Fix ECDH zeroization, add audit logging, and remediate high findings
- Fix #61: handleRotateKey and handleDeleteUser now zeroize stored privBytes instead of calling Bytes() (which returns a copy). New state populates privBytes; old references nil'd for GC. - Add audit logging subsystem (internal/audit) with structured event recording for cryptographic operations. - Add audit log engine spec (engines/auditlog.md). - Add ValidateName checks across all engines for path traversal (#48). - Update AUDIT.md: all High findings resolved (0 open). - Add REMEDIATION.md with detailed remediation tracking. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
55
AUDIT.md
55
AUDIT.md
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@
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- **2026-03-16**: Initial design review of ARCHITECTURE.md, engines/sshca.md, engines/transit.md. Issues #1–#24 identified. Subsequent engine design review of all three engine specs (sshca, transit, user). Issues #25–#38 identified.
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- **2026-03-17**: Full system audit covering implementation code, API surfaces, deployment, and documentation. Issues #39–#80 identified.
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- **2026-03-16**: High finding remediation validation. #39, #40, #49, #62, #68, #69 confirmed resolved. #48, #61 confirmed still open.
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- **2026-03-17**: #61 resolved — `handleRotateKey` and `handleDeleteUser` now zeroize stored `privBytes` instead of calling `Bytes()` (which returns a copy). New state in `handleRotateKey` populates `privBytes`. References to `*ecdh.PrivateKey` are nil'd for GC. Residual risk: Go's internal copy in `*ecdh.PrivateKey` cannot be zeroized.
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---
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@@ -164,13 +166,13 @@ A compromised token could issue unlimited encrypt/decrypt/sign requests.
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#### Issues
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**39. TOCTOU race in barrier Seal/Unseal**
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**39. ~~TOCTOU race in barrier Seal/Unseal~~ RESOLVED**
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`barrier.go`: `Seal()` zeroizes keys while concurrent operations may hold stale references between `RLock` release and actual use. A read operation could read the MEK, lose the lock, then use a zeroized key. Requires restructuring to hold the lock through the crypto operation or using atomic pointer swaps.
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`barrier.go`: `Get()` and `Put()` hold `RLock` (via `defer`) through the entire crypto operation including decryption/encryption. `Seal()` acquires an exclusive `Lock()`, which blocks until all RLock holders release. There is no window where a reader can use zeroized key material.
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**40. Crash during `ReWrapKeys` loses all barrier data**
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**40. ~~Crash during `ReWrapKeys` loses all barrier data~~ RESOLVED**
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`seal.go`: If the process crashes between re-encrypting all DEKs in `ReWrapKeys` and updating `seal_config` with the new MEK, all data becomes irrecoverable — the old MEK is gone and the new MEK was never persisted. This needs a two-phase commit or WAL-based approach.
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`seal.go`: `RotateMEK` now wraps both `ReWrapKeysTx` (re-encrypts all DEKs) and the `seal_config` update in a single SQLite transaction. A crash at any point results in full rollback or full commit — no partial state. In-memory state (`SwapMEK`) is updated only after successful commit.
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**41. `loadKeys` errors silently swallowed during unseal**
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@@ -204,13 +206,13 @@ A compromised token could issue unlimited encrypt/decrypt/sign requests.
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#### CA (PKI) Engine
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**48. Path traversal via unsanitized issuer names**
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**48. ~~Path traversal via unsanitized entity names in get/update/delete operations~~ RESOLVED**
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`ca/ca.go`: Issuer names from user input are concatenated directly into barrier paths (e.g., `engine/ca/{mount}/issuers/{name}/...`). A name containing `../` could write to arbitrary barrier locations. All engines should validate mount and entity names against a strict pattern (alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores).
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All engines now call `engine.ValidateName()` on every operation that accepts user-supplied names, not just create operations. Fixed in: CA (`handleGetChain`, `handleGetIssuer`, `handleDeleteIssuer`, `handleIssue`, `handleSignCSR`), SSH CA (`handleUpdateProfile`, `handleGetProfile`, `handleDeleteProfile`), Transit (`handleDeleteKey`, `handleGetKey`, `handleRotateKey`, `handleUpdateKeyConfig`, `handleTrimKey`, `handleGetPublicKey`), User (`handleRegister`, `handleGetPublicKey`, `handleDeleteUser`).
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**49. No TTL enforcement against issuer MaxTTL in issuance**
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**49. ~~No TTL enforcement against issuer MaxTTL in issuance~~ RESOLVED**
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`ca/ca.go`: The `handleIssue` and `handleSignCSR` operations accept a TTL from the user but do not enforce the issuer's `MaxTTL` ceiling. A user can request arbitrarily long certificate lifetimes.
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`ca/ca.go`: Both `handleIssue` and `handleSignCSR` now use a `resolveTTL` helper that parses the issuer's `MaxTTL`, caps the requested TTL against it, and returns an error if the requested TTL exceeds the maximum. Default TTL is the issuer's MaxTTL when none is specified.
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**50. Non-admin users can override key usages**
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@@ -262,13 +264,13 @@ A compromised token could issue unlimited encrypt/decrypt/sign requests.
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#### User E2E Encryption Engine
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**61. ECDH private key zeroization is ineffective**
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**61. ~~ECDH private key zeroization is ineffective~~ RESOLVED**
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`user/user.go`: `key.Bytes()` returns a copy of the private key bytes. Zeroizing this copy does not clear the original key material inside the `*ecdh.PrivateKey` struct. The actual private key remains in memory.
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`user/user.go`: `handleRotateKey` and `handleDeleteUser` now zeroize the stored `privBytes` field (retained at key creation time) instead of calling `Bytes()` which returns a new copy. The `privKey` and `privBytes` fields are nil'd after zeroization to allow GC of the `*ecdh.PrivateKey` object. Note: Go's `*ecdh.PrivateKey` internal bytes cannot be zeroized through the public API — this is a known limitation of Go's crypto library. The stored `privBytes` copy is the best-effort mitigation.
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**62. Policy resource path uses mountPath instead of mount name**
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**62. ~~Policy resource path uses mountPath instead of mount name~~ RESOLVED**
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`user/user.go`: Policy checks use the full mount path instead of the mount name. If the mount path differs from the name (which it does — paths include the `engine/` prefix), policy rules written against mount names will never match.
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`user/user.go`: A `mountName()` helper extracts the mount name from the full mount path (e.g., `"engine/user/mymount/"` → `"mymount"`). Policy resource paths are correctly constructed as `"user/{mountname}/recipient/{recipient}"`.
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**63. No role checks on decrypt, re-encrypt, and rotate-key**
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@@ -294,13 +296,13 @@ A compromised token could issue unlimited encrypt/decrypt/sign requests.
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#### REST API
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**68. JSON injection via unsanitized error messages**
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**68. ~~JSON injection via unsanitized error messages~~ RESOLVED**
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`server/routes.go`: Error messages are concatenated into JSON string literals using `fmt.Sprintf` without JSON escaping. An error message containing `"` or `\` could break the JSON structure, and a carefully crafted input could inject additional JSON fields.
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`server/routes.go`: All error responses now use `writeJSONError()` which delegates to `writeJSON()` → `json.NewEncoder().Encode()`, properly JSON-escaping all error message content.
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**69. Typed REST handlers bypass policy engine**
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**69. ~~Typed REST handlers bypass policy engine~~ RESOLVED**
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`server/routes.go`: The typed REST handlers for CA certificates, SSH CA operations, and user engine operations call the engine's `HandleRequest` directly without wrapping a `CheckPolicy` callback. Only the generic `/v1/engine/request` endpoint passes the policy checker. This means typed routes rely entirely on the engine's internal policy check, which (per #54, #58) may default-allow.
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`server/routes.go`: All typed REST handlers now pass a `CheckPolicy` callback via `s.newPolicyChecker(r, info)` or an inline policy checker function. This includes all SSH CA, transit, user, and CA handlers.
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**70. `RenewCert` gRPC RPC has no corresponding REST route**
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@@ -366,16 +368,7 @@ A compromised token could issue unlimited encrypt/decrypt/sign requests.
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### Open — High
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| # | Issue | Location |
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|---|-------|----------|
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| 39 | TOCTOU race in barrier Seal/Unseal allows use of zeroized keys | `barrier/barrier.go` |
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| 40 | Crash during `ReWrapKeys` makes all barrier data irrecoverable | `seal/seal.go` |
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| 48 | Path traversal via unsanitized issuer/entity names in all engines | `ca/ca.go`, all engines |
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| 49 | No TTL enforcement against issuer MaxTTL in cert issuance | `ca/ca.go` |
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| 61 | ECDH private key zeroization is ineffective (`Bytes()` returns copy) | `user/user.go` |
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| 62 | Policy resource path uses mountPath instead of mount name | `user/user.go` |
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| 68 | JSON injection via unsanitized error messages in REST API | `server/routes.go` |
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| 69 | Typed REST handlers bypass policy engine | `server/routes.go` |
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*None.*
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### Open — Medium
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@@ -435,13 +428,13 @@ A compromised token could issue unlimited encrypt/decrypt/sign requests.
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---
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## Resolved Issues (#1–#38)
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## Resolved Issues (#1–#38, plus #39, #40, #48, #49, #61, #62, #68, #69)
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All design review findings from the 2026-03-16 audit have been resolved or accepted. See the [Audit History](#audit-history) section. The following issues were resolved:
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**Critical** (all resolved): #4 (policy auth contradiction), #9 (user-controllable SSH serials), #13 (policy path collision), #37 (adminOnlyOperations name collision).
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**High** (all resolved): #5 (no path AAD), #6 (single MEK), #11 (critical_options unrestricted), #12 (no KRL), #15 (no min key version), #17 (RSA padding), #22 (no per-engine DEKs), #28 (HMAC not versioned), #30 (max_key_versions unclear), #33 (auto-provision arbitrary usernames).
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**High** (all resolved): #5 (no path AAD), #6 (single MEK), #11 (critical_options unrestricted), #12 (no KRL), #15 (no min key version), #17 (RSA padding), #22 (no per-engine DEKs), #28 (HMAC not versioned), #30 (max_key_versions unclear), #33 (auto-provision arbitrary usernames), #39 (TOCTOU race — RLock held through crypto ops), #40 (ReWrapKeys crash — atomic transaction), #48 (path traversal — ValidateName on all ops), #49 (TTL enforcement — resolveTTL helper), #61 (ECDH zeroization — use stored privBytes), #62 (policy path — mountName helper), #68 (JSON injection — writeJSONError), #69 (policy bypass — newPolicyChecker).
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**Medium** (all resolved or accepted): #1, #2, #3, #8, #20, #23, #24, #25, #26, #27, #29, #31, #34.
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@@ -453,10 +446,10 @@ All design review findings from the 2026-03-16 audit have been resolved or accep
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| Priority | Count | Status |
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|----------|-------|--------|
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| High | 8 | Open |
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| High | 0 | All resolved |
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| Medium | 21 | Open |
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| Low | 14 | Open |
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| Accepted | 3 | Closed |
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| Resolved | 38 | Closed |
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| Resolved | 46 | Closed |
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**Recommendation**: Address all High findings before the next deployment. The path traversal (#48, #72), default-allow policy violations (#54, #58, #69), and the barrier TOCTOU race (#39) are the most urgent. The JSON injection (#68) is exploitable if error messages contain user-controlled input. The user engine issues (#61–#67) should be addressed as a batch since they interact with each other.
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**Recommendation**: All High findings are resolved. The user engine medium issues (#63–#67) should be addressed as a batch since they interact with each other.
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709
REMEDIATION.md
709
REMEDIATION.md
@@ -561,19 +561,702 @@ subsystems (barrier/seal vs engines/server).
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---
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## Post-Remediation
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## Post-Remediation (High)
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After all eight findings are resolved:
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All eight High findings (#39, #40, #48, #49, #61, #62, #68, #69) have
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been resolved. See commit `a80323e`.
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1. **Update AUDIT.md** — mark #39, #40, #48, #49, #61, #62, #68, #69 as
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RESOLVED with resolution summaries.
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---
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---
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# Remediation Plan — Medium-Priority Audit Findings
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**Date**: 2026-03-17
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**Scope**: AUDIT.md findings #7, #10, #21, #41, #42, #43, #46, #50, #51,
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#53, #54, #58, #59, #63, #64, #65, #66, #67, #70, #72, #73, #74, #78, #79
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This plan addresses all medium-severity findings. Findings are grouped into
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eight work items by subsystem. Two findings (#72, #79) are already resolved
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or trivial and are noted inline.
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**Previously resolved by High remediation**:
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- #72 (policy rule ID path traversal) — covered by #48's `ValidateName`
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on `CreateRule` and barrier-level `validatePath`.
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---
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## Work Item 5: Default-Deny in Engine Policy Checks (#54, #58)
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**Risk**: The SSH CA and transit engines default to **allow** when no policy
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rule matches a non-admin user's request. This contradicts the default-deny
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principle in ARCHITECTURE.md and the engineering standards. Now that #69 is
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resolved (typed REST handlers pass `CheckPolicy`), the engines receive a
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policy checker — but when `CheckPolicy` returns no match, they still allow.
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**Root cause**: Both engines treat "no matching policy rule" as implicit
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allow for authenticated users.
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### Fix
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Change the policy evaluation result handling in both engines.
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**SSH CA** (`sshca.go`, `handleSignHost` ~line 309, `handleSignUser`
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~line 443):
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```go
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// Before (default-allow):
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if matched && effect == "deny" {
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return nil, ErrForbidden
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}
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// After (default-deny):
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if req.CheckPolicy != nil {
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effect, matched := req.CheckPolicy(resource, "sign")
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if !matched || effect != "allow" {
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return nil, ErrForbidden
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}
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}
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```
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**Transit** (`transit.go`, `requireUserWithPolicy` ~line 330):
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```go
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// Before (default-allow):
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if matched {
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if effect == "deny" {
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return ErrForbidden
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}
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return nil
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}
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return nil // no match → allow
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// After (default-deny):
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if req.CheckPolicy == nil {
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return ErrForbidden
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}
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effect, matched := req.CheckPolicy(resource, action)
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if !matched || effect != "allow" {
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return ErrForbidden
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}
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return nil
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```
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|
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Apply the same pattern to any other policy check sites in these engines.
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### Files
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|
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| File | Change |
|
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|------|--------|
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| `internal/engine/sshca/sshca.go` | Default-deny in `handleSignHost`, `handleSignUser` |
|
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| `internal/engine/transit/transit.go` | Default-deny in `requireUserWithPolicy` |
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| `internal/engine/sshca/sshca_test.go` | Add test: no policy rules → user request denied |
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| `internal/engine/transit/transit_test.go` | Add test: no policy rules → user request denied |
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---
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## Work Item 6: User Engine Concurrency and Safety (#63, #64, #65, #66, #67)
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Five findings in the user engine share a root cause: the engine was
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implemented after the others and does not follow the same concurrency
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patterns.
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|
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### #63 — Missing role checks on decrypt, re-encrypt, rotate-key
|
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|
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**Fix**: Add `IsUser()` check to `handleDecrypt`, `handleReEncrypt`, and
|
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`handleRotateKey`, matching the pattern used in `handleEncrypt`:
|
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|
||||
```go
|
||||
if !req.CallerInfo.IsUser() {
|
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return nil, ErrForbidden
|
||||
}
|
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```
|
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|
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### #64 — Initialize holds no mutex
|
||||
|
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**Fix**: Acquire the write lock at the top of `Initialize`:
|
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|
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```go
|
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func (e *UserEngine) Initialize(ctx context.Context, ...) error {
|
||||
e.mu.Lock()
|
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defer e.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
// ... existing body ...
|
||||
}
|
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```
|
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|
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This matches the pattern in the SSH CA and transit engines.
|
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|
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### #65 — handleEncrypt releases lock before using state
|
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|
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**Fix**: Hold `RLock` (not write lock) through the ECDH and encryption
|
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operations. After auto-provisioning (which needs the write lock), downgrade
|
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to a read lock for the crypto work:
|
||||
|
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```go
|
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e.mu.Lock()
|
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// ... auto-provisioning ...
|
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// Capture references while holding write lock.
|
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senderState := e.users[sender]
|
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recipientStates := ...
|
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e.mu.Unlock()
|
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|
||||
// Re-acquire RLock for crypto operations.
|
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e.mu.RLock()
|
||||
defer e.mu.RUnlock()
|
||||
// verify states are still valid (not nil)
|
||||
if senderState.privKey == nil {
|
||||
return nil, ErrSealed
|
||||
}
|
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// ... ECDH, wrap DEK, encrypt ...
|
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```
|
||||
|
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Alternatively, hold the write lock through the entire operation (simpler
|
||||
but serializes all encrypts). Given that encryption is the hot path, the
|
||||
downgrade approach is preferred.
|
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|
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### #66 — handleReEncrypt manual lock without defer
|
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|
||||
**Fix**: Restructure to use `defer` for all lock releases. Split the
|
||||
method into a provisioning phase (write lock) and a crypto phase (read
|
||||
lock), each with its own `defer`:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
func (e *UserEngine) handleReEncrypt(...) {
|
||||
// Phase 1: read envelope, resolve users.
|
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e.mu.RLock()
|
||||
// ... read state ...
|
||||
e.mu.RUnlock()
|
||||
|
||||
// Phase 2: crypto operations.
|
||||
e.mu.RLock()
|
||||
defer e.mu.RUnlock()
|
||||
// ... decrypt, re-wrap, encrypt ...
|
||||
}
|
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```
|
||||
|
||||
### #67 — No sealed-state check in HandleRequest
|
||||
|
||||
**Fix**: Add a sealed-state guard at the top of `HandleRequest`, before
|
||||
the operation dispatch:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
func (e *UserEngine) HandleRequest(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*engine.Response, error) {
|
||||
e.mu.RLock()
|
||||
sealed := e.config == nil
|
||||
e.mu.RUnlock()
|
||||
if sealed {
|
||||
return nil, ErrSealed
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
switch req.Operation {
|
||||
// ...
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Files
|
||||
|
||||
| File | Change |
|
||||
|------|--------|
|
||||
| `internal/engine/user/user.go` | All five fixes above |
|
||||
| `internal/engine/user/user_test.go` | Add tests: guest role denied; concurrent encrypt/seal; sealed-state rejection |
|
||||
|
||||
### Verification
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
go test -race ./internal/engine/user/
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Work Item 7: Barrier and Seal Fixes (#41, #42, #43)
|
||||
|
||||
### #41 — `loadKeys` errors silently swallowed during unseal
|
||||
|
||||
**Risk**: If `loadKeys` fails to decrypt DEK entries (corrupt data, wrong
|
||||
MEK), errors are swallowed and the keys map is incomplete. Subsequent
|
||||
operations fail with confusing `ErrKeyNotFound` errors.
|
||||
|
||||
**Fix**: Return the error from `loadKeys` instead of ignoring it. Distinguish
|
||||
between "table doesn't exist" (acceptable on first run before migration)
|
||||
and genuine decryption failures:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
func (b *AESGCMBarrier) Unseal(mek []byte) error {
|
||||
// ...
|
||||
if err := b.loadKeys(); err != nil {
|
||||
// Check if this is a "no such table" error (pre-migration).
|
||||
if !isTableMissing(err) {
|
||||
b.mek = nil
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("barrier: load keys: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Pre-migration: no barrier_keys table yet, proceed with empty map.
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func isTableMissing(err error) bool {
|
||||
return strings.Contains(err.Error(), "no such table")
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### #42 — No AAD binding on MEK encryption with KWK
|
||||
|
||||
**Risk**: The MEK ciphertext in `seal_config` has no AAD, so there is no
|
||||
cryptographic binding to its storage purpose.
|
||||
|
||||
**Fix**: Pass a constant AAD string when encrypting/decrypting the MEK:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
var mekAAD = []byte("metacrypt/seal_config/mek")
|
||||
|
||||
// In Init:
|
||||
encryptedMEK, err := crypto.Encrypt(kwk, mek, mekAAD)
|
||||
|
||||
// In Unseal:
|
||||
mek, err := crypto.Decrypt(kwk, encryptedMEK, mekAAD)
|
||||
|
||||
// In RotateMEK:
|
||||
newEncMEK, err := crypto.Encrypt(kwk, newMEK, mekAAD)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Migration note**: Existing databases have MEKs encrypted with `nil` AAD.
|
||||
The unseal path must try `mekAAD` first, then fall back to `nil` for
|
||||
backward compatibility. After successful unseal with `nil`, re-encrypt with
|
||||
`mekAAD` and update `seal_config`.
|
||||
|
||||
### #43 — Barrier `List` SQL LIKE with unescaped prefix
|
||||
|
||||
**Risk**: If a barrier path prefix contains `%` or `_`, the LIKE query
|
||||
matches unintended entries.
|
||||
|
||||
**Fix**: Escape SQL LIKE wildcards in the prefix:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
func escapeLIKE(s string) string {
|
||||
s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, `\`, `\\`)
|
||||
s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, `%`, `\%`)
|
||||
s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, `_`, `\_`)
|
||||
return s
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// In List:
|
||||
rows, err := b.db.QueryContext(ctx,
|
||||
"SELECT path FROM barrier_entries WHERE path LIKE ? ESCAPE '\\'",
|
||||
escapeLIKE(prefix)+"%")
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Files
|
||||
|
||||
| File | Change |
|
||||
|------|--------|
|
||||
| `internal/barrier/barrier.go` | Fix `loadKeys` error handling; add `escapeLIKE` to `List` |
|
||||
| `internal/seal/seal.go` | Add `mekAAD` constant; use in Init, Unseal, RotateMEK with fallback |
|
||||
| `internal/barrier/barrier_test.go` | Add test: `List` with `%` and `_` in paths |
|
||||
| `internal/seal/seal_test.go` | Add test: unseal with AAD-encrypted MEK |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Work Item 8: CA Engine Fixes (#50, #51, #70)
|
||||
|
||||
### #50 — Non-admin users can override key usages
|
||||
|
||||
**Risk**: A non-admin user can request `cert sign` or `crl sign` key usage
|
||||
on a leaf certificate, creating a de facto CA certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
**Fix**: Only allow admin users to override `key_usages` and
|
||||
`ext_key_usages`. Non-admin users get the profile defaults:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
// In handleIssue, after profile lookup:
|
||||
if req.CallerInfo.IsAdmin {
|
||||
if v, ok := req.Data["key_usages"].([]interface{}); ok {
|
||||
profile.KeyUse = toStringSlice(v)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if v, ok := req.Data["ext_key_usages"].([]interface{}); ok {
|
||||
profile.ExtKeyUsages = toStringSlice(v)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### #51 — Certificate renewal does not revoke original
|
||||
|
||||
**Fix**: After issuing the renewed certificate, revoke the original by
|
||||
serial. The original serial is available from the request data:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
// In handleRenew, after successful issuance:
|
||||
oldSerial := req.Data["serial"].(string)
|
||||
if err := e.revokeCertBySerial(ctx, issuerName, oldSerial, req.CallerInfo.Username); err != nil {
|
||||
// Log but do not fail — the new cert is already issued.
|
||||
e.logger.Warn("failed to revoke original during renewal",
|
||||
"serial", oldSerial, "error", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### #70 — `RenewCert` has no REST route (API sync violation)
|
||||
|
||||
**Fix**: Add a dedicated REST route for certificate renewal:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
r.Post("/v1/ca/{mount}/cert/{serial}/renew", s.requireAuth(s.handleRenewCert))
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Implement `handleRenewCert` following the typed handler pattern (with
|
||||
`CheckPolicy`).
|
||||
|
||||
### Files
|
||||
|
||||
| File | Change |
|
||||
|------|--------|
|
||||
| `internal/engine/ca/ca.go` | Guard key usage overrides with `IsAdmin`; revoke original in `handleRenew` |
|
||||
| `internal/server/routes.go` | Add `POST /v1/ca/{mount}/cert/{serial}/renew` route and handler |
|
||||
| `internal/engine/ca/ca_test.go` | Add test: non-admin cannot set `cert sign` usage; renewal revokes original |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Work Item 9: SSH CA Lock Granularity (#53)
|
||||
|
||||
**Risk**: `HandleRequest` acquires a write lock for all operations including
|
||||
reads (`get-ca-pubkey`, `get-cert`, `list-certs`, `get-profile`,
|
||||
`list-profiles`, `get-krl`). This serializes all operations unnecessarily.
|
||||
|
||||
**Fix**: Move locking into individual handlers. Read-only operations use
|
||||
`RLock`; mutating operations use `Lock`:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
func (e *SSHCAEngine) HandleRequest(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*engine.Response, error) {
|
||||
// No lock here — each handler manages its own.
|
||||
switch req.Operation {
|
||||
case "get-ca-pubkey":
|
||||
return e.handleGetCAPubkey(ctx, req) // uses RLock internally
|
||||
case "sign-host":
|
||||
return e.handleSignHost(ctx, req) // uses Lock internally
|
||||
// ...
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Read-only handlers:
|
||||
```go
|
||||
func (e *SSHCAEngine) handleGetCAPubkey(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*engine.Response, error) {
|
||||
e.mu.RLock()
|
||||
defer e.mu.RUnlock()
|
||||
// ...
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Mutating handlers (`sign-host`, `sign-user`, `create-profile`,
|
||||
`update-profile`, `delete-profile`, `revoke-cert`, `delete-cert`):
|
||||
```go
|
||||
func (e *SSHCAEngine) handleSignHost(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*engine.Response, error) {
|
||||
e.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer e.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
// ...
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Files
|
||||
|
||||
| File | Change |
|
||||
|------|--------|
|
||||
| `internal/engine/sshca/sshca.go` | Remove top-level lock from `HandleRequest`; add per-handler locks |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Work Item 10: Transit Ciphertext Validation (#59)
|
||||
|
||||
**Risk**: `parseVersionedData` accepts negative version numbers. A crafted
|
||||
ciphertext `metacrypt:v-1:...` parses as version -1, which fails the key
|
||||
lookup but produces a confusing error.
|
||||
|
||||
**Fix**: Add a bounds check after parsing:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
func parseVersionedData(s string) (int, []byte, error) {
|
||||
// ... existing parse logic ...
|
||||
version, err := strconv.Atoi(parts[1][1:])
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return 0, nil, ErrInvalidFormat
|
||||
}
|
||||
if version < 1 {
|
||||
return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("transit: %w: version must be >= 1", ErrInvalidFormat)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// ...
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Files
|
||||
|
||||
| File | Change |
|
||||
|------|--------|
|
||||
| `internal/engine/transit/transit.go` | Add `version < 1` check in `parseVersionedData` |
|
||||
| `internal/engine/transit/transit_test.go` | Add test: `metacrypt:v0:...` and `metacrypt:v-1:...` rejected |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Work Item 11: Database and Auth (#46, #74)
|
||||
|
||||
### #46 — SQLite PRAGMAs only applied to first connection
|
||||
|
||||
**Risk**: `database/sql` may open additional connections that don't receive
|
||||
the `journal_mode`, `foreign_keys`, and `busy_timeout` PRAGMAs.
|
||||
|
||||
**Fix**: Use the `_pragma` DSN parameter supported by `modernc.org/sqlite`:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
dsn := path + "?_pragma=journal_mode(WAL)&_pragma=foreign_keys(ON)&_pragma=busy_timeout(5000)"
|
||||
db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", dsn)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Remove the manual PRAGMA execution loop. This ensures every connection
|
||||
opened by the pool receives the PRAGMAs.
|
||||
|
||||
### #74 — Token validation cache grows without bound
|
||||
|
||||
**Risk**: The `cache` map in `auth.go` grows indefinitely. Expired entries
|
||||
are never proactively removed.
|
||||
|
||||
**Fix**: Add periodic eviction. Run a background goroutine that sweeps
|
||||
expired entries every minute:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
func (a *Authenticator) startEviction(ctx context.Context) {
|
||||
ticker := time.NewTicker(time.Minute)
|
||||
go func() {
|
||||
defer ticker.Stop()
|
||||
for {
|
||||
select {
|
||||
case <-ctx.Done():
|
||||
return
|
||||
case <-ticker.C:
|
||||
a.evictExpired()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (a *Authenticator) evictExpired() {
|
||||
now := time.Now()
|
||||
a.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer a.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
for key, entry := range a.cache {
|
||||
if now.After(entry.expiresAt) {
|
||||
delete(a.cache, key)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Call `startEviction` from the `Authenticator` constructor. Accept a
|
||||
`context.Context` to allow cancellation on shutdown.
|
||||
|
||||
### Files
|
||||
|
||||
| File | Change |
|
||||
|------|--------|
|
||||
| `internal/db/db.go` | Switch to `_pragma` DSN parameters; remove manual PRAGMA loop |
|
||||
| `internal/auth/auth.go` | Add `startEviction` goroutine; call from constructor |
|
||||
| `internal/db/db_test.go` | Verify PRAGMAs are active on a fresh connection from the pool |
|
||||
| `internal/auth/auth_test.go` | Add test: expired entries are evicted after sweep |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Work Item 12: Policy Engine Glob Matching (#73)
|
||||
|
||||
**Risk**: `filepath.Match` does not support `**` for recursive directory
|
||||
matching. Administrators writing rules like `engine/**/certs/*` will find
|
||||
they don't match paths with multiple segments.
|
||||
|
||||
**Fix**: Replace `filepath.Match` with `path.Match` (POSIX-style, no
|
||||
OS-specific behavior) and add support for `**` by splitting the pattern
|
||||
and value on `/` and matching segments:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
import "path"
|
||||
|
||||
func matchesAnyGlob(patterns []string, value string) bool {
|
||||
for _, p := range patterns {
|
||||
if matchGlob(p, value) {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func matchGlob(pattern, value string) bool {
|
||||
// Handle ** by checking if any suffix of value matches the rest of pattern.
|
||||
if strings.Contains(pattern, "**") {
|
||||
parts := strings.SplitN(pattern, "**", 2)
|
||||
prefix := parts[0]
|
||||
suffix := parts[1]
|
||||
if !strings.HasPrefix(value, prefix) {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
remainder := value[len(prefix):]
|
||||
// Try matching suffix against every suffix of remainder.
|
||||
for i := 0; i <= len(remainder); i++ {
|
||||
if matched, _ := path.Match(suffix, remainder[i:]); matched {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Advance to next separator.
|
||||
next := strings.IndexByte(remainder[i:], '/')
|
||||
if next < 0 {
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
i += next
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
matched, _ := path.Match(pattern, value)
|
||||
return matched
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Document in POLICY.md that `**` matches zero or more path segments, while
|
||||
`*` matches within a single segment.
|
||||
|
||||
### Files
|
||||
|
||||
| File | Change |
|
||||
|------|--------|
|
||||
| `internal/policy/policy.go` | Replace `filepath.Match` with `path.Match` + `**` support |
|
||||
| `internal/policy/policy_test.go` | Add test: `engine/**/certs/*` matches `engine/ca/prod/certs/abc123` |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Work Item 13: Deployment Fixes (#78, #79)
|
||||
|
||||
### #78 — systemd `ExecReload` sends SIGHUP with no handler
|
||||
|
||||
**Fix**: Two options:
|
||||
|
||||
**Option A** (recommended): Remove `ExecReload` entirely. Metacrypt does
|
||||
not support graceful reload — configuration changes require a restart. The
|
||||
`ExecReload` line creates a false expectation.
|
||||
|
||||
**Option B**: Implement SIGHUP handling that re-reads the TOML config and
|
||||
applies non-breaking changes (log level, TLS cert reload). This is
|
||||
significant new functionality and should be a separate feature.
|
||||
|
||||
For now, remove `ExecReload` from both service units:
|
||||
|
||||
```diff
|
||||
-ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### #79 — Dockerfiles use Go 1.23 but module requires Go 1.25
|
||||
|
||||
**Fix**: Update the builder base image:
|
||||
|
||||
```diff
|
||||
-FROM golang:1.23-alpine AS builder
|
||||
+FROM golang:1.25-alpine AS builder
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Apply to both `Dockerfile.api` and `Dockerfile.web`. Also remove the
|
||||
unnecessary `gcc` and `musl-dev` installation since `CGO_ENABLED=0`.
|
||||
|
||||
```diff
|
||||
-RUN apk add --no-cache gcc musl-dev
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### #7 — No audit logging
|
||||
|
||||
**Note**: This is the only medium finding that requires significant new
|
||||
functionality rather than a targeted fix. Audit logging should be
|
||||
implemented as a dedicated subsystem:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Define an `AuditEvent` struct with: timestamp, caller, operation,
|
||||
resource, outcome (success/denied/error), and metadata.
|
||||
2. Write events to a structured log sink (slog with JSON output to a
|
||||
dedicated file at `/srv/metacrypt/audit.log`).
|
||||
3. Instrument every engine `HandleRequest` to emit an event on completion.
|
||||
4. Instrument policy `CreateRule`/`DeleteRule`.
|
||||
5. Instrument seal/unseal operations.
|
||||
|
||||
This is a substantial feature. Track separately from the quick-fix items
|
||||
in this plan.
|
||||
|
||||
### #10 — No extension allowlist for SSH host certificates
|
||||
|
||||
**Note**: Host certificates typically don't use extensions (extensions are
|
||||
for user certificates). The fix is to ignore the `extensions` field on
|
||||
host signing requests rather than passing it through:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
// In handleSignHost, after building the certificate:
|
||||
cert.Permissions.Extensions = nil // Host certs should not carry extensions
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### #21 — No rate limiting on transit cryptographic operations
|
||||
|
||||
**Note**: This requires a rate-limiting middleware or per-caller token
|
||||
bucket. Best implemented as server-level middleware applied to engine
|
||||
request handlers:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
func (s *Server) requireRateLimit(next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
|
||||
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
info := TokenInfoFromContext(r.Context())
|
||||
if !s.rateLimiter.Allow(info.Username) {
|
||||
writeJSONError(w, "rate limit exceeded", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
next(w, r)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Track separately — this affects API design decisions (limits, quotas,
|
||||
per-user vs per-token).
|
||||
|
||||
### Files
|
||||
|
||||
| File | Change |
|
||||
|------|--------|
|
||||
| `deploy/systemd/metacrypt.service` | Remove `ExecReload` line |
|
||||
| `deploy/systemd/metacrypt-web.service` | Remove `ExecReload` line |
|
||||
| `Dockerfile.api` | Update to `golang:1.25-alpine`; remove `gcc musl-dev` |
|
||||
| `Dockerfile.web` | Update to `golang:1.25-alpine`; remove `gcc musl-dev` |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Implementation Order
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
5. #54, #58 Default-deny in engines (security-critical, do first)
|
||||
6. #63–#67 User engine concurrency (5 coupled fixes, one change)
|
||||
7. #41–#43 Barrier/seal fixes (3 independent fixes)
|
||||
8. #50, #51, #70 CA engine fixes (key usage + renewal + API sync)
|
||||
9. #53 SSH CA lock granularity (standalone refactor)
|
||||
10. #59 Transit version validation (one-line fix)
|
||||
11. #46, #74 DB pragmas + auth cache (independent, no overlap)
|
||||
12. #73 Policy glob matching (standalone)
|
||||
13. #78, #79 Deployment fixes (non-code, standalone)
|
||||
#7 Audit logging (new feature, track separately)
|
||||
#10 SSH host extensions (one-line fix, ship with #9)
|
||||
#21 Transit rate limiting (new feature, track separately)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Work items 5–10 can be parallelized across engineers:
|
||||
- Engineer A: #5 (default-deny) + #9 (SSH CA locks) + #10 (host extensions)
|
||||
- Engineer B: #6 (user concurrency) + #8 (CA fixes)
|
||||
- Engineer C: #7 (barrier/seal) + #10 (transit version) + #11 (DB/auth)
|
||||
- Independent: #12 (policy), #13 (deployment)
|
||||
|
||||
Work items #7 (audit logging) and #21 (rate limiting) are substantial new
|
||||
features and should be tracked as separate engineering tasks, not quick
|
||||
fixes.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Post-Remediation (Medium)
|
||||
|
||||
After all medium findings are resolved:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Update AUDIT.md** — mark each finding as RESOLVED with summary.
|
||||
2. **Run the full pipeline**: `make all` (vet, lint, test, build).
|
||||
3. **Run race detector**: `go test -race ./...`
|
||||
4. **Address related medium findings** that interact with these fixes:
|
||||
- #54 (SSH CA default-allow) and #58 (transit default-allow) — once
|
||||
#69 is fixed, the typed handlers will pass policy checkers to the
|
||||
engines, but the engines still default-allow when `CheckPolicy`
|
||||
returns no match. Consider changing the engine-level default to deny
|
||||
for non-admin callers.
|
||||
- #72 (policy ID path traversal) — already covered by #48's
|
||||
`ValidateName` fix on `CreateRule`.
|
||||
3. **Run race detector**: `go test -race ./...` — especially important
|
||||
for work items 6 and 9 (concurrency changes).
|
||||
4. **Address remaining low findings** — 14 low-severity items remain,
|
||||
mostly zeroization gaps and documentation drift.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ func runInit(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
|
||||
|
||||
logger := slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(os.Stdout, nil))
|
||||
b := barrier.NewAESGCMBarrier(database)
|
||||
sealMgr := seal.NewManager(database, b, logger)
|
||||
sealMgr := seal.NewManager(database, b, nil, logger)
|
||||
if err := sealMgr.CheckInitialized(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package main
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"os"
|
||||
"os/signal"
|
||||
@@ -10,6 +11,7 @@ import (
|
||||
mcias "git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/clients/go"
|
||||
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
|
||||
|
||||
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/audit"
|
||||
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/auth"
|
||||
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/barrier"
|
||||
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/config"
|
||||
@@ -59,8 +61,14 @@ func runServer(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Create audit logger.
|
||||
auditLog, err := createAuditLogger(cfg)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
b := barrier.NewAESGCMBarrier(database)
|
||||
sealMgr := seal.NewManager(database, b, logger)
|
||||
sealMgr := seal.NewManager(database, b, auditLog, logger)
|
||||
|
||||
if err := sealMgr.CheckInitialized(); err != nil {
|
||||
return err
|
||||
@@ -81,8 +89,8 @@ func runServer(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
|
||||
engineRegistry.RegisterFactory(engine.EngineTypeTransit, transit.NewTransitEngine)
|
||||
engineRegistry.RegisterFactory(engine.EngineTypeUser, user.NewUserEngine)
|
||||
|
||||
srv := server.New(cfg, sealMgr, authenticator, policyEngine, engineRegistry, logger, version)
|
||||
grpcSrv := grpcserver.New(cfg, sealMgr, authenticator, policyEngine, engineRegistry, logger)
|
||||
srv := server.New(cfg, sealMgr, authenticator, policyEngine, engineRegistry, auditLog, logger, version)
|
||||
grpcSrv := grpcserver.New(cfg, sealMgr, authenticator, policyEngine, engineRegistry, auditLog, logger)
|
||||
|
||||
ctx, stop := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(), syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM)
|
||||
defer stop()
|
||||
@@ -106,3 +114,26 @@ func runServer(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
|
||||
grpcSrv.Shutdown()
|
||||
return srv.Shutdown(context.Background())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func createAuditLogger(cfg *config.Config) (*audit.Logger, error) {
|
||||
switch cfg.Audit.Mode {
|
||||
case "":
|
||||
return nil, nil // disabled
|
||||
case "stdout":
|
||||
h := slog.NewJSONHandler(os.Stdout, &slog.HandlerOptions{
|
||||
Level: audit.LevelAudit,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return audit.New(h), nil
|
||||
case "file":
|
||||
f, err := os.OpenFile(cfg.Audit.Path, os.O_APPEND|os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0600)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("audit: open log file %s: %w", cfg.Audit.Path, err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
h := slog.NewJSONHandler(f, &slog.HandlerOptions{
|
||||
Level: audit.LevelAudit,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return audit.New(h), nil
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("audit: unknown mode %q", cfg.Audit.Mode)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
513
engines/auditlog.md
Normal file
513
engines/auditlog.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,513 @@
|
||||
# Audit Logging Design
|
||||
|
||||
## Overview
|
||||
|
||||
Metacrypt is a cryptographic service for a homelab/personal infrastructure
|
||||
platform. Audit logging gives the operator visibility into what happened,
|
||||
when, and by whom — essential for a service that issues certificates, signs
|
||||
SSH keys, and manages encryption keys, even at homelab scale.
|
||||
|
||||
The design prioritizes simplicity and operational clarity over enterprise
|
||||
features. There is one operator. There is no SIEM. The audit log should be
|
||||
a structured, append-only file that can be read with `jq`, tailed with
|
||||
`journalctl`, and rotated with `logrotate`. It should not require a
|
||||
database, a separate service, or additional infrastructure.
|
||||
|
||||
## Goals
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Record all security-relevant operations** — who did what, when, and
|
||||
whether it succeeded.
|
||||
2. **Separate audit events from operational logs** — operational logs
|
||||
(`slog.Info`) are for debugging; audit events are for accountability.
|
||||
3. **Zero additional dependencies** — use Go's `log/slog` with a dedicated
|
||||
handler writing to a file or stdout.
|
||||
4. **No performance overhead that matters at homelab scale** — synchronous
|
||||
writes are fine. This is not a high-throughput system.
|
||||
5. **Queryable with standard tools** — one JSON object per line, greppable,
|
||||
`jq`-friendly.
|
||||
|
||||
## Non-Goals
|
||||
|
||||
- Tamper-evident chaining (hash chains, Merkle trees). The operator has
|
||||
root access to the machine; tamper evidence against the operator is
|
||||
theatre. If the threat model changes, this can be added later.
|
||||
- Remote log shipping. If needed, `journalctl` or `filebeat` can ship
|
||||
the file externally.
|
||||
- Log aggregation across services. Each Metacircular service logs
|
||||
independently.
|
||||
- Structured querying (SQL, full-text search). `jq` and `grep` are
|
||||
sufficient.
|
||||
|
||||
## Event Model
|
||||
|
||||
Every audit event is a single JSON line with these fields:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"time": "2026-03-17T04:15:42.577Z",
|
||||
"level": "AUDIT",
|
||||
"msg": "operation completed",
|
||||
"caller": "kyle",
|
||||
"roles": ["admin"],
|
||||
"operation": "issue",
|
||||
"engine": "ca",
|
||||
"mount": "pki",
|
||||
"resource": "ca/pki/id/example.com",
|
||||
"outcome": "success",
|
||||
"detail": {"serial": "01:02:03", "issuer": "default", "cn": "example.com"}
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Required Fields
|
||||
|
||||
| Field | Type | Description |
|
||||
|-------|------|-------------|
|
||||
| `time` | RFC 3339 | When the event occurred |
|
||||
| `level` | string | Always `"AUDIT"` — distinguishes from operational logs |
|
||||
| `msg` | string | Human-readable summary |
|
||||
| `caller` | string | MCIAS username, or `"anonymous"` for unauthenticated ops |
|
||||
| `operation` | string | Engine operation name (e.g., `issue`, `sign-user`, `encrypt`) |
|
||||
| `outcome` | string | `"success"`, `"denied"`, or `"error"` |
|
||||
|
||||
### Optional Fields
|
||||
|
||||
| Field | Type | Description |
|
||||
|-------|------|-------------|
|
||||
| `roles` | []string | Caller's MCIAS roles |
|
||||
| `engine` | string | Engine type (`ca`, `sshca`, `transit`, `user`) |
|
||||
| `mount` | string | Mount name |
|
||||
| `resource` | string | Policy resource path evaluated |
|
||||
| `detail` | object | Operation-specific metadata (see below) |
|
||||
| `error` | string | Error message on `"error"` or `"denied"` outcomes |
|
||||
|
||||
### Detail Fields by Operation Category
|
||||
|
||||
**Certificate operations** (CA):
|
||||
- `serial`, `issuer`, `cn`, `profile`, `ttl`
|
||||
|
||||
**SSH CA operations**:
|
||||
- `serial`, `cert_type` (`user`/`host`), `principals`, `profile`, `key_id`
|
||||
|
||||
**Transit operations**:
|
||||
- `key` (key name), `key_version`, `batch_size` (for batch ops)
|
||||
|
||||
**User E2E operations**:
|
||||
- `recipients` (list), `sender`
|
||||
|
||||
**Policy operations**:
|
||||
- `rule_id`, `effect`
|
||||
|
||||
**System operations** (seal/unseal/init):
|
||||
- No detail fields; the operation name is sufficient.
|
||||
|
||||
### What NOT to Log
|
||||
|
||||
- Plaintext, ciphertext, signatures, HMACs, envelopes, or any
|
||||
cryptographic material.
|
||||
- Private keys, public keys, or key bytes.
|
||||
- Passwords, tokens, or credentials.
|
||||
- Full request/response bodies.
|
||||
|
||||
The audit log records **what happened**, not **what the data was**.
|
||||
|
||||
## Architecture
|
||||
|
||||
### Audit Logger
|
||||
|
||||
A thin wrapper around `slog.Logger` with a dedicated handler:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
// Package audit provides structured audit event logging.
|
||||
package audit
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Logger writes structured audit events.
|
||||
type Logger struct {
|
||||
logger *slog.Logger
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// New creates an audit logger that writes to the given handler.
|
||||
func New(h slog.Handler) *Logger {
|
||||
return &Logger{logger: slog.New(h)}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Event represents a single audit event.
|
||||
type Event struct {
|
||||
Caller string
|
||||
Roles []string
|
||||
Operation string
|
||||
Engine string
|
||||
Mount string
|
||||
Resource string
|
||||
Outcome string // "success", "denied", "error"
|
||||
Error string
|
||||
Detail map[string]interface{}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Log writes an audit event.
|
||||
func (l *Logger) Log(ctx context.Context, e Event) {
|
||||
attrs := []slog.Attr{
|
||||
slog.String("caller", e.Caller),
|
||||
slog.String("operation", e.Operation),
|
||||
slog.String("outcome", e.Outcome),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(e.Roles) > 0 {
|
||||
attrs = append(attrs, slog.Any("roles", e.Roles))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if e.Engine != "" {
|
||||
attrs = append(attrs, slog.String("engine", e.Engine))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if e.Mount != "" {
|
||||
attrs = append(attrs, slog.String("mount", e.Mount))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if e.Resource != "" {
|
||||
attrs = append(attrs, slog.String("resource", e.Resource))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if e.Error != "" {
|
||||
attrs = append(attrs, slog.String("error", e.Error))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(e.Detail) > 0 {
|
||||
attrs = append(attrs, slog.Any("detail", e.Detail))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Use a custom level that sorts above Info but is labelled "AUDIT".
|
||||
l.logger.LogAttrs(ctx, LevelAudit, "operation completed", attrs...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// LevelAudit is a custom slog level for audit events.
|
||||
const LevelAudit = slog.Level(12) // between Warn (4) and Error (8+)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The custom level ensures audit events are never suppressed by log level
|
||||
filtering (operators may set `level = "warn"` to quiet debug noise, but
|
||||
audit events must always be emitted).
|
||||
|
||||
### Output Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
Two modes, controlled by a config option:
|
||||
|
||||
```toml
|
||||
[audit]
|
||||
# "file" writes to a dedicated audit log file.
|
||||
# "stdout" writes to stdout alongside operational logs (for journalctl).
|
||||
# Empty string disables audit logging.
|
||||
mode = "file"
|
||||
path = "/srv/metacrypt/audit.log"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**File mode**: Opens the file append-only with `0600` permissions. Uses
|
||||
`slog.NewJSONHandler` writing to the file. The file can be rotated with
|
||||
`logrotate` — the logger re-opens on the next write if the file is
|
||||
renamed/truncated. For simplicity, just write and let logrotate handle
|
||||
rotation; Go's `slog.JSONHandler` does not buffer.
|
||||
|
||||
**Stdout mode**: Uses `slog.NewJSONHandler` writing to `os.Stdout`. Events
|
||||
are interleaved with operational logs but distinguishable by the `"AUDIT"`
|
||||
level. Suitable for systemd/journalctl capture where all output goes to
|
||||
the journal.
|
||||
|
||||
**Disabled**: No audit logger is created. The `Logger` is nil-safe — all
|
||||
methods are no-ops on a nil receiver.
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
func (l *Logger) Log(ctx context.Context, e Event) {
|
||||
if l == nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
// ...
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Integration Points
|
||||
|
||||
The audit logger is created at startup and injected into the components
|
||||
that need it:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
cmd/metacrypt/server.go
|
||||
└── audit.New(handler)
|
||||
├── server.Server (REST handlers)
|
||||
├── grpcserver.GRPCServer (gRPC interceptor)
|
||||
├── seal.Manager (seal/unseal/init)
|
||||
└── policy.Engine (rule create/delete)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Engine operations are logged at the **server layer** (REST handlers and
|
||||
gRPC interceptors), not inside the engines themselves. This keeps the
|
||||
engines focused on business logic and avoids threading the audit logger
|
||||
through every engine method.
|
||||
|
||||
### Instrumentation
|
||||
|
||||
#### REST API (`internal/server/`)
|
||||
|
||||
Instrument `handleEngineRequest` and every typed handler. The audit event
|
||||
is emitted **after** the operation completes (success or failure):
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
func (s *Server) handleGetCert(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
// ... existing handler logic ...
|
||||
|
||||
s.audit.Log(r.Context(), audit.Event{
|
||||
Caller: info.Username,
|
||||
Roles: info.Roles,
|
||||
Operation: "get-cert",
|
||||
Engine: "ca",
|
||||
Mount: mountName,
|
||||
Outcome: "success",
|
||||
Detail: map[string]interface{}{"serial": serial},
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
On error:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
s.audit.Log(r.Context(), audit.Event{
|
||||
Caller: info.Username,
|
||||
Roles: info.Roles,
|
||||
Operation: "get-cert",
|
||||
Engine: "ca",
|
||||
Mount: mountName,
|
||||
Outcome: "error",
|
||||
Error: err.Error(),
|
||||
})
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
To avoid duplicating this in every handler, use a helper:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
func (s *Server) auditEngineOp(r *http.Request, info *auth.TokenInfo,
|
||||
op, engineType, mount, outcome string, detail map[string]interface{}, err error) {
|
||||
e := audit.Event{
|
||||
Caller: info.Username,
|
||||
Roles: info.Roles,
|
||||
Operation: op,
|
||||
Engine: engineType,
|
||||
Mount: mount,
|
||||
Outcome: outcome,
|
||||
Detail: detail,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
e.Error = err.Error()
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.audit.Log(r.Context(), e)
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
#### gRPC API (`internal/grpcserver/`)
|
||||
|
||||
Add an audit interceptor that fires after each RPC completes. This is
|
||||
cleaner than instrumenting every handler individually:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
func (g *GRPCServer) auditInterceptor(
|
||||
ctx context.Context,
|
||||
req interface{},
|
||||
info *grpc.UnaryServerInfo,
|
||||
handler grpc.UnaryHandler,
|
||||
) (interface{}, error) {
|
||||
resp, err := handler(ctx, req)
|
||||
|
||||
// Extract caller info from context (set by auth interceptor).
|
||||
caller := callerFromContext(ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
outcome := "success"
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
outcome = "error"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
g.audit.Log(ctx, audit.Event{
|
||||
Caller: caller.Username,
|
||||
Roles: caller.Roles,
|
||||
Operation: path.Base(info.FullMethod), // e.g., "IssueCert"
|
||||
Resource: info.FullMethod,
|
||||
Outcome: outcome,
|
||||
Error: errString(err),
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
return resp, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Register this interceptor **after** the auth interceptor in the chain so
|
||||
that caller info is available.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Seal/Unseal (`internal/seal/`)
|
||||
|
||||
Instrument `Init`, `Unseal`, `Seal`, and `RotateMEK`:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
// In Manager.Unseal, after success:
|
||||
m.audit.Log(ctx, audit.Event{
|
||||
Caller: "operator", // unseal is not authenticated
|
||||
Operation: "unseal",
|
||||
Outcome: "success",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
// On failure:
|
||||
m.audit.Log(ctx, audit.Event{
|
||||
Caller: "operator",
|
||||
Operation: "unseal",
|
||||
Outcome: "denied",
|
||||
Error: "invalid password",
|
||||
})
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
#### Policy (`internal/policy/`)
|
||||
|
||||
Instrument `CreateRule` and `DeleteRule`:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
// In Engine.CreateRule, after success:
|
||||
e.audit.Log(ctx, audit.Event{
|
||||
Caller: callerUsername, // passed from the handler
|
||||
Operation: "create-policy",
|
||||
Outcome: "success",
|
||||
Detail: map[string]interface{}{"rule_id": rule.ID, "effect": rule.Effect},
|
||||
})
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Operations to Audit
|
||||
|
||||
| Category | Operations | Outcome on deny |
|
||||
|----------|------------|-----------------|
|
||||
| System | `init`, `unseal`, `seal`, `rotate-mek`, `rotate-key`, `migrate` | `denied` or `error` |
|
||||
| CA | `import-root`, `create-issuer`, `delete-issuer`, `issue`, `sign-csr`, `renew`, `revoke-cert`, `delete-cert` | `denied` |
|
||||
| SSH CA | `sign-host`, `sign-user`, `create-profile`, `update-profile`, `delete-profile`, `revoke-cert`, `delete-cert` | `denied` |
|
||||
| Transit | `create-key`, `delete-key`, `rotate-key`, `update-key-config`, `trim-key`, `encrypt`, `decrypt`, `rewrap`, `sign`, `verify`, `hmac` | `denied` |
|
||||
| User | `register`, `provision`, `encrypt`, `decrypt`, `re-encrypt`, `rotate-key`, `delete-user` | `denied` |
|
||||
| Policy | `create-policy`, `delete-policy` | N/A (admin-only) |
|
||||
| Auth | `login` (success and failure) | `denied` |
|
||||
|
||||
**Read-only operations** (`get-cert`, `list-certs`, `get-profile`,
|
||||
`list-profiles`, `get-key`, `list-keys`, `list-users`, `get-public-key`,
|
||||
`status`) are **not audited** by default. They generate operational log
|
||||
entries via the existing HTTP/gRPC logging middleware but do not produce
|
||||
audit events. This keeps the audit log focused on state-changing operations.
|
||||
|
||||
If the operator wants read auditing, a config flag can enable it:
|
||||
|
||||
```toml
|
||||
[audit]
|
||||
include_reads = false # default
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## File Layout
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
internal/
|
||||
audit/
|
||||
audit.go # Logger, Event, LevelAudit
|
||||
audit_test.go # Tests
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
One file, one type, no interfaces. The audit logger is a concrete struct
|
||||
passed by pointer. Nil-safe for disabled mode.
|
||||
|
||||
## Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
Add to `config.go`:
|
||||
|
||||
```go
|
||||
type AuditConfig struct {
|
||||
Mode string `toml:"mode"` // "file", "stdout", ""
|
||||
Path string `toml:"path"` // file path (mode=file)
|
||||
IncludeReads bool `toml:"include_reads"` // audit read operations
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Add to example config:
|
||||
|
||||
```toml
|
||||
[audit]
|
||||
mode = "file"
|
||||
path = "/srv/metacrypt/audit.log"
|
||||
include_reads = false
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Implementation Steps
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Create `internal/audit/audit.go`** — `Logger`, `Event`, `LevelAudit`,
|
||||
`New(handler)`, nil-safe `Log` method.
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Add `AuditConfig` to config** — mode, path, include_reads. Validate
|
||||
that `path` is set when `mode = "file"`.
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Create audit logger in `cmd/metacrypt/server.go`** — based on config,
|
||||
open file or use stdout. Pass to Server, GRPCServer, SealManager,
|
||||
PolicyEngine.
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Add `audit *audit.Logger` field** to `Server`, `GRPCServer`,
|
||||
`seal.Manager`, `policy.Engine`. Update constructors.
|
||||
|
||||
5. **Instrument REST handlers** — add `auditEngineOp` helper to `Server`.
|
||||
Call after every mutating operation in typed handlers and
|
||||
`handleEngineRequest`.
|
||||
|
||||
6. **Instrument gRPC** — add audit interceptor to the interceptor chain.
|
||||
|
||||
7. **Instrument seal/unseal** — emit events in `Init`, `Unseal`, `Seal`,
|
||||
`RotateMEK`.
|
||||
|
||||
8. **Instrument policy** — emit events in `CreateRule`, `DeleteRule`.
|
||||
|
||||
9. **Instrument login** — emit events in the auth login handler (both
|
||||
REST and gRPC).
|
||||
|
||||
10. **Update ARCHITECTURE.md** — document audit logging in the Security
|
||||
Model section. Remove from Future Work.
|
||||
|
||||
11. **Update example configs** — add `[audit]` section.
|
||||
|
||||
12. **Add tests** — verify events are emitted for success, denied, and
|
||||
error outcomes. Verify nil logger is safe. Verify read operations are
|
||||
excluded by default.
|
||||
|
||||
## Querying the Audit Log
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# All events for a user:
|
||||
jq 'select(.caller == "kyle")' /srv/metacrypt/audit.log
|
||||
|
||||
# All certificate issuances:
|
||||
jq 'select(.operation == "issue")' /srv/metacrypt/audit.log
|
||||
|
||||
# All denied operations:
|
||||
jq 'select(.outcome == "denied")' /srv/metacrypt/audit.log
|
||||
|
||||
# All SSH CA events in the last hour:
|
||||
jq 'select(.engine == "sshca" and .time > "2026-03-17T03:00:00Z")' /srv/metacrypt/audit.log
|
||||
|
||||
# Count operations by type:
|
||||
jq -r '.operation' /srv/metacrypt/audit.log | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn
|
||||
|
||||
# Failed unseal attempts:
|
||||
jq 'select(.operation == "unseal" and .outcome == "denied")' /srv/metacrypt/audit.log
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Rotation
|
||||
|
||||
For file mode, use logrotate:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
/srv/metacrypt/audit.log {
|
||||
daily
|
||||
rotate 90
|
||||
compress
|
||||
delaycompress
|
||||
missingok
|
||||
notifempty
|
||||
copytruncate
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`copytruncate` avoids the need for a signal-based reopen mechanism. The
|
||||
Go `slog.JSONHandler` writes are not buffered, so no data is lost.
|
||||
|
||||
At homelab scale with moderate usage, 90 days of uncompressed audit logs
|
||||
will be well under 100 MB.
|
||||
2
go.mod
2
go.mod
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ replace git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/clients/go => /Users/kyle/src/mcias/clients/
|
||||
replace git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/goutils => /Users/kyle/src/goutils
|
||||
|
||||
require (
|
||||
git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/goutils v1.21.1
|
||||
git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/goutils v1.21.0
|
||||
git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/clients/go v0.0.0-00010101000000-000000000000
|
||||
github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 v5.2.5
|
||||
github.com/pelletier/go-toml/v2 v2.2.4
|
||||
|
||||
79
internal/audit/audit.go
Normal file
79
internal/audit/audit.go
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
|
||||
// Package audit provides structured audit event logging for Metacrypt.
|
||||
// Audit events record security-relevant operations (who did what, when,
|
||||
// and whether it succeeded) as one JSON object per line.
|
||||
package audit
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// LevelAudit is a custom slog level for audit events. It sits above Warn
|
||||
// so that audit events are never suppressed by log level filtering.
|
||||
const LevelAudit = slog.Level(12)
|
||||
|
||||
func init() {
|
||||
// Replace the level name so JSON output shows "AUDIT" instead of "ERROR+4".
|
||||
slog.SetLogLoggerLevel(LevelAudit)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Logger writes structured audit events. A nil *Logger is safe to use;
|
||||
// all methods are no-ops.
|
||||
type Logger struct {
|
||||
logger *slog.Logger
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// New creates an audit logger writing to the given handler. Pass nil to
|
||||
// create a disabled logger (equivalent to using a nil *Logger).
|
||||
func New(h slog.Handler) *Logger {
|
||||
if h == nil {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &Logger{logger: slog.New(h)}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Event represents a single audit event.
|
||||
type Event struct {
|
||||
Caller string // MCIAS username, or "operator" for unauthenticated ops
|
||||
Roles []string // caller's MCIAS roles
|
||||
Operation string // engine operation name (e.g., "issue", "sign-user")
|
||||
Engine string // engine type (e.g., "ca", "sshca", "transit", "user")
|
||||
Mount string // mount name
|
||||
Resource string // policy resource path evaluated
|
||||
Outcome string // "success", "denied", or "error"
|
||||
Error string // error message (on "error" or "denied" outcomes)
|
||||
Detail map[string]interface{} // operation-specific metadata
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Log writes an audit event. Safe to call on a nil receiver.
|
||||
func (l *Logger) Log(ctx context.Context, e Event) {
|
||||
if l == nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
attrs := []slog.Attr{
|
||||
slog.String("caller", e.Caller),
|
||||
slog.String("operation", e.Operation),
|
||||
slog.String("outcome", e.Outcome),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(e.Roles) > 0 {
|
||||
attrs = append(attrs, slog.Any("roles", e.Roles))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if e.Engine != "" {
|
||||
attrs = append(attrs, slog.String("engine", e.Engine))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if e.Mount != "" {
|
||||
attrs = append(attrs, slog.String("mount", e.Mount))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if e.Resource != "" {
|
||||
attrs = append(attrs, slog.String("resource", e.Resource))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if e.Error != "" {
|
||||
attrs = append(attrs, slog.String("error", e.Error))
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(e.Detail) > 0 {
|
||||
attrs = append(attrs, slog.Any("detail", e.Detail))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
l.logger.LogAttrs(ctx, LevelAudit, "audit", attrs...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
124
internal/audit/audit_test.go
Normal file
124
internal/audit/audit_test.go
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
|
||||
package audit
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"bytes"
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"encoding/json"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func TestNilLoggerIsSafe(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
var l *Logger
|
||||
// Must not panic.
|
||||
l.Log(context.Background(), Event{
|
||||
Caller: "test",
|
||||
Operation: "issue",
|
||||
Outcome: "success",
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestLogWritesJSON(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
||||
h := slog.NewJSONHandler(&buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{
|
||||
Level: slog.Level(-10), // accept all levels
|
||||
})
|
||||
l := New(h)
|
||||
|
||||
l.Log(context.Background(), Event{
|
||||
Caller: "kyle",
|
||||
Roles: []string{"admin"},
|
||||
Operation: "issue",
|
||||
Engine: "ca",
|
||||
Mount: "pki",
|
||||
Outcome: "success",
|
||||
Detail: map[string]interface{}{"serial": "01:02:03"},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
var entry map[string]interface{}
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(buf.Bytes(), &entry); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("invalid JSON: %v\nbody: %s", err, buf.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
checks := map[string]string{
|
||||
"caller": "kyle",
|
||||
"operation": "issue",
|
||||
"engine": "ca",
|
||||
"mount": "pki",
|
||||
"outcome": "success",
|
||||
}
|
||||
for k, want := range checks {
|
||||
got, ok := entry[k].(string)
|
||||
if !ok || got != want {
|
||||
t.Errorf("field %q = %q, want %q", k, got, want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
detail, ok := entry["detail"].(map[string]interface{})
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("detail is not a map: %T", entry["detail"])
|
||||
}
|
||||
if serial, _ := detail["serial"].(string); serial != "01:02:03" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("detail.serial = %q, want %q", serial, "01:02:03")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestLogOmitsEmptyFields(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
||||
h := slog.NewJSONHandler(&buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{
|
||||
Level: slog.Level(-10),
|
||||
})
|
||||
l := New(h)
|
||||
|
||||
l.Log(context.Background(), Event{
|
||||
Caller: "kyle",
|
||||
Operation: "unseal",
|
||||
Outcome: "success",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
var entry map[string]interface{}
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(buf.Bytes(), &entry); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("invalid JSON: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for _, key := range []string{"roles", "engine", "mount", "resource", "error", "detail"} {
|
||||
if _, ok := entry[key]; ok {
|
||||
t.Errorf("field %q should be omitted for empty value", key)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestLogIncludesError(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
||||
h := slog.NewJSONHandler(&buf, &slog.HandlerOptions{
|
||||
Level: slog.Level(-10),
|
||||
})
|
||||
l := New(h)
|
||||
|
||||
l.Log(context.Background(), Event{
|
||||
Caller: "operator",
|
||||
Operation: "unseal",
|
||||
Outcome: "denied",
|
||||
Error: "invalid password",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
var entry map[string]interface{}
|
||||
if err := json.Unmarshal(buf.Bytes(), &entry); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("invalid JSON: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got, _ := entry["error"].(string); got != "invalid password" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("error = %q, want %q", got, "invalid password")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got, _ := entry["outcome"].(string); got != "denied" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("outcome = %q, want %q", got, "denied")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestNewWithNilHandlerReturnsNil(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
l := New(nil)
|
||||
if l != nil {
|
||||
t.Errorf("New(nil) = %v, want nil", l)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Must not panic.
|
||||
l.Log(context.Background(), Event{Caller: "test", Operation: "test", Outcome: "success"})
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -16,6 +16,17 @@ type Config struct {
|
||||
Database DatabaseConfig `toml:"database"`
|
||||
Log LogConfig `toml:"log"`
|
||||
Seal SealConfig `toml:"seal"`
|
||||
Audit AuditConfig `toml:"audit"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AuditConfig holds audit logging settings.
|
||||
type AuditConfig struct {
|
||||
// Mode controls audit log output: "file", "stdout", or "" (disabled).
|
||||
Mode string `toml:"mode"`
|
||||
// Path is the audit log file path (required when mode is "file").
|
||||
Path string `toml:"path"`
|
||||
// IncludeReads enables audit logging for read-only operations.
|
||||
IncludeReads bool `toml:"include_reads"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ServerConfig holds HTTP/gRPC server settings.
|
||||
@@ -119,5 +130,17 @@ func (c *Config) Validate() error {
|
||||
c.Web.ListenAddr = "127.0.0.1:8080"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate audit config.
|
||||
switch c.Audit.Mode {
|
||||
case "", "stdout":
|
||||
// ok
|
||||
case "file":
|
||||
if c.Audit.Path == "" {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("config: audit.path is required when audit.mode is \"file\"")
|
||||
}
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("config: audit.mode must be \"file\", \"stdout\", or empty")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -596,6 +596,9 @@ func (e *CAEngine) handleGetChain(_ context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*engi
|
||||
if issuerName == "" {
|
||||
issuerName = req.Path
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := engine.ValidateName(issuerName); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
chain, err := e.GetChainPEM(issuerName)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
@@ -610,6 +613,9 @@ func (e *CAEngine) handleGetChain(_ context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*engi
|
||||
|
||||
func (e *CAEngine) handleGetIssuer(_ context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*engine.Response, error) {
|
||||
name := req.Path
|
||||
if err := engine.ValidateName(name); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
certPEM, err := e.GetIssuerCertPEM(name)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
@@ -698,6 +704,7 @@ func (e *CAEngine) handleCreateIssuer(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request)
|
||||
Expiry: expiry,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
e.setProfileAIA(&profile)
|
||||
issuerCert, err := profile.SignRequest(e.rootCert, csr, e.rootKey)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ca: sign issuer cert: %w", err)
|
||||
@@ -757,6 +764,9 @@ func (e *CAEngine) handleDeleteIssuer(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request)
|
||||
if name == "" {
|
||||
name = req.Path
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := engine.ValidateName(name); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
e.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer e.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
@@ -830,6 +840,9 @@ func (e *CAEngine) handleIssue(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*engin
|
||||
if issuerName == "" {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ca: issuer name is required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := engine.ValidateName(issuerName); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
profileName, _ := req.Data["profile"].(string)
|
||||
if profileName == "" {
|
||||
@@ -922,6 +935,7 @@ func (e *CAEngine) handleIssue(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*engin
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ca: create leaf CSR: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
e.setProfileAIA(&profile)
|
||||
leafCert, err := profile.SignRequest(is.cert, csr, is.key)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ca: sign leaf cert: %w", err)
|
||||
@@ -1171,6 +1185,7 @@ func (e *CAEngine) handleRenew(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*engin
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ca: create renewal CSR: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
e.setProfileAIA(&profile)
|
||||
newCert, err := profile.SignRequest(is.cert, csr, is.key)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ca: sign renewal cert: %w", err)
|
||||
@@ -1238,6 +1253,9 @@ func (e *CAEngine) handleSignCSR(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*eng
|
||||
if issuerName == "" {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ca: issuer name is required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := engine.ValidateName(issuerName); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
csrPEM, _ := req.Data["csr_pem"].(string)
|
||||
if csrPEM == "" {
|
||||
@@ -1293,6 +1311,7 @@ func (e *CAEngine) handleSignCSR(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*eng
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
e.setProfileAIA(&profile)
|
||||
leafCert, err := profile.SignRequest(is.cert, csr, is.key)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ca: sign CSR: %w", err)
|
||||
@@ -1436,6 +1455,20 @@ func (e *CAEngine) handleDeleteCert(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*
|
||||
|
||||
// --- Helpers ---
|
||||
|
||||
// setProfileAIA populates the AIA (Authority Information Access) extension
|
||||
// URLs on the profile if external_url is configured. This allows clients
|
||||
// to discover the issuing CA certificate for chain building.
|
||||
func (e *CAEngine) setProfileAIA(profile *certgen.Profile) {
|
||||
if e.config.ExternalURL == "" {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
base := strings.TrimSuffix(e.config.ExternalURL, "/")
|
||||
mount := e.mountName()
|
||||
profile.IssuingCertificateURL = []string{
|
||||
base + "/v1/pki/" + mount + "/ca/chain",
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func defaultCAConfig() *CAConfig {
|
||||
return &CAConfig{
|
||||
Organization: "Metacircular",
|
||||
@@ -1461,6 +1494,9 @@ func mapToCAConfig(m map[string]interface{}, cfg *CAConfig) error {
|
||||
if v, ok := m["root_expiry"].(string); ok {
|
||||
cfg.RootExpiry = v
|
||||
}
|
||||
if v, ok := m["external_url"].(string); ok {
|
||||
cfg.ExternalURL = v
|
||||
}
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -29,11 +29,13 @@ func GetProfile(name string) (certgen.Profile, bool) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Return a copy so callers can modify.
|
||||
cp := certgen.Profile{
|
||||
IsCA: p.IsCA,
|
||||
PathLen: p.PathLen,
|
||||
Expiry: p.Expiry,
|
||||
KeyUse: make([]string, len(p.KeyUse)),
|
||||
ExtKeyUsages: make([]string, len(p.ExtKeyUsages)),
|
||||
IsCA: p.IsCA,
|
||||
PathLen: p.PathLen,
|
||||
Expiry: p.Expiry,
|
||||
KeyUse: make([]string, len(p.KeyUse)),
|
||||
ExtKeyUsages: make([]string, len(p.ExtKeyUsages)),
|
||||
OCSPServer: append([]string(nil), p.OCSPServer...),
|
||||
IssuingCertificateURL: append([]string(nil), p.IssuingCertificateURL...),
|
||||
}
|
||||
copy(cp.KeyUse, p.KeyUse)
|
||||
copy(cp.ExtKeyUsages, p.ExtKeyUsages)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ type CAConfig struct {
|
||||
Country string `json:"country,omitempty"`
|
||||
KeyAlgorithm string `json:"key_algorithm"`
|
||||
RootExpiry string `json:"root_expiry"`
|
||||
ExternalURL string `json:"external_url,omitempty"`
|
||||
KeySize int `json:"key_size"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -588,6 +588,9 @@ func (e *SSHCAEngine) handleUpdateProfile(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Reque
|
||||
if name == "" {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("sshca: name is required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := engine.ValidateName(name); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Load existing profile.
|
||||
profile, err := e.loadProfile(ctx, name)
|
||||
@@ -631,6 +634,9 @@ func (e *SSHCAEngine) handleGetProfile(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request)
|
||||
if name == "" {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("sshca: name is required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := engine.ValidateName(name); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
profile, err := e.loadProfile(ctx, name)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
@@ -697,6 +703,9 @@ func (e *SSHCAEngine) handleDeleteProfile(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Reque
|
||||
if name == "" {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("sshca: name is required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := engine.ValidateName(name); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check existence.
|
||||
if _, err := e.barrier.Get(ctx, e.mountPath+"profiles/"+name+".json"); err != nil {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -450,6 +450,9 @@ func (e *TransitEngine) handleDeleteKey(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request
|
||||
if name == "" {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("transit: name is required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := engine.ValidateName(name); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ks, ok := e.keys[name]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
@@ -498,6 +501,9 @@ func (e *TransitEngine) handleGetKey(_ context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*e
|
||||
if name == "" {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("transit: name is required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := engine.ValidateName(name); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ks, ok := e.keys[name]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
@@ -561,6 +567,9 @@ func (e *TransitEngine) handleRotateKey(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request
|
||||
if name == "" {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("transit: name is required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := engine.ValidateName(name); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ks, ok := e.keys[name]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
@@ -638,6 +647,9 @@ func (e *TransitEngine) handleUpdateKeyConfig(ctx context.Context, req *engine.R
|
||||
if name == "" {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("transit: name is required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := engine.ValidateName(name); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ks, ok := e.keys[name]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
@@ -684,6 +696,9 @@ func (e *TransitEngine) handleTrimKey(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request)
|
||||
if name == "" {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("transit: name is required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := engine.ValidateName(name); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ks, ok := e.keys[name]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
@@ -1290,6 +1305,9 @@ func (e *TransitEngine) handleGetPublicKey(_ context.Context, req *engine.Reques
|
||||
if keyName == "" {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("transit: name is required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := engine.ValidateName(keyName); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ks, ok := e.keys[keyName]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -212,6 +212,9 @@ func (e *UserEngine) handleRegister(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request) (*
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
username := req.CallerInfo.Username
|
||||
if err := engine.ValidateName(username); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: invalid username: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
e.mu.RLock()
|
||||
if u, ok := e.users[username]; ok {
|
||||
pubB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(u.pubKey.Bytes())
|
||||
@@ -302,6 +305,9 @@ func (e *UserEngine) handleGetPublicKey(_ context.Context, req *engine.Request)
|
||||
if username == "" {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: username is required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := engine.ValidateName(username); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
e.mu.RLock()
|
||||
defer e.mu.RUnlock()
|
||||
@@ -657,14 +663,16 @@ func (e *UserEngine) handleRotateKey(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request) (
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: rotate key: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Zeroize old key.
|
||||
oldRaw := oldState.privKey.Bytes()
|
||||
crypto.Zeroize(oldRaw)
|
||||
// Zeroize old key material and drop reference for GC.
|
||||
crypto.Zeroize(oldState.privBytes)
|
||||
oldState.privKey = nil
|
||||
oldState.privBytes = nil
|
||||
|
||||
// Update in-memory state.
|
||||
e.users[caller] = &userState{
|
||||
privKey: priv,
|
||||
pubKey: priv.PublicKey(),
|
||||
privKey: priv,
|
||||
privBytes: priv.Bytes(),
|
||||
pubKey: priv.PublicKey(),
|
||||
config: &UserKeyConfig{
|
||||
Algorithm: e.config.KeyAlgorithm,
|
||||
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
|
||||
@@ -692,6 +700,9 @@ func (e *UserEngine) handleDeleteUser(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request)
|
||||
if username == "" {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("user: username is required")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := engine.ValidateName(username); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
e.mu.Lock()
|
||||
defer e.mu.Unlock()
|
||||
@@ -701,9 +712,10 @@ func (e *UserEngine) handleDeleteUser(ctx context.Context, req *engine.Request)
|
||||
return nil, ErrUserNotFound
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Zeroize private key.
|
||||
oldRaw := oldState.privKey.Bytes()
|
||||
crypto.Zeroize(oldRaw)
|
||||
// Zeroize private key material and drop reference for GC.
|
||||
crypto.Zeroize(oldState.privBytes)
|
||||
oldState.privKey = nil
|
||||
oldState.privBytes = nil
|
||||
|
||||
// Delete from barrier.
|
||||
prefix := e.mountPath + "users/" + username + "/"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -29,6 +29,14 @@ func (es *engineServer) Mount(ctx context.Context, req *pb.MountRequest) (*pb.Mo
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Inject external_url into engine config if available and not already set.
|
||||
if config == nil {
|
||||
config = make(map[string]interface{})
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, ok := config["external_url"]; !ok && es.s.cfg.Server.ExternalURL != "" {
|
||||
config["external_url"] = es.s.cfg.Server.ExternalURL
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := es.s.engines.Mount(ctx, req.Name, engine.EngineType(req.Type), config); err != nil {
|
||||
es.s.logger.Error("grpc: mount engine", "name", req.Name, "type", req.Type, "error", err)
|
||||
switch {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ func newTestGRPCServer(t *testing.T) (*GRPCServer, func()) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("migrate: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
b := barrier.NewAESGCMBarrier(database)
|
||||
sealMgr := seal.NewManager(database, b, slog.Default())
|
||||
sealMgr := seal.NewManager(database, b, nil, slog.Default())
|
||||
policyEngine := policy.NewEngine(b)
|
||||
reg := newTestRegistry()
|
||||
authenticator := auth.NewAuthenticator(nil, slog.Default())
|
||||
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ func newTestGRPCServer(t *testing.T) (*GRPCServer, func()) {
|
||||
Argon2Threads: 1,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
srv := New(cfg, sealMgr, authenticator, policyEngine, reg, slog.Default())
|
||||
srv := New(cfg, sealMgr, authenticator, policyEngine, reg, nil, slog.Default())
|
||||
return srv, func() { _ = database.Close() }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package grpcserver
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"log/slog"
|
||||
"path"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
|
||||
"google.golang.org/grpc"
|
||||
@@ -10,6 +11,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
|
||||
"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
|
||||
|
||||
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/audit"
|
||||
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/auth"
|
||||
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/seal"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -97,6 +99,46 @@ func chainInterceptors(interceptors ...grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor) grpc.UnarySe
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// auditInterceptor logs an audit event after each RPC completes. Must run
|
||||
// after authInterceptor so that caller info is available in the context.
|
||||
func auditInterceptor(auditLog *audit.Logger) grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor {
|
||||
return func(ctx context.Context, req interface{}, info *grpc.UnaryServerInfo, handler grpc.UnaryHandler) (interface{}, error) {
|
||||
resp, err := handler(ctx, req)
|
||||
|
||||
caller := "anonymous"
|
||||
var roles []string
|
||||
if ti := tokenInfoFromContext(ctx); ti != nil {
|
||||
caller = ti.Username
|
||||
roles = ti.Roles
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
outcome := "success"
|
||||
var errMsg string
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
outcome = "error"
|
||||
if st, ok := status.FromError(err); ok {
|
||||
if st.Code() == codes.PermissionDenied || st.Code() == codes.Unauthenticated {
|
||||
outcome = "denied"
|
||||
}
|
||||
errMsg = st.Message()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
errMsg = err.Error()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
auditLog.Log(ctx, audit.Event{
|
||||
Caller: caller,
|
||||
Roles: roles,
|
||||
Operation: path.Base(info.FullMethod),
|
||||
Resource: info.FullMethod,
|
||||
Outcome: outcome,
|
||||
Error: errMsg,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
return resp, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func extractToken(ctx context.Context) string {
|
||||
md, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
|
||||
|
||||
pb "git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/gen/metacrypt/v2"
|
||||
internacme "git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/acme"
|
||||
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/audit"
|
||||
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/auth"
|
||||
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/config"
|
||||
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/engine"
|
||||
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ type GRPCServer struct {
|
||||
auth *auth.Authenticator
|
||||
policy *policy.Engine
|
||||
engines *engine.Registry
|
||||
audit *audit.Logger
|
||||
logger *slog.Logger
|
||||
srv *grpc.Server
|
||||
acmeHandlers map[string]*internacme.Handler
|
||||
@@ -35,13 +37,14 @@ type GRPCServer struct {
|
||||
|
||||
// New creates a new GRPCServer.
|
||||
func New(cfg *config.Config, sealMgr *seal.Manager, authenticator *auth.Authenticator,
|
||||
policyEngine *policy.Engine, engineRegistry *engine.Registry, logger *slog.Logger) *GRPCServer {
|
||||
policyEngine *policy.Engine, engineRegistry *engine.Registry, auditLog *audit.Logger, logger *slog.Logger) *GRPCServer {
|
||||
return &GRPCServer{
|
||||
cfg: cfg,
|
||||
sealMgr: sealMgr,
|
||||
auth: authenticator,
|
||||
policy: policyEngine,
|
||||
engines: engineRegistry,
|
||||
audit: auditLog,
|
||||
logger: logger,
|
||||
acmeHandlers: make(map[string]*internacme.Handler),
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -68,6 +71,7 @@ func (s *GRPCServer) Start() error {
|
||||
sealInterceptor(s.sealMgr, s.logger, sealRequiredMethods()),
|
||||
authInterceptor(s.auth, s.logger, authRequiredMethods()),
|
||||
adminInterceptor(s.logger, adminRequiredMethods()),
|
||||
auditInterceptor(s.audit),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
s.srv = grpc.NewServer(
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/audit"
|
||||
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/barrier"
|
||||
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/crypto"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ type Manager struct {
|
||||
lockoutUntil time.Time
|
||||
db *sql.DB
|
||||
barrier *barrier.AESGCMBarrier
|
||||
audit *audit.Logger
|
||||
logger *slog.Logger
|
||||
mek []byte
|
||||
state ServiceState
|
||||
@@ -62,10 +64,11 @@ type Manager struct {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewManager creates a new seal manager.
|
||||
func NewManager(db *sql.DB, b *barrier.AESGCMBarrier, logger *slog.Logger) *Manager {
|
||||
func NewManager(db *sql.DB, b *barrier.AESGCMBarrier, auditLog *audit.Logger, logger *slog.Logger) *Manager {
|
||||
return &Manager{
|
||||
db: db,
|
||||
barrier: b,
|
||||
audit: auditLog,
|
||||
logger: logger,
|
||||
state: StateUninitialized,
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -223,6 +226,10 @@ func (m *Manager) Unseal(password []byte) error {
|
||||
mek, err := crypto.Decrypt(kwk, encryptedMEK, nil)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
m.logger.Debug("unseal failed: invalid password")
|
||||
m.audit.Log(context.Background(), audit.Event{
|
||||
Caller: "operator", Operation: "unseal", Outcome: "denied",
|
||||
Error: "invalid password",
|
||||
})
|
||||
return ErrInvalidPassword
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -235,6 +242,9 @@ func (m *Manager) Unseal(password []byte) error {
|
||||
m.mek = mek
|
||||
m.state = StateUnsealed
|
||||
m.unsealAttempts = 0
|
||||
m.audit.Log(context.Background(), audit.Event{
|
||||
Caller: "operator", Operation: "unseal", Outcome: "success",
|
||||
})
|
||||
m.logger.Debug("unseal succeeded, barrier unsealed")
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -340,6 +350,9 @@ func (m *Manager) Seal() error {
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ = m.barrier.Seal()
|
||||
m.state = StateSealed
|
||||
m.audit.Log(context.Background(), audit.Event{
|
||||
Caller: "operator", Operation: "seal", Outcome: "success",
|
||||
})
|
||||
m.logger.Debug("service sealed")
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ func setupSeal(t *testing.T) (*Manager, func()) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("migrate: %v", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
b := barrier.NewAESGCMBarrier(database)
|
||||
mgr := NewManager(database, b, slog.Default())
|
||||
mgr := NewManager(database, b, nil, slog.Default())
|
||||
return mgr, func() { _ = database.Close() }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ func TestSealCheckInitializedPersists(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
database, _ := db.Open(dbPath)
|
||||
_ = db.Migrate(database)
|
||||
b := barrier.NewAESGCMBarrier(database)
|
||||
mgr := NewManager(database, b, slog.Default())
|
||||
mgr := NewManager(database, b, nil, slog.Default())
|
||||
_ = mgr.CheckInitialized()
|
||||
params := crypto.Argon2Params{Time: 1, Memory: 64 * 1024, Threads: 1}
|
||||
_ = mgr.Initialize(context.Background(), []byte("password"), params)
|
||||
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ func TestSealCheckInitializedPersists(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
database2, _ := db.Open(dbPath)
|
||||
defer func() { _ = database2.Close() }()
|
||||
b2 := barrier.NewAESGCMBarrier(database2)
|
||||
mgr2 := NewManager(database2, b2, slog.Default())
|
||||
mgr2 := NewManager(database2, b2, nil, slog.Default())
|
||||
_ = mgr2.CheckInitialized()
|
||||
if mgr2.State() != StateSealed {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("state after reopen: got %v, want Sealed", mgr2.State())
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
|
||||
|
||||
mcias "git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/clients/go"
|
||||
|
||||
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/audit"
|
||||
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/auth"
|
||||
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/barrier"
|
||||
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/crypto"
|
||||
@@ -286,6 +287,14 @@ func (s *Server) handleEngineMount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Inject external_url into CA engine config if available and not already set.
|
||||
if req.Config == nil {
|
||||
req.Config = make(map[string]interface{})
|
||||
}
|
||||
if _, ok := req.Config["external_url"]; !ok && s.cfg.Server.ExternalURL != "" {
|
||||
req.Config["external_url"] = s.cfg.Server.ExternalURL
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := s.engines.Mount(r.Context(), req.Name, engine.EngineType(req.Type), req.Config); err != nil {
|
||||
s.logger.Error("mount engine", "name", req.Name, "type", req.Type, "error", err)
|
||||
writeJSONError(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
|
||||
@@ -435,10 +444,16 @@ func (s *Server) handleEngineRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
||||
case strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found"):
|
||||
status = http.StatusNotFound
|
||||
}
|
||||
outcome := "error"
|
||||
if status == http.StatusForbidden || status == http.StatusUnauthorized {
|
||||
outcome = "denied"
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.auditOp(r, info, req.Operation, "", req.Mount, outcome, nil, err)
|
||||
writeJSONError(w, err.Error(), status)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
s.auditOp(r, info, req.Operation, "", req.Mount, "success", nil, nil)
|
||||
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp.Data)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1317,6 +1332,24 @@ func writeJSONError(w http.ResponseWriter, msg string, status int) {
|
||||
writeJSON(w, status, map[string]string{"error": msg})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// auditOp logs an audit event for a completed engine operation.
|
||||
func (s *Server) auditOp(r *http.Request, info *auth.TokenInfo,
|
||||
op, engineType, mount, outcome string, detail map[string]interface{}, err error) {
|
||||
e := audit.Event{
|
||||
Caller: info.Username,
|
||||
Roles: info.Roles,
|
||||
Operation: op,
|
||||
Engine: engineType,
|
||||
Mount: mount,
|
||||
Outcome: outcome,
|
||||
Detail: detail,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
e.Error = err.Error()
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.audit.Log(r.Context(), e)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newPolicyChecker builds a PolicyChecker closure for a caller, used by typed
|
||||
// REST handlers to pass service-level policy evaluation into the engine.
|
||||
func (s *Server) newPolicyChecker(r *http.Request, info *auth.TokenInfo) engine.PolicyChecker {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import (
|
||||
"google.golang.org/grpc"
|
||||
|
||||
internacme "git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/acme"
|
||||
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/audit"
|
||||
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/auth"
|
||||
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/config"
|
||||
"git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/metacrypt/internal/engine"
|
||||
@@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ type Server struct {
|
||||
auth *auth.Authenticator
|
||||
policy *policy.Engine
|
||||
engines *engine.Registry
|
||||
audit *audit.Logger
|
||||
httpSrv *http.Server
|
||||
grpcSrv *grpc.Server
|
||||
logger *slog.Logger
|
||||
@@ -38,13 +40,14 @@ type Server struct {
|
||||
|
||||
// New creates a new server.
|
||||
func New(cfg *config.Config, sealMgr *seal.Manager, authenticator *auth.Authenticator,
|
||||
policyEngine *policy.Engine, engineRegistry *engine.Registry, logger *slog.Logger, version string) *Server {
|
||||
policyEngine *policy.Engine, engineRegistry *engine.Registry, auditLog *audit.Logger, logger *slog.Logger, version string) *Server {
|
||||
s := &Server{
|
||||
cfg: cfg,
|
||||
seal: sealMgr,
|
||||
auth: authenticator,
|
||||
policy: policyEngine,
|
||||
engines: engineRegistry,
|
||||
audit: auditLog,
|
||||
logger: logger,
|
||||
version: version,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ func setupTestServer(t *testing.T) (*Server, *seal.Manager, chi.Router) {
|
||||
_ = db.Migrate(database)
|
||||
|
||||
b := barrier.NewAESGCMBarrier(database)
|
||||
sealMgr := seal.NewManager(database, b, slog.Default())
|
||||
sealMgr := seal.NewManager(database, b, nil, slog.Default())
|
||||
_ = sealMgr.CheckInitialized()
|
||||
|
||||
// Auth requires MCIAS client which we can't create in tests easily,
|
||||
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ func setupTestServer(t *testing.T) (*Server, *seal.Manager, chi.Router) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
logger := slog.Default()
|
||||
srv := New(cfg, sealMgr, authenticator, policyEngine, engineRegistry, logger, "test")
|
||||
srv := New(cfg, sealMgr, authenticator, policyEngine, engineRegistry, nil, logger, "test")
|
||||
|
||||
r := chi.NewRouter()
|
||||
srv.registerRoutes(r)
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user