bxcore (compiler-driven rename, with the spike's four layers named); the
invalid-arguments reason on the wire; the secret store moved into
bxcore behind a feature loopd never enables; bxcore::sanitize with
refuse, neutralise and flag, its lists, hand-written normalisation, two
corpora, a rule-change procedure and `bxctl sanitize check`; memoryd
refusing and flagging (a flag keeps the text as an untrusted note);
loopd neutralising tags on append, with a tokenizer self-test and the
session's trust on TurnDone; gatewayd escaping images and, in untrusted
sessions, links; a table of every link between the roles; runbook
entries; attack tests per trust boundary and the device checks. Four
points left for the owner in section 14.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
What Boxmaker checked of v0.1.0 and the fixes on top of it: the
blocking library now builds and its tests pass, but the quoted
blocking-only test command does not compile (ungated async test
files), and nothing is committed or tagged yet. Five MUST items and
nine SHOULD items remain, a queue-status operation among them. New
requirements R23 to R27 prepare for rift turning on API keys: 401/403
as their own error, an empty key refused, one key per client, keys
wiped on drop, and the live suite able to run with a key. Choices
roncho made that Boxmaker accepts are listed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
roncho moved twice while the requirements were written. Line numbers are
gone; each divergence is described by what the code does, rechecked at
a9708f1, which added the Workspaces API: O1 and O7 now name the async
functions, and workspace delete does not tell the 409 conflict apart.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The owner chose roncho over a client of memoryd's own. The requirements
for its developer: a blocking client whose dependency graph fits
Boxmaker's rules (no async runtime, licences, no duplicate versions,
Rust 1.95), no default server and no hidden environment settings or
redirects, caller-set idle timeouts and body caps, thirteen operations
checked against rift, the search and paging fixes found reading the
code, and eight questions about Honcho 3.2 to answer from its docs and
rift. References are to roncho at f24fc4a.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Found on the device (2026-09-25): the ledger raised a session's state by
the grant's label, so a clean session that recalled a memory-tainted note
stayed trusted and could add it to memory.md. The spec's "as today" was
wrong; section 8 now says the state is raised by the stricter of the
grant's label and the result's, and the recall section says the session
becomes untrusted. The note answers (section 3) name notes.md and, for an
untrusted add, the file that was not changed: the model read the old ones
as success. Tasks 21 and 22.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The M5a review found that a note's text could hold a line shaped like a
notes.md header. Read back, the line started an entry of its own: an
untrusted session could plant a 'moved from memory.md' header, and recall
showed what followed it as identity, not untrusted. Entries and notes now
refuse any line that starts with the separator, and a header must match one
of its three forms exactly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task 04's session read the given test and the check.rs skeleton, both
holding the tags the check refuses, and Ornith took them for its own
template. It lost track of the file and made no change. The tags are
now built with concat! and format! in check.rs and in the four given
tests that held them, and the spec describes them in words. The
rewritten tests pass against the reference, are rustfmt-clean, and
still catch the case-folding mutation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The memory socket in brokerd.toml is optional, and bxctl's flag is
--memory-socket. A note's header carries its class. Built-in grants are
kept apart from the owner's, and builtin- ids are reserved. The session
state is carried through Decision and RunSpec, labels through
run_labelled. loopd's assemble_with and MemorySource. Baseline
measured at 881 and 2,432 tokens.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The research feeds M5b's sanitizer. One finding is a bug in the M5a
draft: category Cf misses variation selectors, the combining grapheme
joiner, and the Hangul and Braille fillers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Writes from sessions that have read untrusted content go to the
archive, labelled untrusted, and never reach the prompt. Every write is
checked, announced in its thread, journalled and can be undone.
Session-scoped approvals for other tools become an open decision.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
approval_reply and GatewayOutcome (proto already has an ApprovalAnswer); the bot's edit permission
confirmed on the owner's server; a restart replaces a dead post's text; the reason escaped as
inline code; the part size bound; the reply for an approval too long to show.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The owner's decisions of 2026-09-24: commands only, no reactions; an approvers list that falls
back to allow.users; approvals in the asking thread; on a gatewayd restart, old posts are marked
dead and brokerd's courier posts pending approvals again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Which channels are caught up (direct channels with allowed users, allowed channels; a new one
starts from now), what posts?since returns at v11.11.0 (changed posts, only those in `order`,
at most 1,000), that a post is recorded before it is acted on, that a failed state write stops
gatewayd, and that "interrupted" is posted on the first connection after a start only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A secret read from a file warns at startup. In allowed channels and group
messages, Boxmaker answers only posts that name it, or replies in its own
threads that name nobody else; one Boxmaker per machine, each its own bot.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
M4 is split into M4a and M4b. The M4a spec rests on facts checked against
the owner's server and Mattermost's source at v11.11.0: the REST and
WebSocket shapes, and that clients will not post a message starting with
'/'. Records the design decisions, proposes P15 (secrets from a systemd
credential, the environment or an owner-only file), and adds the run-time
rows egress.md was missing since M2a and M3b.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review findings 1 and 2, both plan defects. curl gains --globoff and a
leading --disable; both podman runs gain --pull=never. The given fetch.rs and
the six golden files change with them. Checked on straylight with a rebuilt
image: a glob URL is one request, a missing image fails at once.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A draft spec for the owner's review and 13 offline tasks with their given
tests: shared tool arguments and host rules in proto, the sealed fetch
target (M3a finding 14), the toolkit tools and SOCKS5 egress proxy, and
brokerd's [runner], podman argument lists, runtime and proxy lifecycle. Each
task's tests were run against a reference at that task's end state (560 to
638 tests, clippy clean); the reference is not in the repository. Adds the
runner-unavailable runbook entry and tip T23 (ETXTBSY in script tests).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The review table gains findings 16 to 20, which the two review agents
reported and the first write-up dropped. The independent review of the fix
commits, and what was changed for it, is recorded; task 23's claims about
its tests are corrected. The spec and decisions record the day-long cap, the
ttl_ms bound, the socket-directory rule and the listener's retry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every request is recorded, unreadable state is recorded as secret, a
refusal that cannot be recorded is an error, and the other cases the
brokerd reference settled. The audit-unavailable and
broker-state-damaged entries name the new messages; egress lists the
development calls to straylight.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
DecisionRecord's empty struct variants, the verifier's report fields and
region rule, the startup fallback, the IPv4 host rule, Denial, BrokerPort
deadlines and envelope id, the runbook anchor rule, bxctl's --say/--json
and escaping. Recorded in docs/decisions.md; the array-form question is
left open.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both came out of planning the tasks. The three locked steps need a home
that is neither the connection handler nor the pending table. The
one-process end-to-end test would have made loopd dev-depend on
brokerd, which the crate-dependency gate forbids.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
From M3a: a full reference for the audit chain and the approval
handoff, the property test's oracle for policy, and compiling
skeletons for everything else. Each plan records what its checks
exposed, and that record decides what the next milestone gets.
Tip T17; the spec's handover section says which check each module has.
Also restores three / examples that an editing tool had decoded
to a plain slash.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
broker/sessions/<id>.json holds each session's taint and untrusted
flag. It is written only by brokerd and can be rebuilt from the audit
log's result records.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
brokerd internals: the ledger lock over the audit writer and session
state, the pending table's take-it-and-answer rule, sticky
audit_unavailable after a failed write, pure policy functions with an
Ask type that only redecide turns into a Decision, how a waiting
thread detects a lost connection without peek, fixed RunError text.
Approvals: bxctl chat fetches the block from brokerd by id, shows the
parsed arguments with invisible and bidi characters escaped, asks for
the approval id instead of y, and escapes model text. A tool_denied
event carries the reason to the owner.
Also: BrokerPort timeouts, tests for runbook pointers and concurrency,
threat-model notes, P14 for broker/sessions in the brief's State list.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Policy: a deny grant must apply at every taint; a result's label is
combined over all matching grants and the longest matched path wins
within a mode; a grant of / is invalid.
Audit: a recovered line need not fail to parse; the writer never goes
back to an earlier day's file; --accept-break verifies the whole log
and the break record's fields are all checked, with a seq counted from
lines; the Approval record carries the re-decision's grant and state;
calls with no Result are reported.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Split M3 into M3a and M3b, record the M3 design decisions, propose P13
(tool image built by Nix, named by digest), and add docs/runbook.md with an
entry for every fail-closed state, including loopd's existing ones.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
All ten tasks pass the checklist, the gate, the audit and the device
checks, including a four-turn conversation with a loopd restart and no
cache loss. Reading and probing found four low defects: the busy guard
is released before the final frame on the main path but not on the
three error paths, its Drop skips a poisoned lock, an unreadable
core.md is treated as missing, and bxctl's interactive loop exits on a
failed turn. Task 11 carries the fixes with two new tests, checked
against a fixed copy of the branch.
The Model column is filled in (all Ornith) and one malformed row is
repaired. Two rules are promoted to AGENTS.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The tasks build the agent loop on M2a's client: channel messages and
the usage record in proto, four config tables, the tool port and
registry with find_tool and call_tool, the baseline and replay, the
session store, the turn loop with its limits and the append-only
property test, the channel server, loopd serve, bxctl chat, and the
device checks including a four-turn conversation with a restart.
Checked against a private reference implementation: the gate passes
after every task in order, the new suites pass under CPU load, and the
reference passes make verify-device on straylight with no cache loss.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The tasks build the inference path: emsha-backed SHA-256, inferproxy,
config, a hand-written HTTP and SSE client, request building, delta
assembly, the chat state machine, the thinking cap, the slot gate with
retry, the startup self-test and on-device verification.
Everything the tasks copy in was checked against a private reference
implementation: the gate passes after each task in order, the timing
tests pass repeatedly under CPU load, and the reference passes the
self-test and all four device checks on straylight. Expected results
for the recorded streams were derived by a separate script.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The branch passes the checklist: seven commits, copied files unchanged,
gate and audit green. Reading and probing found that AuditRecord and
ToolCall accept unknown fields, that large Timestamps panic when
formatted, and that the dependency-direction scripts miss table-form
dependencies and pass when their inputs are missing. The last two
families were gaps in the tasks, not only in the code.
Tasks 08 and 09 carry the fixes, defined by an exhaustive unknown-field
test, a bounded-Timestamp test and an extended gate-script self-test.
All three were checked against the reference implementation and fail on
the current branch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Threat model, data classes and provenance, approvals, IPC framing and
socket topology, the proto type list, log file rules, runtime layout,
the M1 gate, and how work is handed to the implementing model.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
kyleandClaude Opus 5.5