boxmaker/docs/plans/M5c2/README.md

# M5c-2 implementation plan: Honcho, the read path

> For the implementer: each task file is one closed task for one fresh session. Read `AGENTS.md`,
> then the task file, and do exactly that task. The driver is `tools/run-plan.sh`.

**Goal:** the agent reads what the fleet knows. `recall` searches the other agents' trusted
workspaces and the fleet workspace alongside the local index, each source on its own limit, and
a new core tool, `ask_memory`, asks Honcho's dialectic about one or two workspaces. What comes back
is labelled, and taints the session, as a local `recall` hit does.

**Architecture:** `bxcore` gains `ask_memory`'s arguments; `brokerd` runs it as a built-in memory
tool with its own wait; `loopd` declares it as a core tool with its own wait; `memoryd` gains
read-only Honcho clients, turns Honcho's messages and conclusions into `recall` items, runs its
Honcho sources and chats outside its state lock, and answers `ask_memory`.

**Tech stack:** Rust 1.98.1, edition 2024; `roncho` 1.0.0 (already a dependency of `memoryd`,
`features = ["tls"]`); no new crate.

**Spec:** `docs/specs/2026-09-27-m5c-honcho.md`, sections 3, 8, 9, 10 and 13, as amended on
2026-09-28 (`8e56261`).

## The owner's decisions (2026-09-28)

1. **Queries from any session.** `recall` searches Honcho, and `ask_memory` asks it, from a
   session of any class, `secret` included: Honcho stores no query, and on rift a query reaches
   only the owner's hosts. It is an assumption about rift's configuration, written into the spec
   (section 8) and `docs/egress.md`. A query holding a known-prefix secret is refused before
   anything is sent.
2. **Two workspaces per `ask_memory` call**, both asked at once, so both answer inside
   `brokerd`'s wait; the model asks again for more.
3. **New recordings from rift** for the fake server (task 00), in a throwaway workspace deleted
   afterwards, as in M5c-1. They changed two things (spec, `891f413`): `ask_memory`
   always asks at `minimal`, since a `low` chat on rift returned raw tool-call markup; and a
   Honcho hit is kept only when it shares a term with the query, since search has no relevance
   cutoff.

## What the code already has, and what it lacks

- A session keeps the tools array it was created with (`loopd`'s baseline is saved at the start
  and sent on every request): `ask_memory` appears in sessions started after deployment, and no
  epoch code is needed.
- `brokerd` waits 30 s for any memory tool (`memory_port.rs`, `MEMORY_WAIT`), and `loopd` 120 s for
  any tool (`[broker] timeout_ms`). Neither has a per-tool wait; `ask_memory` needs 170 s and 180 s
  (spec 9).
- `memoryd` holds its one state lock for the whole of a `recall`. Honcho searches (5 s) and chats
  (150 s) must run outside it, or every `memory` call waits behind them.
- M5c-1's `Clients` are the sync worker's, for writes, and move into its thread. Reading needs
  its own clients: one per `[[honcho.read]]` workspace, the fleet, and the agent's own two (for
  `ask_memory`).
- `roncho`'s blocking client has what is needed: `search_workspace`, `query_conclusions` (it
  requires the observer and the observed) and `workspace_chat`.

## Global constraints

- Roles depend on `bxcore` only; `memoryd` also on `roncho`. No `unsafe`, no async runtime.
- Every `roncho` client is built with `.without_config_file()`; keys come from
  `bxcore::secrets` and are never logged; errors are logged by kind and status only.
- Text from Honcho is neutralised on arrival and capped like a local `recall` snippet (600
  characters); a result's labels raise the session as a local hit's do.
- No Honcho call runs under `memoryd`'s state lock.
- Without a `[honcho]` section, `recall` is exactly M5b's and `ask_memory` answers that Honcho is
  not configured.
- No file the implementer reads holds a chat-template tag whole (T33), nor a fake key whole.
- Every path a given test creates is removed by a guard (T44); every process a test starts has a
  deadline.
- Each task gives its baseline and its gate count with what the count includes (T50, T53); the
  branch line is a check, never `git switch` (T51); import changes are single added lines (T54);
  whitespace-checked literals are marked on every edit (T55); the task's table of `roncho`'s API
  is complete, and the Cargo registry is off limits (T56).

## Tasks (outline, for the owner's review)

| # | Delivers | Crates |
|---|---|---|
| 00 | (done by the design model, `718e66d`) recordings from rift: workspace search with a limit and with no match, conclusion queries for two peers, and what a missing workspace answers | memoryd fixtures |
| 01 | Wire: `AskMemoryArgs { question, workspaces }`, its name and its checks (question at most 2,000 characters; one or two workspace names, no repeats, each 1 to 512 characters as `memoryd`'s name rule) | bxcore |
| 02 | `brokerd`: `ask_memory` as a built-in memory tool (name, parsing, the grant `builtin-ask-memory`, owner grants naming it refused, routing to `memoryd`); its answer's labels raise the session | brokerd |
| 03 | `brokerd`: a per-tool wait on `memoryd`, 170 s for `ask_memory` (`ASK_MEMORY_WAIT`) and 30 s for the others, chosen by `MemoryPort::wait_for` | brokerd |
| 04 | `loopd`: `ask_memory`'s schema as a core tool in a new registry; a per-tool wait on `brokerd`, 180 s for `ask_memory` and `[broker] timeout_ms` for the others; the system prompt's line on memory tools | loopd |
| 05 | `memoryd`: read clients, one per `[[honcho.read]]` workspace, the fleet and the agent's own two, with a 5 s limit for searches and 150 s for chat | memoryd |
| 06 | `memoryd`, pure: Honcho messages and conclusions as `recall` items (tag, source name, class, neutralised, capped), kept only when they share a term with the query, interleaved with the local hits to `k`, the local index first | memoryd |
| 07 | `memoryd`: `recall`'s Honcho sources, each on its own thread with its own limit, after the local search and outside the lock; `<source>: unavailable`; a query holding a secret sends nothing | memoryd |
| 08 | `memoryd`: `ask_memory`: workspace names checked against `[honcho]`, both chats at once, each answer tagged and capped, labels, `<workspace>: unavailable`; a question holding a secret sends nothing | memoryd |
| 09 | `memoryd` serves `ask_memory` beside `recall` and `memory`, outside the lock; `bxctl`'s usage and the runbook where a new message needs a pointer | memoryd, bxctl |

After task 09, the design model runs the M5c-2 device check (spec 13) on straylight, rift and the
owner's Mattermost: a second `memoryd` under its own name writes a fleet note that `recall` finds,
tagged `memory-tainted`, turning the session untrusted; `ask_memory` answers from the agent's own
trusted workspace within its limit; with rift down, `recall` answers from the local index with
`unavailable` lines. The baseline is measured again against the 3,000-token budget
(`make verify-device`).

## Counts, as tasks are written

The gate count is the passed total of `cargo test --workspace` plus one, for the ignored
`end_to_end` test the gate runs on its own. Before task 01 it is 1364 (talos, rustc 1.98.1).

| Task | Gate count after | Mutations tried, caught |
|---|---|---|
| 01 | 1372 | 23, 23 |
| 02 | 1381 | 17, 17 |
| 03 | 1384 | 10, 10 |
| 04 | 1394 | 19, 19 |

## Before hand-over

Every task is worked through `docs/plans/CHECKLIST.md` with a reference in a scratch worktree
with its own build directory, replayed from its task text; mutations; `/tmp` compared around a
gate run; scratch files in the worktree's `.state/`; the whole workspace stressed under load
(T52); the reference moved to straylight as a bundle before the run. Task files name their log
row (T47). For every class or trust rule, each path that reads from Honcho gets a test at the
forbidden label (T58).

## Running it

```sh
git switch -c m5c2 master
OPENCODE_MODEL=straylight/ornith-1.5-35b-a3b RESUME=1 \
  SLOTS_URL='http://straylight:11434/slots?model=ornith-1.5-35b-a3b' \
  tools/run-plan.sh docs/plans/M5c2 01
```