- Add internal/audit package with JSON() and JSONWithRoles() helpers
that use json.Marshal instead of fmt.Sprintf with %q
- Replace all fmt.Sprintf audit detail construction in:
- internal/server/server.go (10 occurrences)
- internal/ui/handlers_auth.go (4 occurrences)
- internal/grpcserver/auth.go (4 occurrences)
- Add tests for the helpers including edge-case Unicode,
null bytes, special characters, and odd argument counts
- Fix broken {"roles":%v} formatting that produced invalid JSON
Security: Audit log detail strings are now constructed via
json.Marshal, which correctly handles all Unicode edge cases
(U+2028, U+2029, null bytes, etc.) that fmt.Sprintf with %q
may mishandle. This prevents potential log injection or parsing
issues in audit event consumers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add IsAdmin bool to PageData (embedded in all page view structs)
- Remove redundant IsAdmin from DashboardData
- Add isAdmin() helper to derive admin status from request claims
- Set IsAdmin in all page-level handlers that populate PageData
- Wrap admin-only nav links in base.html with {{if .IsAdmin}}
- Add tests: non-admin dashboard/profile hide admin links,
admin dashboard shows them
Security: navigation links to /accounts, /audit, /policies,
and /pgcreds are now only rendered for admin users. Server-side
authorization (requireAdminRole middleware) was already in place;
this change removes the information leak of showing links that
return 403 to non-admin users.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- REST login: change locked account response from HTTP 429
"account_locked" to HTTP 401 "invalid credentials"
- gRPC login: change from ResourceExhausted to Unauthenticated
with "invalid credentials" message
- UI login: change from "account temporarily locked" to
"invalid credentials"
- REST password-change endpoint: same normalization
- Audit logs still record "account_locked" internally
- Added tests in all three layers verifying locked-account
responses are indistinguishable from wrong-password responses
Security: lockout responses now return identical status codes and
messages as wrong-password failures across REST, gRPC, and UI,
preventing user-enumeration via lockout differentiation. Internal
audit logging of lockout events is preserved for operational use.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add noDirListing handler wrapper that returns 404 for directory
requests (paths ending with "/" or empty path) instead of delegating
to http.FileServerFS which would render an index page
- Wrap the static file server in Register() with noDirListing
- Add tests verifying GET /static/ returns 404 and GET /static/style.css
still returns 200
Security: directory listings exposed the names of all static assets,
leaking framework details. The wrapper blocks directory index responses
while preserving normal file serving.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add Permissions-Policy header disabling camera, microphone,
geolocation, and payment browser features
- Update assertSecurityHeaders test helper to verify the new header
Security: Permissions-Policy restricts browser APIs that this
application does not use, reducing attack surface from content
injection vulnerabilities. No crypto or auth flow changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Change dashboard route from adminGet to authed middleware
- Show account counts and audit events only for admin users
- Show welcome message for non-admin authenticated users
Security: non-admin users cannot access account lists or audit
events; admin-only data is gated by claims.HasRole("admin") in
the handler, not just at the route level.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add requireAdminRole middleware to web UI that checks
claims.HasRole("admin") and returns 403 if absent
- Apply middleware to all admin routes (accounts, policies,
audit, dashboard, credentials)
- Remove redundant inline admin check from handleAdminResetPassword
- Profile routes correctly require only authentication, not admin
Security: The admin/adminGet middleware wrappers only called
requireCookieAuth (JWT validation) but never verified the admin
role. Any authenticated user could access admin endpoints
including role assignment. Fixed by inserting requireAdminRole
into the middleware chain for all admin routes.
- Update knownRoles to include guest, viewer, editor, and commenter
- Replace hardcoded role strings with model constants
- Remove obsolete 'service' role from UI
- All tests pass
- Trusted proxy config option for proxy-aware IP extraction
used by rate limiting and audit logs; validates proxy IP
before trusting X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP headers
- TOTP replay protection via counter-based validation to
reject reused codes within the same time step (±30s)
- RateLimit middleware updated to extract client IP from
proxy headers without IP spoofing risk
- New tests for ClientIP proxy logic (spoofed headers,
fallback) and extended rate-limit proxy coverage
- HTMX error banner script integrated into web UI base
- .gitignore updated for mciasdb build artifact
Security: resolves CRIT-01 (TOTP replay attack) and
DEF-03 (proxy-unaware rate limiting); gRPC TOTP
enrollment aligned with REST via StorePendingTOTP
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Web UI admin password reset now enforces admin role
server-side (was cookie-auth + CSRF only; any logged-in
user could previously reset any account's password)
- Added self-service password change UI at GET/PUT /profile:
current_password + new_password + confirm_password;
server-side equality check; lockout + Argon2id verification;
revokes all other sessions on success
- password_change_form.html fragment and profile.html page
- Nav bar actor name now links to /profile
- policy: ActionChangePassword + default rule -7 allowing
human accounts to change their own password
- openapi.yaml: built-in rules count updated to -7
Migration recovery:
- mciasdb schema force --version N: new subcommand to clear
dirty migration state without running SQL (break-glass)
- schema subcommands bypass auto-migration on open so the
tool stays usable when the database is dirty
- Migrate(): shim no longer overrides schema_migrations
when it already has an entry; duplicate-column error on
the latest migration is force-cleaned and treated as
success (handles columns added outside the runner)
Security:
- Admin role is now validated in handleAdminResetPassword
before any DB access; non-admin receives 403
- handleSelfChangePassword follows identical lockout +
constant-time Argon2id path as the REST self-service
handler; current password required to prevent
token-theft account takeover
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* web/templates/pgcreds.html: New Credentials card is now always
rendered; Add Credentials toggle button reveals the create form
(hidden by default). Shows a message when all system accounts
already have credentials. Previously the card was hidden when
UncredentialedAccounts was empty.
* internal/ui/ui.go: added ActorName string field to PageData;
added actorName(r) helper resolving username from JWT claims
via DB lookup, returns empty string if unauthenticated.
* internal/ui/handlers_*.go: all full-page PageData constructors
now pass ActorName: u.actorName(r).
* web/templates/base.html: nav bar renders actor username as a
muted label before the Logout button when logged in.
* web/static/style.css: added .nav-actor rule (muted grey, 0.85rem).
- internal/ui/ui.go: add PGCred, Tags to AccountDetailData; register
PUT /accounts/{id}/pgcreds and PUT /accounts/{id}/tags routes; add
pgcreds_form.html and tags_editor.html to shared template set; remove
unused AccountTagsData; fix fieldalignment on PolicyRuleView, PoliciesData
- internal/ui/handlers_accounts.go: add handleSetPGCreds — encrypts
password via crypto.SealAESGCM, writes audit EventPGCredUpdated, renders
pgcreds_form fragment; password never echoed; load PG creds and tags in
handleAccountDetail
- internal/ui/handlers_policy.go: fix handleSetAccountTags to render with
AccountDetailData instead of removed AccountTagsData
- internal/ui/ui_test.go: add 5 PG credential UI tests
- web/templates/fragments/pgcreds_form.html: new fragment — metadata display
+ set/replace form; system accounts only; password write-only
- web/templates/fragments/tags_editor.html: new fragment — textarea editor
with HTMX PUT for atomic tag replacement
- web/templates/fragments/policy_form.html: rewrite to use structured fields
matching handleCreatePolicyRule (roles/account_types/actions multi-select,
resource_type, subject_uuid, service_names, required_tags, checkbox)
- web/templates/policies.html: new policies management page
- web/templates/fragments/policy_row.html: new HTMX table row with toggle
and delete
- web/templates/account_detail.html: add Tags card and PG Credentials card
- web/templates/base.html: add Policies nav link
- internal/server/server.go: remove ~220 lines of duplicate tag/policy
handler code (real implementations are in handlers_policy.go)
- internal/policy/engine_wrapper.go: fix corrupted source; use errors.New
- internal/db/policy_test.go: use model.AccountTypeHuman constant
- cmd/mciasctl/main.go: add nolint:gosec to int(os.Stdin.Fd()) calls
- gofmt/goimports: db/policy_test.go, policy/defaults.go,
policy/engine_test.go, ui/ui.go, cmd/mciasctl/main.go
- fieldalignment: model.PolicyRuleRecord, policy.Engine, policy.Rule,
policy.RuleBody, ui.PolicyRuleView
Security: PG password encrypted AES-256-GCM with fresh random nonce before
storage; plaintext never logged or returned in any response; audit event
written on every credential write.
- web/static/htmx.min.js: replace placeholder stub with
htmx 2.0.4 (downloaded from unpkg.com). The placeholder
only logged a console warning; no HTMX features worked,
so form submissions fell back to native POSTs and the
account_row fragment was returned as a raw HTML body
rather than spliced into the table. This was the root
cause of account creation appearing to 'do nothing'.
- internal/ui/ui.go: add pgcreds_form.html to shared
template list; add PUT /accounts/{id}/pgcreds route;
reorder AccountDetailData fields so embedded PageData
does not shadow Account.
- internal/ui/handlers_accounts.go: add handleSetPGCreds
handler — encrypts the submitted password with AES-256-GCM
using the server master key before storage, validates
system-account-only constraint, re-reads and re-renders
the fragment after save. Add PGCred field population to
handleAccountDetail.
- internal/ui/ui_test.go: add tests for account creation,
role management, and PG credential handlers.
- web/templates/account_detail.html: add Postgres
Credentials card for system accounts.
- web/templates/fragments/pgcreds_form.html: new fragment
for the PG credentials form; CSRF token is supplied via
the body-level hx-headers attribute in base.html.
Security: PG password is encrypted with AES-256-GCM
(crypto.SealAESGCM) before storage; a fresh nonce is
generated per call; the plaintext is never logged or
returned in responses.
- Added failed login tracking for account lockout enforcement in `db` and `ui` layers; introduced `failed_logins` table to store attempts, window start, and attempt count.
- Updated login checks in `grpcserver/auth.go` and `ui/handlers_auth.go` to reject requests if the account is locked.
- Added immediate failure counter reset on successful login.
- Implemented username length and character set validation (F-12) and minimum password length enforcement (F-13) in shared `validate` package.
- Updated account creation and edit flows in `ui` and `grpcserver` layers to apply validation before hashing/processing.
- Added comprehensive unit tests for lockout, validation, and related edge cases.
- Updated `AUDIT.md` to mark F-08, F-12, and F-13 as fixed.
- Updated `openapi.yaml` to reflect new validation and lockout behaviors.
Security: Prevents brute-force attacks via lockout mechanism and strengthens defenses against weak and invalid input.
- auth/auth.go: add DummyHash() which uses sync.Once to compute
HashPassword("dummy-password-for-timing-only", DefaultArgonParams())
on first call; subsequent calls return the cached PHC string;
add sync to imports
- auth/auth_test.go: TestDummyHashIsValidPHC verifies the hash
parses and verifies correctly; TestDummyHashIsCached verifies
sync.Once behaviour; TestDummyHashMatchesDefaultParams verifies
embedded m/t/p match DefaultArgonParams()
- server/server.go, grpcserver/auth.go, ui/ui.go: replace five
hardcoded PHC strings with auth.DummyHash() calls
- AUDIT.md: mark F-07 as fixed
Security: the previous hardcoded hash used a 6-byte salt and
6-byte output ("testsalt"/"testhash" in base64), which Argon2id
verifies faster than a real 16-byte-salt / 32-byte-output hash.
This timing gap was measurable and could aid user enumeration.
auth.DummyHash() uses identical parameters and full-length salt
and output, so dummy verification timing matches real timing
exactly, regardless of future parameter changes.
- ui/handlers_accounts.go (handleIssueSystemToken): call
GetSystemToken before issuing; if one exists, call
RevokeToken(existing.JTI, "rotated") before TrackToken
and SetSystemToken for the new token; mirrors the pattern
in REST handleTokenIssue and gRPC IssueServiceToken
- db/db_test.go: TestSystemTokenRotationRevokesOld verifies
the full rotation flow: old JTI revoked with reason
"rotated", new JTI tracked and active, GetSystemToken
returns the new JTI
- AUDIT.md: mark F-16 as fixed
Security: without this fix an old system token remained valid
after rotation until its natural expiry, giving a leaked or
stolen old token extra lifetime. With the revocation the old
JTI is immediately marked in token_revocation so any validator
checking revocation status rejects it.
- ui/ui.go: add pendingLogin struct and pendingLogins sync.Map
to UIServer; add issueTOTPNonce (generates 128-bit random nonce,
stores accountID with 90s TTL) and consumeTOTPNonce (single-use,
expiry-checked LoadAndDelete); add dummyHash() method
- ui/handlers_auth.go: split handleLoginPost into step 1
(password verify → issue nonce) and step 2 (handleTOTPStep,
consume nonce → validate TOTP) via a new finishLogin helper;
password never transmitted or stored after step 1
- ui/ui_test.go: refactor newTestMux to reuse new
newTestUIServer; add TestTOTPNonceIssuedAndConsumed,
TestTOTPNonceUnknownRejected, TestTOTPNonceExpired, and
TestLoginPostPasswordNotInTOTPForm; 11/11 tests pass
- web/templates/fragments/totp_step.html: replace
'name=password' hidden field with 'name=totp_nonce'
- db/accounts.go: add GetAccountByID for TOTP step lookup
- AUDIT.md: mark F-02 as fixed
Security: the plaintext password previously survived two HTTP
round-trips and lived in the browser DOM during the TOTP step.
The nonce approach means the password is verified once and
immediately discarded; only an opaque random token tied to an
account ID (never a credential) crosses the wire on step 2.
Nonces are single-use and expire after 90 seconds to limit
the window if one is captured.
- AUDIT.md: security audit report with 16 findings (F-01..F-16)
- F-04 (server.go): wire loginRateLimit (10 req/s, burst 10) to
POST /v1/auth/login and POST /v1/token/validate; no limit on
/v1/health or public-key endpoints
- F-04 (server_test.go): TestLoginRateLimited uses concurrent
goroutines (sync.WaitGroup) to fire burst+1 requests before
Argon2id completes, sidestepping token-bucket refill timing;
TestTokenValidateRateLimited; TestHealthNotRateLimited
- F-11 (ui.go): refactor Register() so all UI routes are mounted
on a child mux wrapped with securityHeaders middleware; five
headers set on every response: Content-Security-Policy,
X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, HSTS, Referrer-Policy
- F-11 (ui_test.go): 7 new tests covering login page, dashboard
redirect, root redirect, static assets, CSP directives,
HSTS min-age, and middleware unit behaviour
Security: rate limiter on login prevents brute-force credential
stuffing; security headers mitigate clickjacking (X-Frame-Options
DENY), MIME sniffing (nosniff), and protocol downgrade (HSTS)
The package-level defaultRateLimiter drained its token bucket
across all test cases, causing later tests to hit ResourceExhausted.
Move rateLimiter from a package-level var to a *grpcRateLimiter field
on Server; New() allocates a fresh instance (10 req/s, burst 10) per
server. Each test's newTestEnv() constructs its own Server, so tests
no longer share limiter state.
Production behaviour is unchanged: a single Server is constructed at
startup and lives for the process lifetime.
- Introduced `web/templates/` for HTMX-fragmented pages (`dashboard`, `accounts`, `account_detail`, `error_fragment`, etc.).
- Implemented UI routes for account CRUD, audit log display, and login/logout with CSRF protection.
- Added `internal/ui/` package for handlers, CSRF manager, session validation, and token issuance.
- Updated documentation to include new UI features and templates directory structure.
- Security: Double-submit CSRF cookies, constant-time HMAC validation, login password/Argon2id re-verification at all steps to prevent bypass.
