- proto/mcias/v1/: AdminService, AuthService, TokenService, AccountService, CredentialService; generated Go stubs in gen/ - internal/grpcserver: full handler implementations sharing all business logic (auth, token, db, crypto) with REST server; interceptor chain: logging -> auth (JWT alg-first + revocation) -> rate-limit (token bucket, 10 req/s, burst 10, per-IP) - internal/config: optional grpc_addr field in [server] section - cmd/mciassrv: dual-stack startup; gRPC/TLS listener on grpc_addr when configured; graceful shutdown of both servers in 15s window - cmd/mciasgrpcctl: companion gRPC CLI mirroring mciasctl commands (health, pubkey, account, role, token, pgcreds) using TLS with optional custom CA cert - internal/grpcserver/grpcserver_test.go: 20 tests via bufconn covering public RPCs, auth interceptor (no token, invalid, revoked -> 401), non-admin -> 403, Login/Logout/RenewToken/ValidateToken flows, AccountService CRUD, SetPGCreds/GetPGCreds AES-GCM round-trip, credential fields absent from all responses Security: JWT validation path identical to REST: alg header checked before signature, alg:none rejected, revocation table checked after sig. Authorization metadata value never logged by any interceptor. Credential fields (PasswordHash, TOTPSecret*, PGPassword) absent from all proto response messages — enforced by proto design and confirmed by test TestCredentialFieldsAbsentFromAccountResponse. Login dummy-Argon2 timing guard preserves timing uniformity for unknown users (same as REST handleLogin). TLS required at listener level; cmd/mciassrv uses credentials.NewServerTLSFromFile; no h2c offered. 137 tests pass, zero race conditions (go test -race ./...)
274 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
274 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
# MCIAS Progress
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Source of truth for current development state.
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---
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## Current Status: Phase 7 Complete — Phases 8–9 Planned
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137 tests pass with zero race conditions. Phase 7 (gRPC dual-stack) is
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complete. Phases 8–9 are designed and documented; implementation not yet started.
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### Completed Phases
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- [x] Phase 0: Repository bootstrap (go.mod, .gitignore, docs)
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- [x] Phase 1: Foundational packages (model, config, crypto, db)
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- [x] Phase 2: Auth core (auth, token, middleware)
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- [x] Phase 3: HTTP server (server, mciassrv binary)
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- [x] Phase 4: Admin CLI (mciasctl binary)
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- [x] Phase 5: E2E tests, security hardening, commit
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- [x] Phase 6: mciasdb — direct SQLite maintenance tool
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- [x] Phase 7: gRPC interface (alternate transport; dual-stack with REST)
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### Planned Phases
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- [ ] Phase 8: Operational artifacts (systemd unit, man pages, Makefile, install script)
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- [ ] Phase 9: Client libraries (Go, Rust, Common Lisp, Python)
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---
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## Implementation Log
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### 2026-03-11 — Phase 7: gRPC dual-stack
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**proto/mcias/v1/**
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- `common.proto` — shared types: Account, TokenInfo, PGCreds, Error
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- `admin.proto` — AdminService: Health (public), GetPublicKey (public)
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- `auth.proto` — AuthService: Login (public), Logout, RenewToken,
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EnrollTOTP, ConfirmTOTP, RemoveTOTP (admin)
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- `token.proto` — TokenService: ValidateToken (public),
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IssueServiceToken (admin), RevokeToken (admin)
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- `account.proto` — AccountService (CRUD + roles, all admin) +
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CredentialService (GetPGCreds, SetPGCreds, all admin)
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- `proto/generate.go` — go:generate directive for protoc regeneration
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- Generated Go stubs in `gen/mcias/v1/` via protoc + protoc-gen-go-grpc
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**internal/grpcserver**
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- `grpcserver.go` — Server struct, interceptor chain
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(loggingInterceptor → authInterceptor → rateLimitInterceptor),
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GRPCServer() / GRPCServerWithCreds(creds) / buildServer() helpers,
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per-IP token-bucket rate limiter (same parameters as REST: 10 req/s,
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burst 10), extractBearerFromMD, requireAdmin
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- `admin.go` — Health, GetPublicKey implementations
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- `auth.go` — Login (with dummy-Argon2 timing guard), Logout, RenewToken,
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EnrollTOTP, ConfirmTOTP, RemoveTOTP
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- `tokenservice.go` — ValidateToken (returns valid=false on error, never
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an RPC error), IssueServiceToken, RevokeToken
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- `accountservice.go` — ListAccounts, CreateAccount, GetAccount,
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UpdateAccount, DeleteAccount, GetRoles, SetRoles
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- `credentialservice.go` — GetPGCreds (AES-GCM decrypt), SetPGCreds
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(AES-GCM encrypt)
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**Security invariants (same as REST server):**
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- Authorization metadata value never logged by any interceptor
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- Credential fields (PasswordHash, TOTPSecret*, PGPassword) absent from
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all proto response messages by proto design + grpcserver enforcement
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- JWT validation: alg-first, then signature, then revocation table lookup
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- Public RPCs bypass auth: Health, GetPublicKey, ValidateToken, Login
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- Admin-only RPCs checked in-handler via requireAdmin(ctx)
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- Dummy Argon2 in Login for unknown users prevents timing enumeration
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**internal/config additions**
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- `GRPCAddr string` field in ServerConfig (optional; omit to disable gRPC)
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**cmd/mciassrv updates**
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- Dual-stack: starts both HTTPS (REST) and gRPC/TLS listeners when
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grpc_addr is configured in [server] section
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- gRPC listener uses same TLS cert/key as REST; credentials passed at
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server-construction time via GRPCServerWithCreds
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- Graceful shutdown drains both listeners within 15s window
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**cmd/mciasgrpcctl**
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- New companion CLI for gRPC management
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- Global flags: -server (host:port), -token (or MCIAS_TOKEN), -cacert
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- Commands: health, pubkey, account (list/create/get/update/delete),
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role (list/set), token (validate/issue/revoke),
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pgcreds (get/set)
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- Connects with TLS; custom CA cert support for self-signed certs
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**Tests**
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- `internal/grpcserver/grpcserver_test.go`: 20 tests using bufconn
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(in-process, no network sockets); covers:
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- Health and GetPublicKey (public RPCs, no auth)
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- Auth interceptor: no token, invalid token, revoked token all → 401
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- Non-admin calling admin RPC → 403
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- Login: success, wrong password, unknown user
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- Logout and RenewToken
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- ValidateToken: good token → valid=true; garbage → valid=false (no error)
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- IssueServiceToken requires admin
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- ListAccounts: non-admin → 403, admin → OK
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- CreateAccount, GetAccount, UpdateAccount, SetRoles, GetRoles lifecycle
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- SetPGCreds + GetPGCreds with AES-GCM round-trip verification
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- PGCreds requires admin
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- Credential fields absent from account responses (structural enforcement)
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**Dependencies added**
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- `google.golang.org/grpc v1.68.0`
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- `google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.0`
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- `google.golang.org/grpc/test/bufconn` (test only, included in grpc module)
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Total: 137 tests, all pass, zero race conditions (go test -race ./...)
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### 2026-03-11 — Phase 6: mciasdb
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**cmd/mciasdb**
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- Binary skeleton: config loading, master key derivation (identical to
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mciassrv for key compatibility), DB open + migrate on startup
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- `schema verify` / `schema migrate` — reports and applies pending migrations
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- `account list/get/create/set-password/set-status/reset-totp` — offline
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account management; set-password prompts interactively (no --password flag)
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- `role list/grant/revoke` — direct role management
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- `token list/revoke/revoke-all` + `prune tokens` — token maintenance
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- `audit tail/query` — audit log inspection with --json output flag
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- `pgcreds get/set` — decrypt/encrypt Postgres credentials with master key;
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set prompts interactively; get prints warning before sensitive output
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- All write operations emit audit log entries tagged `actor:"mciasdb"`
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**internal/db additions**
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- `ListTokensForAccount(accountID)` — newest-first token list for an account
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- `ListAuditEvents(AuditQueryParams)` — filtered audit query (account, type,
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since, limit)
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- `TailAuditEvents(n)` — last n events, returned oldest-first
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- `SchemaVersion(db)` / `LatestSchemaVersion` — exported for mciasdb verify
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**Dependencies**
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- Added `golang.org/x/term v0.29.0` for interactive password prompting
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(no-echo terminal reads); pinned to version compatible with local module cache
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- `golang.org/x/crypto` pinned at v0.33.0 (compatible with term@v0.29.0)
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**Tests**
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- `internal/db/mciasdb_test.go`: 4 tests covering ListTokensForAccount,
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ListAuditEvents filtering, TailAuditEvents ordering, combined filters
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- `cmd/mciasdb/mciasdb_test.go`: 20 tests covering all subcommands via
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in-memory SQLite and stdout capture
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Total: 117 tests, all pass, zero race conditions (go test -race ./...)
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### 2026-03-11 — Initial Full Implementation
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#### Phase 0: Bootstrap
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- Wrote ARCHITECTURE.md (security model, crypto choices, DB schema, API design)
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- Wrote PROJECT_PLAN.md (5 phases, 12 steps with acceptance criteria)
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- Created go.mod with dependencies (golang-jwt/jwt/v5, uuid, go-toml/v2,
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golang.org/x/crypto, modernc.org/sqlite)
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- Created .gitignore
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#### Phase 1: Foundational Packages
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**internal/model**
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- Account (human/system), Role, TokenRecord, SystemToken, PGCredential,
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AuditEvent structs
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- All credential fields tagged `json:"-"` — never serialised to responses
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- Audit event type constants
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**internal/config**
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- TOML config parsing with validation
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- Enforces OWASP 2023 Argon2id minimums (time≥2, memory≥64MiB)
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- Requires exactly one of passphrase_env or keyfile for master key
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- NewTestConfig() for test use
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**internal/crypto**
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- Ed25519 key generation, PEM marshal/parse
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- AES-256-GCM seal/open with random nonces
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- Argon2id KDF (DeriveKey) with OWASP-exceeding parameters
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- NewSalt(), RandomBytes()
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**internal/db**
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- SQLite with WAL mode, FK enforcement, busy timeout
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- Idempotent migrations (schema_version table)
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- Migration 1: full schema (server_config, accounts, account_roles,
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token_revocation, system_tokens, pg_credentials, audit_log)
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- Migration 2: master_key_salt column in server_config
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- Full CRUD: accounts, roles, tokens, PG credentials, audit log
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#### Phase 2: Auth Core
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**internal/auth**
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- Argon2id password hashing in PHC format
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- Constant-time password verification (crypto/subtle)
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- TOTP generation and validation (RFC 6238 ±1 window, constant-time)
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- HOTP per RFC 4226
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**internal/token**
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- Ed25519/EdDSA JWT issuance with UUID JTI
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- alg header validated BEFORE signature verification (alg confusion defence)
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- alg:none explicitly rejected
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- ErrWrongAlgorithm, ErrExpiredToken, ErrInvalidSignature, ErrMissingClaim
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**internal/middleware**
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- RequestLogger — never logs Authorization header
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- RequireAuth — validates JWT, checks revocation table
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- RequireRole — checks claims for required role
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- RateLimit — per-IP token bucket
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#### Phase 3: HTTP Server
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**internal/server**
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- Full REST API wired to middleware
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- Handlers: health, public-key, login (dummy Argon2 on unknown user for
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timing uniformity), logout, renew, token validate/issue/revoke,
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account CRUD, roles, TOTP enrol/confirm/remove, PG credentials
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- Strict JSON decoding (DisallowUnknownFields)
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- Credential fields never appear in any response
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**cmd/mciassrv**
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- Config loading, master key derivation (passphrase via Argon2id KDF or
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key file), signing key load/generate (AES-256-GCM encrypted in DB),
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HTTPS listener with graceful shutdown
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- TLS 1.2+ minimum, X25519+P256 curves
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- 30s read/write timeouts, 5s header timeout
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#### Phase 4: Admin CLI
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**cmd/mciasctl**
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- Subcommands: account (list/create/get/update/delete), role (list/set),
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token (issue/revoke), pgcreds (get/set)
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- Auth via -token flag or MCIAS_TOKEN env var
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- Custom CA cert support for self-signed TLS
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#### Phase 5: Tests and Hardening
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**Test coverage:**
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- internal/model: 5 tests
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- internal/config: 8 tests
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- internal/crypto: 12 tests
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- internal/db: 13 tests
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- internal/auth: 13 tests
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- internal/token: 9 tests (including alg confusion and alg:none attacks)
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- internal/middleware: 12 tests
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- internal/server: 14 tests
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- test/e2e: 11 tests
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Total: 97 tests — all pass, zero race conditions (go test -race ./...)
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**Security tests (adversarial):**
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- JWT alg:HS256 confusion attack → 401
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- JWT alg:none attack → 401
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- Revoked token reuse → 401
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- Non-admin calling admin endpoint → 403
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- Wrong password → 401 (same response as unknown user)
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- Credential material absent from all API responses
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**Security hardening:**
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- go vet ./... — zero issues
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- gofmt applied to all files
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- golangci-lint v2 config updated (note: v2.6.2 built with go1.25.3
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cannot analyse go1.26 source; go vet used as primary linter for now)
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---
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## Architecture Decisions
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- **SQLite driver**: `modernc.org/sqlite` (pure Go, no CGo)
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- **JWT**: `github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5`; alg validated manually before
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library dispatch to defeat algorithm confusion
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- **No ORM**: `database/sql` with parameterized statements only
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- **Master key salt**: stored in server_config table for stable KDF across
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restarts; generated on first run
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- **Signing key**: stored AES-256-GCM encrypted in server_config; generated
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on first run, decrypted each startup using master key
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- **Timing uniformity**: unknown user login runs dummy Argon2 to match
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timing of wrong-password path; all credential comparisons use
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`crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare`
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