Kyle Isom
0ad9ef1bb4
- Added failed login tracking for account lockout enforcement in `db` and `ui` layers; introduced `failed_logins` table to store attempts, window start, and attempt count. - Updated login checks in `grpcserver/auth.go` and `ui/handlers_auth.go` to reject requests if the account is locked. - Added immediate failure counter reset on successful login. - Implemented username length and character set validation (F-12) and minimum password length enforcement (F-13) in shared `validate` package. - Updated account creation and edit flows in `ui` and `grpcserver` layers to apply validation before hashing/processing. - Added comprehensive unit tests for lockout, validation, and related edge cases. - Updated `AUDIT.md` to mark F-08, F-12, and F-13 as fixed. - Updated `openapi.yaml` to reflect new validation and lockout behaviors. Security: Prevents brute-force attacks via lockout mechanism and strengthens defenses against weak and invalid input.
283 lines
10 KiB
Go
283 lines
10 KiB
Go
// authServiceServer implements mciasv1.AuthServiceServer.
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// All handlers delegate to the same internal packages as the REST server.
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package grpcserver
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
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"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
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"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
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"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb"
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mciasv1 "git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/gen/mcias/v1"
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"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/auth"
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"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/crypto"
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"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/model"
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"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/token"
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)
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type authServiceServer struct {
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mciasv1.UnimplementedAuthServiceServer
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s *Server
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}
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// Login authenticates a user and issues a JWT.
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// Public RPC — no auth interceptor required.
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//
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// Security: Identical to the REST handleLogin: always runs Argon2 for unknown
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// users to prevent timing-based user enumeration. Generic error returned
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// regardless of which step failed.
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func (a *authServiceServer) Login(ctx context.Context, req *mciasv1.LoginRequest) (*mciasv1.LoginResponse, error) {
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if req.Username == "" || req.Password == "" {
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return nil, status.Error(codes.InvalidArgument, "username and password are required")
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}
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ip := peerIP(ctx)
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acct, err := a.s.db.GetAccountByUsername(req.Username)
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if err != nil {
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// Security: run dummy Argon2 to equalise timing for unknown users.
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_, _ = auth.VerifyPassword("dummy", auth.DummyHash())
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a.s.db.WriteAuditEvent(model.EventLoginFail, nil, nil, ip, //nolint:errcheck // audit failure is non-fatal
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fmt.Sprintf(`{"username":%q,"reason":"unknown_user"}`, req.Username))
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "invalid credentials")
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}
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if acct.Status != model.AccountStatusActive {
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_, _ = auth.VerifyPassword("dummy", auth.DummyHash())
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a.s.db.WriteAuditEvent(model.EventLoginFail, &acct.ID, nil, ip, `{"reason":"account_inactive"}`) //nolint:errcheck
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "invalid credentials")
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}
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// Security: check per-account lockout before running Argon2 (F-08).
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locked, lockErr := a.s.db.IsLockedOut(acct.ID)
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if lockErr != nil {
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a.s.logger.Error("lockout check", "error", lockErr)
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}
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if locked {
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_, _ = auth.VerifyPassword("dummy", auth.DummyHash())
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a.s.db.WriteAuditEvent(model.EventLoginFail, &acct.ID, nil, ip, `{"reason":"account_locked"}`) //nolint:errcheck
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return nil, status.Error(codes.ResourceExhausted, "account temporarily locked")
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}
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ok, err := auth.VerifyPassword(req.Password, acct.PasswordHash)
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if err != nil || !ok {
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a.s.db.WriteAuditEvent(model.EventLoginFail, &acct.ID, nil, ip, `{"reason":"wrong_password"}`) //nolint:errcheck
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_ = a.s.db.RecordLoginFailure(acct.ID)
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "invalid credentials")
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}
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if acct.TOTPRequired {
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if req.TotpCode == "" {
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a.s.db.WriteAuditEvent(model.EventLoginFail, &acct.ID, nil, ip, `{"reason":"totp_missing"}`) //nolint:errcheck
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_ = a.s.db.RecordLoginFailure(acct.ID)
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "TOTP code required")
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}
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secret, err := crypto.OpenAESGCM(a.s.masterKey, acct.TOTPSecretNonce, acct.TOTPSecretEnc)
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if err != nil {
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a.s.logger.Error("decrypt TOTP secret", "error", err, "account_id", acct.ID)
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Internal, "internal error")
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}
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valid, err := auth.ValidateTOTP(secret, req.TotpCode)
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if err != nil || !valid {
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a.s.db.WriteAuditEvent(model.EventLoginTOTPFail, &acct.ID, nil, ip, `{"reason":"wrong_totp"}`) //nolint:errcheck
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_ = a.s.db.RecordLoginFailure(acct.ID)
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "invalid credentials")
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}
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}
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// Login succeeded: clear any outstanding failure counter.
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_ = a.s.db.ClearLoginFailures(acct.ID)
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expiry := a.s.cfg.DefaultExpiry()
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roles, err := a.s.db.GetRoles(acct.ID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Internal, "internal error")
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}
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for _, r := range roles {
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if r == "admin" {
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expiry = a.s.cfg.AdminExpiry()
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break
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}
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}
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tokenStr, claims, err := token.IssueToken(a.s.privKey, a.s.cfg.Tokens.Issuer, acct.UUID, roles, expiry)
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if err != nil {
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a.s.logger.Error("issue token", "error", err)
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Internal, "internal error")
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}
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if err := a.s.db.TrackToken(claims.JTI, acct.ID, claims.IssuedAt, claims.ExpiresAt); err != nil {
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a.s.logger.Error("track token", "error", err)
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Internal, "internal error")
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}
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a.s.db.WriteAuditEvent(model.EventLoginOK, &acct.ID, nil, ip, "") //nolint:errcheck
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a.s.db.WriteAuditEvent(model.EventTokenIssued, &acct.ID, nil, ip, //nolint:errcheck
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fmt.Sprintf(`{"jti":%q}`, claims.JTI))
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return &mciasv1.LoginResponse{
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Token: tokenStr,
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ExpiresAt: timestamppb.New(claims.ExpiresAt),
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}, nil
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}
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// Logout revokes the caller's current JWT.
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func (a *authServiceServer) Logout(ctx context.Context, _ *mciasv1.LogoutRequest) (*mciasv1.LogoutResponse, error) {
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claims := claimsFromContext(ctx)
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if err := a.s.db.RevokeToken(claims.JTI, "logout"); err != nil {
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a.s.logger.Error("revoke token on logout", "error", err)
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Internal, "internal error")
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}
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a.s.db.WriteAuditEvent(model.EventTokenRevoked, nil, nil, peerIP(ctx), //nolint:errcheck
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fmt.Sprintf(`{"jti":%q,"reason":"logout"}`, claims.JTI))
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return &mciasv1.LogoutResponse{}, nil
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}
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// RenewToken exchanges the caller's token for a new one.
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func (a *authServiceServer) RenewToken(ctx context.Context, _ *mciasv1.RenewTokenRequest) (*mciasv1.RenewTokenResponse, error) {
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claims := claimsFromContext(ctx)
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acct, err := a.s.db.GetAccountByUUID(claims.Subject)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "account not found")
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}
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if acct.Status != model.AccountStatusActive {
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "account inactive")
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}
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roles, err := a.s.db.GetRoles(acct.ID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Internal, "internal error")
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}
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expiry := a.s.cfg.DefaultExpiry()
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for _, r := range roles {
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if r == "admin" {
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expiry = a.s.cfg.AdminExpiry()
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break
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}
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}
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newTokenStr, newClaims, err := token.IssueToken(a.s.privKey, a.s.cfg.Tokens.Issuer, acct.UUID, roles, expiry)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Internal, "internal error")
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}
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// Security: revoke old + track new in a single transaction (F-03) so that a
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// failure between the two steps cannot leave the user with no valid token.
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if err := a.s.db.RenewToken(claims.JTI, "renewed", newClaims.JTI, acct.ID, newClaims.IssuedAt, newClaims.ExpiresAt); err != nil {
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Internal, "internal error")
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}
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a.s.db.WriteAuditEvent(model.EventTokenRenewed, &acct.ID, nil, peerIP(ctx), //nolint:errcheck
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fmt.Sprintf(`{"old_jti":%q,"new_jti":%q}`, claims.JTI, newClaims.JTI))
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return &mciasv1.RenewTokenResponse{
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Token: newTokenStr,
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ExpiresAt: timestamppb.New(newClaims.ExpiresAt),
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}, nil
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}
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// EnrollTOTP begins TOTP enrollment for the calling account.
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func (a *authServiceServer) EnrollTOTP(ctx context.Context, _ *mciasv1.EnrollTOTPRequest) (*mciasv1.EnrollTOTPResponse, error) {
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claims := claimsFromContext(ctx)
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acct, err := a.s.db.GetAccountByUUID(claims.Subject)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "account not found")
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}
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rawSecret, b32Secret, err := auth.GenerateTOTPSecret()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Internal, "internal error")
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}
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secretEnc, secretNonce, err := crypto.SealAESGCM(a.s.masterKey, rawSecret)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Internal, "internal error")
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}
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if err := a.s.db.SetTOTP(acct.ID, secretEnc, secretNonce); err != nil {
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Internal, "internal error")
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}
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otpURI := fmt.Sprintf("otpauth://totp/MCIAS:%s?secret=%s&issuer=MCIAS", acct.Username, b32Secret)
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// Security: secret is shown once here only; the stored form is encrypted.
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return &mciasv1.EnrollTOTPResponse{
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Secret: b32Secret,
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OtpauthUri: otpURI,
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}, nil
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}
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// ConfirmTOTP confirms TOTP enrollment.
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func (a *authServiceServer) ConfirmTOTP(ctx context.Context, req *mciasv1.ConfirmTOTPRequest) (*mciasv1.ConfirmTOTPResponse, error) {
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if req.Code == "" {
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return nil, status.Error(codes.InvalidArgument, "code is required")
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}
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claims := claimsFromContext(ctx)
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acct, err := a.s.db.GetAccountByUUID(claims.Subject)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "account not found")
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}
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if acct.TOTPSecretEnc == nil {
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return nil, status.Error(codes.FailedPrecondition, "TOTP enrollment not started")
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}
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secret, err := crypto.OpenAESGCM(a.s.masterKey, acct.TOTPSecretNonce, acct.TOTPSecretEnc)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Internal, "internal error")
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}
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valid, err := auth.ValidateTOTP(secret, req.Code)
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if err != nil || !valid {
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Unauthenticated, "invalid TOTP code")
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}
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// SetTOTP with existing enc/nonce sets totp_required=1, confirming enrollment.
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if err := a.s.db.SetTOTP(acct.ID, acct.TOTPSecretEnc, acct.TOTPSecretNonce); err != nil {
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Internal, "internal error")
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}
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a.s.db.WriteAuditEvent(model.EventTOTPEnrolled, &acct.ID, nil, peerIP(ctx), "") //nolint:errcheck
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return &mciasv1.ConfirmTOTPResponse{}, nil
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}
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// RemoveTOTP removes TOTP from an account. Admin only.
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func (a *authServiceServer) RemoveTOTP(ctx context.Context, req *mciasv1.RemoveTOTPRequest) (*mciasv1.RemoveTOTPResponse, error) {
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if err := a.s.requireAdmin(ctx); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if req.AccountId == "" {
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return nil, status.Error(codes.InvalidArgument, "account_id is required")
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}
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acct, err := a.s.db.GetAccountByUUID(req.AccountId)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, status.Error(codes.NotFound, "account not found")
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}
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if err := a.s.db.ClearTOTP(acct.ID); err != nil {
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return nil, status.Error(codes.Internal, "internal error")
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}
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a.s.db.WriteAuditEvent(model.EventTOTPRemoved, nil, &acct.ID, peerIP(ctx), "") //nolint:errcheck
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return &mciasv1.RemoveTOTPResponse{}, nil
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}
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// peerIP extracts the client IP from gRPC peer context.
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func peerIP(ctx context.Context) string {
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p, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
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if !ok {
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return ""
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}
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host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(p.Addr.String())
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if err != nil {
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return p.Addr.String()
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}
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return host
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}
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