- db.Open: delegate to mcdsl/db.Open
- db.Migrate: convert to mcdsl/db.Migration format, delegate
- auth: type aliases for TokenInfo/Authenticator/Config from mcdsl,
re-export error sentinels, Logout helper
- cmd/server: construct auth.Authenticator from Config (not mcias.Client)
- server/routes.go logout: use auth.Logout(authenticator, token)
- grpcserver/auth.go: same logout pattern, fix Login return type
(time.Time not string)
- webserver: replace mcias.Client with mcdsl/auth for service token
validation; resolveUser degrades to raw UUID (TODO: restore when
mcias client library is properly tagged)
- Dockerfiles: bump to golang:1.25-alpine, remove gcc/musl-dev,
add VERSION build arg
- Deploy: add docker-compose-rift.yml with localhost-only port mapping
- Remove git.wntrmute.dev/kyle/mcias/clients/go dependency entirely
- All tests pass, net -185 lines
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Fix#61: handleRotateKey and handleDeleteUser now zeroize stored
privBytes instead of calling Bytes() (which returns a copy). New
state populates privBytes; old references nil'd for GC.
- Add audit logging subsystem (internal/audit) with structured event
recording for cryptographic operations.
- Add audit log engine spec (engines/auditlog.md).
- Add ValidateName checks across all engines for path traversal (#48).
- Update AUDIT.md: all High findings resolved (0 open).
- Add REMEDIATION.md with detailed remediation tracking.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Web UI: Added browser-based management for all three remaining engines
(SSH CA, Transit, User E2E). Includes gRPC client wiring, handler files,
7 HTML templates, dashboard mount forms, and conditional navigation links.
Fixed REST API routes to match design specs (SSH CA cert singular paths,
Transit PATCH for update-key-config).
Security audit: Conducted full-system audit covering crypto core, all
engine implementations, API servers, policy engine, auth, deployment,
and documentation. Identified 42 new findings (#39-#80) across all
severity levels.
Remediation of all 8 High findings:
- #68: Replaced 14 JSON-injection-vulnerable error responses with safe
json.Encoder via writeJSONError helper
- #48: Added two-layer path traversal defense (barrier validatePath
rejects ".." segments; engine ValidateName enforces safe name pattern)
- #39: Extended RLock through entire crypto operations in barrier
Get/Put/Delete/List to eliminate TOCTOU race with Seal
- #40: Unified ReWrapKeys and seal_config UPDATE into single SQLite
transaction to prevent irrecoverable data loss on crash during MEK
rotation
- #49: Added resolveTTL to CA engine enforcing issuer MaxTTL ceiling
on handleIssue and handleSignCSR
- #61: Store raw ECDH private key bytes in userState for effective
zeroization on Seal
- #62: Fixed user engine policy resource path from mountPath to
mountName() so policy rules match correctly
- #69: Added newPolicyChecker helper and passed service-level policy
evaluation to all 25 typed REST handler engine.Request structs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add complete transit engine supporting symmetric encryption (AES-256-GCM,
XChaCha20-Poly1305), asymmetric signing (Ed25519, ECDSA P-256/P-384),
and HMAC (SHA-256/SHA-512) with versioned key rotation, min decryption
version enforcement, key trimming, batch operations, and rewrap.
Includes proto definitions, gRPC handlers, REST routes, and comprehensive
tests covering all 18 operations, auth enforcement, and edge cases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements the complete user engine for multi-recipient envelope encryption:
- ECDH key agreement (X25519, P-256, P-384) with HKDF-derived wrapping keys
- Per-message random DEK wrapped individually for each recipient
- 9 operations: register, provision, get-public-key, list-users, encrypt,
decrypt, re-encrypt, rotate-key, delete-user
- Auto-provisioning of sender and recipients on encrypt
- Role-based authorization (admin-only provision/delete, user-only decrypt)
- gRPC UserService with proto definitions and REST API routes
- 16 comprehensive tests covering lifecycle, crypto roundtrips, multi-recipient,
key rotation, auth enforcement, and algorithm variants
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implement the complete SSH CA engine following the CA engine pattern:
- Engine core (initialize, unseal, seal, HandleRequest) with ed25519/ecdsa key support
- Host and user certificate signing with TTL enforcement and policy checks
- Signing profiles with extensions, critical options, and principal restrictions
- Certificate CRUD (list, get, revoke, delete) with proper auth enforcement
- OpenSSH KRL generation rebuilt on revoke/delete operations
- gRPC service (SSHCAService) with all RPCs and interceptor registration
- REST routes for public endpoints (CA pubkey, KRL) and authenticated operations
- Comprehensive test suite (15 tests covering lifecycle, signing, profiles, KRL, auth)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implement a two-level key hierarchy: the MEK now wraps per-engine DEKs
stored in a new barrier_keys table, rather than encrypting all barrier
entries directly. A v2 ciphertext format (0x02) embeds the key ID so the
barrier can resolve which DEK to use on decryption. v1 ciphertext remains
supported for backward compatibility.
Key changes:
- crypto: EncryptV2/DecryptV2/ExtractKeyID for v2 ciphertext with key IDs
- barrier: key registry (CreateKey, RotateKey, ListKeys, MigrateToV2, ReWrapKeys)
- seal: RotateMEK re-wraps DEKs without re-encrypting data
- engine: Mount auto-creates per-engine DEK
- REST + gRPC: barrier/keys, barrier/rotate-mek, barrier/rotate-key, barrier/migrate
- proto: BarrierService (v1 + v2) with ListKeys, RotateMEK, RotateKey, Migrate
- db: migration v2 adds barrier_keys table
Also includes: security audit report, CSRF protection, engine design specs
(sshca, transit, user), path-bound AAD migration tool, policy engine
enhancements, and ARCHITECTURE.md updates.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Register handleSignCSR route in webserver (was dead code)
- Add GET /v1/pki/{mount}/issuer/{name}/crl REST endpoint and
PKIService.GetCRL gRPC RPC for DER-encoded CRL generation
- Replace admin-only gates on issue/renew/sign-csr with policy-based
access control: admins grant-all, authenticated users subject to
identifier ownership (CN/SANs not held by another user's active cert)
and optional policy overrides via ca/{mount}/id/{identifier} resources
- Add PolicyChecker to engine.Request and policy.Match() method to
distinguish matched rules from default deny
- Update and expand CA engine tests for ownership, revocation freeing,
and policy override scenarios
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add PUT /v1/policy/rule endpoint for updating policy rules; expose
full policy CRUD through the web UI with a dedicated policy page
- Add certificate revoke, delete, and get-cert to CA engine and wire
REST + gRPC routes; fix missing interceptor registrations
- Update ARCHITECTURE.md to reflect v2 gRPC as the active implementation,
document ACME endpoints, correct CA permission levels, and add policy/cert
management route tables
- Add POLICY.md documenting the priority-based ACL engine design
- Add web/templates/policy.html for policy management UI
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Admins can now revoke or delete certificate records from the cert detail
page in the web UI. Revoked certificates display a [REVOKED] badge and
show revocation metadata (time and actor). Deletion redirects to the
issuer page.
The REST API gains three new authenticated endpoints that mirror the
gRPC surface:
GET /v1/ca/{mount}/cert/{serial} (auth required)
POST /v1/ca/{mount}/cert/{serial}/revoke (admin only)
DELETE /v1/ca/{mount}/cert/{serial} (admin only)
The CA engine stores revocation state (revoked, revoked_at, revoked_by)
directly in the existing CertRecord barrier entry. The proto CertRecord
message is extended with the same three fields (field numbers 10–12).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The vault server holds in-memory unsealed state (KEK, engine keys) that
is lost on restart, requiring a full unseal ceremony. Previously the web
UI ran inside the vault process, so any UI change forced a restart and
re-unseal.
This change extracts the web UI into a separate metacrypt-web binary
that communicates with the vault over an authenticated gRPC connection.
The web server carries no sealed state and can be restarted freely.
- gen/metacrypt/v1/: generated Go bindings from proto/metacrypt/v1/
- internal/grpcserver/: full gRPC server implementation (System, Auth,
Engine, PKI, Policy, ACME services) with seal/auth/admin interceptors
- internal/webserver/: web server with gRPC vault client; templates
embedded via web/embed.go (no runtime web/ directory needed)
- cmd/metacrypt-web/: standalone binary entry point
- internal/config: added [web] section (listen_addr, vault_grpc, etc.)
- internal/server/routes.go: removed all web UI routes and handlers
- cmd/metacrypt/server.go: starts gRPC server alongside HTTP server
- Deploy: Dockerfile builds both binaries, docker-compose adds
metacrypt-web service, new metacrypt-web.service systemd unit,
Makefile gains proto/metacrypt-web targets
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements the SystemService gRPC endpoint (Status, Init, Unseal, Seal)
alongside the existing REST API, secured with the same TLS certificate.
The `metacrypt unseal` CLI command now prefers gRPC when --grpc-addr is
provided, falling back to the REST API via --addr. Both transports require
TLS; a custom CA certificate can be supplied with --ca-cert.
Server changes:
- internal/server/grpc.go: SystemServiceServer implementation with
StartGRPC/ShutdownGRPC methods; uses the TLS cert from config.
- internal/server/server.go: adds grpcSrv field and grpc import.
- cmd/metacrypt/server.go: starts gRPC goroutine when grpc_addr is set
in config, shuts it down on signal.
Generated code (from proto/metacrypt/v1/system.proto):
- gen/metacrypt/v1/system.pb.go: protobuf message types
- gen/metacrypt/v1/system_grpc.pb.go: gRPC client/server stubs
Dependencies added to go.mod (run `go mod tidy` to populate go.sum):
- google.golang.org/grpc v1.71.1
- google.golang.org/protobuf v1.36.5
- google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/rpc (indirect)
- golang.org/x/net (indirect)
https://claude.ai/code/session_013m1QXGoTB4jaPUN5gwir8F
- Add Registry.UnsealAll() that rediscovers mounted engines from the
barrier on unseal, using stored metadata at engine/_mounts/ with a
fallback discovery scan for pre-existing mounts (migration path)
- Registry.Mount() now persists mount metadata to the barrier;
Registry.Unmount() cleans it up
- Call UnsealAll() from both REST and web unseal handlers
- Change Unmount() signature to accept context.Context
- Default CA key size changed from P-384 to P-521
- Add build-time version stamp via ldflags; display in dashboard status bar
- Make metacrypt target .PHONY so make devserver always rebuilds
- Redirect /pki to /dashboard when no CA engine is mounted
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add ARCHITECTURE.md with full system specification
- Add Project Structure and API Sync Rule to CLAUDE.md; ignore srv/
- Fix engine.proto MountRequest missing config field
- Add pki.proto PKIService to match unauthenticated REST PKI routes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add the first concrete engine implementation: a CA (PKI) engine that generates
a self-signed root CA at mount time, issues scoped intermediate CAs ("issuers"),
and signs leaf certificates using configurable profiles (server, client, peer).
Engine framework updates:
- Add CallerInfo struct for auth context in engine requests
- Add config parameter to Engine.Initialize for mount-time configuration
- Export Mount.Engine field; add GetEngine/GetMount on Registry
CA engine (internal/engine/ca/):
- Two-tier PKI: root CA → issuers → leaf certificates
- 10 operations: get-root, get-chain, get-issuer, create/delete/list issuers,
issue, get-cert, list-certs, renew
- Certificate profiles with user-overridable TTL, key usages, and key algorithm
- Private keys never stored in barrier; zeroized from memory on seal
- Supports ECDSA, RSA, and Ed25519 key types via goutils/certlib/certgen
Server routes:
- Wire up engine mount/request handlers (replace Phase 1 stubs)
- Add public PKI routes (/v1/pki/{mount}/ca, /ca/chain, /issuer/{name})
for unauthenticated TLS trust bootstrapping
Also includes: ARCHITECTURE.md, deploy config updates, operational tooling.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
