Split kickoff pack into brief, milestones and decisions
docs/design.md now holds only the design brief, as the pack intended. The session prompt and milestone table move to docs/milestones.md verbatim. Open decisions move to docs/decisions.md, which also records the four decisions made at kickoff. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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# Boxmaker: kickoff pack
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# Boxmaker design brief
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Boxmaker is a sovereign personal agent harness. The name is from *Count Zero*: the remnant AI in
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the Straylight cores that patiently assembles small boxes from fragments.
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Three parts:
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1. **Design brief** — commit as `docs/design.md` in the new repo. Every session reads it.
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2. **Session 1 prompt** — paste into a fresh Opus session in an empty repo directory.
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3. **Milestone outline and per-milestone prompt template** — one session per milestone.
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This brief is binding. Changes to it land as their own commit and are recorded in
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`docs/decisions.md`. Milestones and session prompts are in `docs/milestones.md`.
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Crate names and llama.cpp server parameters below are from memory or secondhand research.
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The prompts tell the session to verify each one against primary docs before use.
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Verify each one against primary docs before use.
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---
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## Part 1: Design brief (`docs/design.md`)
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### Goal
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## Goal
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A personal agent harness that maximizes sovereignty: local inference by default, no ambient
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authority, state in plain files the owner can read, a codebase small enough to audit.
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### Target environment
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## Target environment
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- Inference host: `straylight`, AMD Strix Halo, 128 GB unified memory, llama.cpp `llama-server`,
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~128k context configured.
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@@ -40,12 +33,12 @@ authority, state in plain files the owner can read, a codebase small enough to a
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ACLs restrict what the host as a whole may reach.
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- First channel: the owner's existing self-hosted Mattermost server, reached over the tailnet.
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### Non-goals (v0)
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## Non-goals (v0)
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Plugin registry, skill marketplace, web dashboard, multi-user, voice, more than one chat channel,
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cloud-led orchestration as the default, in-process third-party code of any kind.
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### Roles (separate binaries, narrow interfaces)
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## Roles (separate binaries, narrow interfaces)
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| Role | Holds | Can reach | Never holds |
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|---|---|---|---|
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@@ -57,7 +50,7 @@ cloud-led orchestration as the default, in-process third-party code of any kind.
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v0 runs all roles on one host. The interfaces must not assume co-location with `llama-server`.
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### Network isolation
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## Network isolation
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The host's tailnet identity is shared by every container that has a network, so a container with
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ordinary outbound networking can reach the whole tailnet and the internet as the host.
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@@ -74,7 +67,7 @@ ordinary outbound networking can reach the whole tailnet and the internet as the
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5. Tailnet ACLs (kept in `deploy/`) limit the host's node to `llama-server` and Mattermost, plus
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whatever tool grants need. This is defence in depth, not the role boundary.
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### Channel: Mattermost
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## Channel: Mattermost
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- Bot account with a token held in the `SecretStore`. REST API for posting, WebSocket for events.
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Implement directly over HTTP and WebSocket; do not adopt a community SDK without checking its
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@@ -85,7 +78,7 @@ ordinary outbound networking can reach the whole tailnet and the internet as the
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- Mattermost stores messages unencrypted in its database. That is acceptable because the server is
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the owner's, and it is recorded in `docs/egress.md`.
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### Inference contract (the part existing harnesses get wrong)
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## Inference contract (the part existing harnesses get wrong)
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1. **Baseline budget.** System prompt plus tool schemas at session start: 3,000 tokens or less,
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measured with the server's tokenizer, enforced by a test.
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@@ -115,7 +108,7 @@ to chat-completions. Switch only if the M0 cache measurements fail. Known risk:
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templates drop earlier thinking blocks from history, which changes the rendered prefix at the last
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assistant turn.
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### Authority contract
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## Authority contract
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1. `loopd` has no authority. Every tool call goes to `brokerd` as a request.
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2. A **grant** is a file the owner writes: tool, argument constraints (paths, hosts, patterns),
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@@ -131,7 +124,7 @@ assistant turn.
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unless a grant allows that class out. Every outbound cloud payload is logged in full.
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7. Scheduled jobs are re-validated against current grants on every run.
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### Cloud consult (M6)
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## Cloud consult (M6)
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- One tool, `consult`, behind `brokerd` like any other. The endpoint is any OpenAI-compatible URL,
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set in config. Nothing in the code is specific to one vendor.
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@@ -145,7 +138,7 @@ assistant turn.
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- Hosted GLM always thinks. Treat `consult` as slow and asynchronous.
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- Payloads are built from an explicit allowlist of fields, never from raw session history.
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### Memory (M5)
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## Memory (M5)
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Memory is what carries continuity across epoch compaction, so it is required. It must not break
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the inference contract, and it must not become a way for injected text to persist.
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@@ -176,7 +169,7 @@ the inference contract, and it must not become a way for injected text to persis
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the index passes about one million chunks or measured `recall` latency exceeds one second, and
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then prefer an embedded, file-backed approximate index over a server.
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### State
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## State
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Files are the source of truth. SQLite is allowed only for rebuildable indexes and queues.
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@@ -188,7 +181,7 @@ Files are the source of truth. SQLite is allowed only for rebuildable indexes an
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- Secrets: behind a `SecretStore` trait. v0 backend is an encrypted file whose key is not stored
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beside it. No plaintext secrets on disk, none in config, none in the repo.
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### Code constraints
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## Code constraints
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- Rust stable, Cargo workspace. Crates: `proto` (shared types), `loopd`, `brokerd`, `gatewayd`,
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`inferproxy`, `toolkit` (tool container entrypoints), `bxctl` (owner CLI).
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@@ -197,101 +190,3 @@ Files are the source of truth. SQLite is allowed only for rebuildable indexes an
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`brokerd`'s policy module can construct.
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- Dependencies are few and justified in `docs/dependencies.md`. `cargo-deny` runs in the gate.
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- No telemetry, no update checks, no outbound call not listed in `docs/egress.md`.
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---
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## Part 2: Session 1 prompt (M0 spike + M1 skeleton)
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```text
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You are starting a new Rust project: Boxmaker, a sovereign personal agent harness. Read docs/design.md
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first; it is the design brief and it is binding. If anything in it looks wrong or contradicts
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what you measure, stop and tell me rather than working around it.
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This session has two deliverables, in order.
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DELIVERABLE 1 — M0 measurement spike (throwaway code, kept findings)
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The inference host is `straylight` (Strix Halo, llama.cpp llama-server, Ornith-1.5-35B-A3B,
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~128k context). Before any architecture is built, measure what the design assumes. Ask me for
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the server URL and how you can reach it; if you cannot reach it, stop and say exactly what is
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missing.
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Fetch the llama-server README for the build running on straylight and the model card before
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using any endpoint or parameter. Do not rely on memory for request fields. Then measure and
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record in docs/inference-contract.md:
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a. Prompt-processing and generation throughput at depth 0 and ~32k (llama-bench or timed
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requests; say which).
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b. A 3-turn conversation with 4 tool schemas and thinking enabled: tokens processed versus
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tokens reused from cache on each turn. Show the raw timing fields.
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c. Whether tool calls come back correctly parsed through the chat-completions endpoint with
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the model's shipped template. Run 20 trials across 4 tools and report the failure count.
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d. Whether requests can be pinned to a slot, and whether a second session on another slot
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leaves the first slot's cache intact.
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e. What happens to the cache when an earlier assistant turn contained a thinking block.
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f. The exact launch flags in use, and the flags you recommend, with reasons.
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g. Whether llama-server can listen on a Unix socket, and whether it runs on the same host as
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the harness containers. This decides whether `inferproxy` is needed.
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Spike code goes in spike/ and is labelled throwaway. Conclude with a recommendation on the open
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question in the brief: server-side chat-completions, or in-process template rendering.
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Stop after M0 and show me the findings before starting M1.
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DELIVERABLE 2 — M1 workspace skeleton
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- AGENTS.md at the repo root: project standards drawn from docs/design.md "Code constraints",
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plus how to run the gate and how to verify against straylight.
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- Cargo workspace with the crates named in the brief. `proto` gets the real shared types:
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session log records, tool request and result, data-class labels, grant, decision, audit
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record. Other crates are minimal binaries that compile.
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- Makefile with `make gate`: cargo fmt --check, clippy with warnings denied, cargo test,
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cargo-deny, and a check that fails on any source file over 500 lines.
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- docs/dependencies.md and docs/egress.md, initially short and accurate.
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- Unit tests for `proto` serialization round trips and for the rule that a `Decision` cannot
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be constructed outside the policy module (a compile-fail test is acceptable).
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Working rules
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- Verify every external crate's current API on docs.rs before using it, and check its
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maintenance status and license. If you cannot fetch documentation, say so; do not guess.
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- Write a short plan before M1 and execute it with subagents. Tests first.
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- Run `make gate` before declaring anything done. Report the exit status and last lines.
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- One logical change per commit. Never commit runtime data, secrets, or spike output that
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contains conversation content.
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- Keep it small. If a feature is not in the brief, do not add it. Propose it instead.
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```
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---
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## Part 3: Milestones (one session each)
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| # | Milestone | Proves | Verified by |
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| M0 | Measurement spike | The cache and tool-call assumptions hold on straylight | Numbers in `docs/inference-contract.md` |
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| M1 | Workspace, `proto`, gate | The type-level authority model compiles | `make gate` |
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| M2 | `loopd` core + `bxctl chat` | Append-only loop, baseline ≤ 3k tokens, self-test, runaway control, with one fake in-process tool | Prefix-extension property test; turn-2 cache hit on straylight |
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| M3 | `brokerd` | Grants, deny by default, hash-chained audit, rootless container runner, four tools (read file, write file, sandboxed shell, HTTP fetch with host allowlist), `ask` approvals through `bxctl` | Tests for deny paths; a container with no network grant cannot reach the network |
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| M4 | `gatewayd` + Mattermost | Bot connection, user-ID allowlist, threads as sessions, async delivery, approvals by reply or reaction, no listening port | End-to-end direct message on the real server; a non-allowlisted user gets no response |
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| M5 | Scheduler + memory | Heartbeat and cron on their own slot in isolated sessions; core block, `recall` and `remember` with provenance, FTS5 index, flush-then-compact at idle | Scheduled run leaves the main slot's cache intact; a fact from epoch 1 is recalled in epoch 2; a note written after reading untrusted content is marked on recall |
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| M5b | Embedding index (when justified) | Local embedding server, hybrid retrieval behind the `Retriever` trait, rebuild on model change | A paraphrased query finds a note that lexical search misses; no memory text leaves the host |
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| M6 | Subagents + cloud consult | Subagents on their slot returning summaries; consult tool gated by data-class grants with full payload log | A tainted session is refused; payload log matches what was sent |
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| M7 | Split deployment | Each role in its own rootless container; `loopd` with no network; socket volume permissions; egress proxy for tools; host ACL policy in `deploy/` | From inside the `loopd` container, requests to the internet, the tailnet and the host all fail; a tool container without a host grant cannot reach the tailnet |
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### Per-milestone prompt template
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```text
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Read AGENTS.md, docs/design.md and docs/inference-contract.md. This session delivers milestone
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M<n>: <one-line goal from the table>.
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Scope: <bullets>. Out of scope: everything else, including later milestones.
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Start by restating the acceptance checks from the milestone table as tests or scripted checks.
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Write a plan, show it to me, then execute it with subagents, tests first. Verify external APIs
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from their documentation before use. Finish with `make gate` and the on-device verification
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named in the table; report exit status, last lines, and what you observed on straylight.
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If the design brief turns out to be wrong, stop and propose the change to docs/design.md as its
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own commit before building on it.
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```
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### Decisions still open
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- Container runtime. Default proposal: rootless Podman.
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- Which host runs the harness containers: straylight itself, or another tailnet node.
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- Secret store backend beyond the v0 encrypted file.
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- Whether cloud-led sessions are ever allowed, and for which data classes.
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