Step 14: SSH key auth for gRPC.

Server: AuthInterceptor parses authorized_keys, extracts SSH signature from gRPC metadata (nonce + timestamp signed by client's SSH key), verifies against authorized public keys with 5-minute timestamp window. Client: SSHCredentials implements PerRPCCredentials, signs nonce+timestamp per request. LoadSigner resolves key from flag, ssh-agent, or default paths. 8 tests: valid auth, reject unauthenticated, reject unauthorized key, reject expired timestamp, metadata generation, plus 2 integration tests (authenticated succeeds, unauthenticated rejected). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-23 23:58:09 -07:00
parent 525c3f0b4f
commit 4b841cdd82
7 changed files with 621 additions and 6 deletions
--- a/PROGRESS.md
+++ b/PROGRESS.md
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ ARCHITECTURE.md for design details.

 ## Current Status

-**Phase:** Phase 2 in progress. Steps 9–13 complete, ready for Step 14.
+**Phase:** Phase 2 in progress. Steps 9–14 complete, ready for Step 15.

 **Last updated:** 2026-03-23

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Phase 2: gRPC Remote Sync.

 ## Up Next

-Step 14: SSH Key Auth.
+Step 15: CLI Wiring + Prune.

 ## Known Issues / Decisions Deferred

@@ -74,3 +74,4 @@ Step 14: SSH Key Auth.
 | 2026-03-23 | 12 | gRPC server: 5 RPC handlers (push/pull manifest+blobs, prune), bufconn tests, store.List. |
 | 2026-03-23 | 12b | Directory recursion in Add, mirror up/down commands, 7 tests. |
 | 2026-03-23 | 13 | Client library: Push, Pull, Prune with chunked blob streaming. 6 integration tests. |
+| 2026-03-23 | 14 | SSH key auth: server interceptor (authorized_keys, signature verification), client PerRPCCredentials (ssh-agent/key file). 8 tests including auth integration. |
--- a/PROJECT_PLAN.md
+++ b/PROJECT_PLAN.md
@@ -148,10 +148,11 @@ Depends on Step 12.

 ### Step 14: SSH Key Auth

- [ ] `server/auth.go`: AuthInterceptor, parse authorized_keys, verify SSH signatures
- [ ] `client/auth.go`: LoadSigner (ssh-agent or key file), PerRPCCredentials
- [ ] `server/auth_test.go`: in-memory ed25519 key pair, reject unauthenticated
- [ ] `client/auth_test.go`: metadata generation test
+- [x] `server/auth.go`: AuthInterceptor, parse authorized_keys, verify SSH signatures
+- [x] `client/auth.go`: LoadSigner (ssh-agent or key file), SSHCredentials (PerRPCCredentials)
+- [x] `server/auth_test.go`: valid key, reject unauthenticated, reject unauthorized key, reject expired timestamp
+- [x] `client/auth_test.go`: metadata generation, no-transport-security
+- [x] Integration tests: authenticated push/pull succeeds, unauthenticated is rejected

 ### Step 15: CLI Wiring + Prune

--- a/client/auth.go
+++ b/client/auth.go
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+package client
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+	"os"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
+)
+
+// SSHCredentials implements grpc.PerRPCCredentials using an SSH signer.
+type SSHCredentials struct {
+	signer ssh.Signer
+}
+
+// NewSSHCredentials creates credentials from an SSH signer.
+func NewSSHCredentials(signer ssh.Signer) *SSHCredentials {
+	return &SSHCredentials{signer: signer}
+}
+
+// GetRequestMetadata signs a nonce+timestamp and returns auth metadata.
+func (c *SSHCredentials) GetRequestMetadata(_ context.Context, _ ...string) (map[string]string, error) {
+	nonce := make([]byte, 32)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(nonce); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("generating nonce: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	tsUnix := time.Now().Unix()
+	payload := buildPayload(nonce, tsUnix)
+
+	sig, err := c.signer.Sign(rand.Reader, payload)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("signing payload: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	pubkey := c.signer.PublicKey()
+	pubkeyStr := strings.TrimSpace(string(ssh.MarshalAuthorizedKey(pubkey)))
+
+	return map[string]string{
+		"x-sgard-auth-nonce":     base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(nonce),
+		"x-sgard-auth-timestamp": strconv.FormatInt(tsUnix, 10),
+		"x-sgard-auth-signature": base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(ssh.Marshal(sig)),
+		"x-sgard-auth-pubkey":    pubkeyStr,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// RequireTransportSecurity returns false — auth is via SSH signatures,
+// not TLS. Transport security can be added separately.
+func (c *SSHCredentials) RequireTransportSecurity() bool {
+	return false
+}
+
+// Verify that SSHCredentials implements the interface.
+var _ credentials.PerRPCCredentials = (*SSHCredentials)(nil)
+
+// buildPayload constructs nonce || timestamp (big-endian int64).
+func buildPayload(nonce []byte, tsUnix int64) []byte {
+	payload := make([]byte, len(nonce)+8)
+	copy(payload, nonce)
+	for i := 7; i >= 0; i-- {
+		payload[len(nonce)+i] = byte(tsUnix & 0xff)
+		tsUnix >>= 8
+	}
+	return payload
+}
+
+// LoadSigner loads an SSH signer. Resolution order:
+// 1. keyPath (if non-empty)
+// 2. SSH agent (if SSH_AUTH_SOCK is set)
+// 3. Default key paths: ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+func LoadSigner(keyPath string) (ssh.Signer, error) {
+	if keyPath != "" {
+		return loadSignerFromFile(keyPath)
+	}
+
+	// Try ssh-agent.
+	if sock := os.Getenv("SSH_AUTH_SOCK"); sock != "" {
+		conn, err := net.Dial("unix", sock)
+		if err == nil {
+			ag := agent.NewClient(conn)
+			signers, err := ag.Signers()
+			if err == nil && len(signers) > 0 {
+				return signers[0], nil
+			}
+			_ = conn.Close()
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Try default key paths.
+	home, err := os.UserHomeDir()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("no SSH key found: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	for _, name := range []string{"id_ed25519", "id_rsa"} {
+		path := home + "/.ssh/" + name
+		signer, err := loadSignerFromFile(path)
+		if err == nil {
+			return signer, nil
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil, fmt.Errorf("no SSH key found (tried --ssh-key, agent, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.ssh/id_rsa)")
+}
+
+func loadSignerFromFile(path string) (ssh.Signer, error) {
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading key %s: %w", path, err)
+	}
+	signer, err := ssh.ParsePrivateKey(data)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing key %s: %w", path, err)
+	}
+	return signer, nil
+}
--- a/client/auth_test.go
+++ b/client/auth_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+package client
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"testing"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
+)
+
+func TestSSHCredentialsMetadata(t *testing.T) {
+	_, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generating key: %v", err)
+	}
+	signer, err := ssh.NewSignerFromKey(priv)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("creating signer: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	creds := NewSSHCredentials(signer)
+
+	md, err := creds.GetRequestMetadata(context.Background())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GetRequestMetadata: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Verify all required fields are present and non-empty.
+	for _, key := range []string{
+		"x-sgard-auth-nonce",
+		"x-sgard-auth-timestamp",
+		"x-sgard-auth-signature",
+		"x-sgard-auth-pubkey",
+	} {
+		val, ok := md[key]
+		if !ok || val == "" {
+			t.Errorf("missing or empty metadata key %s", key)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSSHCredentialsNoTransportSecurity(t *testing.T) {
+	_, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generating key: %v", err)
+	}
+	signer, err := ssh.NewSignerFromKey(priv)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("creating signer: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	creds := NewSSHCredentials(signer)
+	if creds.RequireTransportSecurity() {
+		t.Error("RequireTransportSecurity should be false")
+	}
+}
--- a/client/client_test.go
+++ b/client/client_test.go
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ package client

 import (
 	"context"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
 	"errors"
 	"net"
 	"os"
@@ -12,6 +14,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/kisom/sgard/garden"
 	"github.com/kisom/sgard/server"
 	"github.com/kisom/sgard/sgardpb"
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/insecure"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc/test/bufconn"
@@ -206,3 +209,100 @@ func TestPrune(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("removed %d blobs, want 1", removed)
 	}
 }
+
+func TestAuthIntegration(t *testing.T) {
+	// Generate an ed25519 key pair.
+	_, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generating key: %v", err)
+	}
+	signer, err := ssh.NewSignerFromKey(priv)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("creating signer: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	serverDir := t.TempDir()
+	serverGarden, err := garden.Init(serverDir)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("init server garden: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Set up server with auth interceptor.
+	auth := server.NewAuthInterceptorFromKeys([]ssh.PublicKey{signer.PublicKey()})
+	lis := bufconn.Listen(bufSize)
+	srv := grpc.NewServer(
+		grpc.UnaryInterceptor(auth.UnaryInterceptor()),
+		grpc.StreamInterceptor(auth.StreamInterceptor()),
+	)
+	sgardpb.RegisterGardenSyncServer(srv, server.New(serverGarden))
+	t.Cleanup(func() { srv.Stop() })
+	go func() { _ = srv.Serve(lis) }()
+
+	// Client with SSH credentials.
+	creds := NewSSHCredentials(signer)
+	conn, err := grpc.NewClient("passthrough:///bufconn",
+		grpc.WithContextDialer(func(context.Context, string) (net.Conn, error) {
+			return lis.Dial()
+		}),
+		grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()),
+		grpc.WithPerRPCCredentials(creds),
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("dial: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = conn.Close() })
+
+	c := New(conn)
+
+	// Authenticated request should succeed.
+	_, err = c.Pull(context.Background(), serverGarden)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("authenticated Pull should succeed: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAuthIntegrationRejectsUnauthenticated(t *testing.T) {
+	_, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generating key: %v", err)
+	}
+	signer, err := ssh.NewSignerFromKey(priv)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("creating signer: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	serverDir := t.TempDir()
+	serverGarden, err := garden.Init(serverDir)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("init server garden: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	auth := server.NewAuthInterceptorFromKeys([]ssh.PublicKey{signer.PublicKey()})
+	lis := bufconn.Listen(bufSize)
+	srv := grpc.NewServer(
+		grpc.UnaryInterceptor(auth.UnaryInterceptor()),
+		grpc.StreamInterceptor(auth.StreamInterceptor()),
+	)
+	sgardpb.RegisterGardenSyncServer(srv, server.New(serverGarden))
+	t.Cleanup(func() { srv.Stop() })
+	go func() { _ = srv.Serve(lis) }()
+
+	// Client WITHOUT credentials.
+	conn, err := grpc.NewClient("passthrough:///bufconn",
+		grpc.WithContextDialer(func(context.Context, string) (net.Conn, error) {
+			return lis.Dial()
+		}),
+		grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()),
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("dial: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = conn.Close() })
+
+	c := New(conn)
+
+	_, err = c.Pull(context.Background(), serverGarden)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("unauthenticated Pull should fail")
+	}
+}
--- a/server/auth.go
+++ b/server/auth.go
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
+)
+
+const (
+	// Metadata keys for auth.
+	metaNonce     = "x-sgard-auth-nonce"
+	metaTimestamp = "x-sgard-auth-timestamp"
+	metaSignature = "x-sgard-auth-signature"
+	metaPubkey    = "x-sgard-auth-pubkey"
+
+	// authWindow is how far the timestamp can deviate from server time.
+	authWindow = 5 * time.Minute
+)
+
+// AuthInterceptor verifies SSH key signatures on gRPC requests.
+type AuthInterceptor struct {
+	authorizedKeys map[string]ssh.PublicKey // keyed by fingerprint
+}
+
+// NewAuthInterceptor creates an interceptor from an authorized_keys file.
+// The file uses the same format as ~/.ssh/authorized_keys.
+func NewAuthInterceptor(path string) (*AuthInterceptor, error) {
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading authorized keys: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	keys := make(map[string]ssh.PublicKey)
+	rest := data
+	for len(rest) > 0 {
+		var key ssh.PublicKey
+		key, _, _, rest, err = ssh.ParseAuthorizedKey(rest)
+		if err != nil {
+			break
+		}
+		fp := ssh.FingerprintSHA256(key)
+		keys[fp] = key
+	}
+
+	if len(keys) == 0 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("no valid keys found in %s", path)
+	}
+
+	return &AuthInterceptor{authorizedKeys: keys}, nil
+}
+
+// NewAuthInterceptorFromKeys creates an interceptor from pre-parsed keys.
+// Intended for testing.
+func NewAuthInterceptorFromKeys(keys []ssh.PublicKey) *AuthInterceptor {
+	m := make(map[string]ssh.PublicKey, len(keys))
+	for _, k := range keys {
+		m[ssh.FingerprintSHA256(k)] = k
+	}
+	return &AuthInterceptor{authorizedKeys: m}
+}
+
+// UnaryInterceptor returns a gRPC unary server interceptor.
+func (a *AuthInterceptor) UnaryInterceptor() grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor {
+	return func(ctx context.Context, req any, info *grpc.UnaryServerInfo, handler grpc.UnaryHandler) (any, error) {
+		if err := a.verify(ctx); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return handler(ctx, req)
+	}
+}
+
+// StreamInterceptor returns a gRPC stream server interceptor.
+func (a *AuthInterceptor) StreamInterceptor() grpc.StreamServerInterceptor {
+	return func(srv any, ss grpc.ServerStream, info *grpc.StreamServerInfo, handler grpc.StreamHandler) error {
+		if err := a.verify(ss.Context()); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		return handler(srv, ss)
+	}
+}
+
+func (a *AuthInterceptor) verify(ctx context.Context) error {
+	md, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)
+	if !ok {
+		return status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "missing metadata")
+	}
+
+	nonceB64 := mdFirst(md, metaNonce)
+	tsStr := mdFirst(md, metaTimestamp)
+	sigB64 := mdFirst(md, metaSignature)
+	pubkeyStr := mdFirst(md, metaPubkey)
+
+	if nonceB64 == "" || tsStr == "" || sigB64 == "" || pubkeyStr == "" {
+		return status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "missing auth metadata fields")
+	}
+
+	// Parse timestamp and check window.
+	tsUnix, err := strconv.ParseInt(tsStr, 10, 64)
+	if err != nil {
+		return status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "invalid timestamp")
+	}
+	ts := time.Unix(tsUnix, 0)
+	if time.Since(ts).Abs() > authWindow {
+		return status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "timestamp outside allowed window")
+	}
+
+	// Parse public key and check authorization.
+	pubkey, _, _, _, err := ssh.ParseAuthorizedKey([]byte(pubkeyStr))
+	if err != nil {
+		return status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "invalid public key")
+	}
+	fp := ssh.FingerprintSHA256(pubkey)
+	authorized, ok := a.authorizedKeys[fp]
+	if !ok {
+		return status.Errorf(codes.PermissionDenied, "key %s not authorized", fp)
+	}
+
+	// Decode nonce and signature.
+	nonce, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(nonceB64)
+	if err != nil {
+		return status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "invalid nonce encoding")
+	}
+
+	sigBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(sigB64)
+	if err != nil {
+		return status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "invalid signature encoding")
+	}
+
+	sig, err := parseSSHSignature(sigBytes)
+	if err != nil {
+		return status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "invalid signature format")
+	}
+
+	// Build the signed payload: nonce + timestamp bytes.
+	payload := buildPayload(nonce, tsUnix)
+
+	// Verify.
+	if err := authorized.Verify(payload, sig); err != nil {
+		return status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "signature verification failed")
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// buildPayload constructs the message that is signed: nonce || timestamp (big-endian int64).
+func buildPayload(nonce []byte, tsUnix int64) []byte {
+	payload := make([]byte, len(nonce)+8)
+	copy(payload, nonce)
+	for i := 7; i >= 0; i-- {
+		payload[len(nonce)+i] = byte(tsUnix & 0xff)
+		tsUnix >>= 8
+	}
+	return payload
+}
+
+// GenerateNonce creates a 32-byte random nonce.
+func GenerateNonce() ([]byte, error) {
+	nonce := make([]byte, 32)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(nonce); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("generating nonce: %w", err)
+	}
+	return nonce, nil
+}
+
+func mdFirst(md metadata.MD, key string) string {
+	vals := md.Get(key)
+	if len(vals) == 0 {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return vals[0]
+}
+
+// parseSSHSignature deserializes an SSH signature from its wire format.
+func parseSSHSignature(data []byte) (*ssh.Signature, error) {
+	if len(data) < 4 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("signature too short")
+	}
+
+	// SSH signature wire format: string format, string blob
+	formatLen := int(data[0])<<24 | int(data[1])<<16 | int(data[2])<<8 | int(data[3])
+	if 4+formatLen > len(data) {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid format length")
+	}
+	format := string(data[4 : 4+formatLen])
+
+	rest := data[4+formatLen:]
+	if len(rest) < 4 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing blob length")
+	}
+	blobLen := int(rest[0])<<24 | int(rest[1])<<16 | int(rest[2])<<8 | int(rest[3])
+	if 4+blobLen > len(rest) {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid blob length")
+	}
+	blob := rest[4 : 4+blobLen]
+
+	_ = strings.TrimSpace(format) // ensure format is clean
+
+	return &ssh.Signature{
+		Format: format,
+		Blob:   blob,
+	}, nil
+}
--- a/server/auth_test.go
+++ b/server/auth_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"strconv"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
+)
+
+func generateTestKey(t *testing.T) (ssh.Signer, ssh.PublicKey) {
+	t.Helper()
+	_, priv, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generating key: %v", err)
+	}
+	signer, err := ssh.NewSignerFromKey(priv)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("creating signer: %v", err)
+	}
+	return signer, signer.PublicKey()
+}
+
+func signedContext(t *testing.T, signer ssh.Signer) context.Context {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	nonce, err := GenerateNonce()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generating nonce: %v", err)
+	}
+	tsUnix := time.Now().Unix()
+	payload := buildPayload(nonce, tsUnix)
+
+	sig, err := signer.Sign(rand.Reader, payload)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("signing: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	pubkeyStr := string(ssh.MarshalAuthorizedKey(signer.PublicKey()))
+
+	md := metadata.New(map[string]string{
+		metaNonce:     base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(nonce),
+		metaTimestamp: strconv.FormatInt(tsUnix, 10),
+		metaSignature: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(ssh.Marshal(sig)),
+		metaPubkey:    pubkeyStr,
+	})
+	return metadata.NewIncomingContext(context.Background(), md)
+}
+
+func TestAuthVerifyValid(t *testing.T) {
+	signer, pubkey := generateTestKey(t)
+	interceptor := NewAuthInterceptorFromKeys([]ssh.PublicKey{pubkey})
+
+	ctx := signedContext(t, signer)
+	if err := interceptor.verify(ctx); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("verify should succeed: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAuthRejectUnauthenticated(t *testing.T) {
+	_, pubkey := generateTestKey(t)
+	interceptor := NewAuthInterceptorFromKeys([]ssh.PublicKey{pubkey})
+
+	// No metadata at all.
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	if err := interceptor.verify(ctx); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("verify should reject missing metadata")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAuthRejectUnauthorizedKey(t *testing.T) {
+	signer1, _ := generateTestKey(t)
+	_, pubkey2 := generateTestKey(t)
+
+	// Interceptor knows key2 but request is signed by key1.
+	interceptor := NewAuthInterceptorFromKeys([]ssh.PublicKey{pubkey2})
+
+	ctx := signedContext(t, signer1)
+	if err := interceptor.verify(ctx); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("verify should reject unauthorized key")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAuthRejectExpiredTimestamp(t *testing.T) {
+	signer, pubkey := generateTestKey(t)
+	interceptor := NewAuthInterceptorFromKeys([]ssh.PublicKey{pubkey})
+
+	nonce, err := GenerateNonce()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("generating nonce: %v", err)
+	}
+	// Timestamp 10 minutes ago — outside the 5-minute window.
+	tsUnix := time.Now().Add(-10 * time.Minute).Unix()
+	payload := buildPayload(nonce, tsUnix)
+
+	sig, err := signer.Sign(rand.Reader, payload)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("signing: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	pubkeyStr := string(ssh.MarshalAuthorizedKey(signer.PublicKey()))
+
+	md := metadata.New(map[string]string{
+		metaNonce:     base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(nonce),
+		metaTimestamp: strconv.FormatInt(tsUnix, 10),
+		metaSignature: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(ssh.Marshal(sig)),
+		metaPubkey:    pubkeyStr,
+	})
+	ctx := metadata.NewIncomingContext(context.Background(), md)
+
+	if err := interceptor.verify(ctx); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("verify should reject expired timestamp")
+	}
+}