CSRF: Replace local csrfProtect with mcdsl/csrf.Protect. Delete
internal/webserver/csrf.go.
Web: Replace renderTemplate with web.RenderTemplate + csrf.TemplateFunc.
Replace extractCookie with web.GetSessionToken. Replace manual session
cookie SetCookie with web.SetSessionCookie.
Snapshot: Replace local sqliteBackup with mcdsl/db.Snapshot.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Web UI: Added browser-based management for all three remaining engines
(SSH CA, Transit, User E2E). Includes gRPC client wiring, handler files,
7 HTML templates, dashboard mount forms, and conditional navigation links.
Fixed REST API routes to match design specs (SSH CA cert singular paths,
Transit PATCH for update-key-config).
Security audit: Conducted full-system audit covering crypto core, all
engine implementations, API servers, policy engine, auth, deployment,
and documentation. Identified 42 new findings (#39-#80) across all
severity levels.
Remediation of all 8 High findings:
- #68: Replaced 14 JSON-injection-vulnerable error responses with safe
json.Encoder via writeJSONError helper
- #48: Added two-layer path traversal defense (barrier validatePath
rejects ".." segments; engine ValidateName enforces safe name pattern)
- #39: Extended RLock through entire crypto operations in barrier
Get/Put/Delete/List to eliminate TOCTOU race with Seal
- #40: Unified ReWrapKeys and seal_config UPDATE into single SQLite
transaction to prevent irrecoverable data loss on crash during MEK
rotation
- #49: Added resolveTTL to CA engine enforcing issuer MaxTTL ceiling
on handleIssue and handleSignCSR
- #61: Store raw ECDH private key bytes in userState for effective
zeroization on Seal
- #62: Fixed user engine policy resource path from mountPath to
mountName() so policy rules match correctly
- #69: Added newPolicyChecker helper and passed service-level policy
evaluation to all 25 typed REST handler engine.Request structs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implement a two-level key hierarchy: the MEK now wraps per-engine DEKs
stored in a new barrier_keys table, rather than encrypting all barrier
entries directly. A v2 ciphertext format (0x02) embeds the key ID so the
barrier can resolve which DEK to use on decryption. v1 ciphertext remains
supported for backward compatibility.
Key changes:
- crypto: EncryptV2/DecryptV2/ExtractKeyID for v2 ciphertext with key IDs
- barrier: key registry (CreateKey, RotateKey, ListKeys, MigrateToV2, ReWrapKeys)
- seal: RotateMEK re-wraps DEKs without re-encrypting data
- engine: Mount auto-creates per-engine DEK
- REST + gRPC: barrier/keys, barrier/rotate-mek, barrier/rotate-key, barrier/migrate
- proto: BarrierService (v1 + v2) with ListKeys, RotateMEK, RotateKey, Migrate
- db: migration v2 adds barrier_keys table
Also includes: security audit report, CSRF protection, engine design specs
(sshca, transit, user), path-bound AAD migration tool, policy engine
enhancements, and ARCHITECTURE.md updates.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Register handleSignCSR route in webserver (was dead code)
- Add GET /v1/pki/{mount}/issuer/{name}/crl REST endpoint and
PKIService.GetCRL gRPC RPC for DER-encoded CRL generation
- Replace admin-only gates on issue/renew/sign-csr with policy-based
access control: admins grant-all, authenticated users subject to
identifier ownership (CN/SANs not held by another user's active cert)
and optional policy overrides via ca/{mount}/id/{identifier} resources
- Add PolicyChecker to engine.Request and policy.Match() method to
distinguish matched rules from default deny
- Update and expand CA engine tests for ownership, revocation freeing,
and policy override scenarios
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add PUT /v1/policy/rule endpoint for updating policy rules; expose
full policy CRUD through the web UI with a dedicated policy page
- Add certificate revoke, delete, and get-cert to CA engine and wire
REST + gRPC routes; fix missing interceptor registrations
- Update ARCHITECTURE.md to reflect v2 gRPC as the active implementation,
document ACME endpoints, correct CA permission levels, and add policy/cert
management route tables
- Add POLICY.md documenting the priority-based ACL engine design
- Add web/templates/policy.html for policy management UI
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
SameSite=Strict prevents the browser from sending the auth cookie when
following a redirect from a cross-context POST (form submission) to a
GET. Changing to SameSite=Lax allows the cookie to be sent on top-level
navigations (including redirects), so the /pki/download/{token} handler
receives the auth cookie and serves the tgz.
Co-authored-by: Junie <junie@jetbrains.com>
Instead of streaming the tgz directly to the response (which was
fragile under server write timeouts), handleIssueCert now:
- Builds the tgz into a bytes.Buffer
- Stores it in a sync.Map (tgzCache) under a random 16-byte hex token
- Redirects the browser to /pki/download/{token}
handleTGZDownload serves the cached bytes via LoadAndDelete, so the
archive is removed from memory after the first (and only) download.
An unknown or already-used token returns 404.
Also adds TestHandleTGZDownload covering the one-time-use and
not-found cases, and wires issueCertFn into mockVault.
Co-authored-by: Junie <junie@jetbrains.com>
RevokeCert and DeleteCert were not registered in sealRequired, authRequired,
or adminRequired method sets, so the auth interceptor never ran for those
calls and CallerInfo arrived as nil, producing "authentication required".
SignCSR had the same gap in sealRequired and authRequired.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Admins can now revoke or delete certificate records from the cert detail
page in the web UI. Revoked certificates display a [REVOKED] badge and
show revocation metadata (time and actor). Deletion redirects to the
issuer page.
The REST API gains three new authenticated endpoints that mirror the
gRPC surface:
GET /v1/ca/{mount}/cert/{serial} (auth required)
POST /v1/ca/{mount}/cert/{serial}/revoke (admin only)
DELETE /v1/ca/{mount}/cert/{serial} (admin only)
The CA engine stores revocation state (revoked, revoked_at, revoked_by)
directly in the existing CertRecord barrier entry. The proto CertRecord
message is extended with the same three fields (field numbers 10–12).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add SignCSR RPC to v2 CA proto and regenerate; implement handleSignCSR
in CA engine and caServer gRPC layer; add SignCSR client method and
POST /pki/sign-csr web route with result display in pki.html
- Fix issuer detail cert listing: template was using map-style index on
CertSummary structs; switch to struct field access and populate
IssuedBy/IssuedAt fields from proto response
- Add certificate detail view (cert_detail.html) with GET /cert/{serial}
and GET /cert/{serial}/download routes
- Update Makefile proto target to generate both v1 and v2 protos
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The vault server holds in-memory unsealed state (KEK, engine keys) that
is lost on restart, requiring a full unseal ceremony. Previously the web
UI ran inside the vault process, so any UI change forced a restart and
re-unseal.
This change extracts the web UI into a separate metacrypt-web binary
that communicates with the vault over an authenticated gRPC connection.
The web server carries no sealed state and can be restarted freely.
- gen/metacrypt/v1/: generated Go bindings from proto/metacrypt/v1/
- internal/grpcserver/: full gRPC server implementation (System, Auth,
Engine, PKI, Policy, ACME services) with seal/auth/admin interceptors
- internal/webserver/: web server with gRPC vault client; templates
embedded via web/embed.go (no runtime web/ directory needed)
- cmd/metacrypt-web/: standalone binary entry point
- internal/config: added [web] section (listen_addr, vault_grpc, etc.)
- internal/server/routes.go: removed all web UI routes and handlers
- cmd/metacrypt/server.go: starts gRPC server alongside HTTP server
- Deploy: Dockerfile builds both binaries, docker-compose adds
metacrypt-web service, new metacrypt-web.service systemd unit,
Makefile gains proto/metacrypt-web targets
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
