UI: password change enforcement + migration recovery

- Web UI admin password reset now enforces admin role
  server-side (was cookie-auth + CSRF only; any logged-in
  user could previously reset any account's password)
- Added self-service password change UI at GET/PUT /profile:
  current_password + new_password + confirm_password;
  server-side equality check; lockout + Argon2id verification;
  revokes all other sessions on success
- password_change_form.html fragment and profile.html page
- Nav bar actor name now links to /profile
- policy: ActionChangePassword + default rule -7 allowing
  human accounts to change their own password
- openapi.yaml: built-in rules count updated to -7

Migration recovery:
- mciasdb schema force --version N: new subcommand to clear
  dirty migration state without running SQL (break-glass)
- schema subcommands bypass auto-migration on open so the
  tool stays usable when the database is dirty
- Migrate(): shim no longer overrides schema_migrations
  when it already has an entry; duplicate-column error on
  the latest migration is force-cleaned and treated as
  success (handles columns added outside the runner)

Security:
- Admin role is now validated in handleAdminResetPassword
  before any DB access; non-admin receives 403
- handleSelfChangePassword follows identical lockout +
  constant-time Argon2id path as the REST self-service
  handler; current password required to prevent
  token-theft account takeover

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-03-12 15:33:19 -07:00
parent a9ebeb2ba1
commit f262ca7b4e
13 changed files with 412 additions and 24 deletions

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,59 @@ Source of truth for current development state.
---
All phases complete. **v1.0.0 tagged.** All packages pass `go test ./...`; `golangci-lint run ./...` clean.
### 2026-03-12 — Checkpoint: password change UI enforcement + migration recovery
**internal/ui/handlers_accounts.go**
- `handleAdminResetPassword`: added server-side admin role check at the top of
the handler; any authenticated non-admin calling this route now receives 403.
Previously only cookie validity + CSRF were checked.
**internal/ui/handlers_auth.go**
- Added `handleProfilePage`: renders the new `/profile` page for any
authenticated user.
- Added `handleSelfChangePassword`: self-service password change for non-admin
users; validates current password (Argon2id, lockout-checked), enforces
server-side confirmation equality check, hashes new password, revokes all
other sessions, audits as `{"via":"ui_self_service"}`.
**internal/ui/ui.go**
- Added `ProfileData` view model.
- Registered `GET /profile` and `PUT /profile/password` routes (cookie auth +
CSRF; no admin role required).
- Added `password_change_form.html` to shared template list; added `profile`
page template.
- Nav bar actor-name span changed to a link pointing to `/profile`.
**web/templates/fragments/password_change_form.html** (new)
- HTMX form with `current_password`, `new_password`, `confirm_password` fields.
- Client-side JS confirmation guard; server-side equality check in handler.
**web/templates/profile.html** (new)
- Profile page hosting the self-service password change form.
**internal/db/migrate.go**
- Compatibility shim now only calls `m.Force(legacyVersion)` when
`schema_migrations` is completely empty (`ErrNilVersion`); leaves existing
version entries (including dirty ones) alone to prevent re-running already-
attempted migrations.
- Added duplicate-column-name recovery: when `m.Up()` fails with "duplicate
column name" and the dirty version equals `LatestSchemaVersion`, the migrator
is force-cleaned and returns nil (handles databases where columns were added
outside the runner before migration 006 existed).
- Added `ForceSchemaVersion(database *DB, version int) error`: break-glass
exported function; forces golang-migrate version without running SQL.
**cmd/mciasdb/schema.go**
- Added `schema force --version N` subcommand backed by `db.ForceSchemaVersion`.
**cmd/mciasdb/main.go**
- `schema` commands now open the database via `openDBRaw` (no auto-migration)
so the tool stays usable when the database is in a dirty migration state.
- `openDB` refactored to call `openDBRaw` then `db.Migrate`.
- Updated usage text.
All tests pass; `golangci-lint run ./...` clean.
### 2026-03-12 — Password change: self-service and admin reset
Added the ability for users to change their own password and for admins to
@@ -394,9 +447,10 @@ All tests pass (`go test ./...`); `golangci-lint run ./...` reports 0 issues.
- `engine.go``Evaluate(input, operatorRules) (Effect, *Rule)`: pure function;
merges operator rules with default rules, sorts by priority, deny-wins,
then first allow, then default-deny
- `defaults.go`6 compiled-in rules (IDs -1 to -6, Priority 0): admin
wildcard, self-service logout/renew, self-service TOTP, system account own
pgcreds, system account own service token, public login/validate endpoints
- `defaults.go`7 compiled-in rules (IDs -1 to -7, Priority 0): admin
wildcard, self-service logout/renew, self-service TOTP, self-service password
change (human only), system account own pgcreds, system account own service
token, public login/validate endpoints
- `engine_wrapper.go``Engine` struct with `sync.RWMutex`; `SetRules()`
decodes DB records; `PolicyRecord` type avoids import cycle
- `engine_test.go` — 11 tests: DefaultDeny, AdminWildcard, SelfService*,

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@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
//
// schema verify
// schema migrate
// schema force --version N
//
// account list
// account get --id UUID
@@ -62,7 +63,22 @@ func main() {
os.Exit(1)
}
database, masterKey, err := openDB(*configPath)
command := args[0]
subArgs := args[1:]
// schema subcommands manage migrations themselves and must not trigger
// auto-migration on open (a dirty database would prevent the tool from
// opening at all, blocking recovery operations like "schema force").
var (
database *db.DB
masterKey []byte
err error
)
if command == "schema" {
database, masterKey, err = openDBRaw(*configPath)
} else {
database, masterKey, err = openDB(*configPath)
}
if err != nil {
fatalf("%v", err)
}
@@ -76,9 +92,6 @@ func main() {
tool := &tool{db: database, masterKey: masterKey}
command := args[0]
subArgs := args[1:]
switch command {
case "schema":
tool.runSchema(subArgs)
@@ -111,6 +124,21 @@ type tool struct {
// the same passphrase always yields the same key and encrypted secrets remain
// readable. The passphrase env var is unset immediately after reading.
func openDB(configPath string) (*db.DB, []byte, error) {
database, masterKey, err := openDBRaw(configPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
if err := db.Migrate(database); err != nil {
_ = database.Close()
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("migrate database: %w", err)
}
return database, masterKey, nil
}
// openDBRaw opens the database without running migrations. Used by schema
// subcommands so they remain operational even when the database is in a dirty
// migration state (e.g. to allow "schema force" to clear a dirty flag).
func openDBRaw(configPath string) (*db.DB, []byte, error) {
cfg, err := config.Load(configPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err)
@@ -121,11 +149,6 @@ func openDB(configPath string) (*db.DB, []byte, error) {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("open database %q: %w", cfg.Database.Path, err)
}
if err := db.Migrate(database); err != nil {
_ = database.Close()
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("migrate database: %w", err)
}
masterKey, err := deriveMasterKey(cfg, database)
if err != nil {
_ = database.Close()
@@ -210,6 +233,7 @@ Global flags:
Commands:
schema verify Check schema version; exit 1 if migrations pending
schema migrate Apply any pending schema migrations
schema force --version N Force schema version (clears dirty state)
account list List all accounts
account get --id UUID

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@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package main
import (
"flag"
"fmt"
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/db"
@@ -8,13 +9,15 @@ import (
func (t *tool) runSchema(args []string) {
if len(args) == 0 {
fatalf("schema requires a subcommand: verify, migrate")
fatalf("schema requires a subcommand: verify, migrate, force")
}
switch args[0] {
case "verify":
t.schemaVerify()
case "migrate":
t.schemaMigrate()
case "force":
t.schemaForce(args[1:])
default:
fatalf("unknown schema subcommand %q", args[0])
}
@@ -39,6 +42,26 @@ func (t *tool) schemaVerify() {
fmt.Println("schema is up-to-date")
}
// schemaForce marks the database as being at a specific migration version
// without running any SQL. Use this to clear a dirty migration state after
// you have verified that the schema already reflects the target version.
//
// Example: mciasdb schema force --version 6
func (t *tool) schemaForce(args []string) {
fs := flag.NewFlagSet("schema force", flag.ExitOnError)
version := fs.Int("version", 0, "schema version to force (required)")
_ = fs.Parse(args)
if *version <= 0 {
fatalf("--version must be a positive integer")
}
if err := db.ForceSchemaVersion(t.db, *version); err != nil {
fatalf("force schema version: %v", err)
}
fmt.Printf("schema version forced to %d; run 'schema migrate' to apply any remaining migrations\n", *version)
}
// schemaMigrate applies any pending migrations and reports each one.
func (t *tool) schemaMigrate() {
before, err := db.SchemaVersion(t.db)

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@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
"embed"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strings"
"github.com/golang-migrate/migrate/v4"
sqlitedriver "github.com/golang-migrate/migrate/v4/database/sqlite"
@@ -93,19 +94,65 @@ func Migrate(database *DB) error {
defer func() { src, drv := m.Close(); _ = src; _ = drv }()
if legacyVersion > 0 {
// Force the migrator to treat the database as already at
// legacyVersion so Up only applies newer migrations.
// Only fast-forward from the legacy version when golang-migrate has no
// version record of its own yet (ErrNilVersion). If schema_migrations
// already has an entry — including a dirty entry from a previously
// failed migration — leave it alone and let golang-migrate handle it.
// Overriding a non-nil version would discard progress (or a dirty
// state that needs idempotent re-application) and cause migrations to
// be retried unnecessarily.
_, _, versionErr := m.Version()
if errors.Is(versionErr, migrate.ErrNilVersion) {
if err := m.Force(legacyVersion); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("db: force legacy schema version %d: %w", legacyVersion, err)
}
}
}
if err := m.Up(); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, migrate.ErrNoChange) {
// A "duplicate column name" error means the failing migration is an
// ADD COLUMN that was already applied outside the migration runner
// (common during development before a migration file existed).
// If this is the last migration and its version matches LatestSchemaVersion,
// force it clean so subsequent starts succeed.
//
// This is intentionally narrow: we only suppress the error when the
// dirty version equals the latest known version, preventing accidental
// masking of errors in intermediate migrations.
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "duplicate column name") {
v, dirty, verErr := m.Version()
if verErr == nil && dirty && int(v) == LatestSchemaVersion { //nolint:gosec // G115: safe conversion
if forceErr := m.Force(LatestSchemaVersion); forceErr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("db: force after duplicate column: %w", forceErr)
}
return nil
}
}
return fmt.Errorf("db: apply migrations: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// ForceSchemaVersion marks the database as being at the given version without
// running any SQL. This is a break-glass operation: use it to clear a dirty
// migration state after verifying (or manually applying) the migration SQL.
//
// Passing a version that has never been recorded by golang-migrate is safe;
// it simply sets the version and clears the dirty flag. The next call to
// Migrate will apply any versions higher than the forced one.
func ForceSchemaVersion(database *DB, version int) error {
m, err := newMigrate(database)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer func() { src, drv := m.Close(); _ = src; _ = drv }()
if err := m.Force(version); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("db: force schema version %d: %w", version, err)
}
return nil
}
// SchemaVersion returns the current applied schema version of the database.
// Returns 0 if no migrations have been applied yet.
func SchemaVersion(database *DB) (int, error) {

View File

@@ -42,6 +42,18 @@ var defaultRules = []Rule{
Actions: []Action{ActionEnrollTOTP},
Effect: Allow,
},
{
// Self-service password change: any authenticated human account may
// change their own password. The handler derives the target exclusively
// from the JWT subject (claims.Subject) and requires the current
// password, so a non-admin caller can only affect their own account.
ID: -7,
Description: "Self-service: any human account may change their own password",
Priority: 0,
AccountTypes: []string{"human"},
Actions: []Action{ActionChangePassword},
Effect: Allow,
},
{
// System accounts reading their own pgcreds: a service that has already
// authenticated (e.g. via its bearer service token) may retrieve its own

View File

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ const (
ActionLogin Action = "auth:login" // public
ActionLogout Action = "auth:logout" // self-service
ActionChangePassword Action = "auth:change_password" // self-service
ActionListRules Action = "policy:list"
ActionManageRules Action = "policy:manage"

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@@ -901,10 +901,32 @@ func (u *UIServer) handleCreatePGCreds(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// for the target account are revoked so a compromised account is fully
// invalidated.
//
// Security: new password is validated (minimum 12 chars) and hashed with
// Argon2id before storage. The plaintext is never logged or included in any
// response. Audit event EventPasswordChanged is recorded on success.
// Security: caller must hold the admin role; the check is performed server-side
// against the JWT claims so it cannot be bypassed by client-side tricks.
// New password is validated (minimum 12 chars) and hashed with Argon2id before
// storage. The plaintext is never logged or included in any response.
// Audit event EventPasswordChanged is recorded on success.
func (u *UIServer) handleAdminResetPassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Security: enforce admin role; requireCookieAuth only validates the token,
// it does not check roles. A non-admin with a valid session must not be
// able to reset arbitrary accounts' passwords.
callerClaims := claimsFromContext(r.Context())
if callerClaims == nil {
u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized")
return
}
isAdmin := false
for _, role := range callerClaims.Roles {
if role == "admin" {
isAdmin = true
break
}
}
if !isAdmin {
u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusForbidden, "admin role required")
return
}
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxFormBytes)
if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid form")

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@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/crypto"
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/model"
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/token"
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/validate"
)
// handleLoginPage renders the login form.
@@ -255,3 +256,127 @@ func (u *UIServer) writeAudit(r *http.Request, eventType string, actorID, target
u.logger.Warn("write audit event", "type", eventType, "error", err)
}
}
// handleProfilePage renders the profile page for the currently logged-in user.
func (u *UIServer) handleProfilePage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
csrfToken, _ := u.setCSRFCookies(w)
u.render(w, "profile", ProfileData{
PageData: PageData{
CSRFToken: csrfToken,
ActorName: u.actorName(r),
},
})
}
// handleSelfChangePassword allows an authenticated human user to change their
// own password. The current password must be supplied to prevent a stolen
// session token from being used to take over an account.
//
// Security: current password is verified with Argon2id (constant-time) before
// the new hash is written. Lockout is checked first so the endpoint cannot
// be used to brute-force the existing password. On success all other active
// sessions are revoked; the caller's own session is preserved so they remain
// logged in. The plaintext passwords are never logged or returned.
func (u *UIServer) handleSelfChangePassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxFormBytes)
if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid form")
return
}
claims := claimsFromContext(r.Context())
if claims == nil {
u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized")
return
}
acct, err := u.db.GetAccountByUUID(claims.Subject)
if err != nil {
u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, "account not found")
return
}
if acct.AccountType != model.AccountTypeHuman {
u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "password change is only available for human accounts")
return
}
currentPassword := r.FormValue("current_password")
newPassword := r.FormValue("new_password")
confirmPassword := r.FormValue("confirm_password")
if currentPassword == "" || newPassword == "" {
u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "current and new password are required")
return
}
// Server-side confirmation check mirrors the client-side guard; defends
// against direct POST requests that bypass the JavaScript validation.
if newPassword != confirmPassword {
u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "passwords do not match")
return
}
// Security: check lockout before running Argon2 to prevent brute-force.
locked, lockErr := u.db.IsLockedOut(acct.ID)
if lockErr != nil {
u.logger.Error("lockout check (UI self-service password change)", "error", lockErr)
}
if locked {
u.writeAudit(r, model.EventPasswordChanged, &acct.ID, &acct.ID, `{"result":"locked"}`)
u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "account temporarily locked, please try again later")
return
}
// Security: verify current password with constant-time Argon2id path used
// at login so this endpoint cannot serve as a timing oracle.
ok, verifyErr := auth.VerifyPassword(currentPassword, acct.PasswordHash)
if verifyErr != nil || !ok {
_ = u.db.RecordLoginFailure(acct.ID)
u.writeAudit(r, model.EventPasswordChanged, &acct.ID, &acct.ID, `{"result":"wrong_current_password"}`)
u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, "current password is incorrect")
return
}
// Security (F-13): enforce minimum length before hashing.
if err := validate.Password(newPassword); err != nil {
u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
return
}
hash, err := auth.HashPassword(newPassword, auth.ArgonParams{
Time: u.cfg.Argon2.Time,
Memory: u.cfg.Argon2.Memory,
Threads: u.cfg.Argon2.Threads,
})
if err != nil {
u.logger.Error("hash password (UI self-service)", "error", err)
u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error")
return
}
if err := u.db.UpdatePasswordHash(acct.ID, hash); err != nil {
u.logger.Error("update password hash", "error", err)
u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to update password")
return
}
// Security: clear failure counter (user proved knowledge of current
// password), then revoke all sessions except the current one so stale
// tokens are invalidated while the caller stays logged in.
_ = u.db.ClearLoginFailures(acct.ID)
if err := u.db.RevokeAllUserTokensExcept(acct.ID, claims.JTI, "password_changed"); err != nil {
u.logger.Error("revoke other tokens on UI password change", "account_id", acct.ID, "error", err)
u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "password updated but session revocation failed; revoke tokens manually")
return
}
u.writeAudit(r, model.EventPasswordChanged, &acct.ID, &acct.ID, `{"via":"ui_self_service"}`)
csrfToken, _ := u.setCSRFCookies(w)
u.render(w, "password_change_result", ProfileData{
PageData: PageData{
CSRFToken: csrfToken,
ActorName: u.actorName(r),
Flash: "Password updated successfully. Other active sessions have been revoked.",
},
})
}

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@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ func New(database *db.DB, cfg *config.Config, priv ed25519.PrivateKey, pub ed255
"templates/fragments/policy_row.html",
"templates/fragments/policy_form.html",
"templates/fragments/password_reset_form.html",
"templates/fragments/password_change_form.html",
}
base, err := template.New("").Funcs(funcMap).ParseFS(web.TemplateFS, sharedFiles...)
if err != nil {
@@ -208,6 +209,7 @@ func New(database *db.DB, cfg *config.Config, priv ed25519.PrivateKey, pub ed255
"audit_detail": "templates/audit_detail.html",
"policies": "templates/policies.html",
"pgcreds": "templates/pgcreds.html",
"profile": "templates/profile.html",
}
tmpls := make(map[string]*template.Template, len(pageFiles))
for name, file := range pageFiles {
@@ -296,6 +298,10 @@ func (u *UIServer) Register(mux *http.ServeMux) {
uiMux.Handle("PUT /accounts/{id}/tags", admin(u.handleSetAccountTags))
uiMux.Handle("PUT /accounts/{id}/password", admin(u.handleAdminResetPassword))
// Profile routes — accessible to any authenticated user (not admin-only).
uiMux.Handle("GET /profile", adminGet(u.handleProfilePage))
uiMux.Handle("PUT /profile/password", auth(u.requireCSRF(http.HandlerFunc(u.handleSelfChangePassword))))
// Mount the wrapped UI mux on the parent mux. The "/" pattern acts as a
// catch-all for all UI paths; the more-specific /v1/ API patterns registered
// on the parent mux continue to take precedence per Go's routing rules.
@@ -611,6 +617,11 @@ type PoliciesData struct {
AllActions []string
}
// ProfileData is the view model for the profile/settings page.
type ProfileData struct {
PageData
}
// PGCredsData is the view model for the "My PG Credentials" list page.
// It shows all pg_credentials sets accessible to the currently logged-in user:
// those they own and those they have been granted access to.

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@@ -1257,7 +1257,7 @@ paths:
summary: List policy rules (admin)
description: |
Return all operator-defined policy rules ordered by priority (ascending).
Built-in default rules (IDs -1 to -6) are not included.
Built-in default rules (IDs -1 to -7) are not included.
operationId: listPolicyRules
tags: [Admin — Policy]
security:

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@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
<li><a href="/audit">Audit</a></li>
<li><a href="/policies">Policies</a></li>
<li><a href="/pgcreds">PG Creds</a></li>
{{if .ActorName}}<li><span class="nav-actor">{{.ActorName}}</span></li>{{end}}
{{if .ActorName}}<li><a href="/profile">{{.ActorName}}</a></li>{{end}}
<li><form method="POST" action="/logout" style="margin:0"><button class="btn btn-sm btn-secondary" type="submit">Logout</button></form></li>
</ul>
</div>

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@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
{{define "password_change_form"}}
<form id="password-change-form"
hx-put="/profile/password"
hx-target="#password-change-section"
hx-swap="innerHTML"
hx-headers='{"X-CSRF-Token": "{{.CSRFToken}}"}'
onsubmit="return mciasPwChangeConfirm(this)">
<div class="form-group">
<label for="current_password">Current Password</label>
<input type="password" id="current_password" name="current_password"
class="form-control" autocomplete="current-password"
placeholder="Your current password" required>
</div>
<div class="form-group" style="margin-top:.5rem">
<label for="new_password">New Password</label>
<input type="password" id="new_password" name="new_password"
class="form-control" autocomplete="new-password"
placeholder="Minimum 12 characters" required minlength="12">
</div>
<div class="form-group" style="margin-top:.5rem">
<label for="confirm_password">Confirm New Password</label>
<input type="password" id="confirm_password" name="confirm_password"
class="form-control" autocomplete="new-password"
placeholder="Repeat new password" required minlength="12">
</div>
<div id="pw-change-error" role="alert"
style="display:none;color:var(--color-danger,#c0392b);font-size:.85rem;margin-top:.35rem"></div>
<button type="submit" class="btn btn-primary btn-sm" style="margin-top:.75rem">
Change Password
</button>
</form>
<script>
function mciasPwChangeConfirm(form) {
var pw = form.querySelector('#new_password').value;
var cfm = form.querySelector('#confirm_password').value;
var err = form.querySelector('#pw-change-error');
if (pw !== cfm) {
err.textContent = 'Passwords do not match.';
err.style.display = 'block';
return false;
}
err.style.display = 'none';
return true;
}
</script>
{{end}}
{{define "password_change_result"}}
{{if .Flash}}
<div class="alert alert-success" role="alert">{{.Flash}}</div>
{{end}}
{{template "password_change_form" .}}
{{end}}

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@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{{define "profile"}}{{template "base" .}}{{end}}
{{define "title"}}Profile — MCIAS{{end}}
{{define "content"}}
<div class="page-header">
<h1>Profile</h1>
</div>
<div class="card">
<h2 style="font-size:1rem;font-weight:600;margin-bottom:1rem">Change Password</h2>
<p class="text-muted text-small" style="margin-bottom:.75rem">
Enter your current password and choose a new one. Other active sessions will be revoked.
</p>
<div id="password-change-section">
{{template "password_change_form" .}}
</div>
</div>
{{end}}