Add vault seal/unseal lifecycle

- New internal/vault package: thread-safe Vault struct with
  seal/unseal state, key material zeroing, and key derivation
- REST: POST /v1/vault/unseal, POST /v1/vault/seal,
  GET /v1/vault/status; health returns sealed status
- UI: /unseal page with passphrase form, redirect when sealed
- gRPC: sealedInterceptor rejects RPCs when sealed
- Middleware: RequireUnsealed blocks all routes except exempt
  paths; RequireAuth reads pubkey from vault at request time
- Startup: server starts sealed when passphrase unavailable
- All servers share single *vault.Vault by pointer
- CSRF manager derives key lazily from vault

Security: Key material is zeroed on seal. Sealed middleware
runs before auth. Handlers fail closed if vault becomes sealed
mid-request. Unseal endpoint is rate-limited (3/s burst 5).
No CSRF on unseal page (no session to protect; chicken-and-egg
with master key). Passphrase never logged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-03-14 23:55:37 -07:00
parent 5c242f8abb
commit d87b4b4042
28 changed files with 1292 additions and 119 deletions

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@
package server
import (
"crypto/ed25519"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
@@ -31,28 +30,25 @@ import (
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/token"
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/ui"
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/validate"
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/vault"
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/web"
)
// Server holds the dependencies injected into all handlers.
type Server struct {
db *db.DB
cfg *config.Config
logger *slog.Logger
privKey ed25519.PrivateKey
pubKey ed25519.PublicKey
masterKey []byte
db *db.DB
cfg *config.Config
logger *slog.Logger
vault *vault.Vault
}
// New creates a Server with the given dependencies.
func New(database *db.DB, cfg *config.Config, priv ed25519.PrivateKey, pub ed25519.PublicKey, masterKey []byte, logger *slog.Logger) *Server {
func New(database *db.DB, cfg *config.Config, v *vault.Vault, logger *slog.Logger) *Server {
return &Server{
db: database,
cfg: cfg,
privKey: priv,
pubKey: pub,
masterKey: masterKey,
logger: logger,
db: database,
cfg: cfg,
vault: v,
logger: logger,
}
}
@@ -110,8 +106,14 @@ func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
_, _ = w.Write(specYAML)
})))
// Vault endpoints (exempt from sealed middleware and auth).
unsealRateLimit := middleware.RateLimit(3, 5, trustedProxy)
mux.Handle("POST /v1/vault/unseal", unsealRateLimit(http.HandlerFunc(s.handleUnseal)))
mux.HandleFunc("GET /v1/vault/status", s.handleVaultStatus)
mux.Handle("POST /v1/vault/seal", middleware.RequireAuth(s.vault, s.db, s.cfg.Tokens.Issuer)(middleware.RequireRole("admin")(http.HandlerFunc(s.handleSeal))))
// Authenticated endpoints.
requireAuth := middleware.RequireAuth(s.pubKey, s.db, s.cfg.Tokens.Issuer)
requireAuth := middleware.RequireAuth(s.vault, s.db, s.cfg.Tokens.Issuer)
requireAdmin := func(h http.Handler) http.Handler {
return requireAuth(middleware.RequireRole("admin")(h))
}
@@ -152,15 +154,18 @@ func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
mux.Handle("DELETE /v1/policy/rules/{id}", requireAdmin(http.HandlerFunc(s.handleDeletePolicyRule)))
// UI routes (HTMX-based management frontend).
uiSrv, err := ui.New(s.db, s.cfg, s.privKey, s.pubKey, s.masterKey, s.logger)
uiSrv, err := ui.New(s.db, s.cfg, s.vault, s.logger)
if err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("ui: init failed: %v", err))
}
uiSrv.Register(mux)
// Apply global middleware: request logging and security headers.
// Apply global middleware: request logging, sealed check, and security headers.
// Rate limiting is applied per-route above (login, token/validate).
var root http.Handler = mux
// Security: RequireUnsealed runs after the mux (so exempt routes can be
// routed) but before the logger (so sealed-blocked requests are still logged).
root = middleware.RequireUnsealed(s.vault)(root)
root = middleware.RequestLogger(s.logger)(root)
// Security (SEC-04): apply baseline security headers to ALL responses
@@ -178,12 +183,21 @@ func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
// ---- Public handlers ----
func (s *Server) handleHealth(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
if s.vault.IsSealed() {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "sealed"})
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "ok"})
}
// handlePublicKey returns the server's Ed25519 public key in JWK format.
// This allows relying parties to independently verify JWTs.
func (s *Server) handlePublicKey(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
pubKey, err := s.vault.PubKey()
if err != nil {
middleware.WriteError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "vault sealed", "vault_sealed")
return
}
// Encode the Ed25519 public key as a JWK (RFC 8037).
// The "x" parameter is the base64url-encoded public key bytes.
jwk := map[string]string{
@@ -191,7 +205,7 @@ func (s *Server) handlePublicKey(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
"crv": "Ed25519",
"use": "sig",
"alg": "EdDSA",
"x": encodeBase64URL(s.pubKey),
"x": encodeBase64URL(pubKey),
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, jwk)
}
@@ -282,7 +296,12 @@ func (s *Server) handleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
// Decrypt the TOTP secret.
secret, err := crypto.OpenAESGCM(s.masterKey, acct.TOTPSecretNonce, acct.TOTPSecretEnc)
masterKey, err := s.vault.MasterKey()
if err != nil {
middleware.WriteError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "vault sealed", "vault_sealed")
return
}
secret, err := crypto.OpenAESGCM(masterKey, acct.TOTPSecretNonce, acct.TOTPSecretEnc)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Error("decrypt TOTP secret", "error", err, "account_id", acct.ID)
middleware.WriteError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error", "internal_error")
@@ -322,7 +341,12 @@ func (s *Server) handleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
}
tokenStr, claims, err := token.IssueToken(s.privKey, s.cfg.Tokens.Issuer, acct.UUID, roles, expiry)
privKey, err := s.vault.PrivKey()
if err != nil {
middleware.WriteError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "vault sealed", "vault_sealed")
return
}
tokenStr, claims, err := token.IssueToken(privKey, s.cfg.Tokens.Issuer, acct.UUID, roles, expiry)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Error("issue token", "error", err)
middleware.WriteError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error", "internal_error")
@@ -392,7 +416,12 @@ func (s *Server) handleRenew(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
}
newTokenStr, newClaims, err := token.IssueToken(s.privKey, s.cfg.Tokens.Issuer, acct.UUID, roles, expiry)
privKey, err := s.vault.PrivKey()
if err != nil {
middleware.WriteError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "vault sealed", "vault_sealed")
return
}
newTokenStr, newClaims, err := token.IssueToken(privKey, s.cfg.Tokens.Issuer, acct.UUID, roles, expiry)
if err != nil {
middleware.WriteError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error", "internal_error")
return
@@ -444,7 +473,12 @@ func (s *Server) handleTokenValidate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
claims, err := token.ValidateToken(s.pubKey, tokenStr, s.cfg.Tokens.Issuer)
pubKey, err := s.vault.PubKey()
if err != nil {
middleware.WriteError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "vault sealed", "vault_sealed")
return
}
claims, err := token.ValidateToken(pubKey, tokenStr, s.cfg.Tokens.Issuer)
if err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, validateResponse{Valid: false})
return
@@ -484,7 +518,12 @@ func (s *Server) handleTokenIssue(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
tokenStr, claims, err := token.IssueToken(s.privKey, s.cfg.Tokens.Issuer, acct.UUID, nil, s.cfg.ServiceExpiry())
privKey, err := s.vault.PrivKey()
if err != nil {
middleware.WriteError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "vault sealed", "vault_sealed")
return
}
tokenStr, claims, err := token.IssueToken(privKey, s.cfg.Tokens.Issuer, acct.UUID, nil, s.cfg.ServiceExpiry())
if err != nil {
middleware.WriteError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error", "internal_error")
return
@@ -875,7 +914,12 @@ func (s *Server) handleTOTPEnroll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Encrypt the secret before storing it temporarily.
// Note: we store as pending; enrollment is confirmed with /confirm.
secretEnc, secretNonce, err := crypto.SealAESGCM(s.masterKey, rawSecret)
masterKey, err := s.vault.MasterKey()
if err != nil {
middleware.WriteError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "vault sealed", "vault_sealed")
return
}
secretEnc, secretNonce, err := crypto.SealAESGCM(masterKey, rawSecret)
if err != nil {
middleware.WriteError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error", "internal_error")
return
@@ -918,7 +962,12 @@ func (s *Server) handleTOTPConfirm(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
secret, err := crypto.OpenAESGCM(s.masterKey, acct.TOTPSecretNonce, acct.TOTPSecretEnc)
masterKey, err := s.vault.MasterKey()
if err != nil {
middleware.WriteError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "vault sealed", "vault_sealed")
return
}
secret, err := crypto.OpenAESGCM(masterKey, acct.TOTPSecretNonce, acct.TOTPSecretEnc)
if err != nil {
middleware.WriteError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error", "internal_error")
return
@@ -1178,7 +1227,12 @@ func (s *Server) handleGetPGCreds(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
// Decrypt the password to return it to the admin caller.
password, err := crypto.OpenAESGCM(s.masterKey, cred.PGPasswordNonce, cred.PGPasswordEnc)
masterKey, err := s.vault.MasterKey()
if err != nil {
middleware.WriteError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "vault sealed", "vault_sealed")
return
}
password, err := crypto.OpenAESGCM(masterKey, cred.PGPasswordNonce, cred.PGPasswordEnc)
if err != nil {
middleware.WriteError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error", "internal_error")
return
@@ -1215,7 +1269,12 @@ func (s *Server) handleSetPGCreds(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
req.Port = 5432
}
enc, nonce, err := crypto.SealAESGCM(s.masterKey, []byte(req.Password))
masterKey, err := s.vault.MasterKey()
if err != nil {
middleware.WriteError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "vault sealed", "vault_sealed")
return
}
enc, nonce, err := crypto.SealAESGCM(masterKey, []byte(req.Password))
if err != nil {
middleware.WriteError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error", "internal_error")
return

View File

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import (
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/db"
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/model"
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/token"
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/vault"
)
// generateTOTPCode computes a valid RFC 6238 TOTP code for the current time
@@ -72,8 +73,9 @@ func newTestServer(t *testing.T) (*Server, ed25519.PublicKey, ed25519.PrivateKey
cfg := config.NewTestConfig(testIssuer)
v := vault.NewUnsealed(masterKey, priv, pub)
logger := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil))
srv := New(database, cfg, priv, pub, masterKey, logger)
srv := New(database, cfg, v, logger)
return srv, pub, priv, database
}

102
internal/server/vault.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
// Vault seal/unseal REST handlers for MCIAS.
package server
import (
"net/http"
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/audit"
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/middleware"
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/model"
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/vault"
)
// unsealRequest is the request body for POST /v1/vault/unseal.
type unsealRequest struct {
Passphrase string `json:"passphrase"`
}
// handleUnseal accepts a passphrase, derives the master key, decrypts the
// signing key, and unseals the vault. Rate-limited to 3/s burst 5.
//
// Security: The passphrase is never logged. A generic error is returned on
// any failure to prevent information leakage about the vault state.
func (s *Server) handleUnseal(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !s.vault.IsSealed() {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "already unsealed"})
return
}
var req unsealRequest
if !decodeJSON(w, r, &req) {
return
}
if req.Passphrase == "" {
middleware.WriteError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "passphrase is required", "bad_request")
return
}
// Derive master key from passphrase.
masterKey, err := vault.DeriveFromPassphrase(req.Passphrase, s.db)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Error("vault unseal: derive key", "error", err)
middleware.WriteError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unseal failed", "unauthorized")
return
}
// Decrypt the signing key.
privKey, pubKey, err := vault.DecryptSigningKey(s.db, masterKey)
if err != nil {
// Zero derived master key on failure.
for i := range masterKey {
masterKey[i] = 0
}
s.logger.Error("vault unseal: decrypt signing key", "error", err)
middleware.WriteError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unseal failed", "unauthorized")
return
}
if err := s.vault.Unseal(masterKey, privKey, pubKey); err != nil {
s.logger.Error("vault unseal: state transition", "error", err)
middleware.WriteError(w, http.StatusConflict, "vault is already unsealed", "conflict")
return
}
ip := middleware.ClientIP(r, nil)
s.writeAudit(r, model.EventVaultUnsealed, nil, nil, audit.JSON("source", "api", "ip", ip))
s.logger.Info("vault unsealed via API", "ip", ip)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "unsealed"})
}
// handleSeal seals the vault, zeroing all key material. Admin-only.
//
// Security: The caller's token becomes invalid after sealing because the
// public key needed to validate it is no longer available.
func (s *Server) handleSeal(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if s.vault.IsSealed() {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "already sealed"})
return
}
claims := middleware.ClaimsFromContext(r.Context())
var actorID *int64
if claims != nil {
acct, err := s.db.GetAccountByUUID(claims.Subject)
if err == nil {
actorID = &acct.ID
}
}
s.vault.Seal()
ip := middleware.ClientIP(r, nil)
s.writeAudit(r, model.EventVaultSealed, actorID, nil, audit.JSON("source", "api", "ip", ip))
s.logger.Info("vault sealed via API", "ip", ip)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "sealed"})
}
// handleVaultStatus returns the current seal state of the vault.
func (s *Server) handleVaultStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]bool{"sealed": s.vault.IsSealed()})
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
package server
import (
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/vault"
)
func TestHandleHealthSealed(t *testing.T) {
srv, _, _, _ := newTestServer(t)
srv.vault.Seal()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/v1/health", nil)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("health status = %d, want 200", rr.Code)
}
var resp map[string]string
if err := json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode health: %v", err)
}
if resp["status"] != "sealed" {
t.Fatalf("health status = %q, want sealed", resp["status"])
}
}
func TestHandleHealthUnsealed(t *testing.T) {
srv, _, _, _ := newTestServer(t)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/v1/health", nil)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("health status = %d, want 200", rr.Code)
}
var resp map[string]string
if err := json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode health: %v", err)
}
if resp["status"] != "ok" {
t.Fatalf("health status = %q, want ok", resp["status"])
}
}
func TestVaultStatusEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
srv, _, _, _ := newTestServer(t)
// Unsealed
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/v1/vault/status", nil)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status code = %d, want 200", rr.Code)
}
var resp map[string]bool
if err := json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
}
if resp["sealed"] {
t.Fatal("vault should be unsealed")
}
// Seal and check again
srv.vault.Seal()
req = httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/v1/vault/status", nil)
rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status code = %d, want 200", rr.Code)
}
resp = nil
if err := json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
}
if !resp["sealed"] {
t.Fatal("vault should be sealed")
}
}
func TestSealedMiddlewareAPIReturns503(t *testing.T) {
srv, _, _, _ := newTestServer(t)
srv.vault.Seal()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/v1/accounts", nil)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
t.Fatalf("sealed API status = %d, want 503", rr.Code)
}
var resp map[string]string
if err := json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
}
if resp["code"] != "vault_sealed" {
t.Fatalf("error code = %q, want vault_sealed", resp["code"])
}
}
func TestSealedMiddlewareUIRedirects(t *testing.T) {
srv, _, _, _ := newTestServer(t)
srv.vault.Seal()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/dashboard", nil)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusFound {
t.Fatalf("sealed UI status = %d, want 302", rr.Code)
}
loc := rr.Header().Get("Location")
if loc != "/unseal" {
t.Fatalf("redirect location = %q, want /unseal", loc)
}
}
func TestUnsealBadPassphrase(t *testing.T) {
srv, _, _, _ := newTestServer(t)
// Start sealed.
v := vault.NewSealed()
srv.vault = v
body := `{"passphrase":"wrong-passphrase"}`
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/v1/vault/unseal", strings.NewReader(body))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("unseal with bad passphrase status = %d, want 401", rr.Code)
}
}
func TestSealAlreadySealedNoop(t *testing.T) {
srv, _, priv, _ := newTestServer(t)
// Seal via API (needs admin token)
adminToken, _ := issueAdminToken(t, srv, priv, "admin")
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/v1/vault/seal", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+adminToken)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
srv.Handler().ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("seal status = %d, want 200", rr.Code)
}
var resp map[string]string
if err := json.NewDecoder(rr.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
}
if resp["status"] != "sealed" {
t.Fatalf("seal response status = %q, want sealed", resp["status"])
}
// Vault should be sealed now
if !srv.vault.IsSealed() {
t.Fatal("vault should be sealed after seal API call")
}
}