first()?` then `all(|u| u == first)`, `None` for two or more people or for none); S5 `Pending` gains `senders`; S6 `push` pushes `message.user` to `pending.senders` on the `Waiting` path; S7 the `Start` path is `senders: vec![message.user.clone()]` with the new `Pending`'s `senders: Vec::new()`; S8 `finish` takes `senders` with `std::mem::take`. D1 `one_turn` gains `speaker: Option<&str>`; D2 `speaker.map(str::to_string)` on the `Turn` (its comment rewritten); D3 `run_turn` gains `speaker` threaded through both `one_turn` calls; D4 `deliver` gains `speaker`; D5 `deliver` passes `speaker` to `run_turn`. G1 `Gateway` gains `usernames: HashMap<String,String>`; G2 `new()` inits it. H1 `start` computes `speaker = self.speaker(&batch)` and passes `speaker.as_deref()` to `deliver`. H2 added `Gateway::speaker` (`batch.sender()?`; a cache hit returns it; else `client.username`, `Ok` inserts and returns, `Err` logs `"gatewayd: no username for {user}: {e}; the turn has no speaker"` and returns `None`). `approvals.rs` and `mm/rest.rs` untouched, the text still joins as before and the speaker never enters it. `cargo check -p gatewayd` clean after sessions; after deliver it fails only in `serve/handle.rs` at the `deliver` call (E0061/E0277) as the task predicts, then clean after serve. `sessions` 11 passed, `deliver_speaker` 3, `serve_speaker` 4, every gatewayd suite passes. Step 7: the grep for `speaker: None` prints nothing, `git diff --stat -- crates/gatewayd/src` lists exactly `deliver.rs`, `serve/handle.rs`, `serve/mod.rs`, `sessions.rs`, the other-crates diff is empty. `make gate` printed `gate: ok` with 1148 tests (1137 in `cargo test --workspace`, plus the 1 ignored `end_to_end` the gate runs separately with `BOXMAKER_BROKERD`; 1138 before this task plus the 10 new: 3 in `sessions.rs`, 3 in `deliver_speaker.rs`, 4 in `serve_speaker.rs`). No new dependency, so `Cargo.lock` is unchanged. | ornith-1.5-35b-a3b |

docs/runbook.md

@@ -872,3 +872,54 @@ identity entry that breaks a new refuse rule leaves the memory block at once (se
 
 **Check.** `bxctl sanitize check` with the text gives the new answer (nothing, and exit 0, for a
 text that must pass). After the rebuild, the agent's next write of it is answered as expected.
+
+## honcho-config-invalid
+
+**What you see.** `memoryd` exits 1 at start, before it takes its lock or touches its home, with
+one line naming its config file and the reason, then this entry:
+
+```text
+memoryd: /etc/boxmaker/memoryd.toml: [honcho] agent and owner are both "kyle": the agent's peer must not be the owner's
+see docs/runbook.md#honcho-config-invalid
+```
+
+**Why.** `[honcho]` in `memoryd.toml` names this agent's peer, the owner's peer and the
+workspaces the agent writes to and reads in Honcho, and `[secrets.<name>]` where each workspace's
+key comes from (M5c spec, section 10). A wrong name would send turns and memory to a workspace
+they do not belong in, so `memoryd` checks the section before it starts. The reasons:
+
+- `url` is not `http://` or `https://`, a host (letters, digits, `.` and `-`) and an optional
+  port (1 to 65535), and nothing else: no path, not even a `/`, and no user or password. The line
+  does not repeat the URL.
+- A name (`agent`, `owner`, `trusted`, `untrusted`, `fleet`, and each `[[honcho.read]]`'s `agent`
+  and `workspace`) is not 1 to 512 of `a-z`, `A-Z`, `0-9`, `_` and `-`, Honcho's own rule: a `.`
+  or a space is not allowed.
+- `agent` and `owner` are the same peer, or two of `trusted`, `untrusted` and `fleet` are the same
+  workspace.
+- A `[[honcho.read]]` names this agent, names an agent twice, or names one of this agent's three
+  workspaces; or its `trust` is not `trusted` or `untrusted`, or its `class` not `public`,
+  `private` or `secret` (all lower case).
+- A `[secrets.<name>]` is not `honcho_trusted`, `honcho_untrusted`, `honcho_fleet` or
+  `honcho_read_<agent>` for an agent in `[[honcho.read]]`; or it does not name exactly one
+  well-formed `credential`, `env` or `file` (as in `secret-unavailable`); or there is no
+  `[honcho]` section for it.
+
+A key missing from `[honcho]` or `[[honcho.read]]`, an unknown key, or a value of the wrong type
+is a parse error instead, and points to `memoryd-start-failed`. A key's value is not read here,
+only where it comes from, and it is never printed. While `memoryd` is stopped nothing is synced,
+and `bxctl memory sync` cannot reach it.
+
+**Confirm.** The line quotes the table and the value. Open the file it names and compare the
+section with the M5c spec, section 10 (`docs/specs/2026-09-27-m5c-honcho.md`):
+
+```sh
+grep -n -A6 -e '^\[honcho\]' -e '^\[\[honcho.read\]\]' -e '^\[secrets\.' <config path>
+```
+
+**Fix.** Correct the value. Keep a name that is already in use as it is: a new `trusted`,
+`untrusted` or `fleet` sends everything from then on to a new, empty workspace, and a new `agent`
+is a new peer. `agent` is this agent's own name, different on each agent; `owner` and `fleet` are
+the same in every agent's file. To turn Honcho off, remove `[honcho]`, its `[[honcho.read]]`
+tables and every `[secrets.honcho_…]`.
+
+**Check.** `memoryd serve --config <path>` prints `memoryd: serving`.