Phase 14: Full WebAuthn support for passwordless passkey login and
hardware security key 2FA.
- go-webauthn/webauthn v0.16.1 dependency
- WebAuthnConfig with RPID/RPOrigin/DisplayName validation
- Migration 000009: webauthn_credentials table
- DB CRUD with ownership checks and admin operations
- internal/webauthn adapter: encrypt/decrypt at rest with AES-256-GCM
- REST: register begin/finish, login begin/finish, list, delete
- Web UI: profile enrollment, login passkey button, admin management
- gRPC: ListWebAuthnCredentials, RemoveWebAuthnCredential RPCs
- mciasdb: webauthn list/delete/reset subcommands
- OpenAPI: 6 new endpoints, WebAuthnCredentialInfo schema
- Policy: self-service enrollment rule, admin remove via wildcard
- Tests: DB CRUD, adapter round-trip, interface compliance
- Docs: ARCHITECTURE.md §22, PROJECT_PLAN.md Phase 14
Security: Credential IDs and public keys encrypted at rest with
AES-256-GCM via vault master key. Challenge ceremonies use 128-bit
nonces with 120s TTL in sync.Map. Sign counter validated on each
assertion to detect cloned authenticators. Password re-auth required
for registration (SEC-01 pattern). No credential material in API
responses or logs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Replace requireAdmin (role-based) guards on all REST endpoints
with RequirePolicy middleware backed by the existing policy engine;
built-in admin wildcard rule (-1) preserves existing admin behaviour
while operator rules can now grant targeted access to non-admin
accounts (e.g. a system account allowed to list accounts)
- Wire policy engine into Server: loaded from DB at startup,
reloaded after every policy-rule create/update/delete so changes
take effect immediately without a server restart
- Add service_account_delegates table (migration 000008) so a human
account can be delegated permission to issue tokens for a specific
system account without holding the admin role
- Add token-download nonce mechanism: a short-lived (5 min),
single-use random nonce is stored server-side after token issuance;
the browser downloads the token as a file via
GET /token/download/{nonce} (Content-Disposition: attachment)
instead of copying from a flash message
- Add /service-accounts UI page for non-admin delegates
- Add TestPolicyEnforcement and TestPolicyDenyRule integration tests
Security:
- Policy engine uses deny-wins, default-deny semantics; admin wildcard
is a compiled-in built-in and cannot be deleted via the API
- Token download nonces are 128-bit crypto/rand values, single-use,
and expire after 5 minutes; a background goroutine evicts stale entries
- alg header validation and Ed25519 signing unchanged
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- New internal/vault package: thread-safe Vault struct with
seal/unseal state, key material zeroing, and key derivation
- REST: POST /v1/vault/unseal, POST /v1/vault/seal,
GET /v1/vault/status; health returns sealed status
- UI: /unseal page with passphrase form, redirect when sealed
- gRPC: sealedInterceptor rejects RPCs when sealed
- Middleware: RequireUnsealed blocks all routes except exempt
paths; RequireAuth reads pubkey from vault at request time
- Startup: server starts sealed when passphrase unavailable
- All servers share single *vault.Vault by pointer
- CSRF manager derives key lazily from vault
Security: Key material is zeroed on seal. Sealed middleware
runs before auth. Handlers fail closed if vault becomes sealed
mid-request. Unseal endpoint is rate-limited (3/s burst 5).
No CSRF on unseal page (no session to protect; chicken-and-egg
with master key). Passphrase never logged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add IsAdmin bool to PageData (embedded in all page view structs)
- Remove redundant IsAdmin from DashboardData
- Add isAdmin() helper to derive admin status from request claims
- Set IsAdmin in all page-level handlers that populate PageData
- Wrap admin-only nav links in base.html with {{if .IsAdmin}}
- Add tests: non-admin dashboard/profile hide admin links,
admin dashboard shows them
Security: navigation links to /accounts, /audit, /policies,
and /pgcreds are now only rendered for admin users. Server-side
authorization (requireAdminRole middleware) was already in place;
this change removes the information leak of showing links that
return 403 to non-admin users.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add requireAdminRole middleware to web UI that checks
claims.HasRole("admin") and returns 403 if absent
- Apply middleware to all admin routes (accounts, policies,
audit, dashboard, credentials)
- Remove redundant inline admin check from handleAdminResetPassword
- Profile routes correctly require only authentication, not admin
Security: The admin/adminGet middleware wrappers only called
requireCookieAuth (JWT validation) but never verified the admin
role. Any authenticated user could access admin endpoints
including role assignment. Fixed by inserting requireAdminRole
into the middleware chain for all admin routes.
- Update knownRoles to include guest, viewer, editor, and commenter
- Replace hardcoded role strings with model constants
- Remove obsolete 'service' role from UI
- All tests pass
- Web UI admin password reset now enforces admin role
server-side (was cookie-auth + CSRF only; any logged-in
user could previously reset any account's password)
- Added self-service password change UI at GET/PUT /profile:
current_password + new_password + confirm_password;
server-side equality check; lockout + Argon2id verification;
revokes all other sessions on success
- password_change_form.html fragment and profile.html page
- Nav bar actor name now links to /profile
- policy: ActionChangePassword + default rule -7 allowing
human accounts to change their own password
- openapi.yaml: built-in rules count updated to -7
Migration recovery:
- mciasdb schema force --version N: new subcommand to clear
dirty migration state without running SQL (break-glass)
- schema subcommands bypass auto-migration on open so the
tool stays usable when the database is dirty
- Migrate(): shim no longer overrides schema_migrations
when it already has an entry; duplicate-column error on
the latest migration is force-cleaned and treated as
success (handles columns added outside the runner)
Security:
- Admin role is now validated in handleAdminResetPassword
before any DB access; non-admin receives 403
- handleSelfChangePassword follows identical lockout +
constant-time Argon2id path as the REST self-service
handler; current password required to prevent
token-theft account takeover
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* web/templates/pgcreds.html: New Credentials card is now always
rendered; Add Credentials toggle button reveals the create form
(hidden by default). Shows a message when all system accounts
already have credentials. Previously the card was hidden when
UncredentialedAccounts was empty.
* internal/ui/ui.go: added ActorName string field to PageData;
added actorName(r) helper resolving username from JWT claims
via DB lookup, returns empty string if unauthenticated.
* internal/ui/handlers_*.go: all full-page PageData constructors
now pass ActorName: u.actorName(r).
* web/templates/base.html: nav bar renders actor username as a
muted label before the Logout button when logged in.
* web/static/style.css: added .nav-actor rule (muted grey, 0.85rem).
- internal/ui/ui.go: add PGCred, Tags to AccountDetailData; register
PUT /accounts/{id}/pgcreds and PUT /accounts/{id}/tags routes; add
pgcreds_form.html and tags_editor.html to shared template set; remove
unused AccountTagsData; fix fieldalignment on PolicyRuleView, PoliciesData
- internal/ui/handlers_accounts.go: add handleSetPGCreds — encrypts
password via crypto.SealAESGCM, writes audit EventPGCredUpdated, renders
pgcreds_form fragment; password never echoed; load PG creds and tags in
handleAccountDetail
- internal/ui/handlers_policy.go: fix handleSetAccountTags to render with
AccountDetailData instead of removed AccountTagsData
- internal/ui/ui_test.go: add 5 PG credential UI tests
- web/templates/fragments/pgcreds_form.html: new fragment — metadata display
+ set/replace form; system accounts only; password write-only
- web/templates/fragments/tags_editor.html: new fragment — textarea editor
with HTMX PUT for atomic tag replacement
- web/templates/fragments/policy_form.html: rewrite to use structured fields
matching handleCreatePolicyRule (roles/account_types/actions multi-select,
resource_type, subject_uuid, service_names, required_tags, checkbox)
- web/templates/policies.html: new policies management page
- web/templates/fragments/policy_row.html: new HTMX table row with toggle
and delete
- web/templates/account_detail.html: add Tags card and PG Credentials card
- web/templates/base.html: add Policies nav link
- internal/server/server.go: remove ~220 lines of duplicate tag/policy
handler code (real implementations are in handlers_policy.go)
- internal/policy/engine_wrapper.go: fix corrupted source; use errors.New
- internal/db/policy_test.go: use model.AccountTypeHuman constant
- cmd/mciasctl/main.go: add nolint:gosec to int(os.Stdin.Fd()) calls
- gofmt/goimports: db/policy_test.go, policy/defaults.go,
policy/engine_test.go, ui/ui.go, cmd/mciasctl/main.go
- fieldalignment: model.PolicyRuleRecord, policy.Engine, policy.Rule,
policy.RuleBody, ui.PolicyRuleView
Security: PG password encrypted AES-256-GCM with fresh random nonce before
storage; plaintext never logged or returned in any response; audit event
written on every credential write.
- web/static/htmx.min.js: replace placeholder stub with
htmx 2.0.4 (downloaded from unpkg.com). The placeholder
only logged a console warning; no HTMX features worked,
so form submissions fell back to native POSTs and the
account_row fragment was returned as a raw HTML body
rather than spliced into the table. This was the root
cause of account creation appearing to 'do nothing'.
- internal/ui/ui.go: add pgcreds_form.html to shared
template list; add PUT /accounts/{id}/pgcreds route;
reorder AccountDetailData fields so embedded PageData
does not shadow Account.
- internal/ui/handlers_accounts.go: add handleSetPGCreds
handler — encrypts the submitted password with AES-256-GCM
using the server master key before storage, validates
system-account-only constraint, re-reads and re-renders
the fragment after save. Add PGCred field population to
handleAccountDetail.
- internal/ui/ui_test.go: add tests for account creation,
role management, and PG credential handlers.
- web/templates/account_detail.html: add Postgres
Credentials card for system accounts.
- web/templates/fragments/pgcreds_form.html: new fragment
for the PG credentials form; CSRF token is supplied via
the body-level hx-headers attribute in base.html.
Security: PG password is encrypted with AES-256-GCM
(crypto.SealAESGCM) before storage; a fresh nonce is
generated per call; the plaintext is never logged or
returned in responses.
- Added failed login tracking for account lockout enforcement in `db` and `ui` layers; introduced `failed_logins` table to store attempts, window start, and attempt count.
- Updated login checks in `grpcserver/auth.go` and `ui/handlers_auth.go` to reject requests if the account is locked.
- Added immediate failure counter reset on successful login.
- Implemented username length and character set validation (F-12) and minimum password length enforcement (F-13) in shared `validate` package.
- Updated account creation and edit flows in `ui` and `grpcserver` layers to apply validation before hashing/processing.
- Added comprehensive unit tests for lockout, validation, and related edge cases.
- Updated `AUDIT.md` to mark F-08, F-12, and F-13 as fixed.
- Updated `openapi.yaml` to reflect new validation and lockout behaviors.
Security: Prevents brute-force attacks via lockout mechanism and strengthens defenses against weak and invalid input.
- ui/handlers_accounts.go (handleIssueSystemToken): call
GetSystemToken before issuing; if one exists, call
RevokeToken(existing.JTI, "rotated") before TrackToken
and SetSystemToken for the new token; mirrors the pattern
in REST handleTokenIssue and gRPC IssueServiceToken
- db/db_test.go: TestSystemTokenRotationRevokesOld verifies
the full rotation flow: old JTI revoked with reason
"rotated", new JTI tracked and active, GetSystemToken
returns the new JTI
- AUDIT.md: mark F-16 as fixed
Security: without this fix an old system token remained valid
after rotation until its natural expiry, giving a leaked or
stolen old token extra lifetime. With the revocation the old
JTI is immediately marked in token_revocation so any validator
checking revocation status rejects it.
The package-level defaultRateLimiter drained its token bucket
across all test cases, causing later tests to hit ResourceExhausted.
Move rateLimiter from a package-level var to a *grpcRateLimiter field
on Server; New() allocates a fresh instance (10 req/s, burst 10) per
server. Each test's newTestEnv() constructs its own Server, so tests
no longer share limiter state.
Production behaviour is unchanged: a single Server is constructed at
startup and lives for the process lifetime.
- Introduced `web/templates/` for HTMX-fragmented pages (`dashboard`, `accounts`, `account_detail`, `error_fragment`, etc.).
- Implemented UI routes for account CRUD, audit log display, and login/logout with CSRF protection.
- Added `internal/ui/` package for handlers, CSRF manager, session validation, and token issuance.
- Updated documentation to include new UI features and templates directory structure.
- Security: Double-submit CSRF cookies, constant-time HMAC validation, login password/Argon2id re-verification at all steps to prevent bypass.
