Files
metacrypt/internal/engine/user/user.go
Kyle Isom a80323e320 Add web UI for SSH CA, Transit, and User engines; full security audit and remediation
Web UI: Added browser-based management for all three remaining engines
(SSH CA, Transit, User E2E). Includes gRPC client wiring, handler files,
7 HTML templates, dashboard mount forms, and conditional navigation links.
Fixed REST API routes to match design specs (SSH CA cert singular paths,
Transit PATCH for update-key-config).

Security audit: Conducted full-system audit covering crypto core, all
engine implementations, API servers, policy engine, auth, deployment,
and documentation. Identified 42 new findings (#39-#80) across all
severity levels.

Remediation of all 8 High findings:
- #68: Replaced 14 JSON-injection-vulnerable error responses with safe
  json.Encoder via writeJSONError helper
- #48: Added two-layer path traversal defense (barrier validatePath
  rejects ".." segments; engine ValidateName enforces safe name pattern)
- #39: Extended RLock through entire crypto operations in barrier
  Get/Put/Delete/List to eliminate TOCTOU race with Seal
- #40: Unified ReWrapKeys and seal_config UPDATE into single SQLite
  transaction to prevent irrecoverable data loss on crash during MEK
  rotation
- #49: Added resolveTTL to CA engine enforcing issuer MaxTTL ceiling
  on handleIssue and handleSignCSR
- #61: Store raw ECDH private key bytes in userState for effective
  zeroization on Seal
- #62: Fixed user engine policy resource path from mountPath to
  mountName() so policy rules match correctly
- #69: Added newPolicyChecker helper and passed service-level policy
  evaluation to all 25 typed REST handler engine.Request structs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-16 22:02:06 -07:00

994 lines
25 KiB
Go

// Package user implements the user-to-user encryption engine.
package user
import (
"context"
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/ecdh"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf"
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/barrier"
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/crypto"
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/engine"
)
const (
maxRecipients = 100
nonceSize = 12
keySize = 32
hkdfInfoPrefix = "metacrypt-user-v1:"
)
var (
ErrSealed = errors.New("user: engine is sealed")
ErrForbidden = errors.New("user: forbidden")
ErrUnauthorized = errors.New("user: authentication required")
ErrUserNotFound = errors.New("user: user not found")
ErrUserExists = errors.New("user: user already exists")
ErrTooMany = errors.New("user: too many recipients")
ErrInvalidEnvelope = errors.New("user: invalid envelope")
ErrRecipientNotFound = errors.New("user: recipient entry not found in envelope")
ErrDecryptionFailed = errors.New("user: decryption failed")
ErrInvalidAlgorithm = errors.New("user: unsupported algorithm")
ErrNoRecipients = errors.New("user: no recipients specified")
)
// userState holds in-memory state for a loaded user.
type userState struct {
privKey *ecdh.PrivateKey
privBytes []byte // raw private key bytes, retained for zeroization
pubKey *ecdh.PublicKey
config *UserKeyConfig
}
// UserEngine implements the user-to-user encryption engine.
type UserEngine struct {
barrier barrier.Barrier
config *UserConfig
users map[string]*userState
mountPath string
mu sync.RWMutex
}
// NewUserEngine creates a new user engine instance.
func NewUserEngine() engine.Engine {
return &UserEngine{
users: make(map[string]*userState),
}
}
// mountName extracts the mount name from the full mount path.
// mountPath is "engine/user/{name}/".
func (e *UserEngine) mountName() string {
parts := strings.Split(strings.TrimSuffix(e.mountPath, "/"), "/")
if len(parts) >= 3 {
return parts[2]
}
return e.mountPath
}
func (e *UserEngine) Type() engine.EngineType {
return engine.EngineTypeUser
}
func (e *UserEngine) Initialize(ctx context.Context, b barrier.Barrier, mountPath string, config map[string]interface{}) error {
cfg := &UserConfig{
KeyAlgorithm: "x25519",
SymAlgorithm: "aes256-gcm",
}
if v, ok := config["key_algorithm"].(string); ok && v != "" {
cfg.KeyAlgorithm = v
}
if v, ok := config["sym_algorithm"].(string); ok && v != "" {
cfg.SymAlgorithm = v
}
if err := validateKeyAlgorithm(cfg.KeyAlgorithm); err != nil {
return err
}
if cfg.SymAlgorithm != "aes256-gcm" {
return fmt.Errorf("user: unsupported symmetric algorithm: %s", cfg.SymAlgorithm)
}
data, err := json.Marshal(cfg)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("user: marshal config: %w", err)
}
if err := b.Put(ctx, mountPath+"config.json", data); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("user: store config: %w", err)
}
e.barrier = b
e.config = cfg
e.mountPath = mountPath
e.users = make(map[string]*userState)
return nil
}
func (e *UserEngine) Unseal(ctx context.Context, b barrier.Barrier, mountPath string) error {
e.mu.Lock()
defer e.mu.Unlock()
e.barrier = b
e.mountPath = mountPath
// Load config.
data, err := b.Get(ctx, mountPath+"config.json")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("user: load config: %w", err)
}
var cfg UserConfig
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &cfg); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("user: parse config: %w", err)
}
e.config = &cfg
e.users = make(map[string]*userState)
// Load all user keys.
prefix := mountPath + "users/"
paths, err := b.List(ctx, prefix)
if err != nil {
return nil // no users yet
}
// Discover unique usernames from paths like "alice/config.json", "alice/priv.key".
seen := make(map[string]bool)
for _, p := range paths {
parts := strings.SplitN(p, "/", 2)
if len(parts) > 0 && parts[0] != "" {
seen[parts[0]] = true
}
}
for username := range seen {
if err := e.loadUser(ctx, username); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("user: load user %q: %w", username, err)
}
}
return nil
}
func (e *UserEngine) Seal() error {
e.mu.Lock()
defer e.mu.Unlock()
// Zeroize all private key material.
for _, u := range e.users {
if u.privBytes != nil {
crypto.Zeroize(u.privBytes)
u.privBytes = nil
}
u.privKey = nil
}
e.users = nil
e.config = nil
e.barrier = nil
return nil
}
func (e *UserEngine) HandleRequest(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*engine.Response, error) {
switch req.Operation {
case "register":
return e.handleRegister(ctx, req)
case "provision":
return e.handleProvision(ctx, req)
case "get-public-key":
return e.handleGetPublicKey(ctx, req)
case "list-users":
return e.handleListUsers(ctx, req)
case "encrypt":
return e.handleEncrypt(ctx, req)
case "decrypt":
return e.handleDecrypt(ctx, req)
case "re-encrypt":
return e.handleReEncrypt(ctx, req)
case "rotate-key":
return e.handleRotateKey(ctx, req)
case "delete-user":
return e.handleDeleteUser(ctx, req)
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: unknown operation: %s", req.Operation)
}
}
// --- Operation handlers ---
func (e *UserEngine) handleRegister(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*engine.Response, error) {
if req.CallerInfo == nil {
return nil, ErrUnauthorized
}
username := req.CallerInfo.Username
e.mu.RLock()
if u, ok := e.users[username]; ok {
pubB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(u.pubKey.Bytes())
e.mu.RUnlock()
return &engine.Response{Data: map[string]interface{}{
"username": username,
"public_key": pubB64,
"algorithm": u.config.Algorithm,
}}, nil
}
e.mu.RUnlock()
e.mu.Lock()
defer e.mu.Unlock()
// Double-check after acquiring write lock.
if u, ok := e.users[username]; ok {
pubB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(u.pubKey.Bytes())
return &engine.Response{Data: map[string]interface{}{
"username": username,
"public_key": pubB64,
"algorithm": u.config.Algorithm,
}}, nil
}
u, err := e.createUser(ctx, username, false)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
pubB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(u.pubKey.Bytes())
return &engine.Response{Data: map[string]interface{}{
"username": username,
"public_key": pubB64,
"algorithm": u.config.Algorithm,
}}, nil
}
func (e *UserEngine) handleProvision(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*engine.Response, error) {
if req.CallerInfo == nil {
return nil, ErrUnauthorized
}
if !req.CallerInfo.IsAdmin {
return nil, ErrForbidden
}
username, _ := req.Data["username"].(string)
if username == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: username is required")
}
if err := engine.ValidateName(username); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: %w", err)
}
e.mu.Lock()
defer e.mu.Unlock()
// No-op if exists.
if u, ok := e.users[username]; ok {
pubB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(u.pubKey.Bytes())
return &engine.Response{Data: map[string]interface{}{
"username": username,
"public_key": pubB64,
"algorithm": u.config.Algorithm,
}}, nil
}
u, err := e.createUser(ctx, username, false)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
pubB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(u.pubKey.Bytes())
return &engine.Response{Data: map[string]interface{}{
"username": username,
"public_key": pubB64,
"algorithm": u.config.Algorithm,
}}, nil
}
func (e *UserEngine) handleGetPublicKey(_ context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*engine.Response, error) {
if req.CallerInfo == nil {
return nil, ErrUnauthorized
}
if !req.CallerInfo.IsUser() {
return nil, ErrForbidden
}
username, _ := req.Data["username"].(string)
if username == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: username is required")
}
e.mu.RLock()
defer e.mu.RUnlock()
u, ok := e.users[username]
if !ok {
return nil, ErrUserNotFound
}
pubB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(u.pubKey.Bytes())
return &engine.Response{Data: map[string]interface{}{
"username": username,
"public_key": pubB64,
"algorithm": u.config.Algorithm,
}}, nil
}
func (e *UserEngine) handleListUsers(_ context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*engine.Response, error) {
if req.CallerInfo == nil {
return nil, ErrUnauthorized
}
if !req.CallerInfo.IsUser() {
return nil, ErrForbidden
}
e.mu.RLock()
defer e.mu.RUnlock()
usernames := make([]interface{}, 0, len(e.users))
for name := range e.users {
usernames = append(usernames, name)
}
return &engine.Response{Data: map[string]interface{}{
"users": usernames,
}}, nil
}
func (e *UserEngine) handleEncrypt(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*engine.Response, error) {
if req.CallerInfo == nil {
return nil, ErrUnauthorized
}
if !req.CallerInfo.IsUser() {
return nil, ErrForbidden
}
plaintext, _ := req.Data["plaintext"].(string)
if plaintext == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: plaintext is required")
}
metadata, _ := req.Data["metadata"].(string)
recipientNames, err := extractRecipients(req.Data)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if len(recipientNames) == 0 {
return nil, ErrNoRecipients
}
if len(recipientNames) > maxRecipients {
return nil, ErrTooMany
}
for _, r := range recipientNames {
if err := engine.ValidateName(r); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: invalid recipient: %w", err)
}
}
sender := req.CallerInfo.Username
// Policy check for each recipient.
if req.CheckPolicy != nil {
for _, r := range recipientNames {
resource := fmt.Sprintf("user/%s/recipient/%s", e.mountName(), r)
effect, matched := req.CheckPolicy(resource, "write")
if matched && effect == "deny" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: forbidden: policy denies encryption to recipient %s", r)
}
}
}
e.mu.Lock()
// Auto-provision sender if not registered.
if _, ok := e.users[sender]; !ok {
if _, err := e.createUser(ctx, sender, true); err != nil {
e.mu.Unlock()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: auto-provision sender: %w", err)
}
}
// Auto-provision recipients without keys.
for _, r := range recipientNames {
if _, ok := e.users[r]; !ok {
if _, err := e.createUser(ctx, r, true); err != nil {
e.mu.Unlock()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: auto-provision recipient %s: %w", r, err)
}
}
}
senderState := e.users[sender]
recipientStates := make(map[string]*userState, len(recipientNames))
for _, r := range recipientNames {
recipientStates[r] = e.users[r]
}
e.mu.Unlock()
// Generate random DEK.
dek := make([]byte, keySize)
if _, err := rand.Read(dek); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: generate DEK: %w", err)
}
defer crypto.Zeroize(dek)
// Encrypt plaintext with DEK.
var aad []byte
if metadata != "" {
aad = []byte(metadata)
}
ct, err := encryptAESGCM(dek, []byte(plaintext), aad)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: encrypt plaintext: %w", err)
}
// Wrap DEK for each recipient.
recipients := make(map[string]*recipientEntry, len(recipientNames))
for _, rName := range recipientNames {
rState := recipientStates[rName]
entry, wrapErr := wrapDEKForRecipient(senderState.privKey, rState.pubKey, dek, sender, rName)
if wrapErr != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: wrap DEK for %s: %w", rName, wrapErr)
}
recipients[rName] = entry
}
env := &envelope{
Version: 1,
Sender: sender,
SymAlgorithm: e.config.SymAlgorithm,
Ciphertext: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(ct),
Metadata: metadata,
Recipients: recipients,
}
envJSON, err := json.Marshal(env)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: marshal envelope: %w", err)
}
envB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(envJSON)
return &engine.Response{Data: map[string]interface{}{
"envelope": envB64,
}}, nil
}
func (e *UserEngine) handleDecrypt(_ context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*engine.Response, error) {
if req.CallerInfo == nil {
return nil, ErrUnauthorized
}
caller := req.CallerInfo.Username
envelopeB64, _ := req.Data["envelope"].(string)
if envelopeB64 == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: envelope is required")
}
env, err := parseEnvelope(envelopeB64)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Self-only: caller must be a recipient.
entry, ok := env.Recipients[caller]
if !ok {
return nil, ErrRecipientNotFound
}
e.mu.RLock()
callerState, callerExists := e.users[caller]
senderState, senderExists := e.users[env.Sender]
e.mu.RUnlock()
if !callerExists {
return nil, ErrUserNotFound
}
if !senderExists {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: sender %q not found", env.Sender)
}
// Unwrap DEK.
dek, err := unwrapDEK(callerState.privKey, senderState.pubKey, entry, env.Sender, caller)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: unwrap DEK: %w", err)
}
defer crypto.Zeroize(dek)
// Decrypt ciphertext.
ct, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(env.Ciphertext)
if err != nil {
return nil, ErrInvalidEnvelope
}
var aad []byte
if env.Metadata != "" {
aad = []byte(env.Metadata)
}
plaintext, err := decryptAESGCM(dek, ct, aad)
if err != nil {
return nil, ErrDecryptionFailed
}
resp := map[string]interface{}{
"plaintext": string(plaintext),
"sender": env.Sender,
}
if env.Metadata != "" {
resp["metadata"] = env.Metadata
}
return &engine.Response{Data: resp}, nil
}
func (e *UserEngine) handleReEncrypt(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*engine.Response, error) {
if req.CallerInfo == nil {
return nil, ErrUnauthorized
}
caller := req.CallerInfo.Username
envelopeB64, _ := req.Data["envelope"].(string)
if envelopeB64 == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: envelope is required")
}
env, err := parseEnvelope(envelopeB64)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Self-only: caller must be a recipient.
entry, ok := env.Recipients[caller]
if !ok {
return nil, ErrRecipientNotFound
}
e.mu.RLock()
callerState, callerExists := e.users[caller]
senderState, senderExists := e.users[env.Sender]
e.mu.RUnlock()
if !callerExists {
return nil, ErrUserNotFound
}
if !senderExists {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: sender %q not found", env.Sender)
}
// Unwrap DEK using old keys.
dek, err := unwrapDEK(callerState.privKey, senderState.pubKey, entry, env.Sender, caller)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: unwrap DEK: %w", err)
}
defer crypto.Zeroize(dek)
// Verify we can decrypt (validates envelope integrity).
ct, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(env.Ciphertext)
if err != nil {
return nil, ErrInvalidEnvelope
}
var aad []byte
if env.Metadata != "" {
aad = []byte(env.Metadata)
}
plaintext, err := decryptAESGCM(dek, ct, aad)
if err != nil {
return nil, ErrDecryptionFailed
}
// Generate new DEK and re-encrypt.
newDEK := make([]byte, keySize)
if _, err := rand.Read(newDEK); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: generate new DEK: %w", err)
}
defer crypto.Zeroize(newDEK)
newCT, err := encryptAESGCM(newDEK, plaintext, aad)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: re-encrypt: %w", err)
}
// Re-wrap for same recipients with current keys, using caller as new sender.
e.mu.RLock()
newRecipients := make(map[string]*recipientEntry, len(env.Recipients))
for rName := range env.Recipients {
rState, exists := e.users[rName]
if !exists {
e.mu.RUnlock()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: recipient %q not found for re-encrypt", rName)
}
re, wrapErr := wrapDEKForRecipient(callerState.privKey, rState.pubKey, newDEK, caller, rName)
if wrapErr != nil {
e.mu.RUnlock()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: re-wrap DEK for %s: %w", rName, wrapErr)
}
newRecipients[rName] = re
}
e.mu.RUnlock()
newEnv := &envelope{
Version: 1,
Sender: caller,
SymAlgorithm: env.SymAlgorithm,
Ciphertext: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(newCT),
Metadata: env.Metadata,
Recipients: newRecipients,
}
envJSON, err := json.Marshal(newEnv)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: marshal envelope: %w", err)
}
envB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(envJSON)
return &engine.Response{Data: map[string]interface{}{
"envelope": envB64,
}}, nil
}
func (e *UserEngine) handleRotateKey(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*engine.Response, error) {
if req.CallerInfo == nil {
return nil, ErrUnauthorized
}
caller := req.CallerInfo.Username
e.mu.Lock()
defer e.mu.Unlock()
oldState, ok := e.users[caller]
if !ok {
return nil, ErrUserNotFound
}
// Generate new keypair.
priv, err := generateKey(e.config.KeyAlgorithm)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: rotate key: %w", err)
}
// Store new keys in barrier.
if err := e.storeUserKeys(ctx, caller, priv, oldState.config.AutoProvisioned); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: rotate key: %w", err)
}
// Zeroize old key.
oldRaw := oldState.privKey.Bytes()
crypto.Zeroize(oldRaw)
// Update in-memory state.
e.users[caller] = &userState{
privKey: priv,
pubKey: priv.PublicKey(),
config: &UserKeyConfig{
Algorithm: e.config.KeyAlgorithm,
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
AutoProvisioned: oldState.config.AutoProvisioned,
},
}
pubB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(priv.PublicKey().Bytes())
return &engine.Response{Data: map[string]interface{}{
"username": caller,
"public_key": pubB64,
"algorithm": e.config.KeyAlgorithm,
}}, nil
}
func (e *UserEngine) handleDeleteUser(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*engine.Response, error) {
if req.CallerInfo == nil {
return nil, ErrUnauthorized
}
if !req.CallerInfo.IsAdmin {
return nil, ErrForbidden
}
username, _ := req.Data["username"].(string)
if username == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: username is required")
}
e.mu.Lock()
defer e.mu.Unlock()
oldState, ok := e.users[username]
if !ok {
return nil, ErrUserNotFound
}
// Zeroize private key.
oldRaw := oldState.privKey.Bytes()
crypto.Zeroize(oldRaw)
// Delete from barrier.
prefix := e.mountPath + "users/" + username + "/"
paths, err := e.barrier.List(ctx, prefix)
if err == nil {
for _, p := range paths {
_ = e.barrier.Delete(ctx, prefix+p)
}
}
delete(e.users, username)
return &engine.Response{Data: map[string]interface{}{
"ok": true,
}}, nil
}
// --- Internal helpers ---
// createUser generates a new keypair and stores it. Caller must hold e.mu write lock.
func (e *UserEngine) createUser(ctx context.Context, username string, autoProvisioned bool) (*userState, error) {
priv, err := generateKey(e.config.KeyAlgorithm)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("generate key for %s: %w", username, err)
}
if err := e.storeUserKeys(ctx, username, priv, autoProvisioned); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
u := &userState{
privKey: priv,
privBytes: priv.Bytes(), // retain copy for zeroization on Seal
pubKey: priv.PublicKey(),
config: &UserKeyConfig{
Algorithm: e.config.KeyAlgorithm,
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
AutoProvisioned: autoProvisioned,
},
}
e.users[username] = u
return u, nil
}
// storeUserKeys persists user key material to the barrier. Caller must hold e.mu write lock.
func (e *UserEngine) storeUserKeys(ctx context.Context, username string, priv *ecdh.PrivateKey, autoProvisioned bool) error {
prefix := e.mountPath + "users/" + username + "/"
// Store private key.
if err := e.barrier.Put(ctx, prefix+"priv.key", priv.Bytes()); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("store private key: %w", err)
}
// Store public key.
if err := e.barrier.Put(ctx, prefix+"pub.key", priv.PublicKey().Bytes()); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("store public key: %w", err)
}
// Store config.
cfg := &UserKeyConfig{
Algorithm: e.config.KeyAlgorithm,
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
AutoProvisioned: autoProvisioned,
}
cfgData, err := json.Marshal(cfg)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("marshal key config: %w", err)
}
if err := e.barrier.Put(ctx, prefix+"config.json", cfgData); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("store key config: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// loadUser loads a single user's keys from the barrier into memory. Caller must hold e.mu write lock.
func (e *UserEngine) loadUser(ctx context.Context, username string) error {
prefix := e.mountPath + "users/" + username + "/"
// Load config first to know the algorithm.
cfgData, err := e.barrier.Get(ctx, prefix+"config.json")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err)
}
var cfg UserKeyConfig
if err := json.Unmarshal(cfgData, &cfg); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("parse config: %w", err)
}
// Load private key.
privBytes, err := e.barrier.Get(ctx, prefix+"priv.key")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("load private key: %w", err)
}
curve, err := curveForAlgorithm(cfg.Algorithm)
if err != nil {
return err
}
priv, err := curve.NewPrivateKey(privBytes)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("parse private key: %w", err)
}
e.users[username] = &userState{
privKey: priv,
privBytes: privBytes, // retained for zeroization on Seal
pubKey: priv.PublicKey(),
config: &cfg,
}
return nil
}
// --- Cryptographic helpers ---
func generateKey(algorithm string) (*ecdh.PrivateKey, error) {
curve, err := curveForAlgorithm(algorithm)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return curve.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
}
func curveForAlgorithm(algorithm string) (ecdh.Curve, error) {
switch algorithm {
case "x25519":
return ecdh.X25519(), nil
case "ecdh-p256":
return ecdh.P256(), nil
case "ecdh-p384":
return ecdh.P384(), nil
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrInvalidAlgorithm, algorithm)
}
}
func validateKeyAlgorithm(alg string) error {
_, err := curveForAlgorithm(alg)
return err
}
func wrapDEKForRecipient(senderPriv *ecdh.PrivateKey, recipientPub *ecdh.PublicKey, dek []byte, sender, recipient string) (*recipientEntry, error) {
shared, err := senderPriv.ECDH(recipientPub)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ECDH: %w", err)
}
defer crypto.Zeroize(shared)
// Generate HKDF salt.
salt := make([]byte, 32)
if _, err := rand.Read(salt); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("generate salt: %w", err)
}
// Derive wrapping key.
info := []byte(hkdfInfoPrefix + sender + ":" + recipient)
wrappingKey := make([]byte, keySize)
hkdfReader := hkdf.New(sha256.New, shared, salt, info)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(hkdfReader, wrappingKey); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("HKDF: %w", err)
}
defer crypto.Zeroize(wrappingKey)
// Wrap DEK with AES-256-GCM.
wrapped, err := encryptAESGCM(wrappingKey, dek, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("wrap DEK: %w", err)
}
return &recipientEntry{
Salt: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(salt),
WrappedDEK: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(wrapped),
}, nil
}
func unwrapDEK(callerPriv *ecdh.PrivateKey, senderPub *ecdh.PublicKey, entry *recipientEntry, sender, caller string) ([]byte, error) {
shared, err := callerPriv.ECDH(senderPub)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ECDH: %w", err)
}
defer crypto.Zeroize(shared)
salt, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(entry.Salt)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode salt: %w", err)
}
info := []byte(hkdfInfoPrefix + sender + ":" + caller)
wrappingKey := make([]byte, keySize)
hkdfReader := hkdf.New(sha256.New, shared, salt, info)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(hkdfReader, wrappingKey); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("HKDF: %w", err)
}
defer crypto.Zeroize(wrappingKey)
wrapped, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(entry.WrappedDEK)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode wrapped DEK: %w", err)
}
dek, err := decryptAESGCM(wrappingKey, wrapped, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unwrap DEK: %w", err)
}
return dek, nil
}
func encryptAESGCM(key, plaintext, aad []byte) ([]byte, error) {
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
nonce := make([]byte, nonceSize)
if _, err := rand.Read(nonce); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
ct := gcm.Seal(nil, nonce, plaintext, aad)
// Return nonce + ciphertext+tag.
result := make([]byte, nonceSize+len(ct))
copy(result, nonce)
copy(result[nonceSize:], ct)
return result, nil
}
func decryptAESGCM(key, data, aad []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if len(data) < nonceSize+16 { // nonce + at least one AES block
return nil, ErrInvalidEnvelope
}
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
gcm, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
nonce := data[:nonceSize]
ct := data[nonceSize:]
return gcm.Open(nil, nonce, ct, aad)
}
func parseEnvelope(b64 string) (*envelope, error) {
data, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(b64)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: base64 decode: %s", ErrInvalidEnvelope, err)
}
var env envelope
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &env); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: json unmarshal: %s", ErrInvalidEnvelope, err)
}
if env.Version != 1 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: unsupported version %d", ErrInvalidEnvelope, env.Version)
}
if env.Sender == "" || len(env.Recipients) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: missing sender or recipients", ErrInvalidEnvelope)
}
return &env, nil
}
func extractRecipients(data map[string]interface{}) ([]string, error) {
raw, ok := data["recipients"]
if !ok {
return nil, nil
}
switch v := raw.(type) {
case []interface{}:
names := make([]string, 0, len(v))
for _, item := range v {
s, ok := item.(string)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: recipient must be a string")
}
names = append(names, s)
}
return names, nil
case []string:
return v, nil
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: invalid recipients format")
}
}