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Fix F-08, F-12, F-13: Implement account lockout, username validation, and password minimum length enforcement

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- Added failed login tracking for account lockout enforcement in `db` and `ui` layers; introduced `failed_logins` table to store attempts, window start, and attempt count.
- Updated login checks in `grpcserver/auth.go` and `ui/handlers_auth.go` to reject requests if the account is locked.
- Added immediate failure counter reset on successful login.
- Implemented username length and character set validation (F-12) and minimum password length enforcement (F-13) in shared `validate` package.
- Updated account creation and edit flows in `ui` and `grpcserver` layers to apply validation before hashing/processing.
- Added comprehensive unit tests for lockout, validation, and related edge cases.
- Updated `AUDIT.md` to mark F-08, F-12, and F-13 as fixed.
- Updated `openapi.yaml` to reflect new validation and lockout behaviors.

Security: Prevents brute-force attacks via lockout mechanism and strengthens defenses against weak and invalid input.
This commit is contained in:
Kyle Isom
2026-03-11 20:59:26 -07:00
parent 6e690c4435
commit 0ad9ef1bb4
13 changed files with 1487 additions and 15 deletions
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17
internal/grpcserver/auth.go
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@@ -52,15 +52,28 @@ func (a *authServiceServer) Login(ctx context.Context, req *mciasv1.LoginRequest
return nil, status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "invalid credentials")
}
// Security: check per-account lockout before running Argon2 (F-08).
locked, lockErr := a.s.db.IsLockedOut(acct.ID)
if lockErr != nil {
a.s.logger.Error("lockout check", "error", lockErr)
}
if locked {
_, _ = auth.VerifyPassword("dummy", auth.DummyHash())
a.s.db.WriteAuditEvent(model.EventLoginFail, &acct.ID, nil, ip, `{"reason":"account_locked"}`) //nolint:errcheck
return nil, status.Error(codes.ResourceExhausted, "account temporarily locked")
}
ok, err := auth.VerifyPassword(req.Password, acct.PasswordHash)
if err != nil || !ok {
a.s.db.WriteAuditEvent(model.EventLoginFail, &acct.ID, nil, ip, `{"reason":"wrong_password"}`) //nolint:errcheck
_ = a.s.db.RecordLoginFailure(acct.ID)
return nil, status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "invalid credentials")
}
if acct.TOTPRequired {
if req.TotpCode == "" {
a.s.db.WriteAuditEvent(model.EventLoginFail, &acct.ID, nil, ip, `{"reason":"totp_missing"}`) //nolint:errcheck
_ = a.s.db.RecordLoginFailure(acct.ID)
return nil, status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "TOTP code required")
}
secret, err := crypto.OpenAESGCM(a.s.masterKey, acct.TOTPSecretNonce, acct.TOTPSecretEnc)
@@ -71,10 +84,14 @@ func (a *authServiceServer) Login(ctx context.Context, req *mciasv1.LoginRequest
valid, err := auth.ValidateTOTP(secret, req.TotpCode)
if err != nil || !valid {
a.s.db.WriteAuditEvent(model.EventLoginTOTPFail, &acct.ID, nil, ip, `{"reason":"wrong_totp"}`) //nolint:errcheck
_ = a.s.db.RecordLoginFailure(acct.ID)
return nil, status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "invalid credentials")
}
}
// Login succeeded: clear any outstanding failure counter.
_ = a.s.db.ClearLoginFailures(acct.ID)
expiry := a.s.cfg.DefaultExpiry()
roles, err := a.s.db.GetRoles(acct.ID)
if err != nil {