mcias/internal/policy/defaults.go

package policy

// defaultRules are the compiled-in authorization rules. They cannot be
// modified or deleted via the API. They reproduce the previous binary
// admin/non-admin behavior exactly when no operator rules exist, so wiring
// the policy engine alongside RequireRole("admin") produces identical results.
//
// All defaults use Priority 0 so they are evaluated before any operator rule
// (which defaults to Priority 100). Within priority 0, deny-wins still applies,
// but the defaults contain no Deny rules — they only grant the minimum required
// for self-service and admin operations.
//
// Security rationale for each rule is documented inline.
var defaultRules = []Rule{
	{
		// Admin wildcard: an account bearing the "admin" role is permitted to
		// perform any action on any resource. This mirrors the previous
		// RequireRole("admin") check and is the root of all administrative trust.
		ID:          -1,
		Description: "Admin wildcard: admin role allows all actions",
		Priority:    0,
		Roles:       []string{"admin"},
		Effect:      Allow,
	},
	{
		// Self-service logout and token renewal: any authenticated principal may
		// revoke or renew their own token. No resource scoping is needed because
		// the handler independently verifies that the JTI belongs to the caller.
		ID:          -2,
		Description: "Self-service: any principal may logout or renew their own token",
		Priority:    0,
		Actions:     []Action{ActionLogout, ActionRenewToken},
		Effect:      Allow,
	},
	{
		// Self-service TOTP enrollment: any authenticated human account may
		// initiate and confirm their own TOTP enrollment. The handler verifies
		// the subject matches before writing.
		ID:          -3,
		Description: "Self-service: any principal may enroll their own TOTP",
		Priority:    0,
		Actions:     []Action{ActionEnrollTOTP},
		Effect:      Allow,
	},
	{
		// Self-service password change: any authenticated human account may
		// change their own password. The handler derives the target exclusively
		// from the JWT subject (claims.Subject) and requires the current
		// password, so a non-admin caller can only affect their own account.
		ID:           -7,
		Description:  "Self-service: any human account may change their own password",
		Priority:     0,
		AccountTypes: []string{"human"},
		Actions:      []Action{ActionChangePassword},
		Effect:       Allow,
	},
	{
		// System accounts reading their own pgcreds: a service that has already
		// authenticated (e.g. via its bearer service token) may retrieve its own
		// Postgres credentials without admin privilege. OwnerMatchesSubject
		// ensures the service can only reach its own row — not another service's.
		ID:                  -4,
		Description:         "System accounts may read their own pg_credentials",
		Priority:            0,
		AccountTypes:        []string{"system"},
		Actions:             []Action{ActionReadPGCreds},
		ResourceType:        ResourcePGCreds,
		OwnerMatchesSubject: true,
		Effect:              Allow,
	},
	{
		// System accounts issuing or renewing their own service token: a system
		// account may rotate its own bearer token. OwnerMatchesSubject ensures
		// it cannot issue tokens for other accounts.
		ID:                  -5,
		Description:         "System accounts may issue or renew their own service token",
		Priority:            0,
		AccountTypes:        []string{"system"},
		Actions:             []Action{ActionIssueToken, ActionRenewToken},
		ResourceType:        ResourceToken,
		OwnerMatchesSubject: true,
		Effect:              Allow,
	},
	{
		// Public endpoints: token validation and login do not require
		// authentication. The middleware exempts them from RequireAuth entirely;
		// this rule exists so that if a policy check is accidentally applied to
		// these paths, it does not block them.
		ID:          -6,
		Description: "Public: token validation and login are always permitted",
		Priority:    0,
		Actions:     []Action{ActionValidateToken, ActionLogin},
		Effect:      Allow,
	},
}