- S4: TinesNode::trust_system_clock(now) and trust_wall_clock(wall, now)
give a ROS2-only fleet a local trusted-time source, with the same
plausibility bounds as the service (tines::trust).
- Decision J: poll collects peer estimates for a window (default 10 s,
set_peer_time_window_ms) from the first plausible one and adopts the
latest, once; implausible estimates (B3) are never adopted.
- S5: adoption goes through tines::trust::adopt_wall_clock, which flushes
the store right after set_wall_clock.
- has_trusted_time() reports whether a wall time was adopted.
The `ros2` feature is outside the default gate; the shared logic is
tested in `tines`, and these methods were type-checked against it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- B3: HostClock::wall_ms saturates. New `tines::trust` module: wall times
outside WALL_FLOOR_MS (2026-01-01Z) ..= WALL_CEILING_MS (+100 years) are
never adopted, from a peer or the system clock.
- Decision J: `serve` takes `peer_time_window_ms`; PeerTimeWindow opens on
the first plausible estimate, keeps the latest (advanced by ticks), and
adopts once when the window closes. The scan stops once trusted.
- S5: adopt_wall_clock flushes right after set_wall_clock.
- S6: `trusted_clock` accepts only "system", Config denies unknown fields,
an implausible system clock is logged and left to the peer path, and the
docs say to order the unit after time-sync.target. New config key
`peer_time_window_ms` (default 10000).
- Tests: the observed_at and time_from_peer tests now run the host's own
logic through `serve`; smallest_age_wins is replaced by window and
latest-estimate tests (the latter ignored until the store returns the
latest estimate); forged u64::MAX and below-floor estimates aren't
adopted and don't panic the host.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- The drop table now empties on drain, keys included. Before, after 32
distinct (addr, reason) pairs every later drop went to the overflow
slot until reboot. The overflow slot's reason is documented as that of
the first drop to overflow since the last drain (review S7).
- F9's receive-side check accepts a summary at least
SUMMARY_INTERVAL_MS / 2 after the last one acted on, so an on-time
summary measured at 1999 ms isn't ignored (decision L, review D-f).
- DropReason::IdentityChanged loses its variant-level non_exhaustive,
which made it unmatchable outside the crate; the enum keeps its own.
- Stale comments: drain_events is used by Node (drop the dead_code
allow), and NodeEvent drops are this node's, not the peer's.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The reassembler decoded with postcard::from_bytes, which accepts
trailing bytes. It now uses take_from_bytes and rejects a non-empty
remainder, as Frame::decode does (spec §10 F13).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The idle check ran only in on_frame and only for the peer that just
sent, so a peer that went quiet, or never sent (contact-only), held its
slot forever: eight spoofed addresses locked out every newcomer
(review S1).
Peers now record when their contact started (added_at), and idle peers
(now - last_inbound.unwrap_or(added_at) > PEER_IDLE_MS) are swept as if
Lost before a peer is added and at the top of next_frame. A peer that
resumes after its idle window is an implicit new contact: its frame is
processed rather than silently dropped. A repeat Contact restarts the
idle clock.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- remove_peer purges only the removed peer's pending acks, not every
peer's (review S9, F13).
- bcast_sent records for an address are dropped when its contact starts
or ends, and a broadcast whose send fails has its record undone, so a
broadcast Ack is accepted only for this contact's dispatched frames
(review S10).
- A repeat Contact for a known peer starts a new contact: it resets the
F6 pin and the per-contact bounce and receipt records (spec §10 F6).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Core re-checks dest when building the summary Bloom filter, rebuilding
a peer's broadcast send queue, and emitting a broadcast, so a store
whose for_each_broadcast_id yields addressed ids can't leak them into a
summary or forward them (expired) as broadcasts (review S11).
Adds UnfilteredStore, a test store whose iterators yield every held id,
released and broadcast ones included, pinning spec §4's 'core never
trusts a backend's filtering' for custody, acks and summaries (B8).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
I: LogStore snapshots the log at the end of open and after the
set_wall_clock fold, so fold results and age lineage survive reboots.
J: hosts adopt the latest peer time estimate within a short window,
bounded, once per run.
K: local constants become pub(crate); only wire constants stay public.
L: quarantined entries are exempt from the count trims; the F9 summary
rate limit accepts at SUMMARY_INTERVAL_MS / 2; Observation.sig stays a
public field and §2's wording is corrected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Record the public 1.0 API that 941a7ce introduced in place of the revived
store_mut backdoor: the opt-in WallClockStore trait (FoldReport,
set_wall_clock, peer_time_estimate) and Node::set_wall_clock /
Node::peer_time_estimate, bounded on S: WallClockStore. Updates §3's
public table and Node method list and §9's fold and time-from-peers
text; core still never interprets wall time.
Also split the drain_events sentence into its own §3 bullet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task 10b reached LogStore::set_wall_clock through a general Node::store_mut.
Kyle: replace it with a narrower accessor. A WallClockStore trait (set_wall_clock
+ peer_time_estimate, implemented only by LogStore) now backs Node::set_wall_clock
and Node::peer_time_estimate, so no &mut Store escapes the facade.
The workspace build pulls in bluer -> dbus -> libdbus-sys, which links
against the system D-Bus library. The ubuntu-latest runner has pkg-config
but not dbus-1.pc, so libdbus-sys's build script fails. Install the
libdbus-1-dev headers (matching Dockerfile.ros2) before running the gate.
The store opens before trusted time. Observations already in the log
are quarantined (not summarised, offered, believed or age-trimmed;
addressed ones report released) until LogStore::set_wall_clock runs the
downtime fold. Trusted time comes from the robot's RTC/GPS, else a
peer's observed_at + age_ms (smallest age wins), else the robot's own
fail-safe. Supersedes "don't open the store until trusted time".
Plan: Task 10 rewritten (quarantine, set_wall_clock, FoldReport,
derived marker wall time); new Task 10b (host trusted-time state
machine, time from peers, observed_at).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- F: Store::flush(now) with a no-op default; Node::flush(now) replaces
Node::store_mut. The caller's now anchors ages (fixes LogStore's stale
clock marker, F18).
- G: age_ms is documented as a lower bound. Robots are assumed to have a
trusted wall clock (RTC or GPS); LogStore adds power-off time on open
from a wall-clock flush marker. Unknown downtime expires held addressed
messages and floors held broadcasts' age at unknown_downtime_age_ms.
Hosts set observed_at.
- AGENTS.md: specs and plans change only to record decisions Kyle has
discussed and agreed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- README: custody chain and receipts replace epidemic forwarding; Ack
frame; running on a robot (host crates, current limits); security;
crate layout, constants and reading list.
- AGENTS.md: current spec list, receipt constraints and review focus
7-8, first_seq rule, constants, host crates and the ros2 gate.
- THREAT_MODEL.md: re-checked at 89041ea. F1, F2, F5, F17 fixed; F3
(single configured peer) and F4 partly fixed; new F18 (no scheduled
flush, stale clock marker).
- CHANGELOG: Unreleased section for the fleet milestone and fixes.
- tines-bt README: single-peer limit; manual BLE check not yet recorded.
- tines service rustdoc: oversized-frame behaviour, JSON tagging, clock.
- 1.0 spec: approved (2026-10-20), including §10 and the adversarial
fuzz mode.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Exchange::accept enqueued a pending ack whenever
!(duplicate && addressed && released) held, even when the backend
store.insert returned Err (store full / backend error). On Err the
released flag computed to false, so an ack was still enqueued: a
receiver that did not keep the message acked it. For an addressed
offer that releases the sender's custody for a message nobody holds;
for a broadcast it fires a false confidence event at the sender.
Gate the ack enqueue on res.is_ok(): enqueue only when the store
actually retained the observation. The existing released-holder
exception still applies among kept copies. No bounce is recorded on
Err (already the case).
Adds a unit test exercising a capped store (StoreError::Full) for
both a broadcast and an addressed offer, and a tines-sim property
that drives custody with CappedStore-backed nodes and asserts the
"at least one holder" invariant still holds when stores fill.
Rewrite tines-ros2/src/node.rs against the rclrs 0.8 API (Context::
default_from_env -> create_basic_executor -> create_node; type-inferred
subscriptions; thiserror-based RclrsError) and switch payloads from
std_msgs String to UInt8MultiArray:
* live topics publish the raw Observation.bytes as data (no UTF-8 lossy);
* inbound callbacks use msg.data verbatim;
* receipts are a 32-byte UInt8MultiArray (peer[..16] ++ id[..16]);
* supply the required MultiArrayLayout { dim: [], data_offset: 0 }.
Bump ros_env 0.1 -> 0.3 so the crate's std_msgs pins rclrs 0.8's rosidl
runtime 0.7 (was 0.6), and update Cargo.lock. Add #[allow(dead_code)] on
ManagedTopic::subscriber (drop-guard for the rcl subscription handle).
Keep the ROS2-free build green; no changes outside tines-ros2/ (and the
Cargo.lock entry).
serve() now replies with Response::Error on a malformed JSON frame and
keeps the connection serving instead of dropping it on the parse error;
the per-connection loop only breaks on a clean disconnect
(UnexpectedEof). node.lock().unwrap() is replaced with poison-safe
into_inner() so one panicking handler can't take down the daemon.
Drop duplicate tines-core/tines-store/serde/serde_json from
dev-dependencies (only heapless is genuinely test-only).
kyleandClaude Opus 5.5