kyle
099b94979c
Block 6to4/Teredo/NAT64-local/site-local/benchmarking/reserved ranges from the IANA registries (families, not decoded embeds). Guard.DenyPrefixes / -deny-prefix covers hairpin WAN /32s; home addresses stay on-box, not in git. Control is tcp/tcp4/tcp6 only.
408 lines
11 KiB
Go
408 lines
11 KiB
Go
// Package guard is the SSRF control plane for sift's outbound fetches.
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//
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// Threat model: the URL is attacker-influenced (prompt-injected pages tell
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// agents to fetch things). Sift runs inside the tailnet, so without these
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// checks it is an SSRF gadget into Honcho, Dixie, Mattermost, orion itself,
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// and the LAN.
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//
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// Defence is two-layered and both layers must fire:
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//
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// 1. Pre-check: parse the URL, require http(s) / no userinfo / port 80 or 443,
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// resolve every A/AAAA, and reject the URL if *any* record is blocked.
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// 2. Dial-time: net.Dialer.Control sees the literal IP about to be connect()ed
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// (including Happy Eyeballs races and a rebinding answer that arrived after
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// the pre-check) and applies the same address predicate.
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//
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// Redirects are followed manually (max 5); each hop re-runs the pre-check.
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// There is no proxy, including from the environment.
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package guard
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"net/netip"
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"net/url"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"syscall"
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"time"
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)
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const maxRedirects = 5
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// LookupIP resolves a hostname to addresses. Tests inject this.
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type LookupIP func(ctx context.Context, host string) ([]netip.Addr, error)
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// Guard holds the SSRF policy. A zero Guard is ready to use.
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type Guard struct {
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LookupIP LookupIP
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// DenyPrefixes are extra CIDRs blocked at pre-check and at Control
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// (home WAN /32s that hairpin through the router into LAN services).
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// Set from config deny_prefixes / -deny-prefix; never from the URL.
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DenyPrefixes []netip.Prefix
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}
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func (g *Guard) lookup(ctx context.Context, host string) ([]netip.Addr, error) {
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if g.LookupIP != nil {
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return g.LookupIP(ctx, host)
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}
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return net.DefaultResolver.LookupNetIP(ctx, "ip", host)
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}
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// BlockedError is returned for every policy rejection. Error() is stable
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// ("blocked: …") so the HTTP layer can put it in Firecrawl-shaped responses
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// without agents retrying.
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type BlockedError struct {
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Reason string
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Addr netip.Addr
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Port string
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}
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func (e *BlockedError) Error() string {
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if e.Addr.IsValid() {
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return fmt.Sprintf("blocked: %s %s", e.Reason, e.Addr)
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}
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if e.Port != "" {
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return fmt.Sprintf("blocked: %s %s", e.Reason, e.Port)
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}
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return "blocked: " + e.Reason
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}
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func blocked(reason string) error {
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return &BlockedError{Reason: reason}
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}
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func blockedAddr(reason string, addr netip.Addr) error {
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return &BlockedError{Reason: reason, Addr: addr}
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}
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func blockedPort(port string) error {
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return &BlockedError{Reason: "port", Port: port}
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}
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// ParseURL validates scheme, userinfo, host, and port. It does not resolve.
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// Hostnames are returned as ASCII (non-ASCII IDN is rejected in P0: fail closed,
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// punycode required). IP literals include inet_aton-style decimal/octal/hex
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// forms so those never reach DNS.
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func ParseURL(raw string) (*url.URL, netip.Addr, error) {
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if raw == "" {
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return nil, netip.Addr{}, blocked("empty url")
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}
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u, err := url.Parse(raw)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, netip.Addr{}, blocked("invalid url")
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}
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if u.Scheme != "http" && u.Scheme != "https" {
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return nil, netip.Addr{}, blocked("scheme " + u.Scheme)
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}
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if u.User != nil {
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return nil, netip.Addr{}, blocked("userinfo")
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}
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host := u.Hostname()
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if host == "" {
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return nil, netip.Addr{}, blocked("missing host")
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}
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port := u.Port()
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if port == "" {
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if u.Scheme == "https" {
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port = "443"
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} else {
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port = "80"
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}
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}
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if err := checkPort(port); err != nil {
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return nil, netip.Addr{}, err
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}
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if addr, ok := parseIPLiteral(host); ok {
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return u, addr, nil
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}
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if err := checkASCIIHost(host); err != nil {
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return nil, netip.Addr{}, err
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}
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return u, netip.Addr{}, nil
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}
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func checkPort(port string) error {
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n, err := strconv.Atoi(port)
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if err != nil || n < 1 || n > 65535 {
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return blockedPort(port)
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}
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if n != 80 && n != 443 {
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return blockedPort(port)
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}
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return nil
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}
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func checkASCIIHost(host string) error {
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for _, r := range host {
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if r > 127 {
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return blocked("non-ascii host (punycode required)")
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}
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if r < 0x20 || strings.ContainsRune(" /\\", r) {
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return blocked("invalid host")
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}
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}
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if strings.Contains(host, "..") {
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return blocked("invalid host")
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}
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return nil
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}
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// parseIPLiteral accepts canonical IPs plus inet_aton-style IPv4 (decimal,
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// octal, hex, 1–4 dotted parts) and IPv4-mapped / zone-id IPv6.
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func parseIPLiteral(host string) (netip.Addr, bool) {
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if addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(host); err == nil {
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return addr, true
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}
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if addr, ok := parseIPv4AtOn(host); ok {
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return addr, true
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}
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return netip.Addr{}, false
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}
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func parseIPv4AtOn(s string) (netip.Addr, bool) {
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parts := strings.Split(s, ".")
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if len(parts) < 1 || len(parts) > 4 {
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return netip.Addr{}, false
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}
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nums := make([]uint64, len(parts))
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for i, p := range parts {
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n, ok := parseIPv4Part(p)
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if !ok {
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return netip.Addr{}, false
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}
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nums[i] = n
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}
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var b [4]byte
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switch len(nums) {
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case 1:
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if nums[0] > 0xffffffff {
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return netip.Addr{}, false
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}
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b[0] = byte(nums[0] >> 24)
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b[1] = byte(nums[0] >> 16)
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b[2] = byte(nums[0] >> 8)
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b[3] = byte(nums[0])
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case 2:
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if nums[0] > 0xff || nums[1] > 0xffffff {
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return netip.Addr{}, false
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}
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b[0] = byte(nums[0])
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b[1] = byte(nums[1] >> 16)
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b[2] = byte(nums[1] >> 8)
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b[3] = byte(nums[1])
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case 3:
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if nums[0] > 0xff || nums[1] > 0xff || nums[2] > 0xffff {
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return netip.Addr{}, false
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}
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b[0] = byte(nums[0])
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b[1] = byte(nums[1])
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b[2] = byte(nums[2] >> 8)
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b[3] = byte(nums[2])
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case 4:
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for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
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if nums[i] > 0xff {
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return netip.Addr{}, false
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}
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b[i] = byte(nums[i])
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}
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}
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return netip.AddrFrom4(b), true
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}
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func parseIPv4Part(s string) (uint64, bool) {
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if s == "" {
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return 0, false
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}
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switch {
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case len(s) > 2 && (s[0] == '0' && (s[1] == 'x' || s[1] == 'X')):
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n, err := strconv.ParseUint(s[2:], 16, 32)
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return n, err == nil
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case len(s) > 1 && s[0] == '0':
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n, err := strconv.ParseUint(s, 8, 32)
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return n, err == nil
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default:
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n, err := strconv.ParseUint(s, 10, 32)
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return n, err == nil
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}
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}
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// CheckAddr is the default (no extra prefixes) address predicate.
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func CheckAddr(addr netip.Addr) error {
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var g Guard
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return g.CheckAddr(addr)
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}
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// CheckAddr is the address predicate applied to every resolved record and to
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// the literal IP in Dialer.Control. Extra DenyPrefixes are checked first.
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func (g *Guard) CheckAddr(addr netip.Addr) error {
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if !addr.IsValid() {
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return blocked("invalid address")
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}
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addr = addr.Unmap()
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if g != nil {
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for _, p := range g.DenyPrefixes {
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if p.Contains(addr) {
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return blockedAddr("denied prefix", addr)
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}
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}
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}
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switch {
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case addr.IsUnspecified():
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return blockedAddr("unspecified address", addr)
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case addr.IsLoopback():
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return blockedAddr("loopback address", addr)
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case addr.IsPrivate():
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return blockedAddr("private address", addr)
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case addr.IsMulticast(), addr.IsInterfaceLocalMulticast(), addr.IsLinkLocalMulticast():
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return blockedAddr("multicast address", addr)
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case addr.IsLinkLocalUnicast():
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return blockedAddr("link-local address", addr)
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}
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if err := checkIANA(addr); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if v4, ok := ipv4Compatible(addr); ok {
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return g.CheckAddr(v4)
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}
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if !addr.IsGlobalUnicast() {
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return blockedAddr("non-global address", addr)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// ipv4Compatible reports deprecated IPv4-compatible IPv6 (::/96). Unspecified
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// and loopback are handled before this is called. IPv4-mapped addresses are
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// Unmap'd first.
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func ipv4Compatible(addr netip.Addr) (netip.Addr, bool) {
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if !addr.Is6() || addr.Is4In6() {
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return netip.Addr{}, false
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}
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a := addr.As16()
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for i := 0; i < 12; i++ {
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if a[i] != 0 {
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return netip.Addr{}, false
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}
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}
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v4 := netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{a[12], a[13], a[14], a[15]})
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if !v4.IsValid() || v4.IsUnspecified() {
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return netip.Addr{}, false
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}
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return v4, true
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}
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// CheckURL parses, and if the host is a name, resolves every record. Any
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// blocked address fails the whole URL (mixed-record trick).
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func (g *Guard) CheckURL(ctx context.Context, raw string) (*url.URL, []netip.Addr, error) {
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u, literal, err := ParseURL(raw)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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if literal.IsValid() {
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if err := g.CheckAddr(literal); err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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return u, []netip.Addr{literal}, nil
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}
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addrs, err := g.lookup(ctx, u.Hostname())
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("blocked: resolve %s: %w", u.Hostname(), err)
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}
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if len(addrs) == 0 {
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return nil, nil, blocked("no addresses for " + u.Hostname())
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}
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for _, a := range addrs {
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if err := g.CheckAddr(a); err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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}
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return u, addrs, nil
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}
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// Control is a net.Dialer Control / ControlContext hook. address is the
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// remote IP:port about to be connect()ed.
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func (g *Guard) Control(network, address string, _ syscall.RawConn) error {
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switch network {
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case "tcp", "tcp4", "tcp6":
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default:
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return blocked("network " + network)
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}
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host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(address)
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if err != nil {
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return blocked("dial address " + address)
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}
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if err := checkPort(port); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(host)
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if err != nil {
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return blocked("dial address not an IP " + host)
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}
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return g.CheckAddr(addr)
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}
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// ControlContext is the context-aware form; policy does not use ctx today.
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func (g *Guard) ControlContext(_ context.Context, network, address string, c syscall.RawConn) error {
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return g.Control(network, address, c)
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}
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// CheckRedirect is an http.Client CheckRedirect hook. Max 5 hops; every hop
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// is re-validated (parse + resolve + address predicate).
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func (g *Guard) CheckRedirect(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
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if len(via) >= maxRedirects {
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return blocked("too many redirects")
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}
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if req.URL == nil {
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return blocked("redirect missing url")
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}
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_, _, err := g.CheckURL(req.Context(), req.URL.String())
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return err
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}
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// Dialer returns a net.Dialer whose Control hook is the address predicate.
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// Connect timeout is 5s as specified in the plan.
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func (g *Guard) Dialer() *net.Dialer {
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return &net.Dialer{
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Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
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Control: g.Control,
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ControlContext: g.ControlContext,
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}
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}
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// Transport is an HTTP transport with no proxy, the guarded dialer, and a
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// 20s overall request timeout left to the caller via context. Body size caps
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// land in P1.
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func (g *Guard) Transport() *http.Transport {
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d := g.Dialer()
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return &http.Transport{
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Proxy: nil, // never ProxyFromEnvironment
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DialContext: d.DialContext,
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ForceAttemptHTTP2: true,
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MaxIdleConns: 8,
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IdleConnTimeout: 30 * time.Second,
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TLSHandshakeTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
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ExpectContinueTimeout: 1 * time.Second,
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// Go gunzips transparently when this is false. P1 size caps MUST
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// apply to the decompressed resp.Body (io.LimitReader on the body
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// the client returns); that also covers zip-bombs.
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DisableCompression: false,
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}
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}
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// Client returns an http.Client that refuses blocked URLs on redirect.
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// Callers must still CheckURL the initial URL; Client.CheckRedirect covers hops.
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func (g *Guard) Client() *http.Client {
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return &http.Client{
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Transport: g.Transport(),
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CheckRedirect: g.CheckRedirect,
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Timeout: 20 * time.Second,
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}
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}
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