Files
mcias/cmd/mciasdb/rekey.go
Kyle Isom 0d38bbae00 Add mciasdb rekey command
- internal/db/accounts.go: add ListAccountsWithTOTP,
  ListAllPGCredentials, TOTPRekeyRow, PGRekeyRow, and
  Rekey — atomic transaction that replaces master_key_salt,
  signing_key_enc/nonce, all TOTP enc/nonce, and all
  pg_password enc/nonce in one SQLite BEGIN/COMMIT
- cmd/mciasdb/rekey.go: runRekey — decrypts all secrets
  under old master key, prompts for new passphrase (with
  confirmation), derives new key from fresh Argon2id salt,
  re-encrypts everything, and commits atomically
- cmd/mciasdb/main.go: wire "rekey" command + update usage
- Tests: DB-layer tests for ListAccountsWithTOTP,
  ListAllPGCredentials, Rekey (happy path, empty DB, salt
  replacement); command-level TestRekeyCommandRoundTrip
  verifies full round-trip and adversarially confirms old
  key no longer decrypts after rekey

Security: fresh random salt is always generated so a
reused passphrase still produces an independent key; old
and new master keys are zeroed via defer; no passphrase or
key material appears in logs or audit events; the entire
re-encryption is done in-memory before the single atomic
DB write so the database is never in a mixed state.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-15 13:27:29 -07:00

155 lines
5.9 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/crypto"
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/db"
)
// runRekey re-encrypts all secrets under a new passphrase-derived master key.
//
// The current master key (already loaded in tool.masterKey by openDB) is used
// to decrypt every encrypted secret: the Ed25519 signing key, all TOTP secrets,
// and all Postgres credential passwords. The operator is then prompted for a
// new passphrase (confirmed), a fresh Argon2id salt is generated, a new 256-bit
// master key is derived, and all secrets are re-encrypted and written back in a
// single atomic SQLite transaction.
//
// Security: The entire re-encryption happens in memory first; the database is
// only updated once all ciphertext has been produced successfully. The new
// salt replaces the old salt atomically within the same transaction so the
// database is never left in a mixed state. Both the old and new master keys
// are zeroed in deferred cleanup. No secret material is logged or printed.
func (t *tool) runRekey(_ []string) {
// ── 1. Decrypt signing key under old master key ──────────────────────
sigKeyEnc, sigKeyNonce, err := t.db.ReadServerConfig()
if err != nil {
fatalf("read server config: %v", err)
}
sigKeyPEM, err := crypto.OpenAESGCM(t.masterKey, sigKeyNonce, sigKeyEnc)
if err != nil {
fatalf("decrypt signing key: %v", err)
}
// ── 2. Decrypt all TOTP secrets under old master key ─────────────────
totpAccounts, err := t.db.ListAccountsWithTOTP()
if err != nil {
fatalf("list accounts with TOTP: %v", err)
}
type totpPlain struct {
secret []byte
accountID int64
}
totpPlaintexts := make([]totpPlain, 0, len(totpAccounts))
for _, a := range totpAccounts {
pt, err := crypto.OpenAESGCM(t.masterKey, a.TOTPSecretNonce, a.TOTPSecretEnc)
if err != nil {
fatalf("decrypt TOTP secret for account %s: %v", a.Username, err)
}
totpPlaintexts = append(totpPlaintexts, totpPlain{accountID: a.ID, secret: pt})
}
// ── 3. Decrypt all pg_credentials passwords under old master key ──────
pgCreds, err := t.db.ListAllPGCredentials()
if err != nil {
fatalf("list pg credentials: %v", err)
}
type pgPlain struct {
password []byte
credID int64
}
pgPlaintexts := make([]pgPlain, 0, len(pgCreds))
for _, c := range pgCreds {
pt, err := crypto.OpenAESGCM(t.masterKey, c.PGPasswordNonce, c.PGPasswordEnc)
if err != nil {
fatalf("decrypt pg password for credential %d: %v", c.ID, err)
}
pgPlaintexts = append(pgPlaintexts, pgPlain{credID: c.ID, password: pt})
}
// ── 4. Prompt for new passphrase (confirmed) ──────────────────────────
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "Enter new master passphrase (will not echo):")
newPassphrase, err := readPassword("New passphrase: ")
if err != nil {
fatalf("read passphrase: %v", err)
}
if newPassphrase == "" {
fatalf("passphrase must not be empty")
}
confirm, err := readPassword("Confirm passphrase: ")
if err != nil {
fatalf("read passphrase confirmation: %v", err)
}
if newPassphrase != confirm {
fatalf("passphrases do not match")
}
// ── 5. Derive new master key ──────────────────────────────────────────
// Security: a fresh random salt is generated for every rekey so that the
// new key is independent of the old key even if the same passphrase is
// reused. The new salt is stored atomically with the re-encrypted secrets.
newSalt, err := crypto.NewSalt()
if err != nil {
fatalf("generate new salt: %v", err)
}
newKey, err := crypto.DeriveKey(newPassphrase, newSalt)
if err != nil {
fatalf("derive new master key: %v", err)
}
// Zero both keys when done, regardless of outcome.
defer func() {
for i := range newKey {
newKey[i] = 0
}
}()
// ── 6. Re-encrypt signing key ─────────────────────────────────────────
newSigKeyEnc, newSigKeyNonce, err := crypto.SealAESGCM(newKey, sigKeyPEM)
if err != nil {
fatalf("re-encrypt signing key: %v", err)
}
// ── 7. Re-encrypt TOTP secrets ────────────────────────────────────────
totpRows := make([]db.TOTPRekeyRow, 0, len(totpPlaintexts))
for _, tp := range totpPlaintexts {
enc, nonce, err := crypto.SealAESGCM(newKey, tp.secret)
if err != nil {
fatalf("re-encrypt TOTP secret for account %d: %v", tp.accountID, err)
}
totpRows = append(totpRows, db.TOTPRekeyRow{
AccountID: tp.accountID,
Enc: enc,
Nonce: nonce,
})
}
// ── 8. Re-encrypt pg_credentials passwords ────────────────────────────
pgRows := make([]db.PGRekeyRow, 0, len(pgPlaintexts))
for _, pp := range pgPlaintexts {
enc, nonce, err := crypto.SealAESGCM(newKey, pp.password)
if err != nil {
fatalf("re-encrypt pg password for credential %d: %v", pp.credID, err)
}
pgRows = append(pgRows, db.PGRekeyRow{
CredentialID: pp.credID,
Enc: enc,
Nonce: nonce,
})
}
// ── 9. Atomic commit ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
if err := t.db.Rekey(newSalt, newSigKeyEnc, newSigKeyNonce, totpRows, pgRows); err != nil {
fatalf("rekey database: %v", err)
}
if err := t.db.WriteAuditEvent("master_key_rekeyed", nil, nil, "", `{"actor":"mciasdb"}`); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: write audit event: %v\n", err)
}
fmt.Printf("Rekey complete: %d TOTP secrets and %d pg credentials re-encrypted.\n",
len(totpRows), len(pgRows))
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "Update your mcias.toml or passphrase environment variable to use the new passphrase.")
}