From M5c-2 task 00's recordings on rift: a chat at reasoning low returned raw tool-call markup,
and a search with no match still returned the nearest messages.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Owner, 2026-09-28: recall and ask_memory query Honcho from a session of any class, since Honcho
stores no query and rift's models and telemetry stay on the owner's hosts; the assumption is
written down, with what changes if rift's configuration does. A query holding a known-prefix
secret is refused. ask_memory names at most two workspaces, both asked at once inside brokerd's
wait. A session keeps the tools array it started with, so M5c-2 needs no new epoch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A memory write is made during a turn, before that turn's Honcho session exists, and a session
whose turns are never synced has none, so each Boxmaker session's conclusions go to its own
<id>_memory session, holding the agent's peer and the owner's. `bxctl memory undo` refuses notes
(they are append-only), so the undo-of-a-fleet-note row and its retraction go. Owner, 2026-09-28.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The ledger cannot promise an item is never sent twice: a crash between a send and its sent line,
or an owner removing that line, sends it again. A decided line holds a skip and its reason, as
task 07's ledger does. Turns from before sync began are skipped (owner's decision, 2026-09-28).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A turn without complete speaker information is not sent; every peer in
the fleet workspace is a member, so fleet notes are messages that one
search finds, with a retraction message for an undone note (Honcho
cannot delete a message); the fleet workspace derives nothing
(reasoning, summaries and dreaming off); API keys per workspace are
first-class, with a runbook entry for a refused key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Designed with the owner on 2026-09-27: per agent a trusted and an
untrusted workspace plus one fleet workspace for untrusted notes;
private ceiling, secret sessions never synced; no rebuild (contra-facts,
or deleting our own conclusion); the owner and other people observed,
the agent not; every trusted memory write mirrored as a conclusion; a
decision ledger that doubles as the outbox; recall over the local index
and the fleet; ask_memory by workspace chat. Grounded in roncho 1.0.0
and Honcho 3.2.0 (source read at v3.2.0) and rift's live metrics.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Found in the M5b device check on straylight: the self-test asked about
each of the 33 tags and each neutralised form, 66 requests, one
connection each, and inferproxy's token bucket (burst 10) refused the
ninth, so loopd would not start. Now it asks about all the tags at once,
one per line, and then all their neutralised forms: the answer to the
first must hold each tag's recorded token in order, the second none of
them. Each tag is a special token, split out before anything else, so
the lines between cannot change it; and a neutralised form is only
dangerous as a tag's own token, so that is what the second answer must
not hold. The errors name a tag by its id, as before.
The fake tokenizer reads text with several tags in it; the tests cover
each tag as ordinary tokens, as another listed or unlisted token, a
duplicated token in the middle and at the end, a form holding each tag,
and both requests failing. Spec section 8 and the runbook entry follow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Records what porting Hermes' patterns decided: seven rules kept,
"dump the conversation" narrowed, agent-configuration changes left out
(Boxmaker's agent loads no such files), about fifty look-alikes,
apostrophes folded, and a flag in bxctl names only its rule. A false
positive also marks a session that recalls the note untrusted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The private-key rule named only PEM's ending, so an armored PGP
private key passed. Public-key blocks still pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every daemon removes a leftover socket before binding, which also lets a
second copy silently take a running one's sockets. Owner's decision:
refuse to start instead. Each daemon takes an exclusive std File lock
(stable since 1.89, checked on 1.95) on <home>/run/<role>.lock, or
<socket>.lock for inferproxy, before touching its sockets; the system
releases it however the process ends. A runbook entry, a security note
and a test per daemon.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Code spans stop both the link preview and the server's image fetch;
Markdown links are not previewed; images are fetched by the server at
posting time. Emoji refusal accepted, phrases move to flag, Hermes'
patterns ported at plan time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
bxcore (compiler-driven rename, with the spike's four layers named); the
invalid-arguments reason on the wire; the secret store moved into
bxcore behind a feature loopd never enables; bxcore::sanitize with
refuse, neutralise and flag, its lists, hand-written normalisation, two
corpora, a rule-change procedure and `bxctl sanitize check`; memoryd
refusing and flagging (a flag keeps the text as an untrusted note);
loopd neutralising tags on append, with a tokenizer self-test and the
session's trust on TurnDone; gatewayd escaping images and, in untrusted
sessions, links; a table of every link between the roles; runbook
entries; attack tests per trust boundary and the device checks. Four
points left for the owner in section 14.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
What Boxmaker checked of v0.1.0 and the fixes on top of it: the
blocking library now builds and its tests pass, but the quoted
blocking-only test command does not compile (ungated async test
files), and nothing is committed or tagged yet. Five MUST items and
nine SHOULD items remain, a queue-status operation among them. New
requirements R23 to R27 prepare for rift turning on API keys: 401/403
as their own error, an empty key refused, one key per client, keys
wiped on drop, and the live suite able to run with a key. Choices
roncho made that Boxmaker accepts are listed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
roncho moved twice while the requirements were written. Line numbers are
gone; each divergence is described by what the code does, rechecked at
a9708f1, which added the Workspaces API: O1 and O7 now name the async
functions, and workspace delete does not tell the 409 conflict apart.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The owner chose roncho over a client of memoryd's own. The requirements
for its developer: a blocking client whose dependency graph fits
Boxmaker's rules (no async runtime, licences, no duplicate versions,
Rust 1.95), no default server and no hidden environment settings or
redirects, caller-set idle timeouts and body caps, thirteen operations
checked against rift, the search and paging fixes found reading the
code, and eight questions about Honcho 3.2 to answer from its docs and
rift. References are to roncho at f24fc4a.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Found on the device (2026-09-25): the ledger raised a session's state by
the grant's label, so a clean session that recalled a memory-tainted note
stayed trusted and could add it to memory.md. The spec's "as today" was
wrong; section 8 now says the state is raised by the stricter of the
grant's label and the result's, and the recall section says the session
becomes untrusted. The note answers (section 3) name notes.md and, for an
untrusted add, the file that was not changed: the model read the old ones
as success. Tasks 21 and 22.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The M5a review found that a note's text could hold a line shaped like a
notes.md header. Read back, the line started an entry of its own: an
untrusted session could plant a 'moved from memory.md' header, and recall
showed what followed it as identity, not untrusted. Entries and notes now
refuse any line that starts with the separator, and a header must match one
of its three forms exactly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task 04's session read the given test and the check.rs skeleton, both
holding the tags the check refuses, and Ornith took them for its own
template. It lost track of the file and made no change. The tags are
now built with concat! and format! in check.rs and in the four given
tests that held them, and the spec describes them in words. The
rewritten tests pass against the reference, are rustfmt-clean, and
still catch the case-folding mutation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The memory socket in brokerd.toml is optional, and bxctl's flag is
--memory-socket. A note's header carries its class. Built-in grants are
kept apart from the owner's, and builtin- ids are reserved. The session
state is carried through Decision and RunSpec, labels through
run_labelled. loopd's assemble_with and MemorySource. Baseline
measured at 881 and 2,432 tokens.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The research feeds M5b's sanitizer. One finding is a bug in the M5a
draft: category Cf misses variation selectors, the combining grapheme
joiner, and the Hangul and Braille fillers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Writes from sessions that have read untrusted content go to the
archive, labelled untrusted, and never reach the prompt. Every write is
checked, announced in its thread, journalled and can be undone.
Session-scoped approvals for other tools become an open decision.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
approval_reply and GatewayOutcome (proto already has an ApprovalAnswer); the bot's edit permission
confirmed on the owner's server; a restart replaces a dead post's text; the reason escaped as
inline code; the part size bound; the reply for an approval too long to show.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The owner's decisions of 2026-09-24: commands only, no reactions; an approvers list that falls
back to allow.users; approvals in the asking thread; on a gatewayd restart, old posts are marked
dead and brokerd's courier posts pending approvals again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Which channels are caught up (direct channels with allowed users, allowed channels; a new one
starts from now), what posts?since returns at v11.11.0 (changed posts, only those in `order`,
at most 1,000), that a post is recorded before it is acted on, that a failed state write stops
gatewayd, and that "interrupted" is posted on the first connection after a start only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A secret read from a file warns at startup. In allowed channels and group
messages, Boxmaker answers only posts that name it, or replies in its own
threads that name nobody else; one Boxmaker per machine, each its own bot.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
M4 is split into M4a and M4b. The M4a spec rests on facts checked against
the owner's server and Mattermost's source at v11.11.0: the REST and
WebSocket shapes, and that clients will not post a message starting with
'/'. Records the design decisions, proposes P15 (secrets from a systemd
credential, the environment or an owner-only file), and adds the run-time
rows egress.md was missing since M2a and M3b.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review findings 1 and 2, both plan defects. curl gains --globoff and a
leading --disable; both podman runs gain --pull=never. The given fetch.rs and
the six golden files change with them. Checked on straylight with a rebuilt
image: a glob URL is one request, a missing image fails at once.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A draft spec for the owner's review and 13 offline tasks with their given
tests: shared tool arguments and host rules in proto, the sealed fetch
target (M3a finding 14), the toolkit tools and SOCKS5 egress proxy, and
brokerd's [runner], podman argument lists, runtime and proxy lifecycle. Each
task's tests were run against a reference at that task's end state (560 to
638 tests, clippy clean); the reference is not in the repository. Adds the
runner-unavailable runbook entry and tip T23 (ETXTBSY in script tests).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The review table gains findings 16 to 20, which the two review agents
reported and the first write-up dropped. The independent review of the fix
commits, and what was changed for it, is recorded; task 23's claims about
its tests are corrected. The spec and decisions record the day-long cap, the
ttl_ms bound, the socket-directory rule and the listener's retry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every request is recorded, unreadable state is recorded as secret, a
refusal that cannot be recorded is an error, and the other cases the
brokerd reference settled. The audit-unavailable and
broker-state-damaged entries name the new messages; egress lists the
development calls to straylight.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
DecisionRecord's empty struct variants, the verifier's report fields and
region rule, the startup fallback, the IPv4 host rule, Denial, BrokerPort
deadlines and envelope id, the runbook anchor rule, bxctl's --say/--json
and escaping. Recorded in docs/decisions.md; the array-form question is
left open.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both came out of planning the tasks. The three locked steps need a home
that is neither the connection handler nor the pending table. The
one-process end-to-end test would have made loopd dev-depend on
brokerd, which the crate-dependency gate forbids.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
From M3a: a full reference for the audit chain and the approval
handoff, the property test's oracle for policy, and compiling
skeletons for everything else. Each plan records what its checks
exposed, and that record decides what the next milestone gets.
Tip T17; the spec's handover section says which check each module has.
Also restores three / examples that an editing tool had decoded
to a plain slash.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
kyleandClaude Opus 5.5