Phase 14: Full WebAuthn support for passwordless passkey login and
hardware security key 2FA.
- go-webauthn/webauthn v0.16.1 dependency
- WebAuthnConfig with RPID/RPOrigin/DisplayName validation
- Migration 000009: webauthn_credentials table
- DB CRUD with ownership checks and admin operations
- internal/webauthn adapter: encrypt/decrypt at rest with AES-256-GCM
- REST: register begin/finish, login begin/finish, list, delete
- Web UI: profile enrollment, login passkey button, admin management
- gRPC: ListWebAuthnCredentials, RemoveWebAuthnCredential RPCs
- mciasdb: webauthn list/delete/reset subcommands
- OpenAPI: 6 new endpoints, WebAuthnCredentialInfo schema
- Policy: self-service enrollment rule, admin remove via wildcard
- Tests: DB CRUD, adapter round-trip, interface compliance
- Docs: ARCHITECTURE.md §22, PROJECT_PLAN.md Phase 14
Security: Credential IDs and public keys encrypted at rest with
AES-256-GCM via vault master key. Challenge ceremonies use 128-bit
nonces with 120s TTL in sync.Map. Sign counter validated on each
assertion to detect cloned authenticators. Password re-auth required
for registration (SEC-01 pattern). No credential material in API
responses or logs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- REST handleTOTPEnroll now requires password field in request body
- gRPC EnrollTOTP updated with password field in proto message
- Both handlers check lockout status and record failures on bad password
- Updated Go, Python, and Rust client libraries to pass password
- Updated OpenAPI specs with new requestBody schema
- Added TestTOTPEnrollRequiresPassword with no-password, wrong-password,
and correct-password sub-tests
Security: TOTP enrollment now requires the current password to prevent
session-theft escalation to persistent account takeover. Lockout and
failure recording use the same Argon2id constant-time path as login.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add POST /v1/accounts/{id}/roles and DELETE /v1/accounts/{id}/roles/{role} REST endpoints
- Add GrantRole and RevokeRole RPCs to AccountService in gRPC API
- Update OpenAPI specification with new endpoints
- Add grant and revoke subcommands to mciasctl
- Add grant and revoke subcommands to mciasgrpcctl
- Regenerate proto files with new message types and RPCs
- Implement gRPC server methods for granular role management
- All existing tests pass; build verified with goimports
Security: Role changes are audited via EventRoleGranted and EventRoleRevoked events,
consistent with existing SetRoles implementation.
- Add auth/login and auth/logout to mciasgrpcctl, calling
the existing AuthService.Login/Logout RPCs; password is
always prompted interactively (term.ReadPassword), never
accepted as a flag, raw bytes zeroed after use
- Add proto/mcias/v1/policy.proto with PolicyService
(List, Create, Get, Update, Delete policy rules)
- Regenerate gen/mcias/v1/ stubs to include policy
- Implement internal/grpcserver/policyservice.go delegating
to the same db layer as the REST policy handlers
- Register PolicyService in grpcserver.go
- Add policy list/create/get/update/delete to mciasgrpcctl
- Update mciasgrpcctl man page with new commands
Security: auth login uses the same interactive password
prompt pattern as mciasctl; password never appears in
process args, shell history, or logs; raw bytes zeroed
after string conversion (same as REST CLI and REST server).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- proto/mcias/v1/: AdminService, AuthService, TokenService,
AccountService, CredentialService; generated Go stubs in gen/
- internal/grpcserver: full handler implementations sharing all
business logic (auth, token, db, crypto) with REST server;
interceptor chain: logging -> auth (JWT alg-first + revocation) ->
rate-limit (token bucket, 10 req/s, burst 10, per-IP)
- internal/config: optional grpc_addr field in [server] section
- cmd/mciassrv: dual-stack startup; gRPC/TLS listener on grpc_addr
when configured; graceful shutdown of both servers in 15s window
- cmd/mciasgrpcctl: companion gRPC CLI mirroring mciasctl commands
(health, pubkey, account, role, token, pgcreds) using TLS with
optional custom CA cert
- internal/grpcserver/grpcserver_test.go: 20 tests via bufconn covering
public RPCs, auth interceptor (no token, invalid, revoked -> 401),
non-admin -> 403, Login/Logout/RenewToken/ValidateToken flows,
AccountService CRUD, SetPGCreds/GetPGCreds AES-GCM round-trip,
credential fields absent from all responses
Security:
JWT validation path identical to REST: alg header checked before
signature, alg:none rejected, revocation table checked after sig.
Authorization metadata value never logged by any interceptor.
Credential fields (PasswordHash, TOTPSecret*, PGPassword) absent from
all proto response messages — enforced by proto design and confirmed
by test TestCredentialFieldsAbsentFromAccountResponse.
Login dummy-Argon2 timing guard preserves timing uniformity for
unknown users (same as REST handleLogin).
TLS required at listener level; cmd/mciassrv uses
credentials.NewServerTLSFromFile; no h2c offered.
137 tests pass, zero race conditions (go test -race ./...)
