mcias/internal/ui/handlers_auth.go

package ui

import (
	"fmt"
	"net/http"

	"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/auth"
	"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/crypto"
	"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/model"
	"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/token"
	"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/internal/validate"
)

// handleLoginPage renders the login form.
func (u *UIServer) handleLoginPage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	u.render(w, "login", LoginData{})
}

// handleLoginPost processes username+password (step 1) or TOTP code (step 2).
//
// Security design (F-02 fix):
//   - Step 1: username+password submitted. Password verified via Argon2id.
//     On success with TOTP required, a 90-second single-use server-side nonce
//     is issued and its account ID stored in pendingLogins. Only the nonce
//     (not the password) is embedded in the TOTP step HTML form, so the
//     plaintext password is never sent over the wire a second time and never
//     appears in the DOM during the TOTP step.
//   - Step 2: totp_step=1 form submitted. The nonce is consumed (single-use,
//     expiry checked) to retrieve the account ID; no password is needed.
//     TOTP code is then verified against the decrypted stored secret.
//   - Timing is held constant for unknown accounts by always running a dummy
//     Argon2 check, preventing username enumeration.
//   - On final success: JWT issued, stored as HttpOnly session cookie.
func (u *UIServer) handleLoginPost(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxFormBytes)
	if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
		u.render(w, "login", LoginData{Error: "invalid form submission"})
		return
	}

	// Step 2: TOTP confirmation (totp_step=1 was set by step 1's rendered form).
	if r.FormValue("totp_step") == "1" {
		u.handleTOTPStep(w, r)
		return
	}

	// Step 1: password verification.
	username := r.FormValue("username")
	password := r.FormValue("password")

	if username == "" || password == "" {
		u.render(w, "login", LoginData{Error: "username and password are required"})
		return
	}

	// Load account by username.
	acct, err := u.db.GetAccountByUsername(username)
	if err != nil {
		// Security: always run dummy Argon2 to prevent timing-based user enumeration.
		_, _ = auth.VerifyPassword("dummy", u.dummyHash())
		u.writeAudit(r, model.EventLoginFail, nil, nil,
			fmt.Sprintf(`{"username":%q,"reason":"unknown_user"}`, username))
		u.render(w, "login", LoginData{Error: "invalid credentials"})
		return
	}

	// Security: check account status before credential verification.
	if acct.Status != model.AccountStatusActive {
		_, _ = auth.VerifyPassword("dummy", u.dummyHash())
		u.writeAudit(r, model.EventLoginFail, &acct.ID, nil, `{"reason":"account_inactive"}`)
		u.render(w, "login", LoginData{Error: "invalid credentials"})
		return
	}

	// Security: check per-account lockout before running Argon2 (F-08).
	locked, lockErr := u.db.IsLockedOut(acct.ID)
	if lockErr != nil {
		u.logger.Error("lockout check", "error", lockErr)
	}
	if locked {
		_, _ = auth.VerifyPassword("dummy", u.dummyHash())
		u.writeAudit(r, model.EventLoginFail, &acct.ID, nil, `{"reason":"account_locked"}`)
		u.render(w, "login", LoginData{Error: "account temporarily locked, please try again later"})
		return
	}

	// Verify password.
	ok, err := auth.VerifyPassword(password, acct.PasswordHash)
	if err != nil || !ok {
		u.writeAudit(r, model.EventLoginFail, &acct.ID, nil, `{"reason":"wrong_password"}`)
		_ = u.db.RecordLoginFailure(acct.ID)
		u.render(w, "login", LoginData{Error: "invalid credentials"})
		return
	}

	// TOTP required: issue a server-side nonce and show the TOTP step form.
	// Security: the nonce replaces the password hidden field (F-02). The password
	// is not stored anywhere after this point; only the account ID is retained.
	if acct.TOTPRequired {
		nonce, err := u.issueTOTPNonce(acct.ID)
		if err != nil {
			u.logger.Error("issue TOTP nonce", "error", err)
			u.render(w, "login", LoginData{Error: "internal error"})
			return
		}
		u.render(w, "totp_step", LoginData{
			Username: username,
			Nonce:    nonce,
		})
		return
	}

	u.finishLogin(w, r, acct)
}

// handleTOTPStep handles the second POST when totp_step=1 is set.
// It consumes the single-use nonce to retrieve the account, then validates
// the submitted TOTP code before completing the login.
//
// The body has already been limited by MaxBytesReader in handleLoginPost
// before ParseForm was called; r.FormValue reads from the already-parsed
// in-memory form cache, not the network stream.
func (u *UIServer) handleTOTPStep(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	// Body is already size-limited and parsed by the caller (handleLoginPost).
	username := r.FormValue("username")  //nolint:gosec // body already limited by caller
	nonce := r.FormValue("totp_nonce")   //nolint:gosec // body already limited by caller
	totpCode := r.FormValue("totp_code") //nolint:gosec // body already limited by caller

	// Security: consume the nonce (single-use); reject if unknown or expired.
	accountID, ok := u.consumeTOTPNonce(nonce)
	if !ok {
		u.writeAudit(r, model.EventLoginFail, nil, nil,
			fmt.Sprintf(`{"username":%q,"reason":"invalid_totp_nonce"}`, username))
		u.render(w, "login", LoginData{Error: "session expired, please log in again"})
		return
	}

	acct, err := u.db.GetAccountByID(accountID)
	if err != nil {
		u.logger.Error("get account for TOTP step", "error", err, "account_id", accountID)
		u.render(w, "login", LoginData{Error: "internal error"})
		return
	}

	// Decrypt and validate TOTP secret.
	secret, err := crypto.OpenAESGCM(u.masterKey, acct.TOTPSecretNonce, acct.TOTPSecretEnc)
	if err != nil {
		u.logger.Error("decrypt TOTP secret", "error", err, "account_id", acct.ID)
		u.render(w, "login", LoginData{Error: "internal error"})
		return
	}
	valid, err := auth.ValidateTOTP(secret, totpCode)
	if err != nil || !valid {
		u.writeAudit(r, model.EventLoginTOTPFail, &acct.ID, nil, `{"reason":"wrong_totp"}`)
		_ = u.db.RecordLoginFailure(acct.ID)
		// Re-issue a fresh nonce so the user can retry without going back to step 1.
		newNonce, nonceErr := u.issueTOTPNonce(acct.ID)
		if nonceErr != nil {
			u.render(w, "login", LoginData{Error: "internal error"})
			return
		}
		u.render(w, "totp_step", LoginData{
			Error:    "invalid TOTP code",
			Username: username,
			Nonce:    newNonce,
		})
		return
	}

	u.finishLogin(w, r, acct)
}

// finishLogin issues a JWT, sets the session cookie, and redirects to dashboard.
func (u *UIServer) finishLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, acct *model.Account) {
	// Determine token expiry based on admin role.
	expiry := u.cfg.DefaultExpiry()
	roles, err := u.db.GetRoles(acct.ID)
	if err != nil {
		u.render(w, "login", LoginData{Error: "internal error"})
		return
	}
	for _, rol := range roles {
		if rol == "admin" {
			expiry = u.cfg.AdminExpiry()
			break
		}
	}

	// Login succeeded: clear any outstanding failure counter.
	_ = u.db.ClearLoginFailures(acct.ID)

	tokenStr, claims, err := token.IssueToken(u.privKey, u.cfg.Tokens.Issuer, acct.UUID, roles, expiry)
	if err != nil {
		u.logger.Error("issue token", "error", err)
		u.render(w, "login", LoginData{Error: "internal error"})
		return
	}

	if err := u.db.TrackToken(claims.JTI, acct.ID, claims.IssuedAt, claims.ExpiresAt); err != nil {
		u.logger.Error("track token", "error", err)
		u.render(w, "login", LoginData{Error: "internal error"})
		return
	}

	// Security: set session cookie as HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Strict.
	// Path=/ so it is sent on all UI routes (not just /ui/*).
	http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
		Name:     sessionCookieName,
		Value:    tokenStr,
		Path:     "/",
		HttpOnly: true,
		Secure:   true,
		SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,
		Expires:  claims.ExpiresAt,
	})

	// Set CSRF tokens for subsequent requests.
	if _, err := u.setCSRFCookies(w); err != nil {
		u.logger.Error("set CSRF cookie", "error", err)
	}

	u.writeAudit(r, model.EventLoginOK, &acct.ID, nil, "")
	u.writeAudit(r, model.EventTokenIssued, &acct.ID, nil,
		fmt.Sprintf(`{"jti":%q,"via":"ui"}`, claims.JTI))

	// Redirect to dashboard.
	if isHTMX(r) {
		w.Header().Set("HX-Redirect", "/dashboard")
		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
		return
	}
	http.Redirect(w, r, "/dashboard", http.StatusFound)
}

// handleLogout revokes the session token and clears the cookie.
func (u *UIServer) handleLogout(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	cookie, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName)
	if err == nil && cookie.Value != "" {
		claims, err := validateSessionToken(u.pubKey, cookie.Value, u.cfg.Tokens.Issuer)
		if err == nil {
			if revokeErr := u.db.RevokeToken(claims.JTI, "ui_logout"); revokeErr != nil {
				u.logger.Warn("revoke token on UI logout", "error", revokeErr)
			}
			u.writeAudit(r, model.EventTokenRevoked, nil, nil,
				fmt.Sprintf(`{"jti":%q,"reason":"ui_logout"}`, claims.JTI))
		}
	}
	u.clearSessionCookie(w)
	http.Redirect(w, r, "/login", http.StatusFound)
}

// writeAudit is a fire-and-forget audit log helper for the UI package.
func (u *UIServer) writeAudit(r *http.Request, eventType string, actorID, targetID *int64, details string) {
	ip := clientIP(r)
	if err := u.db.WriteAuditEvent(eventType, actorID, targetID, ip, details); err != nil {
		u.logger.Warn("write audit event", "type", eventType, "error", err)
	}
}

// handleProfilePage renders the profile page for the currently logged-in user.
func (u *UIServer) handleProfilePage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	csrfToken, _ := u.setCSRFCookies(w)
	u.render(w, "profile", ProfileData{
		PageData: PageData{
			CSRFToken: csrfToken,
			ActorName: u.actorName(r),
		},
	})
}

// handleSelfChangePassword allows an authenticated human user to change their
// own password.  The current password must be supplied to prevent a stolen
// session token from being used to take over an account.
//
// Security: current password is verified with Argon2id (constant-time) before
// the new hash is written.  Lockout is checked first so the endpoint cannot
// be used to brute-force the existing password.  On success all other active
// sessions are revoked; the caller's own session is preserved so they remain
// logged in.  The plaintext passwords are never logged or returned.
func (u *UIServer) handleSelfChangePassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxFormBytes)
	if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
		u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid form")
		return
	}

	claims := claimsFromContext(r.Context())
	if claims == nil {
		u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized")
		return
	}

	acct, err := u.db.GetAccountByUUID(claims.Subject)
	if err != nil {
		u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, "account not found")
		return
	}
	if acct.AccountType != model.AccountTypeHuman {
		u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "password change is only available for human accounts")
		return
	}

	currentPassword := r.FormValue("current_password")
	newPassword := r.FormValue("new_password")
	confirmPassword := r.FormValue("confirm_password")

	if currentPassword == "" || newPassword == "" {
		u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "current and new password are required")
		return
	}
	// Server-side confirmation check mirrors the client-side guard; defends
	// against direct POST requests that bypass the JavaScript validation.
	if newPassword != confirmPassword {
		u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "passwords do not match")
		return
	}

	// Security: check lockout before running Argon2 to prevent brute-force.
	locked, lockErr := u.db.IsLockedOut(acct.ID)
	if lockErr != nil {
		u.logger.Error("lockout check (UI self-service password change)", "error", lockErr)
	}
	if locked {
		u.writeAudit(r, model.EventPasswordChanged, &acct.ID, &acct.ID, `{"result":"locked"}`)
		u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "account temporarily locked, please try again later")
		return
	}

	// Security: verify current password with constant-time Argon2id path used
	// at login so this endpoint cannot serve as a timing oracle.
	ok, verifyErr := auth.VerifyPassword(currentPassword, acct.PasswordHash)
	if verifyErr != nil || !ok {
		_ = u.db.RecordLoginFailure(acct.ID)
		u.writeAudit(r, model.EventPasswordChanged, &acct.ID, &acct.ID, `{"result":"wrong_current_password"}`)
		u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, "current password is incorrect")
		return
	}

	// Security (F-13): enforce minimum length before hashing.
	if err := validate.Password(newPassword); err != nil {
		u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
		return
	}

	hash, err := auth.HashPassword(newPassword, auth.ArgonParams{
		Time:    u.cfg.Argon2.Time,
		Memory:  u.cfg.Argon2.Memory,
		Threads: u.cfg.Argon2.Threads,
	})
	if err != nil {
		u.logger.Error("hash password (UI self-service)", "error", err)
		u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error")
		return
	}

	if err := u.db.UpdatePasswordHash(acct.ID, hash); err != nil {
		u.logger.Error("update password hash", "error", err)
		u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to update password")
		return
	}

	// Security: clear failure counter (user proved knowledge of current
	// password), then revoke all sessions except the current one so stale
	// tokens are invalidated while the caller stays logged in.
	_ = u.db.ClearLoginFailures(acct.ID)
	if err := u.db.RevokeAllUserTokensExcept(acct.ID, claims.JTI, "password_changed"); err != nil {
		u.logger.Error("revoke other tokens on UI password change", "account_id", acct.ID, "error", err)
		u.renderError(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "password updated but session revocation failed; revoke tokens manually")
		return
	}

	u.writeAudit(r, model.EventPasswordChanged, &acct.ID, &acct.ID, `{"via":"ui_self_service"}`)

	csrfToken, _ := u.setCSRFCookies(w)
	u.render(w, "password_change_result", ProfileData{
		PageData: PageData{
			CSRFToken: csrfToken,
			ActorName: u.actorName(r),
			Flash:     "Password updated successfully. Other active sessions have been revoked.",
		},
	})
}