- Replace type: [string, "null"] array syntax with
type: string + nullable: true on AuditEvent.actor_id,
AuditEvent.target_id, PolicyRule.not_before, and
PolicyRule.expires_at; Swagger UI 5 cannot parse the
JSON Schema array form
- Add missing username field to /v1/token/validate response
schema (added to handler in d6cc827 but never synced)
- Add missing GET /v1/pgcreds endpoint to spec
- Sync web/static/openapi.yaml (served file) with root;
the static copy was many commits out of date, missing
all policy/tags schemas and endpoints
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- New internal/vault package: thread-safe Vault struct with
seal/unseal state, key material zeroing, and key derivation
- REST: POST /v1/vault/unseal, POST /v1/vault/seal,
GET /v1/vault/status; health returns sealed status
- UI: /unseal page with passphrase form, redirect when sealed
- gRPC: sealedInterceptor rejects RPCs when sealed
- Middleware: RequireUnsealed blocks all routes except exempt
paths; RequireAuth reads pubkey from vault at request time
- Startup: server starts sealed when passphrase unavailable
- All servers share single *vault.Vault by pointer
- CSRF manager derives key lazily from vault
Security: Key material is zeroed on seal. Sealed middleware
runs before auth. Handlers fail closed if vault becomes sealed
mid-request. Unseal endpoint is rate-limited (3/s burst 5).
No CSRF on unseal page (no session to protect; chicken-and-egg
with master key). Passphrase never logged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- REST handleTOTPEnroll now requires password field in request body
- gRPC EnrollTOTP updated with password field in proto message
- Both handlers check lockout status and record failures on bad password
- Updated Go, Python, and Rust client libraries to pass password
- Updated OpenAPI specs with new requestBody schema
- Added TestTOTPEnrollRequiresPassword with no-password, wrong-password,
and correct-password sub-tests
Security: TOTP enrollment now requires the current password to prevent
session-theft escalation to persistent account takeover. Lockout and
failure recording use the same Argon2id constant-time path as login.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Added failed login tracking for account lockout enforcement in `db` and `ui` layers; introduced `failed_logins` table to store attempts, window start, and attempt count.
- Updated login checks in `grpcserver/auth.go` and `ui/handlers_auth.go` to reject requests if the account is locked.
- Added immediate failure counter reset on successful login.
- Implemented username length and character set validation (F-12) and minimum password length enforcement (F-13) in shared `validate` package.
- Updated account creation and edit flows in `ui` and `grpcserver` layers to apply validation before hashing/processing.
- Added comprehensive unit tests for lockout, validation, and related edge cases.
- Updated `AUDIT.md` to mark F-08, F-12, and F-13 as fixed.
- Updated `openapi.yaml` to reflect new validation and lockout behaviors.
Security: Prevents brute-force attacks via lockout mechanism and strengthens defenses against weak and invalid input.
