Apply P20: M5 splits into M5a (local memory), M5b (Honcho) and M5c (the scheduler)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-24 13:12:21 -07:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent 774807aa81
commit d1c106dd5c
2 changed files with 5 additions and 7 deletions
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@@ -97,11 +97,8 @@ Later changes to the brief:
| 2026-09-24 | P17, Memory 1, the baseline and State: the core block becomes three files (`soul.md`, owner-written; `memory.md` and `user.md`, agent-edited at `ask` with add, replace, remove and `consolidate`), read once per epoch; moved entries go to `memory/archive.md`. | Owner's approval, 2026-09-24; see the row of that date under Decided. | | 2026-09-24 | P17, Memory 1, the baseline and State: the core block becomes three files (`soul.md`, owner-written; `memory.md` and `user.md`, agent-edited at `ask` with add, replace, remove and `consolidate`), read once per epoch; moved entries go to `memory/archive.md`. | Owner's approval, 2026-09-24; see the row of that date under Decided. |
| 2026-09-24 | P18, Roles and Network isolation: a sixth role, `memoryd`, owns `memory/` and `index/`, syncs turns to Honcho and runs memory tool calls; `loopd` has four sockets and no longer holds the memory files. | Owner's approval, 2026-09-24; see the row of that date under Decided. | | 2026-09-24 | P18, Roles and Network isolation: a sixth role, `memoryd`, owns `memory/` and `index/`, syncs turns to Honcho and runs memory tool calls; `loopd` has four sockets and no longer holds the memory files. | Owner's approval, 2026-09-24; see the row of that date under Decided. |
| 2026-09-24 | P19, Memory 2 to 8: `recall` over a local FTS5 index (session logs, archive) and Honcho, `ask_memory`; Honcho writes only from clean sessions; per-workspace trust set by the owner; notes, the flush job and the embedding index go; memory text stays on the owner's hosts. | Owner's approval, 2026-09-24; see the row of that date under Decided. | | 2026-09-24 | P19, Memory 2 to 8: `recall` over a local FTS5 index (session logs, archive) and Honcho, `ask_memory`; Honcho writes only from clean sessions; per-workspace trust set by the owner; notes, the flush job and the embedding index go; memory text stays on the owner's hosts. | Owner's approval, 2026-09-24; see the row of that date under Decided. |
| 2026-09-24 | P20, Milestones: M5 becomes M5a (local memory in `memoryd`), M5b (Honcho) and M5c (the scheduler and the tiering job); the embedding-index M5b goes. | Owner's approval, 2026-09-24; see the row of that date under Decided. |
## Proposed changes to the design brief ## Proposed changes to the design brief
Proposed 2026-09-24 for M5 (row of that date under Decided). Not yet applied. None pending.
| # | Change | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| P20 | Milestones: M5 becomes M5a (`memoryd` without a network: the three files, the `memory` tool with `consolidate`, the archive, full-text `recall`), M5b (`memoryd` and Honcho) and M5c (heartbeat and cron on their own slot). The old M5b row goes. Acceptance moves with the parts: a fact from epoch 1 is recalled in epoch 2, and an entry moved by `consolidate` is found by `recall` (M5a); a turn from a tainted session never reaches Honcho, and a result from an untrusted workspace taints the session (M5b); a scheduled run leaves the main slot's cache intact, and the tiering job's proposals reach the owner as ordinary approvals and change nothing on their own (M5c). M5c's tiering job: a scheduled session that reads the memory files, the archive with its hit counts, and Boxmaker's Honcho summaries, and proposes a `consolidate` (moving entries down) or an `add` naming its source (bringing one up), when a file passes about 80% full or weekly, at most one per file per run. | As for M2 to M4: the parts are reviewed separately, and M5a needs no network. |
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@@ -13,8 +13,9 @@ One session per milestone. The design brief is `docs/design.md`.
| M3b | `brokerd` runner | Rootless container runner, four tools (read file, write file, sandboxed shell, HTTP fetch with host allowlist), egress proxy | A container with no network grant cannot reach the network; fetch refused for hosts outside the grant | | M3b | `brokerd` runner | Rootless container runner, four tools (read file, write file, sandboxed shell, HTTP fetch with host allowlist), egress proxy | A container with no network grant cannot reach the network; fetch refused for hosts outside the grant |
| M4a | `gatewayd` + Mattermost conversations | Bot connection over TLS, user-ID allowlist, threads as sessions, bursts as one turn, typing while working, catching up after downtime, the secret store, no listening port | A direct message answered on the real server; a non-allowlisted user gets no response | | M4a | `gatewayd` + Mattermost conversations | Bot connection over TLS, user-ID allowlist, threads as sessions, bursts as one turn, typing while working, catching up after downtime, the secret store, no listening port | A direct message answered on the real server; a non-allowlisted user gets no response |
| M4b | Approvals over Mattermost | `gateway.sock`, approval posts, answers by `!approve`/`!deny` in the thread, approvers list, long approvals in parts | An `ask` call approved and refused from Mattermost; the audit log names the post | | M4b | Approvals over Mattermost | `gateway.sock`, approval posts, answers by `!approve`/`!deny` in the thread, approvers list, long approvals in parts | An `ask` call approved and refused from Mattermost; the audit log names the post |
| M5 | Scheduler + memory | Heartbeat and cron on their own slot in isolated sessions; core block, `recall` and `remember` with provenance, FTS5 index, flush-then-compact at idle | Scheduled run leaves the main slot's cache intact; a fact from epoch 1 is recalled in epoch 2; a note written after reading untrusted content is marked on recall | | M5a | Local memory | `memoryd` without a network: the three memory files served to `loopd` once per epoch, the `memory` tool (add, replace, remove, `consolidate`) at `ask`, `memory/archive.md`, FTS5 `recall` over session logs and the archive, `recall` hit counts, `bxctl reindex` | A fact from epoch 1 is recalled in epoch 2; an entry moved by `consolidate` is found by `recall`; a memory edit changes the prompt only at the next epoch; the baseline with the owner's files stays under 3,000 tokens |
| M5b | Embedding index (when justified) | Local embedding server, hybrid retrieval behind the `Retriever` trait, rebuild on model change | A paraphrased query finds a note that lexical search misses; no memory text leaves the host | | M5b | Honcho | `memoryd` syncs finished turns to its own Honcho workspace through `roncho`, `recall` and `ask_memory` over Honcho, other workspaces read with the owner's trust labels, moved entries written as conclusions | A turn from a tainted session never reaches Honcho; a result from an untrusted workspace taints the session; Honcho's contents are rebuilt from the logs |
| M5c | Scheduler | Heartbeat and cron on their own slot in isolated sessions; the tiering job, which proposes what stays at which tier | A scheduled run leaves the main slot's cache intact; the tiering job's proposals reach the owner as ordinary approvals and change nothing on their own |
| M6 | Subagents + cloud consult | Subagents on their slot returning summaries; consult tool gated by data-class grants with full payload log | A tainted session is refused; payload log matches what was sent | | M6 | Subagents + cloud consult | Subagents on their slot returning summaries; consult tool gated by data-class grants with full payload log | A tainted session is refused; payload log matches what was sent |
| M7 | Split deployment | Each role in its own rootless container; `loopd` with no network; socket volume permissions; egress proxy for tools; host ACL policy in `deploy/` | From inside the `loopd` container, requests to the internet, the tailnet and the host all fail; a tool container without a host grant cannot reach the tailnet | | M7 | Split deployment | Each role in its own rootless container; `loopd` with no network; socket volume permissions; egress proxy for tools; host ACL policy in `deploy/` | From inside the `loopd` container, requests to the internet, the tailnet and the host all fail; a tool container without a host grant cannot reach the tailnet |