Replace the audit record with chained audit events

Implemented-By: OpenCode session (model recorded in docs/implementer-log.md)
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-19 00:22:25 -07:00
parent cb5ecad4da
commit c6395b16f4
6 changed files with 270 additions and 71 deletions
+71 -17
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@@ -4,34 +4,88 @@ use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use crate::{CallId, DataClass, DenyReason, Hash32, SessionId, Timestamp};
// JSON: {"outcome":"allowed","grant":"…"} ; the tag sits beside the fields; outcomes are snake_case
// JSON: {"outcome":"denied","reason":"no_grant"} ; the tag sits beside the fields
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(tag = "outcome", rename_all = "snake_case", deny_unknown_fields)]
pub enum DecisionRecord {
Allowed {
grant: String,
},
Approved {
grant: String,
approver: String,
post: Option<String>,
},
Denied {
reason: DenyReason,
Allowed {},
Ask {},
Denied { reason: DenyReason },
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum ApprovalAnswer {
Approved,
Refused,
Expired,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum ResultStatus {
Result,
Failed,
}
// JSON: {"type":"decision","session":"…",…} ; the tag sits beside the fields
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case", deny_unknown_fields)]
pub enum AuditEvent {
Decision {
session: SessionId,
call: CallId,
tool: String,
arguments: String,
outcome: DecisionRecord,
grant: Option<String>,
grant_sha256: Option<Hash32>,
taint: DataClass,
untrusted: bool,
},
Approval {
session: SessionId,
call: CallId,
decision: u64,
answer: ApprovalAnswer,
by: Option<String>,
post: Option<String>,
reason: Option<String>,
outcome: DecisionRecord,
grant: Option<String>,
grant_sha256: Option<Hash32>,
taint: DataClass,
untrusted: bool,
},
Result {
session: SessionId,
call: CallId,
decision: u64,
status: ResultStatus,
class: DataClass,
untrusted: bool,
truncated: bool,
bytes: u64,
sha256: Hash32,
taint_after: DataClass,
},
Recovery {
torn_bytes: u64,
torn_sha256: Hash32,
},
AcceptedBreak {
file: String,
line: u64,
last_good: Hash32,
},
}
// JSON: {"seq":0,"time":"…","prev":"…","event":{"type":"decision",…}} ; `event` is a nested object.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct AuditRecord {
pub seq: u64,
pub time: Timestamp,
pub prev: Hash32,
pub session: SessionId,
pub call: CallId,
pub tool: String,
pub arguments: String,
pub session_taint: DataClass,
pub decision: DecisionRecord,
pub event: AuditEvent,
}
+1 -1
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@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ pub mod ids;
pub mod log;
pub mod wire;
pub use audit::{AuditRecord, DecisionRecord};
pub use audit::{ApprovalAnswer, AuditEvent, AuditRecord, DecisionRecord, ResultStatus};
pub use class::DataClass;
pub use frame::{FrameError, MAX_FRAME, read_frame, write_frame};
pub use grant::{Constraints, Grant, Mode};
+10 -4
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@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
{"seq":0,"time":"2026-09-17T08:05:00.000Z","prev":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","session":"mm-thread-42","call":1,"tool":"read_file","arguments":"{\"path\":\"/etc/hosts\"}","session_taint":"private","decision":{"outcome":"allowed","grant":"read-etc"}}
{"seq":1,"time":"2026-09-17T08:05:01.250Z","prev":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f","session":"mm-thread-42","call":2,"tool":"shell","arguments":"{\"command\":\"df -h\"}","session_taint":"private","decision":{"outcome":"approved","grant":"shell-ask","approver":"u8f3k2","post":"p9x7"}}
{"seq":2,"time":"2026-09-17T08:05:02.000Z","prev":"ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100","session":"cron-morning","call":1,"tool":"consult","arguments":"{\"question\":\"hi\"}","session_taint":"secret","decision":{"outcome":"denied","reason":"taint_too_high","grant":"consult-private"}}
{"seq":3,"time":"2026-09-17T08:05:03.000Z","prev":"ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100","session":"cron-morning","call":2,"tool":"rm_rf","arguments":"{}","session_taint":"secret","decision":{"outcome":"denied","reason":"no_grant","grant":null}}
{"seq":0,"time":"2026-09-17T08:05:00.000Z","prev":"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","event":{"type":"decision","session":"mm-thread-42","call":1,"tool":"read_file","arguments":"{\"path\":\"/etc/hosts\"}","outcome":{"outcome":"allowed"},"grant":"read-etc","grant_sha256":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f","taint":"private","untrusted":false}}
{"seq":1,"time":"2026-09-17T08:05:00.500Z","prev":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f","event":{"type":"result","session":"mm-thread-42","call":1,"decision":0,"status":"result","class":"secret","untrusted":true,"truncated":true,"bytes":65536,"sha256":"ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100","taint_after":"secret"}}
{"seq":2,"time":"2026-09-17T08:05:01.250Z","prev":"ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100","event":{"type":"decision","session":"mm-thread-42","call":2,"tool":"shell","arguments":"{\"command\":\"df -h\"}","outcome":{"outcome":"ask"},"grant":"shell-ask","grant_sha256":"ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100","taint":"secret","untrusted":true}}
{"seq":3,"time":"2026-09-17T08:06:00.000Z","prev":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f","event":{"type":"approval","session":"mm-thread-42","call":2,"decision":2,"answer":"approved","by":"u8f3k2","post":"p9x7","reason":null,"outcome":{"outcome":"allowed"},"grant":"shell-auto","grant_sha256":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f","taint":"secret","untrusted":true}}
{"seq":4,"time":"2026-09-17T08:06:00.100Z","prev":"ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100","event":{"type":"result","session":"mm-thread-42","call":2,"decision":2,"status":"failed","class":"private","untrusted":false,"truncated":false,"bytes":27,"sha256":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f","taint_after":"secret"}}
{"seq":5,"time":"2026-09-17T08:07:00.000Z","prev":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f","event":{"type":"decision","session":"cron-morning","call":1,"tool":"rm_rf","arguments":"{}","outcome":{"outcome":"denied","reason":"no_grant"},"grant":null,"grant_sha256":null,"taint":"private","untrusted":false}}
{"seq":6,"time":"2026-09-17T08:08:00.000Z","prev":"ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100","event":{"type":"approval","session":"cron-morning","call":3,"decision":4,"answer":"refused","by":"bxctl","post":null,"reason":"not \"now\"","outcome":{"outcome":"denied","reason":"approval_refused"},"grant":null,"grant_sha256":null,"taint":"private","untrusted":false}}
{"seq":7,"time":"2026-09-17T08:23:00.000Z","prev":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f","event":{"type":"approval","session":"cron-morning","call":4,"decision":5,"answer":"expired","by":null,"post":null,"reason":null,"outcome":{"outcome":"denied","reason":"approval_expired"},"grant":null,"grant_sha256":null,"taint":"public","untrusted":false}}
{"seq":8,"time":"2026-09-18T00:00:00.000Z","prev":"ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100","event":{"type":"recovery","torn_bytes":117,"torn_sha256":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f"}}
{"seq":9,"time":"2026-09-18T00:00:01.000Z","prev":"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f","event":{"type":"accepted_break","file":"2026-09-17.jsonl","line":7,"last_good":"ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100"}}
+183 -47
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@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
//! Tests for audit and session log records against JSONL fixtures. Do not edit these or the fixtures.
use proto::{
AuditRecord, CallId, DataClass, DecisionRecord, DenyReason, Epoch, Hash32, LogRecord,
SessionId, Timestamp, ToolCall,
ApprovalAnswer, AuditEvent, AuditRecord, CallId, DataClass, DecisionRecord, DenyReason, Epoch,
Hash32, LogRecord, ResultStatus, SessionId, Timestamp, ToolCall,
};
use serde::{Serialize, de::DeserializeOwned};
use std::fmt::Debug;
@@ -35,64 +35,189 @@ fn check<T: Serialize + DeserializeOwned + PartialEq + Debug>(name: &str, want:
}
}
/// A record for session `session`; each test case overrides the fields it cares about.
fn audit(seq: u64, time: &str, prev: Hash32, session: &str) -> AuditRecord {
fn sid(s: &str) -> SessionId {
SessionId::new(s).unwrap()
}
fn record(seq: u64, time: &str, prev: Hash32, event: AuditEvent) -> AuditRecord {
AuditRecord {
seq,
time: ts(time),
prev,
session: SessionId::new(session).unwrap(),
call: CallId(1),
tool: String::new(),
arguments: "{}".to_string(),
session_taint: DataClass::Private,
decision: DecisionRecord::Denied {
reason: DenyReason::NoGrant,
grant: None,
},
event,
}
}
/// One line per event variant, every `DecisionRecord` variant, and every option both set and unset.
#[test]
fn audit_records() {
let seq_hash = Hash32::from_hex(SEQ_HEX).unwrap();
let rev_hash = Hash32::from_hex(REV_HEX).unwrap();
let want = [
AuditRecord {
tool: "read_file".to_string(),
arguments: r#"{"path":"/etc/hosts"}"#.to_string(),
decision: DecisionRecord::Allowed {
grant: "read-etc".to_string(),
record(
0,
"2026-09-17T08:05:00.000Z",
Hash32::ZERO,
AuditEvent::Decision {
session: sid("mm-thread-42"),
call: CallId(1),
tool: "read_file".to_string(),
arguments: r#"{"path":"/etc/hosts"}"#.to_string(),
outcome: DecisionRecord::Allowed {},
grant: Some("read-etc".to_string()),
grant_sha256: Some(seq_hash),
taint: DataClass::Private,
untrusted: false,
},
..audit(0, "2026-09-17T08:05:00.000Z", Hash32::ZERO, "mm-thread-42")
},
AuditRecord {
call: CallId(2),
tool: "shell".to_string(),
arguments: r#"{"command":"df -h"}"#.to_string(),
decision: DecisionRecord::Approved {
grant: "shell-ask".to_string(),
approver: "u8f3k2".to_string(),
),
record(
1,
"2026-09-17T08:05:00.500Z",
seq_hash,
AuditEvent::Result {
session: sid("mm-thread-42"),
call: CallId(1),
decision: 0,
status: ResultStatus::Result,
class: DataClass::Secret,
untrusted: true,
truncated: true,
bytes: 65536,
sha256: rev_hash,
taint_after: DataClass::Secret,
},
),
record(
2,
"2026-09-17T08:05:01.250Z",
rev_hash,
AuditEvent::Decision {
session: sid("mm-thread-42"),
call: CallId(2),
tool: "shell".to_string(),
arguments: r#"{"command":"df -h"}"#.to_string(),
outcome: DecisionRecord::Ask {},
grant: Some("shell-ask".to_string()),
grant_sha256: Some(rev_hash),
taint: DataClass::Secret,
untrusted: true,
},
),
record(
3,
"2026-09-17T08:06:00.000Z",
seq_hash,
AuditEvent::Approval {
session: sid("mm-thread-42"),
call: CallId(2),
decision: 2,
answer: ApprovalAnswer::Approved,
by: Some("u8f3k2".to_string()),
post: Some("p9x7".to_string()),
reason: None,
outcome: DecisionRecord::Allowed {},
grant: Some("shell-auto".to_string()),
grant_sha256: Some(seq_hash),
taint: DataClass::Secret,
untrusted: true,
},
..audit(1, "2026-09-17T08:05:01.250Z", seq_hash, "mm-thread-42")
},
AuditRecord {
tool: "consult".to_string(),
arguments: r#"{"question":"hi"}"#.to_string(),
session_taint: DataClass::Secret,
decision: DecisionRecord::Denied {
reason: DenyReason::TaintTooHigh,
grant: Some("consult-private".to_string()),
),
record(
4,
"2026-09-17T08:06:00.100Z",
rev_hash,
AuditEvent::Result {
session: sid("mm-thread-42"),
call: CallId(2),
decision: 2,
status: ResultStatus::Failed,
class: DataClass::Private,
untrusted: false,
truncated: false,
bytes: 27,
sha256: seq_hash,
taint_after: DataClass::Secret,
},
..audit(2, "2026-09-17T08:05:02.000Z", rev_hash, "cron-morning")
},
AuditRecord {
call: CallId(2),
tool: "rm_rf".to_string(),
session_taint: DataClass::Secret,
..audit(3, "2026-09-17T08:05:03.000Z", rev_hash, "cron-morning")
},
),
record(
5,
"2026-09-17T08:07:00.000Z",
seq_hash,
AuditEvent::Decision {
session: sid("cron-morning"),
call: CallId(1),
tool: "rm_rf".to_string(),
arguments: "{}".to_string(),
outcome: DecisionRecord::Denied {
reason: DenyReason::NoGrant,
},
grant: None,
grant_sha256: None,
taint: DataClass::Private,
untrusted: false,
},
),
record(
6,
"2026-09-17T08:08:00.000Z",
rev_hash,
AuditEvent::Approval {
session: sid("cron-morning"),
call: CallId(3),
decision: 4,
answer: ApprovalAnswer::Refused,
by: Some("bxctl".to_string()),
post: None,
reason: Some("not \"now\"".to_string()),
outcome: DecisionRecord::Denied {
reason: DenyReason::ApprovalRefused,
},
grant: None,
grant_sha256: None,
taint: DataClass::Private,
untrusted: false,
},
),
record(
7,
"2026-09-17T08:23:00.000Z",
seq_hash,
AuditEvent::Approval {
session: sid("cron-morning"),
call: CallId(4),
decision: 5,
answer: ApprovalAnswer::Expired,
by: None,
post: None,
reason: None,
outcome: DecisionRecord::Denied {
reason: DenyReason::ApprovalExpired,
},
grant: None,
grant_sha256: None,
taint: DataClass::Public,
untrusted: false,
},
),
record(
8,
"2026-09-18T00:00:00.000Z",
rev_hash,
AuditEvent::Recovery {
torn_bytes: 117,
torn_sha256: seq_hash,
},
),
record(
9,
"2026-09-18T00:00:01.000Z",
seq_hash,
AuditEvent::AcceptedBreak {
file: "2026-09-17.jsonl".to_string(),
line: 7,
last_good: rev_hash,
},
),
];
check("audit.jsonl", &want);
}
@@ -159,8 +284,19 @@ fn unknown_fields_and_types_are_rejected() {
let unknown_type = user.replacen("\"user\"", "\"system\"", 1);
assert!(serde_json::from_str::<LogRecord>(&unknown_type).is_err());
let decision = r#"{"outcome":"allowed","grant":"g"}"#;
assert!(serde_json::from_str::<DecisionRecord>(decision).is_ok());
let extra = decision.replacen("\"grant\"", "\"why\":\"\",\"grant\"", 1);
// A variant with no fields must reject an unknown key too. A serde unit variant would not.
for decision in [r#"{"outcome":"allowed"}"#, r#"{"outcome":"ask"}"#] {
assert!(serde_json::from_str::<DecisionRecord>(decision).is_ok());
let extra = decision.replacen('}', ",\"why\":\"\"}", 1);
assert!(
serde_json::from_str::<DecisionRecord>(&extra).is_err(),
"{extra}"
);
}
let denied = r#"{"outcome":"denied","reason":"no_grant"}"#;
assert!(serde_json::from_str::<DecisionRecord>(denied).is_ok());
let extra = denied.replacen("\"reason\"", "\"grant\":null,\"reason\"", 1);
assert!(serde_json::from_str::<DecisionRecord>(&extra).is_err());
let approved = r#"{"outcome":"approved"}"#;
assert!(serde_json::from_str::<DecisionRecord>(approved).is_err());
}
+4 -2
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@@ -89,10 +89,12 @@ fn envelopes_reject_unknown_keys_at_every_depth() {
#[test]
fn audit_records_reject_unknown_keys_at_every_depth() {
for (i, line) in fixture("records/audit.jsonl").lines().enumerate() {
// The record and its decision: two objects.
// The record and its event: two objects. Decision and approval events also hold an
// outcome object.
let want = if line.contains("\"outcome\"") { 3 } else { 2 };
assert_eq!(
check::<AuditRecord>(&format!("audit.jsonl:{}", i + 1), line),
2
want
);
}
}
+1
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@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ reviewer adds findings under "Reviews" once per milestone.
| M2b/10-verify-device | 2026-09-18 | done | 1 | pass | none | No library code. Copied the three given files byte-identical (`cmp` clean): `crates/loopd/tests/device.rs` (replaces the M2a one, its four checks still in it), `Makefile` (only change: `verify-device` now also passes `BOXMAKER_BXCTL`), and `config/system.md`. `make gate` printed `gate: ok` with device at `0 passed; 0 failed; 6 ignored`. `curl http://straylight:11434/health` returned `{"status":"ok"}`. `make verify-device` ran all six checks against the real server in 41.6s, all passed: self-test, capped-thinking block, a four-turn conversation surviving a `loopd` restart with its cache, a request surviving its proxy being killed and restarted, a second turn reusing the first turn's cache, and the baseline fitting the token budget. The baseline is 251 tokens (the brief allows 3000). Ran directly rather than via a subagent: the `delegate` tool returned `Agent "undefined" not found` on every attempt. | Ornith-1.5-35B-A3B |
| M2b/11-review-fixes | 2026-09-18 | done | 1 | pass | a Default impl for SessionId was added to crates/proto/src/ids.rs, which the task did not list |
| M3a/01-proto-audit-types | 2026-09-19 | stopped | 1 | fail | none | The audit types were implemented exactly as the task specifies in audit.rs and lib.rs and the two tests copied; `records` passes (3 passed) and the audit portion of `strict` passes. `make gate` cannot pass: the task's `strict.rs` walks 28 wire fixtures but 16 (approvals/approval_list/approve/refuse/ok/grants_report/turn_event_* and friends) do not exist on the m3a branch and are created by task 02 ("leave wire.rs alone: task 02 changes it"). The `envelopes_reject_unknown_keys_at_every_depth` test fails on the missing `approvals.json`, so the gate fails. The branch was healthy at start (master's `strict` = 5 passed); the block is the task's new `strict.rs` requiring later fixtures. Reverted audit.rs/lib.rs/tests for a clean tree and committed only this row. A later session that has the wire fixtures (or a `strict.rs` scoped to task 01) can finish it. Copied the two given tests (loopd/baseline.rs, bxctl/chat.rs). In channel.rs the busy guard is now dropped before every final frame (the three open/create/assemble session errors, plus the existing turn_done/error path) and Held::drop recovers a poisoned lock with unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner()). baseline::assemble treats a core.md that exists but cannot be read as BaselineError::Read, a missing one still fine (matched on ErrorKind::NotFound). bxctl's interactive loop reports a failed turn and continues instead of exiting 1, and new_session_id has no expect. The prescribed new_session_id fix (unwrap_or_else with a fixed valid id via unwrap_or_default) does not compile without SessionId: Default, and there is no non-panicking way to build a SessionId outside proto, so the fallback default is the valid id "chat-0-0". Staged proto in addition to the listed paths because the build requires it. Gate: ok, 219 tests. | Ornith |
| M3a/01-proto-audit-types | 2026-09-22 | done | 1 | pass | none | Finished the blocked task. `audit.rs` now holds the chained shapes: `DecisionRecord` (`Allowed {}`, `Ask {}`, `Denied { reason }`), `ApprovalAnswer`, `ResultStatus`, `AuditEvent` (Decision/Approval/Result/Recovery/AcceptedBreak), and `AuditRecord { seq, time, prev, event }`; `lib.rs` re-exports the five names. All `Option`s emit as `null` (no `skip_serializing_if`); `deny_unknown_fields` on all three object enums/struct. Tests copied from `docs/plans/M3a/files/`: `records` 3 passed, `strict` 5 passed. Proved the brace rule has teeth: with `Allowed`/`Ask` as unit variants, `audit_records_reject_unknown_keys_at_every_depth` accepted `{"outcome":"allowed","zz_unknown":true}` and failed; braces restored, it passes again. NOTE: `docs/plans/M3a/files/crates/proto/tests/strict.rs` was already locally modified in the working tree (the committed version walks 16 wire fixtures that do not exist on m3a and are created by task 02) — I copied it as-is from the path, which is why `strict` is 5 passed; I did not touch any other protected file. `git status` was not empty at start because of that pre-existing modification, which I left uncommitted and unstaged. | OpenCode |
## Reviews