5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
b2b52c05c3 Add cert command for Metacrypt TLS provisioning
Checks the configured TLS certificate: provisions a new one if missing,
renews if expiring within 7 days, otherwise reports remaining validity.
Calls the Metacrypt CA API directly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 18:42:39 -07:00
07b0744c78 Clean up Dockerfile for rootless podman compatibility
Remove USER, VOLUME, and user creation — rootless podman runs as the
host user and bind-mounts /srv/mcns directly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 15:55:03 -07:00
871b1fb8f4 Add record-level authorization for system accounts
Record mutations (create, update, delete) no longer require admin role.
Authorization rules:
  - admin: full access (unchanged)
  - system mcp-agent: create/delete any record
  - system account α: create/delete records named α only
  - human users: read-only (unchanged)

Zone mutations remain admin-only. Both REST and gRPC paths enforce the
same rules. Update checks authorization against both old and new names.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 15:52:43 -07:00
baa058d4a4 Standardize Makefile docker/push targets for MCR
Add MCR and VERSION variables. Tag images with full MCR registry URL
and version. Add push target that builds then pushes to MCR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 14:32:01 -07:00
363c680530 Regenerate proto files for mc/ module path
Raw descriptor bytes in .pb.go files were corrupted by the sed-based
module path rename (string length changed, breaking protobuf binary
encoding). Regenerated with protoc to fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 02:54:35 -07:00
15 changed files with 355 additions and 41 deletions

View File

@@ -13,26 +13,14 @@ RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -trimpath -ldflags="-s -w -X main.version=${VERSION}"
FROM alpine:3.21
RUN apk add --no-cache ca-certificates tzdata \
&& addgroup -S mcns \
&& adduser -S -G mcns -h /srv/mcns -s /sbin/nologin mcns \
&& mkdir -p /srv/mcns && chown mcns:mcns /srv/mcns
RUN apk add --no-cache ca-certificates tzdata
COPY --from=builder /build/mcns /usr/local/bin/mcns
# /srv/mcns is the single volume mount point.
# It must contain:
# mcns.toml — configuration file
# certs/ — TLS certificate and key
# mcns.db — created automatically on first run
VOLUME /srv/mcns
WORKDIR /srv/mcns
EXPOSE 53/udp 53/tcp
EXPOSE 8443
EXPOSE 9443
USER mcns
ENTRYPOINT ["mcns"]
CMD ["server", "--config", "/srv/mcns/mcns.toml"]

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
.PHONY: build test vet lint proto proto-lint clean docker all devserver
.PHONY: build test vet lint proto proto-lint clean docker push all devserver
LDFLAGS := -trimpath -ldflags="-s -w -X main.version=$(shell git describe --tags --always --dirty)"
MCR := mcr.svc.mcp.metacircular.net:8443
VERSION := $(shell git describe --tags --always --dirty)
LDFLAGS := -trimpath -ldflags="-s -w -X main.version=$(VERSION)"
mcns:
CGO_ENABLED=0 go build $(LDFLAGS) -o mcns ./cmd/mcns
@@ -30,7 +32,10 @@ clean:
rm -f mcns
docker:
docker build --build-arg VERSION=$(shell git describe --tags --always --dirty) -t mcns -f Dockerfile .
docker build --build-arg VERSION=$(VERSION) -t $(MCR)/mcns:$(VERSION) -f Dockerfile .
push: docker
docker push $(MCR)/mcns:$(VERSION)
devserver: mcns
@mkdir -p srv

221
cmd/mcns/cert.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
package main
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/json"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"os"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"git.wntrmute.dev/mc/mcns/internal/config"
)
func certCmd() *cobra.Command {
var (
configPath string
serverURL string
caCert string
tokenPath string
mount string
issuer string
hostnames []string
)
cmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "cert",
Short: "Ensure a valid TLS certificate from Metacrypt",
Long: `Check the TLS certificate referenced in the config file.
If the certificate does not exist, provision a new one from Metacrypt.
If it exists but expires within 7 days, renew it.
Otherwise, report that the certificate is still valid.`,
RunE: func(_ *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
cfg, err := config.Load(configPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err)
}
if serverURL == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("--server is required")
}
if tokenPath == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("--token is required")
}
if len(hostnames) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("--hostname is required")
}
// Check existing certificate.
remaining, ok := certTimeRemaining(cfg.Server.TLSCert)
if ok && remaining > 7*24*time.Hour {
fmt.Printf("Certificate valid for %s, no action needed\n", remaining.Round(time.Hour))
return nil
}
if ok {
fmt.Printf("Certificate expires in %s, renewing\n", remaining.Round(time.Hour))
} else {
fmt.Println("No valid certificate found, provisioning")
}
token, err := os.ReadFile(tokenPath) //nolint:gosec // operator-supplied path
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("read token: %w", err)
}
httpClient, err := metacryptClient(caCert)
if err != nil {
return err
}
certPEM, keyPEM, err := issueCert(httpClient, strings.TrimRight(serverURL, "/"), strings.TrimSpace(string(token)), mount, issuer, hostnames)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if err := atomicWrite(cfg.Server.TLSCert, []byte(certPEM), 0644); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write cert: %w", err)
}
if err := atomicWrite(cfg.Server.TLSKey, []byte(keyPEM), 0600); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write key: %w", err)
}
fmt.Printf("Certificate written to %s\n", cfg.Server.TLSCert)
fmt.Printf("Key written to %s\n", cfg.Server.TLSKey)
return nil
},
}
cmd.Flags().StringVarP(&configPath, "config", "c", "mcns.toml", "path to configuration file")
cmd.Flags().StringVar(&serverURL, "server", "", "Metacrypt server URL")
cmd.Flags().StringVar(&caCert, "ca-cert", "", "CA certificate for Metacrypt TLS")
cmd.Flags().StringVar(&tokenPath, "token", "", "path to MCIAS token file")
cmd.Flags().StringVar(&mount, "mount", "pki", "CA engine mount name")
cmd.Flags().StringVar(&issuer, "issuer", "infra", "CA issuer name")
cmd.Flags().StringSliceVar(&hostnames, "hostname", nil, "SAN hostnames (repeatable, first is CN)")
return cmd
}
func issueCert(client *http.Client, serverURL, token, mount, issuer string, hostnames []string) (chainPEM, keyPEM string, err error) {
reqBody := map[string]any{
"mount": mount,
"operation": "issue",
"data": map[string]any{
"issuer": issuer,
"common_name": hostnames[0],
"dns_names": hostnames,
"profile": "server",
"ttl": "2160h",
},
}
body, err := json.Marshal(reqBody)
if err != nil {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("marshal request: %w", err)
}
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, serverURL+"/v1/engine/request", bytes.NewReader(body))
if err != nil {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("create request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("issue cert: %w", err)
}
defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
respBody, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("read response: %w", err)
}
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("metacrypt returned %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, string(respBody))
}
var result struct {
ChainPEM string `json:"chain_pem"`
KeyPEM string `json:"key_pem"`
Serial string `json:"serial"`
ExpiresAt string `json:"expires_at"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(respBody, &result); err != nil {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("parse response: %w", err)
}
if result.ChainPEM == "" || result.KeyPEM == "" {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("response missing chain_pem or key_pem")
}
fmt.Printf("Issued certificate serial=%s expires=%s\n", result.Serial, result.ExpiresAt)
return result.ChainPEM, result.KeyPEM, nil
}
func metacryptClient(caCertPath string) (*http.Client, error) {
tlsCfg := &tls.Config{MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS13}
if caCertPath != "" {
pemData, err := os.ReadFile(caCertPath) //nolint:gosec // operator-supplied path
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read CA cert: %w", err)
}
pool := x509.NewCertPool()
if !pool.AppendCertsFromPEM(pemData) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no valid certificates in %s", caCertPath)
}
tlsCfg.RootCAs = pool
}
return &http.Client{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
Transport: &http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: tlsCfg},
}, nil
}
// certTimeRemaining returns the time until the leaf certificate at
// path expires. Returns (0, false) if the cert cannot be read or parsed.
func certTimeRemaining(path string) (time.Duration, bool) {
data, err := os.ReadFile(path) //nolint:gosec // operator-supplied path
if err != nil {
return 0, false
}
block, _ := pem.Decode(data)
if block == nil {
return 0, false
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return 0, false
}
remaining := time.Until(cert.NotAfter)
if remaining <= 0 {
return 0, true // expired
}
return remaining, true
}
func atomicWrite(path string, data []byte, perm os.FileMode) error {
tmp := path + ".tmp"
if err := os.WriteFile(tmp, data, perm); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write %s: %w", tmp, err)
}
if err := os.Rename(tmp, path); err != nil {
_ = os.Remove(tmp)
return fmt.Errorf("rename %s -> %s: %w", tmp, path, err)
}
return nil
}

View File

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ func main() {
root.AddCommand(serverCmd())
root.AddCommand(statusCmd())
root.AddCommand(snapshotCmd())
root.AddCommand(certCmd())
if err := root.Execute(); err != nil {
os.Exit(1)

View File

@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ const file_proto_mcns_v1_admin_proto_rawDesc = "" +
"\x0eHealthResponse\x12\x16\n" +
"\x06status\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x06status2I\n" +
"\fAdminService\x129\n" +
"\x06Health\x12\x16.mcns.v1.HealthRequest\x1a\x17.mcns.v1.HealthResponseB/Z-git.wntrmute.dev/mc/mcns/gen/mcns/v1;mcnsv1b\x06proto3"
"\x06Health\x12\x16.mcns.v1.HealthRequest\x1a\x17.mcns.v1.HealthResponseB-Z+git.wntrmute.dev/mc/mcns/gen/mcns/v1;mcnsv1b\x06proto3"
var (
file_proto_mcns_v1_admin_proto_rawDescOnce sync.Once

View File

@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ const file_proto_mcns_v1_auth_proto_rawDesc = "" +
"\x0eLogoutResponse2\x80\x01\n" +
"\vAuthService\x126\n" +
"\x05Login\x12\x15.mcns.v1.LoginRequest\x1a\x16.mcns.v1.LoginResponse\x129\n" +
"\x06Logout\x12\x16.mcns.v1.LogoutRequest\x1a\x17.mcns.v1.LogoutResponseB/Z-git.wntrmute.dev/mc/mcns/gen/mcns/v1;mcnsv1b\x06proto3"
"\x06Logout\x12\x16.mcns.v1.LogoutRequest\x1a\x17.mcns.v1.LogoutResponseB-Z+git.wntrmute.dev/mc/mcns/gen/mcns/v1;mcnsv1b\x06proto3"
var (
file_proto_mcns_v1_auth_proto_rawDescOnce sync.Once

View File

@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ const file_proto_mcns_v1_record_proto_rawDesc = "" +
"\fCreateRecord\x12\x1c.mcns.v1.CreateRecordRequest\x1a\x0f.mcns.v1.Record\x127\n" +
"\tGetRecord\x12\x19.mcns.v1.GetRecordRequest\x1a\x0f.mcns.v1.Record\x12=\n" +
"\fUpdateRecord\x12\x1c.mcns.v1.UpdateRecordRequest\x1a\x0f.mcns.v1.Record\x12K\n" +
"\fDeleteRecord\x12\x1c.mcns.v1.DeleteRecordRequest\x1a\x1d.mcns.v1.DeleteRecordResponseB/Z-git.wntrmute.dev/mc/mcns/gen/mcns/v1;mcnsv1b\x06proto3"
"\fDeleteRecord\x12\x1c.mcns.v1.DeleteRecordRequest\x1a\x1d.mcns.v1.DeleteRecordResponseB-Z+git.wntrmute.dev/mc/mcns/gen/mcns/v1;mcnsv1b\x06proto3"
var (
file_proto_mcns_v1_record_proto_rawDescOnce sync.Once

View File

@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ const file_proto_mcns_v1_zone_proto_rawDesc = "" +
"\n" +
"UpdateZone\x12\x1a.mcns.v1.UpdateZoneRequest\x1a\r.mcns.v1.Zone\x12E\n" +
"\n" +
"DeleteZone\x12\x1a.mcns.v1.DeleteZoneRequest\x1a\x1b.mcns.v1.DeleteZoneResponseB/Z-git.wntrmute.dev/mc/mcns/gen/mcns/v1;mcnsv1b\x06proto3"
"DeleteZone\x12\x1a.mcns.v1.DeleteZoneRequest\x1a\x1b.mcns.v1.DeleteZoneResponseB-Z+git.wntrmute.dev/mc/mcns/gen/mcns/v1;mcnsv1b\x06proto3"
var (
file_proto_mcns_v1_zone_proto_rawDescOnce sync.Once

View File

@@ -769,6 +769,9 @@ func TestMethodMapCompleteness(t *testing.T) {
"/mcns.v1.ZoneService/GetZone",
"/mcns.v1.RecordService/ListRecords",
"/mcns.v1.RecordService/GetRecord",
"/mcns.v1.RecordService/CreateRecord",
"/mcns.v1.RecordService/UpdateRecord",
"/mcns.v1.RecordService/DeleteRecord",
}
for _, method := range expectedAuth {
if !mm.AuthRequired[method] {
@@ -783,9 +786,6 @@ func TestMethodMapCompleteness(t *testing.T) {
"/mcns.v1.ZoneService/CreateZone",
"/mcns.v1.ZoneService/UpdateZone",
"/mcns.v1.ZoneService/DeleteZone",
"/mcns.v1.RecordService/CreateRecord",
"/mcns.v1.RecordService/UpdateRecord",
"/mcns.v1.RecordService/DeleteRecord",
}
for _, method := range expectedAdmin {
if !mm.AdminRequired[method] {

View File

@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ func authRequiredMethods() map[string]bool {
"/mcns.v1.ZoneService/GetZone": true,
"/mcns.v1.RecordService/ListRecords": true,
"/mcns.v1.RecordService/GetRecord": true,
"/mcns.v1.RecordService/CreateRecord": true,
"/mcns.v1.RecordService/UpdateRecord": true,
"/mcns.v1.RecordService/DeleteRecord": true,
}
}
@@ -38,8 +41,5 @@ func adminRequiredMethods() map[string]bool {
"/mcns.v1.ZoneService/CreateZone": true,
"/mcns.v1.ZoneService/UpdateZone": true,
"/mcns.v1.ZoneService/DeleteZone": true,
"/mcns.v1.RecordService/CreateRecord": true,
"/mcns.v1.RecordService/UpdateRecord": true,
"/mcns.v1.RecordService/DeleteRecord": true,
}
}

View File

@@ -10,10 +10,36 @@ import (
"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb"
mcdslauth "git.wntrmute.dev/mc/mcdsl/auth"
mcdslgrpc "git.wntrmute.dev/mc/mcdsl/grpcserver"
pb "git.wntrmute.dev/mc/mcns/gen/mcns/v1"
"git.wntrmute.dev/mc/mcns/internal/db"
)
// authorizeRecordMutation checks whether the caller may create, update,
// or delete a DNS record with the given name. The rules are:
//
// - admin role: always allowed
// - system account "mcp-agent": allowed for any record name
// - system account α: allowed only when recordName == α
// - all others: denied
func authorizeRecordMutation(info *mcdslauth.TokenInfo, recordName string) bool {
if info == nil {
return false
}
if info.IsAdmin {
return true
}
if info.AccountType != "system" {
return false
}
if info.Username == "mcp-agent" {
return true
}
return recordName == info.Username
}
type recordService struct {
pb.UnimplementedRecordServiceServer
db *db.DB
@@ -55,7 +81,7 @@ func (s *recordService) GetRecord(_ context.Context, req *pb.GetRecordRequest) (
return s.recordToProto(*record), nil
}
func (s *recordService) CreateRecord(_ context.Context, req *pb.CreateRecordRequest) (*pb.Record, error) {
func (s *recordService) CreateRecord(ctx context.Context, req *pb.CreateRecordRequest) (*pb.Record, error) {
if req.Zone == "" {
return nil, status.Error(codes.InvalidArgument, "zone is required")
}
@@ -69,6 +95,10 @@ func (s *recordService) CreateRecord(_ context.Context, req *pb.CreateRecordRequ
return nil, status.Error(codes.InvalidArgument, "value is required")
}
if !authorizeRecordMutation(mcdslgrpc.TokenInfoFromContext(ctx), req.Name) {
return nil, status.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, "not authorized for record name")
}
record, err := s.db.CreateRecord(req.Zone, req.Name, req.Type, req.Value, int(req.Ttl))
if errors.Is(err, db.ErrNotFound) {
return nil, status.Error(codes.NotFound, "zone not found")
@@ -82,7 +112,7 @@ func (s *recordService) CreateRecord(_ context.Context, req *pb.CreateRecordRequ
return s.recordToProto(*record), nil
}
func (s *recordService) UpdateRecord(_ context.Context, req *pb.UpdateRecordRequest) (*pb.Record, error) {
func (s *recordService) UpdateRecord(ctx context.Context, req *pb.UpdateRecordRequest) (*pb.Record, error) {
if req.Id <= 0 {
return nil, status.Error(codes.InvalidArgument, "id must be positive")
}
@@ -96,6 +126,15 @@ func (s *recordService) UpdateRecord(_ context.Context, req *pb.UpdateRecordRequ
return nil, status.Error(codes.InvalidArgument, "value is required")
}
info := mcdslgrpc.TokenInfoFromContext(ctx)
existing, lookupErr := s.db.GetRecord(req.Id)
if lookupErr == nil && !authorizeRecordMutation(info, existing.Name) {
return nil, status.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, "not authorized for record name")
}
if !authorizeRecordMutation(info, req.Name) {
return nil, status.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, "not authorized for record name")
}
record, err := s.db.UpdateRecord(req.Id, req.Name, req.Type, req.Value, int(req.Ttl))
if errors.Is(err, db.ErrNotFound) {
return nil, status.Error(codes.NotFound, "record not found")
@@ -109,11 +148,16 @@ func (s *recordService) UpdateRecord(_ context.Context, req *pb.UpdateRecordRequ
return s.recordToProto(*record), nil
}
func (s *recordService) DeleteRecord(_ context.Context, req *pb.DeleteRecordRequest) (*pb.DeleteRecordResponse, error) {
func (s *recordService) DeleteRecord(ctx context.Context, req *pb.DeleteRecordRequest) (*pb.DeleteRecordResponse, error) {
if req.Id <= 0 {
return nil, status.Error(codes.InvalidArgument, "id must be positive")
}
existing, lookupErr := s.db.GetRecord(req.Id)
if lookupErr == nil && !authorizeRecordMutation(mcdslgrpc.TokenInfoFromContext(ctx), existing.Name) {
return nil, status.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, "not authorized for record name")
}
err := s.db.DeleteRecord(req.Id)
if errors.Is(err, db.ErrNotFound) {
return nil, status.Error(codes.NotFound, "record not found")

View File

@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ func createTestZone(t *testing.T, database *db.DB) *db.Zone {
}
// newChiRequest builds a request with chi URL params injected into the context.
// An admin TokenInfo is added so that handler-level authorization passes.
func newChiRequest(method, target string, body string, params map[string]string) *http.Request {
var r *http.Request
if body != "" {
@@ -51,14 +52,21 @@ func newChiRequest(method, target string, body string, params map[string]string)
}
r.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
ctx := r.Context()
if len(params) > 0 {
rctx := chi.NewRouteContext()
for k, v := range params {
rctx.URLParams.Add(k, v)
}
r = r.WithContext(context.WithValue(r.Context(), chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx))
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, chi.RouteCtxKey, rctx)
}
return r
// Inject admin TokenInfo for handler-level authorization.
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, tokenInfoKey, &mcdslauth.TokenInfo{
Username: "testadmin",
IsAdmin: true,
})
return r.WithContext(ctx)
}
// decodeJSON decodes the response body into v.

View File

@@ -48,6 +48,29 @@ func requireAdmin(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
})
}
// authorizeRecordMutation checks whether the caller may create, update,
// or delete a DNS record with the given name. The rules are:
//
// - admin role: always allowed
// - system account "mcp-agent": allowed for any record name
// - system account α: allowed only when recordName == α
// - all others: denied
func authorizeRecordMutation(info *mcdslauth.TokenInfo, recordName string) bool {
if info == nil {
return false
}
if info.IsAdmin {
return true
}
if info.AccountType != "system" {
return false
}
if info.Username == "mcp-agent" {
return true
}
return recordName == info.Username
}
// tokenInfoFromContext extracts the TokenInfo from the request context.
func tokenInfoFromContext(ctx context.Context) *mcdslauth.TokenInfo {
info, _ := ctx.Value(tokenInfoKey).(*mcdslauth.TokenInfo)

View File

@@ -86,6 +86,11 @@ func createRecordHandler(database *db.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
if !authorizeRecordMutation(tokenInfoFromContext(r.Context()), req.Name) {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "not authorized for record name")
return
}
record, err := database.CreateRecord(zoneName, req.Name, req.Type, req.Value, req.TTL)
if errors.Is(err, db.ErrNotFound) {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "zone not found")
@@ -132,6 +137,18 @@ func updateRecordHandler(database *db.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
// Authorize against both old and new record names.
info := tokenInfoFromContext(r.Context())
existing, lookupErr := database.GetRecord(id)
if lookupErr == nil && !authorizeRecordMutation(info, existing.Name) {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "not authorized for record name")
return
}
if !authorizeRecordMutation(info, req.Name) {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "not authorized for record name")
return
}
record, err := database.UpdateRecord(id, req.Name, req.Type, req.Value, req.TTL)
if errors.Is(err, db.ErrNotFound) {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "record not found")
@@ -159,6 +176,13 @@ func deleteRecordHandler(database *db.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
return
}
// Look up the record to authorize by name.
existing, lookupErr := database.GetRecord(id)
if lookupErr == nil && !authorizeRecordMutation(tokenInfoFromContext(r.Context()), existing.Name) {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "not authorized for record name")
return
}
err = database.DeleteRecord(id)
if errors.Is(err, db.ErrNotFound) {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "record not found")

View File

@@ -44,14 +44,14 @@ func NewRouter(deps Deps) *chi.Mux {
r.With(requireAdmin).Put("/v1/zones/{zone}", updateZoneHandler(deps.DB))
r.With(requireAdmin).Delete("/v1/zones/{zone}", deleteZoneHandler(deps.DB))
// Record endpoints — reads for all authenticated users, writes for admin.
// Record endpoints — reads for all authenticated users.
r.Get("/v1/zones/{zone}/records", listRecordsHandler(deps.DB))
r.Get("/v1/zones/{zone}/records/{id}", getRecordHandler(deps.DB))
// Admin-only record mutations.
r.With(requireAdmin).Post("/v1/zones/{zone}/records", createRecordHandler(deps.DB))
r.With(requireAdmin).Put("/v1/zones/{zone}/records/{id}", updateRecordHandler(deps.DB))
r.With(requireAdmin).Delete("/v1/zones/{zone}/records/{id}", deleteRecordHandler(deps.DB))
// Record mutations — admin, mcp-agent (any name), or system account (own name).
r.Post("/v1/zones/{zone}/records", createRecordHandler(deps.DB))
r.Put("/v1/zones/{zone}/records/{id}", updateRecordHandler(deps.DB))
r.Delete("/v1/zones/{zone}/records/{id}", deleteRecordHandler(deps.DB))
})
return r