The fuzz oracle and its proptest twin checked much less than §7 claims (S8). The harness now: - records every frame the node attempts to send, before the transport can refuse it, so the "every frame fits mtu()" check can fail; - reads the MTU from its own u16 (input bytes 1-2), mapped into MIN_MTU..=MAX_FRAME, instead of reusing the first step tag; - reconciles drained drop counts per address: VersionMismatch/Malformed drops equal the frames that fail decode (the overflow slot makes up any difference), IdentityChanged drops never exceed frames whose `from` changed, and nothing is counted beyond the frames received; - checks no addressed observation is stored, or forwarded in an Obs frame, past its lifetime; - checks signatures round-trip from the input (an observation stored from a whole Obs frame keeps exactly its signature, and a stored signature never changes), replacing the input-independent sig_round_trip call; - checks every acked id is stored (F1) and bounds the broadcast ids offered per received summary by SEND_QUEUE_CAP (F9); - has a real adversarial Mode (input byte 0): well-formed Obs, Frag, Summary and Ack frames from 3 x MAX_PEERS addresses, with signed and max-size observations (u16 payload lengths), chosen observers (including the node's own id), ages, lifetimes and addressing, structured fragment streams that conflict, repeat or arrive out of order, replayed summaries, `from` values that change within a contact, and Acks from the peer's real id naming ids the node really sent; - adds the §10 peer-table recovery probe, which the fuzz target runs after every adversarial input. fuzz_twin.rs now runs the fuzz entry point on random bytes, generated adversarial steps, and two rewritten properties that were trivially true: summary_repeat_does_not_resend seeds broadcasts and checks a replay re-sends nothing while the next on-time summary re-sends all; peer_table_recovers_after_flood floods the table, checks it is full, and probes recovery after PEER_IDLE_MS. The recovery tests are #[ignore]d until the S1 idle sweep lands, and the fuzz target fails on the first adversarial input until then. A 180 s nightly run with the probe disabled found nothing else. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
17 lines
611 B
Rust
17 lines
611 B
Rust
//! cargo-fuzz entry point for the `tines-core` node harness.
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//!
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//! [`fuzz::run_input`] reads the mode and MTU from the first three bytes and
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//! drives the shared [`fuzz::Harness`] — the same oracle the proptest twin in
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//! `tines-core/tests/fuzz_twin.rs` runs, so a property checked here is
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//! checked there too. Adversarial-mode inputs also get the §10 peer-table
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//! recovery probe.
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#![no_main]
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libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
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if let Some(mut h) = fuzz::run_input(data) {
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if h.mode() == fuzz::Mode::Adversarial {
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h.check_peer_table_recovers();
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}
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}
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});
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